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This thesis concerns the development of a family of normative multiple attribute decision 
analysis models, which owe their inspiration to the ideas of Data Envelopment Analysis, 
and which are styled by the acronym DORA-D. Their use has been put in the particular 
context of the cognitive facility of decision makers and, in particular, the argued impairment 
of decision makers across a range of decision related skills. These include the ability to 
articulate objectives, the ability to discriminate and the lability of preference and value, the 
ability to compute value, the ability to express preference between choices with variation in 
several attributes and to trade-off differences, and facility with cardinal probability.
Although, the approach developed can accommodate a range of methods of value 
elicitation, the author has been concerned that it can accommodate minimalist assumptions 
of facility. The use of the ideas of Evolutionary Psychology as a "touchstone" for judging and 
balancing these assumptions, is examined.
The style of the work is one of a personal exploration, based on a personal problem, the 
author's own investment decision making. However, his preoccupation has been with the 
development of devices, and the adoption of different perspectives to decision analysis 
problems, which are useful to other analysts on a broad range of problems, and which can 
be taken further by other researchers. Various extensions to the technique and 
supplementary devices, some of which may be useful in association with other decision 
aids, are suggested. These include the concept of Fundamentally Decomposed Preference, 
and a simplified approach to the analysis of configural problems.
Various simulations, testing the efficacy of alternative elicitation mechanics in association 
with the techniques, are reported.
Key Words
decision analysis; multiple attributes; data envelopment analysis; principles of modelling; 
objectives; preference; value; value function; value lability; evolutionary psychology; 
cognition; rationality; linear programming; non-linear programming; portfolio analysis; 
modem portfolio theory; decomposition; efficiency; problem structuring; configurality; 
prudential algebra.
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Is not less preferred than or Is weakly preferred to
>- Is strictly preferred to
~ Is indifferent between or Is of equal value to
[m,n] choice A binary pair of choices where m+n attributes differ between the two 
choices and one choice is superior with respect to m attributes and the 
other choice superior with respect to the other n attributes. The special case 
of 11,1] choice is also referred to as Fundamentally Decomposed Choice.
adaptation Principally used with its biological/EP meaning: that is the process by which 
generations of an organism become better suited to their environment by 
natural selection, or a function, feature or trait generated by such process.
ancestral environment The environment in which the mental facilities of the human mind evolved 
beyond those of other primates, to its present competence. More formally, 
the Environment of Evolutionaiy Adaptation. Corresponds to the 
Pleistocene (2mya) and before, up to the Neolithic period (10,000 ya) by 
which it is sometimes stylised here.
Attribute A quantitatively measurable or classifiable property of a decision option or 




BDC. An artificial or virtual choice defined by magnitudes of attributes of a 
set of efficient options. The BDC is defined by a set of attribute magnitudes 
(monotonically increasing with decision "goodness") such that each attribute 
magnitude is at the maximum value consistent with it being dominated by 
all specified efficient options. The vector of nadir attribute values.
Beta A measure of non-diversifiable risk, reflecting the degree to which the risk 
associated with an individual investment is correlated with the risk of a 
"portfolio" consisting of all investments in the market.
BPL Best Possible Light
CAF Comparative Advantage Function. The value function that gives rise to the 
MCA. It is the Value Function that shows an option in its Best Possible 
Light.
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model
CCR The Chames, Cooper, Rhodes DEA model
Choice 1. A set of Attributes not necessarily corresponding to an Option but which 
can be valued, or over which a decision maker can express a preference 
relative to another Choice. A Choice in this use has the same characteristics 
as an Option but may be an artificial and not directly implementable 
package of attributes.
2. A binary pair or set of Choices over which an expression of preference is 
sought.
Comparison Set The set of options or choices that are explicitly included in analyses to 
define Frontier Constraints, which constrain the value function or to limit the 
CAF of an option under evaluation. Frequently the option under evaluation 
is excluded from the Comparison Set. Options that are already established 
as not potentially optimal may be excluded from the Comparison Set to 
speed LP execution, or to minimise distortions if mildly mis-specified non­
linear valuation is treated as linear.
Complexity Indicator A binary pair of integers [m,n] describing the number of attributes differing 
for a pair of choices. See [m,n] choice.
Configurality 1 .The dependence of preference and decision value on the inter­
relationship or configuration of attribute values not just independent 
magnitudes; embradng Conjunctive and Disjunctive decision making and 
"cross-product" interactions.
2. The value of the parameter r in the General Configural Model.
vHi
Criterion Space The domain defined by the parameters of a value function. In a linear model 
relating attributes to value, it is the hyperspace defining all possible 
weights of the attributes. There is a mapping between Criterion Space and 
the "hypersurface" of Decision Space containing efficient options, insofar as 
a point in Criterion Space will define an efficient option. However, a specific 
efficient option will correspond to a region within Criterion Space, not 
generally a point.
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis.
Decision Maker A person or group of people with the authority to select an option and 
whose values, or interpretation of other stakeholders' values, determine the 
selection that is made. The term embraces all groups of people involved in 
collective consideration of decisions and includes committees, Boards, and 
situations in which one person or group of people make proposals to 
another. In ail instances such a group is considered as a single entity 
ultimately having or behaving as if it had a single mind. This thesis does not 
concern itself dynamics of such groups or with preference conflict 
resolution within them, treating them as a black box. Singular pronouns are 
invariably used, whilst recognising that only exceptionally is a decision 
exclusively made by one person.
Decision Space That hyperspace defined by feasible decision attribute values, in the case of 
discrete alternatives it is the convex hull containing all feasible options.
Decomposition The process by which a single Option or group of Options may be 
translated into derivative Choices over which a Decision maker can more 
reliably express preferences in a manner which allows the selection of an 
Option or Reduction in the potentially optimal Options. Usually one or 
more Im,n] options are translated into choices of Reduced Order.
DORA-D Contracted acronym for Decision Option Reduction Analysis using concepts 
from Data Envelopment Analysis.
Efficient Peer ... of an inefficient option. The efficient option/s from amongst all efficient 
options that have the highest valuation when evaluated using the CAF of 
the inefficient option.
EP Evolutionary Psychology
Facet A group of efficient options or choices that can be simultaneously co- 




The derivation, from a pair of efficient choices, of a set of [s, 1 ] choices 
(where s is a low integer) over which preference may be expressed. Its 
suggested use in Dora-D is, thus far, confined to 11,1] decompositions. 
Distinguished from Larichev Decomposition.
Frontier Constraint A representation within a mathematical programming formulation that 
limits the coefficients or other parameters of a value function, arising from a 
requirement of Dora-D that no choice within the Comparison Set, or 
portfolio constructed therefrom, may within the method be assigned a 
value of greater than an arbitrary number (in this thesis, 1)
Frontier Probing A methodology for establishing value functions which would result in 
valuations of feasible portfolios which are not permitted though not yet 
prevented in the model, and specifying explicit constraints to avoid 
continuing violation. A metaphor for the process is that the existing 
constraint envelope or "frontier" is "probed" for violating situations and, 





FDC. A binary pair of choices (either existing or generated by 
decomposition) such that the value of all but two attributes are equal for 
both choices and where one choice is superior with respect to one attribute 
and the second choice is superior with respect to the other. Also classified 
as a [1,1] choice. Such choices are considered here to be potentially the 
most meaningful given the mental competencies of human decision 
makers.
Fundamentally Decomposed Preference, FDP, embraces the process.
General Configural 
Model
A valuation model in which attribute magnitudes are related to value by a 
model of the form ^ a . x *  a strategically equivalent valuation to that given
by the Minkowski metric V(X)  =  (5 'JCl)xir )1/r .
he, she, him, her, his, 
her
Generally I have sought to reflect that Decision Makers and Analysts are 
men and women. Occasionally, where I have felt that this would lead to 
clumsy communication, or inadvertently, 1 have used terms of either 
gender but in all instances a gender non-specific pronoun is implied, in 
illustrating some aspects of Evolutionaiy Psychology a sexual distinction, 
apparent from the context, is intended.
Holistic Integration The selection of a desired solution from decision options, after 
consideration of attributes of those options with intuitive or only limited 
conscious processing of the information available.
impaired, impairment Related to any general inability of the unaided human mind to comprehend 
or process information relevant to a decision. Does not imply abnormality.
Information Gain A measure of the reduction of option variety secured by analysis and 
preference elicitation, based on the number of remaining potentially 
optimum options compared with the original number of options. See 
Chapter 9 for definition.
Initial Option 
Reduction
The process, within the methodology developed here, by which all options 
are decreased to a sub-set of potentially optimal options, depending only 
or largely on information relating to the magnitudes of the attributes of the 




The derivation from a set of efficient options of a set of [1,1 ] choices over 
which preference may be expressed to enable the reduction in the efficient 
options.
Latitude That variation in the specification of a value function that can be sustained, 
without inconsistency with the explicit preferences of the decision maker. 
Within a linear programming model it can be operationalised as that 
portion of Criterion Space that is feasible with respect to preference 
constraints.
LP, NLP, MOLP, 
MIP, MP
Linear Programming, Non-Linear Programming, Multiple Objective Linear 
Programming, Mixed Integer Programming, Mathematical Programming
Maxima] Efficient 
Choice
A set of attribute magnitudes (monotonically increasing with decision 
"goodness"), where all attribute magnitudes correspond to those of the Best 
Dominated Choice for a specified set of efficient options with the exception 
of only one attribute. The magnitude of the excepted attribute is equal to 
the highest magnitude occurring for that attribute amongst the specified set 
of efficient options. Any binary pair of a set of Maximal Efficient Choices will 




Maximal Comparative Advantage. A valuation of an Option or Choice using 
that value function, of all those permitted within the valuation Latitude, 
which gives that Choice the highest value relative to the value of the best 
alternative Choice/s in the Comparison Set, measured using the same 
function. In this thesis the value of the best of the Comparison Set (usually 
excluding the option under consideration), is arbitrarily assigned a value of 
1. Also referred to as BPL valuation. Analogous to Efficiency or Super­
efficiency in DEA.
The suffix (AP) refers to "under Andersen-Petersen conditions" where the 
option under evaluation is explicitly excluded from the Comparison Set.
(OI) indicates that the option under evaluation is within the Comparison Set 
absolutely constraining the MCA tot.
Mechanic A particular process, device or procedure governing the form in which 
preference or value information is elidted from a dedsion maker and 
represented as constraints in an analytic model. It is ascribed specialist 
meaning in distinction from the more general term "mechanism".
Modified Minkowski 
Metric
The function used in the General Configural Model.
MPT Modem Portfolio Theory
Option An object, action or policy, defined by Attributes, that may be selected by a 
decision maker for implementation. Distinguished from Choice.
Performance Gain A measure of the expected value of remaining potentially optimum 
options, related to the value of the optimum and the value of all options. 
See Chapter 9 for definition.
Portfolio A dedsion defined by selections from inter-dependent sub-options where 
more than one such sub-option is required to be simultaneously selected.
Preference Bracketing The spedfication of an interval with respect to a variation in the magnitude, 
x, of one attribute A, given a spedfied alternative favourable movement, y, 
In a second attribute B, ceteris paribus, such that a dedsion maker is 
confident that he or she will prefer x to y for any x above the upper bound 
and will prefer y to x for any x below the lower bound.
Preference Constraint, 
Value Constraint
A representation within a mathematical programming formulation that 
limits the coeffidents or other parameters of a value function, constructed 
following the expression by a dedsion maker of a preference between 
Choices or Options, by an expression of relative value of Choices, or by 
arbitrary limitations on parameters reflective of a dedsion maker's 
intentions. Contrasted with Frontier Constraint.
Preferential
Independence
Here implies Mutual Preferential Independence unless otherwise stated. The 
property by which the preference for one choice over another, differing 
only in the magnitudes of a sub-set of attributes, is not affected by the 
magnitudes of the non-differing attributes.
Reason Process by which people assess information by connected thought, ie draw 
inferences by consdous deliberation.
Reduced Order, Higher 
Order
Reduced Order refers to the characteristic where a binary [m',n'l choice has 
m'<m and n'<n when compared with a choice dassified [m,n]. Higher order 
is the converse.
Reduction The process by which decision options are progressively shortlisted by 
exduding those which cannot be optima within constraints spedfied by a 
decision maker and incorporated in the analysis model.
Reference Set Those other options constraining the upper valuation of a particular option. 




A sub-set of all efficient options which, if it does not embrace the optimum 
option, embraces an option which a decision maker could not realistically 
be expected to distinguish from an optimum decision on value grounds, 
given his/her mental competencies and potential preference lability. It is a 
set such that at least one member has an MCA above a threshold level of 
meaningful distinction under all feasible CAFs.
Review group The set of shares considered by the writer for inclusion in his investment 
portfolio.
SEU Subjective(ly) Expected Utility.
spandrel A genetic concomitant of an adaptation not itself having adaptive value.
Strategic Equivalence ... of value functions. The property possessed by functions which give rise 
to the same ranking by value of all possible options and where all instances 




Stages after Initial Option Reduction by which options are further reduced 
on the basis of information relating to decision makers' preferences.
Test Complement Used in project portfolios only. A portfolio excluding all projects within the 
Test Portfolio and including all projects outside it.
Test Portfolio A starting portfolio used in the Frontier Probing Method of extended Dora- 
D and in forming Project Portfolios. The method seeks the efficient peer of 
such a portfolio, within a valuation latitude which is consistent with a 
decision maker's declared preferences and other pre-emptive constraints.
Vague of objectives. Being well understood but incompletely articulated; inexactly 
or only partially expressed in quantitative terms.
Value Constraint Any constraint limiting the Latitude of the Value Function. Contrasts with 
Frontier Constraints.
Value Function A function defining the value, or possible value, to a decision maker of an 
option or choice, in terms of the magnitudes of the attributes of the choice. 
Used in the thesis in preference to Utility.
Virtual Frontier 
Constraint
A Frontier Constraint that exists within the real problem but is not explicitly 
Included in the mathematical representation of the problem. In Frontier 
Probing it is a member of the set of unspecified constraints.
1A Dedsion Aid for Mef Neolithic Man 
and other Impaired Dedsion Makers 
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Objective, approach and origins
This thesis concerns the development o f a normative decision analysis technique, or 
rather an analytic technique w ithin the context o f an approach to  decision making. 
The aim o f the research that underlies it, was to find a novel integrated decision 
analysis methodology to enable a better decision making for certain types o f 
decision problem. Its emphasis was on problem structuring and model formulation, 
rather than the development o f mathematical theory or computational technique, at 
one end o f the spectrum, or embracing the wider, softer issues o f the process or 
systems o f decision making at the other. It depends on one and serves the other. It 
has the characteristic o f "hard methodology" but is based on the assumption that 
decision making is a soft process undertaken by real people w ith aims, values and 
insights but w ith lim ited facility to  process the information that is relevant.
The object was to  advance methodology, though the work described is "on a 
problem". It is problem centric and not technique oriented in the sense that it seeks 
to address methods o f solving real problems, but it is the methodology, not the 
specific problem, that is the focus o f the research. It is concerned w ith quantitative 
analysis methodology o f complex many-factor situations. It is not essentially 
concerned w ith exploring the mathematics o f decision taking, but the expression o f 
models and the exposition o f technique in the area involves mathematical syntax, 
and some arguments may be dependent on declared formal axioms and conjectures 
concerning the existence o f exploitable relationships. However, the formal 
mathematical approach o f theorem and proof is not part o f the core background o f 
the writer, nor in the spirit o f what is presented here. It is design, problem 
representation, or formulation, which is the principal concern. In this it rests most 
comfortably w ithin the discipline o f Operational Research.
It is the impression o f this writer, and no stronger claim is made, that the valid ity o f 
quantitative analytic tools developed by mathematical modellers for decision aid,
2have been particularly related to their mathematical coherence and conformity w ith 
axioms o f good (logically rational) decision making. There has, perhaps, been less 
attention paid to ensuring, on the one hand, that models do not make assumptions 
beyond inherent human capability (ie assuming as simple to comprehend that which 
is difficult) and, on the other, that they do not assume gratuitous complexity and 
sophistication in the ability o f the mind to  process decision information (eg, 
developing models o f unconscious process structure, which cannot be discerned in 
the conscious expressions by a decision maker o f his or her objectives and values). 
As Buchanan, Henig and Henig (1998) observe, " ..a t the centre o f the decision 
process lies the mind o f the decision maker". It is the decision maker s objectives, 
values, and, importantly, in my view, his or her frailties in the cognition and 
communication o f these, that in like manner should be at the centre o f the attention 
o f the modeller and aid designer. These observations w ill be discussed in detail later 
in the thesis.
In developing the approach described here, I have been particularly concerned w ith 
the valid ity o f model formulation and analytic technique in the context o f the 
competencies, in particular the cognitive facility, that people have to make 
decisions and to  analyse them. I set the techniques developed w ithin conservative, 
even m inimalist assumptions o f human facility, or rather, argued premises (though 
these remain capable o f accommodating higher levels o f competence should a 
decision maker or analyst feel that they can fruitfully adopt them or simply disagree 
w ith the assumptions). In seeking these premises I address some psychological 
issues and, in an attempt to articulate a unifying touchstone I make use o f some o f 
the ideas o f Evolutionary Psychology. As far as I am aware this has not been applied 
to the elucidation o f decision making skills before. I believe that this constitutes a 
rich vein o f research opportunity in its own right, perhaps a unifying glue, for 
illum inating a large volume o f disparate empirical research which addresses people's 
decision making. M y purpose remains far more modest; merely to provide a 
context for technique design.
Foremost amongst the ideas I question, is the concept o f the articulated hard 
quantitative objective or criteria (including hard m ultiple or alternative objectives). In 
this research, and in the techniques developed, I have taken the viewpoint that a 
decision maker w ill have a good qualitative understanding o f what he or she wishes
3to achieve and a tight grasp o f the (sometimes well quantified) decision factors or 
attributes contributing to the goodness or badness o f a decision. These are relevant 
to, but not wholly descriptive o f the objectives, and they relate to objectives 
through one-many and/or many-one connections. (This is in distinction from the 
viewpoint o f Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p34) who see an attribute as a measurement 
used to  represent an objective, that is, in one-one relationships). In the view  here, 
objectives are perceived as initia lly being vague (a word to which I w ill ascribe 
specialist meaning) and the decision process as being one in which an initia lly wide 
latitude o f hard valuation possibilities, consistent w ith the decision maker's declared 
preferences, are refined into a single quantified objective or value function, through 
the elucidation o f further preferences informed by the analysis. This process can be 
conceptualised as an inductive-deductive loop; deducing optimal decision 
candidates consistent w ith objective latitude, articulating preference, inducing 
reduced objective latitude, deducing a lesser list o f decision candidates etc.
This thesis is the product o f a personal exploration. It derives from, and was 
directed by, a particular and personal decision problem. I sought to  reveal, develop 
and invent by seeking solutions to the problem o f generating a portfolio o f shares to 
meet my personal needs. Although the case is specific to  me, I w ill suggest that it 
has a generic structure which could be exploited in other decision making situations 
inside and outside the financial portfolio area, and many features that can be 
exploited in m ultiple attribute selection problems generally.
In this exploration I adopted a dual persona. I was analyst or researcher but was 
also the decision maker. The nature o f the issues and techniques explored were 
motivated in part (and in common w ith most research) by a personal interest in 
exploring ideas, which m ight have usefulness. However, the quest for usefulness 
started from considerations o f personal meaningfulness to this researcher. 
Approaches, paradigms, and techniques, which provide insight to  me as a decision 
maker, are the unashamed source. Equally, whilst the task was to  find a "better 
way", this, in the first instance, was simply better for me as decision maker on my 
own problem.
O f course a subjective or private "better" would not o f itself advance "knowledge". It 
would if it were "better" for some objective reason; if  arguments o f general external 
va lid ity were to be advanced (for example, if it were quicker, more accurate,
4overcame criticisms made o f other methods, more philosophically complete etc.). 
But it m ight still do so even if  the reasons were to be internal to  the researcher ("I 
find it easier to relate to this than method X in this instance, though it does the 
same thing"). The personal or private perspective in the latter situation still 
constitutes a valid contribution to  public knowledge and an appropriate 
epistemology for technique development, unless it is argued that the researcher is 
likely to  be unique or unusual, either in the nature o f the problem addressed or in 
his skills and needs. I propose to the reader that the nature and structure o f the 
problems I w ill discuss here are not unusual and the approaches should find 
application elsewhere. It may also be that the decision-related cognitive 
competencies, or the lack o f them, that I attribute to  myself, may be seen as 
reasonable to  a reader, in that at least some others may share them. However, I 
nevertheless seek to avoid a self-indulgent specification, by triangulating 
introspection o f my behaviour and perceived decision related competencies as a 
manager, against my informal observation o f other managers over many years 
(though still a private test) and the declared touchstone developed from EP and 
other's empirical research (a viewable test). I seek to  establish at least a plausible 
basis o f assumption, that some others may be as I consider that I could be.
Another consequence o f the approach I adopt is that it deviates from one o f the 
traditions o f the OR paradigm; the separation o f the roles o f analyst-consultant from 
the decision-owner-client. This owes its origins and justification to history and the 
economic use o f skills rather than the needs o f academic validity. In wartime the 
decision intensity o f decision makers allowed no possibility that that they could do 
their own staff work, and their backgrounds were o f necessity such that they would 
not have the skills necessary to build or process mathematical models. Sixty years 
later some o f this argument remains but w ith diminished force. Managers have 
increasing fam iliarity w ith the process o f model building and off-the-shelf tools are 
available to assist their solution; though it remains the case that the work load o f the 
makers o f important decisions w ill still not usually allow them the luxury o f working 
up the analysis. However, in this respect OR is no different from any other 
specialisation. A  Chief Executive drawn from a financial background w ill likely 
employ accountants to analyse situations on which he seeks to  formulate views, but 
this in no sense disqualifies him from reading a balance sheet or understanding a 
proposed brand s costings. On the contrary someone from outside that background
5would usually under-perform were they not to acquire such skills. Separation is a 
convenience.
Nor should the familiar use o f the "third party case", be seen as an important 
objective indicator o f general utility. True, it constitutes a form o f testimonial but it 
is usually just a sample o f one and general applicability cannot thereby be 
demonstrated. The principal value o f a case is to illustrate and to stimulate the 
imagination o f the reader that w ider benefits should exist. I suggest that although 
OR is rooted in science and embraces positivist assumptions, the reality o f general 
practical validity o f the prescriptions that it develops, are not tested w ithin the 
paradigm. 1 suggest that the presenter effectively invites the reader or potential user 
to test the potential applicability o f a proposed method against the tota lity o f his or 
her own problem experience, and the advantages and disadvantages o f whatever 
alternatives they are familiar w ith, however the technique derived or is illustrated. 
They are perforce party to the validation o f the potential applicability o f a proposal 
in another situation. The approach I adopt suffers no philosophic disadvantage in 
this respect, though 1 am quite clear that 1 ask the reader to a be a party to the 
process.
There is however one strong advantage that the approach I adopt here offers. OR 
has not only traditionally been performed by one party for another, but the language 
o f argument o f the modeller has usually been different from that o f the decision 
maker. Poor communication has often inhibited exposition and implementation o f 
good ideas. In consequence, the OR community has been concerned over many 
years w ith the interface o f the adviser/decision maker relationship; that is to  say 
understanding a decision maker s perception o f a problem and translating it into the 
language o f analysis and, in the other direction, communicating a justification o f the 
analyst's conclusions in terms that the decision maker understands and, ergo, can 
adopt as his or her own. Addressing this is often, properly, a major component o f 
studies and reports. If it is not explicit, it frequently lurks in the sub-text. Important 
though this is, it is not necessary that it should be always examined, or that all 
innovating cases adopt an outside-in perspective. I wish to  examine the practicality 
o f analytic technique, as technique, and the removal o f the distinction between 
purveyor and beneficiary facilitates this.
6A second element o f personal motivation was curiosity concerning the building 
block that forms the basis o f the approach here. In the years that separated my 
original training in OR in the sixths, as I moved from analyst to  hands-on manager, 
until my renewed interest in modelling, a more formal recognition o f the softer 
aspects o f modelled domains had emerged and computational power had radically 
altered the speed and tractability o f problem solution. However, there was little  that 
was fundamentally new about the model analysing tools that were available for 
deployment. An exception was Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) which was 
introduced in mathematical programming form by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes in 
1978 in their seminal paper o f that year. This adopted the unfamiliar perspective o f 
measuring performance in several distinct dimensions, in single statistics, w ithout 
prejudging how factors should be combined. I was struck by the retrospective 
orientation and its usefulness from that view. However, it seemed that value 
independent analysis and the notion o f inducing a value or objective statement that 
causes or would cause a particular entity (Decision Making Unit (DMU) w ithin DEA, 
or a decision option in a decision analysis) to be favoured, had something to offer 
prospective decision making. The prospective opportunity was subsequently 
recognised (eg Stewart, 1996; Belton 1992; Doyle and Green, 1993; Cook and 
Green, 2000) but there remained an important distinction. Value free measurement 
may be reasonable in retrospective assessment, but value remains at the very core 
o f decision making. As Simon (1965, p45) remarks "Decisions are more than factual 
propositions. To be sure, they are descriptive o f a future state o f affairs, and this 
statement can be true or false in a strictly empirical sense; but they select one future 
state o f affairs in preference to another and direct behavior toward the chosen 
alternative. In short, they have ethical as well as factual content." Although DEA 
majors on the processing o f factual content, it appeared to have w ithin it the 
mechanisms for implication testing and those could be used to inform the elicitation 
o f ethical content, in other words, to  articulate w ith greater precision a decision 
maker's objectives. This opportunity had been underplayed.
It appeared that not only was the framework useful but, that the framework could 
constitute a natural approach w ith a synthetic ("bottom-up") outlook towards the 
way which objectives m ight be formed.
71.2 The Generic Problem and Approach in Outline
it is a viewpoint o f this work that people may have dear, comprehensive, and 
sophisticated understandings o f what they wish to  achieve in qualitative terms, but 
these may not be articulated (even internally to a decision maker) in terms that can 
be readily operationalised. It is not that they are merely unquantified, nor given 
relative weight, but in some sense they have not been completely formed. Yet the 
issues at stake and the factors relevant to the decision may be quite clear and if not 
already quantified, frequently quantifiable, by the decision maker, or by analysts in 
terms which the decision maker may readily own. He or she is vague (a term which 
I later explain should not be misconstrued as connoting indecision or confusion), in 
the way such factors may be prioritised or compounded. We m ight say that 
objectives are understood but not known.
DEA has many features which are consonant w ith this outlook:
(a) It draws conclusions from unspecified objectives, making few prior 
centralised declarations o f purpose.
(b) It identifies "situations" which cannot be "best" under any circumstances.
(c) It identifies the conditions under which a particular situation which could 
be best, is best. Or, alternatively, it establishes the valuation implications 
o f asserting that a potentially optimal solution is optimal.
Much o f this is achieved through the concept o f looking at the valuation o f a 
situation in its Best Possible Light. (I mention for completeness that this metaphor 
corresponds to what Chames, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford (1994, p26) call the 
multiplier form. This is the dual o f the envelopment form o f DEA models. W hilst the 
latter has descriptive prominence in DEA, it is the m ultiplier orientation and its 
associated metaphor which seems most valuable here).
There are nevertheless profound differences, and this should not be seen merely as 
an exercise in applying DEA to prospective decision problems. W hilst the 
inspiration is clear, the structural sim ilarity o f the Basic Model, which w ill be 
examined in due course, arises as a consequence o f a willingness to  tolerate, at 
least at the beginning, incompletely specified objectives.
8Later, I enumerate a taxonomy o f decision and decision analysis structure, to clarify 
the domain o f applicability o f the approach developed, w ithin the context o f 
decision problems as a whole. In summary, the basis is that many decisions can be 
conceptualised, at least as an idealised approximation, as a selection o f a single 
option from a set o f many (or an infinite set), where associated w ith the options 
there are attributes, which in the construct are discrete, bounded, and identifiable 
(or can be approximated as such), and which are reflective o f the decision maker's 
qualitatively well-understood objectives. There can be redundancy w ith respect to 
those objectives but in their to ta lity they should adequately embrace the objectives. 
To these attributes can be attached cardinal or ordinal magnitude or logical 
indicators. The magnitudes o f each attribute can be specified for each option. The 
quality o f a decision is enhanced or diminished monotonically w ith the magnitude 
o f the attributes which are preferentially independent. Thus the facts o f the problem 
can be represented by an n x k matrix (n =options, k =attributes). It is further 
perceived that value can be attached to options by forming a value function (in the 
Basic Method, an additive linear function) o f the attribute variables, but that the 
decision makers vagueness m ilitates against its full specification, initially.
On the basis o f a linear mathematical formulation, which expresses the valuation o f 
options and explicit constraints on preference, potentially optimal options are 
progressively reduced in an iterative loop. In the basic method, each option is 
examined in each loop, to determine the circumstances which most favour it and 
whether it is or remains potentially optimum (efficient). Each reduction provides 
data which can be used to facilitate the expression o f preference, which provides 
value information, by constraining the value function flexibility, to  the next cycle o f 
the calculation routine. This would proceed iteratively, preferably, but not always, to 
a final single option. For convenience I refer to the basic approach and its 
derivatives by the appellation DORA-D (see Glossary).
The calculational processing tool w ithin it, is flexible in the mechanics that can be 
employed to reflect the expression o f preference. It can work from value functions 
generated w ithin the process, preferences expressed between options or 
decomposed choices based on generated shortlists, or w ith preferences elicited by 
independent procedures.
9Indeed, the facility to process such expressions is probably more flexible than the 
facility o f a decision maker meaningfully to express preference, in a way which 
allows value to be reliably inferred. This thesis explores the implications o f this 
possibility. I later seek to classify the complexity o f choices in a manner which 
suggests their potential cognitive difficulty. I argue that one perspective o f all 
decision analysis is that it constitutes a decomposition o f decision situations which 
cannot be readily comprehended in totality, into a series o f subordinate choices 
which the human mind is better equipped to process. To this I end, I introduce the 
idea o f Fundamentally Decomposed Preference in which specific decision choices, or 
selections from groups o f options, are broken down, insofar as it is possible to do 
so, into the most elementary non-trivial case in the classification I suggest. I w ill call 
this a Fundamentally Decomposed Choice. I discuss and illustrate the way in which 
these ideas can be incorporated in the framework.
But if  human cognitive lim itations introduce the need for analytic caution in one 
area, they m ight ameliorate the need for excessive sophistication elsewhere. Two 
aspects are particularly examined. One is the possibility, and implications, o f labile 
value- the ability o f the human mind to discriminate and sustain w ithin itself the 
finer features o f relative worth. The other is the significance o f value as a conscious 
process. I w ill argue that both o f these make excessive complexity o f the 
operational models o f our decision value systems redundant and, possibly, 
misleading. Whilst configural issues appropriately add to complexity, they can be 
accommodated w ithin an essentially linear structure, w ith little  or no loss o f 
effectiveness.
However, complexity is forced upon us in the structure o f problems. We are 
inevitably forced to impose structure and bounding in models o f systems which are 
loose and unbounded. However, even w ithin the lim itations o f hard structured 
models, not all decisions are made between options which are specifically 
enumerable. Many are selections o f interdependent combinations o f decision 
components or sub-options. We may describe these as portfolio decisions. Two 
main practical polarisations o f a large array o f theoretical possibilities are perceived. 
One involves the selection on a binaiy "in-or-out" basis from a list o f sub-options.
The value o f the aggregate may be an additive sum o f the values o f the individual 
constituents. However, the components interact through lim itations on one or more
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resources. This m ight be described as the Project Portfolio Problem (although this is 
a major exemplar o f a structure that m ight be used elsewhere, in timetabling for 
example). The other is where the components can be selected in continuous 
proportions, and, whilst there may be a resource lim itation, it is im plicit in the 
structure (ie the variable defining inclusion is a proportion o f resource). However, 
there is an additional attribute o f aggregation which gives value to the collection 
which is distinct from the sum o f its parts. Such a selection m ight be a portfolio o f 
investments (or Financial Portfolio as w ill be used hereafter). As w ill be seen, such 
problems do not fit comfortably w ithin the Basic Dora-D structure. This would, in 
principle, require evaluating each potential optimum explicitly w ith reference to 
each other portfolio, a formidable combinatorial problem. Two factors help us. It is 
possible to find the efficient equivalent or Peer o f any pre-specified portfolio. A  
method called Frontier Probing is introduced to enable this in the case o f both 
Financial Portfolios and Project Portfolios. A  "pet" or attractive project can be used as 
an initial input and improved upon if not already efficient. Moreover, such solutions 
and other sim ilarly generated possibilities can be used to generate preferences to 
progressively reduce valuation latitude, just as in the Basic Method. Financial 
portfolios are the subject o f the personal decision problem that I sought to address. 
General and particular issues w ill be discussed further in this Chapter, and in detail 
later. Project Portfolios w ill be considered in the context o f revisiting a published 
problem addressed by other researchers.
The versatility o f the technique w ill also be discussed in the context o f improving 
solutions, on the basis that some decision makers may make reliable statements o f 
value in the way they favour particular options. It is arguable that we may be 
endowed w ith some innate capability to  make intuitive leaps, to integrate 
holisticaliy, even when we cannot synthesise piece-wise in a reliable manner. If so, 
we could usefully seek to infer value (or to elicit policy) from suggestions made. The 
technique used in policy elicitation mode, may also assist in finding better solutions, 
in situations that Lindblom (1959) characterised as being dealt w ith by Successive 
Limited Comparison. M ultiple constraint decision problems that have traditionally 
been tackled using M ultiple Objective Linear Programming, w ill also be discussed in 
the context o f the approach here. The approach offers no advantages in terms o f 
computational efficiency over traditional MOLP. However, it offers advantages in 
being readily implementable w ith standard LP software and, w ith attention to the
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ideas o f Fundamentally Decomposed Preference, perhaps advantages o f 
psychological reliability as well.
1.3 The Core Problem
The core personal problem I address here is how to select a portfolio o f shares as a 
private, non-institutional investor. The problem w ill be introduced in some detail 
later but, having introduced a distinction between myself and a professional fund 
manager, I should make the point that, at least in intent, 1 have not sought a model 
which is naT ve or simplistic, relative to the real needs o f the "serious" operators. 
Rather, it is the data I can use, the resources that I can bring to bear, and the detail 
o f background knowledge that is more restricted. In the decision models I employ, I 
believe there is greater sophistication than m ight typically be employed by an 
investment house and in part this derives from the scale issue. Specifically, 
professional optim isation seems largely based on developments from a two 
dimensional, (return and risk o f return) objective construction originally introduced 
by Markowitz (1952), which is the cornerstone o f Modem Portfolio Theory (MPT). 
The approach I adopt here is many dimensional, and options are reduced and 
objectives refined w ithin the valuation process. The experienced fund manager may 
more readily relate, or be able to  pre-process, distant fundamentals to  the two 
dimensional form for the traditional model. Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
concepts w ithin the approach here could be usefully exploited by professionals.
The concept, that is expanded later in the thesis, is that a share is not a simple 
commodity but a package o f properties which affect its value to an investor in 
various ways, available for purchase as a job lot. These properties may be hard facts, 
for example, financial performance measures, or the business sector o f the 
underlying company; or soft, for example the opinion o f the decision maker or o f 
other parties on the quality or integrity o f the management, or expected sales 
growth. Value attaches to  these properties, which are not necessarily objective, are 
certainly individual to  the decision maker and not determinable in advance. These 
w ill be reflective o f the decision maker s objectives either directly ("I put high value 
on a share w ith high net cash."), or indirectly ("I value a high expected Net Present 
Value o f future cash flows and believe that the mean level o f profit over the past five 
years is an indicator o f this."). These are attributes o f the type referred to previously,
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though it should be noted, even at this stage, that the attribute which is 
conceptually for sale is a fact or conclusion to which a subjective valuation o f worth 
is attached. Thus an attribute o f future profit (or even expected future profit as an 
objective concept), cannot be for sale; but the attributes o f last years profits, the 
statistics department s regression based forecast o f next year s profits, the Investor's 
Chronicle or Aunt Annie's opinion as to those profits, may be. Most o f such 
attributes are, or can be translated, into an additive scale o f value (I w ill later 
suggest a linear scale); thus one purchases such attributes in proportion to the 
fraction o f purchase price that a share has in a m ix o f shares. But there exists some 
attributes which are defined interdependently, where value is a more complex 
function o f the proportions. These are most usually related to the value o f diversity, 
or rather the attrition o f value arising from the risk o f concentration. Indeed if there 
were no diversifiable risk, ail eggs could be put in the single most attractive basket. 
The problem thus extends from the single option selection problem outlined above, 
to  generating a list w ith quanta.
1.4 Layout of this Thesis
For the convenience o f the reader, I reproduce in this section the introductions and 
summaries o f the succeeding chapters.
1.4.1 Chapter 2. Some issues of Decision Analysis
In this chapter, I explore some philosophical and psychological issues o f decision 
making and analysis to serve as a context for the author's viewpoint and analytic 
predilections. This serves as a backdrop to assumptions that are built into the 
approach to decision aid that is developed in this thesis.
I start by considering the purpose o f decision analysis and conclude, 
unexceptionabiy, that it is to ameliorate human cognitive impairment. I suggest, 
however, that the mathematically-based models and methodologies intended to 
assist, may have paid insufficient attention to this, either taking the nature o f 
impairment as read, or not considering it at all. But consideration of, and 
assumptions about, the competencies we may have, and may not have, should be 
prominent in methodological design. This is as important as the valid ity o f the 
mathematical devices that we make use of.
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I then discuss the concept o f decision maker s Objectives (later pursued in an EP 
context) and suggest that the solidity that seems to  attach to the concept in 
organisational situations may be illusory and o f lim ited help in seeking to assign 
weights in many factor situations. In qualitative terms Objectives may be well 
understood but Vague, in the sense that weight or priority cannot easily be attached 
to  them. I suggest, and the methodology developed here assumes, that a decision 
maker, nevertheless, w ill often have a clear and potentially quantifiable 
understanding o f the Attributes o f a potential decision to which he or she attaches 
value.
I then discuss the value orientation o f the method explored here. This is largely a 
question o f personal appeal and I do not seek to suggest that orientations that 
others find useful are wrong. M y main rationale is that, at root, m ultiple attribute 
decision problems are concerned w ith not being able to achieve everything one 
wants at the same time. Trade-off between one desirable outcome and another 
becomes the central issue, and this concept is the basis o f value. Other mechanisms 
may confuse this.
This is followed by a consideration o f whether a cardinal yardstick o f value can be 
retained in the mind, w ithout reference to an external standard. I conclude that it 
probably cannot; the properties required o f interval, far less ratio, scales are not such 
that we are likely to have innate skill, in the absence o f an external standard. This is 
particularly so, as an infinity o f other "strategically equivalent" scales can indicate the 
same ranking o f options. Nevertheless, even if  the notion o f objective internal 
cardinal value is suspect, it is a valuable fiction that can be used to  render 
statements o f preference free from contradictions.
The issue o f value, and the associated concept o f preference, is returned to in order 
to examine its potential stability or lability. W hilst stable values would not seem to 
be precluded philosophically, the mental capacity lim itations associated w ith 
establishing ordinal standards w ith fine discrimination, provisionally at least, 
m ilitates against this. I again prelude an EP consideration in which I can suggest that 
no adaptive purpose would have been served by stable values. I mention empirical 
conclusions that expressed values are labile, speculating that we m ight properly 
adopt the stronger conclusion that it is the values themselves that are labile. I 
buttress this by a discussion o f tw o types o f information process where the
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psychological foundations are more solid- the lim ited ability o f people to make fine 
distinctions in observing sensory phenomenon, and the lability o f judgement, which 
is evidenced by the success o f bootstrapping models o f judges.
The sovereignty o f people's present values over future values is addressed, 
questioning the view  o f some that a decision maker should be attentive not just to 
present preferences but future values o f future consequences. I suggest that this is 
perhaps misconceived: a decision maker only has a duty to his or her present values 
whilst having a clear duty to recognise, w ithin present values, the future 
consequences o f present actions. This would resolve a paradox in which Elster 
suggests Ulysses m ight be considered irrational in taking what most people would 
feel Weis a sensible precaution. This has pragmatic importance and not just 
philosophic interest.
I move on to  discuss the concept o f Rationality, finding it a more meaningful in a 
normative rather than a descriptive use, and I attem pt a definition consistent w ith 
my personal viewpoint, exploitable w ithin decision aid design, based on the ideas 
o f valuation. A  keystone o f this is that decision maker controls the criteria o f value. 
Recognising that, even w ith a definition w ith its central features controlled by the 
decision maker, there w ill be failures o f execution, I put emphasis on intended 
rationality. Nevertheless, I suggest that he or she cannot intend rationality, if he or 
she w ilfu lly ignores material violations in certain areas. I mention criteria which I 
suggest as tests o f intended rationality o f a decision maker. Some bear sim ilarity to 
mathematical axioms o f rationality, but others are included, eg the role o f Conscious 
Process.
Prior to  the consideration o f a framework which operationalises these ideas, I 
consider the concepts o f Efficiency and Dominance in m ultiple attribute decision 
situations. I mention the traditional definition o f dominance, but prefer a value 
reformulation which, in most respects, is equivalent, but allows more simply for 
domination o f otherwise non-dominated options by combinations o f options. I also 
suggest that the view  o f normal dominance is satisfactory, provided we suppose 
that the set o f attributes considered is both comprehensive and relevant. But in 
practice one considers an arbitrary selection o f potentially relevant factors. I 
introduce the ideas o f strong domination and weak efficiency.
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The importance o f sustaining a distinction between Indifference (one o f the relations 
o f classical decision theory) and Not Knowing (a common condition in the 
expression o f preference by real human beings) is then briefly raised. I make the 
point that practical expressions o f preference by people are usually statements o f 
Strict Preference (doubt, I suggest, is Fuzzy Strict Preference not Weak Preference). 
However, the practicalities o f analytic techniques, notably LP, which is used in the 
methodologies expounded here, and the requirements for conservative treatment, 
make it convenient, and m inimally inhibiting, to treat such Strict Preference as if it 
were Weak.
I then discuss a model structure to operationalise normative rationality. Later I 
concentrate on models o f deterministic structure, including risk as a determined 
property described by parameters. However, I start w ith a model relating a value of 
a decision, to measures o f worth o f the decision under particular states o f the world 
and weights related to the comparative likelihood o f those states o f the world. The 
simple linear model which bears (only) a structural sim ilarity to an SEU model allows 
the decision maker sovereignty over his rationality, w ithin the constraint o f 
intending a rational model, and allows m inimalist assumptions regarding cognition. 
In particular, it depends only on a decision maker's ability to  assess comparative 
likelihood (not objective probability) and comparative worth (not cardinal value).
The decision maker is permitted to generate a measure o f value using any 
parameter and designations wished, requiring only avoidance o f comparative worth 
and comparative likelihood violations. This generalised structure seems to 
accommodate familiar approaches as special cases.
Turning to the measurement o f the outcome desirability (either assuming a single 
state o f the world, as later I effectively do, or as prelude to  the application o f a 
multi-state model), I introduce the concept o f attributes and set down some o f the 
principles governing how these m ight be evaluated and incorporated in a value 
model. These reprise some o f the principles o f rationality but introduce others, 
including what I call Qualified Self Awareness, on which I expand. This is the 
concept that a decision makers values cannot be in a black box secret from himself.
I argue that this ultimately enables an analyst, on behalf o f a decision maker, to 
derive, if they do not already exist, sets o f attributes which are mutually 
preferentially independent and can be incorporated in models which are additive
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and, ultimately, linear. Recognising the possibility o f controversy o f what may be a 
novel position, I underwrite the pragmatic safety o f value linearisation (which I w ill 
use extensively) using other arguments.
I then give special consideration to  the issue o f configurality, which I suggest as a 
special and potentially difficult non-linear case. 1 suggest that disjunctive and 
conjunctive valuation can nevertheless be linearised using what I term the General 
Configural Model; a simple transformation o f the Minkowski metric.
I conclude by attempting a generic classification or taxonomy o f decision problems 
and approaches to their analysis. This is a prelude to the discussion o f the structure 
o f the proposed methodologies in Chapters 5 and 6.
1.4.2 Chapter 3. Generating assumptions of cognitive facility in decision making:
An Evolutionary Psychology touchstone.
In this chapter I build a set o f assumptions which I use to underpin the 
methodology described in this thesis. I start by reminding the reader that the reason 
for formal decision analysis is because we suffer from some form o f impairment in 
our mental process o f decision information. It is important therefore that one makes 
clear, plausible and balanced assumptions o f what mental facility we have and do 
not have, which we exploit or seek to exploit in decision making and decision 
analysis. Unfortunately, a convenient digest o f appropriate assumptions is not 
available "off the shelf and accordingly I try to develop a "balanced" check list here. I 
attem pt to use some o f the ideas o f Evolutionary Psychology (EP) as a patterning 
method and debate what capabilities and concepts would accord adaptive 
advantage in the environment o f human evolutionary development in the light o f 
issues which impact decision making. Although only reasonable assumptions, and 
not research conclusions, are sought this, is subject to  broad triangulation, in 
particular by reference to empirical work.
In section 3.3, I outline a basic description o f the EP concept and follow  this w ith a 
brief description o f how EP has been used to inform issues o f psychology and to 
develop hypotheses for examination. I go on to describe how I seek to exploit it 
here. I make use o f the test that if  one cannot postulate a mechanism by which a 
mental capability could have secured at least a distal impact on reproduction in the
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ancestral environment, it is not reasonable to assume its existence. As minimalist 
assumptions are sought, the criterion is safe and secures balance.
I then address a number o f decision-related issues from this perspective. I start w ith 
the more general issue o f Reason itself; our unique capability to draw conclusions, 
action related conclusions, by connecting thought. I suggest that the adaptation is a 
powerful one but that the adaptive advantages accorded to  survive in our difficult 
marginal niches only required moderately short-chain connections o f thought, not 
the long near-infinite chains that artefacts o f civilisation, which did not exist in the 
environment o f evolutionary adaptation, now allows. I suggest that long chain 
reasoning arose from a purely serendipitous property o f Reason, its capability o f 
bootstrapping itself. Accordingly, we should be cautious in attributing to the mind 
powers which are indirectly dependent on those artefacts, or assumes that we 
possess mental systems which are analogues o f sophisticated long-chain processing 
computers.
I then consider the nature o f decision in the ancestral environment, contrasting it 
w ith modem decisions. Our ancestors would have adaptively applied their 
intelligence to toolmaking, organisation, relations w ithin the group, and to the 
means o f exploiting the environment for food, often involving issues o f intellectual 
discrimination and judgement. Many would relate to a single clear oft repeated 
purpose for which learning, from both one's own experience and communicated 
vicarious experience, would be more useful than fundamental examination that 
characterises many modem problems. Single purpose allows simple "hillclimb" to  be 
an adequate control heuristic for securing desirable parameters in the type o f 
"design" problems that existed in our primeval world.
This presages a discussion o f objectives and optim ality. I suggest that no adaptive 
advantage attaches to articulated concepts o f Strategy and Objectives in the sense 
in which these would be understood today. Goals, probably im plicit, would be 
binary, and multiple objectives would be lexicographic or involve serial switching 
between single preoccupations. However, a considerable benefit would attach to 
weighing a m ultip licity o f factors related to a single goal. Optimisation, however, 
was not a concept that would have been needed to  have been understood, nor 
would it have secured adaptive advantage. Optimal behaviour can be achieved 
through non-intellectual mechanisms and, indeed, is, even by animals and simpler
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organisms. The concept o f relative improvement and the application o f intellect to  
achieve this is, by contrast, fundamentally adaptive.
To illustrate possible differences in adaptive thinking from classically logical thought 
I dissect an empirically examined stylised problem, the Wason Selection Task, 
where the classically correct conclusion is not intuitive. However, the intuitive 
responses do seem to relate to  the information discoveiy processes that m ight have 
led to adaptive decisions. Whilst this is a very specific example it serves to illustrate 
that an adapted mind is not a classically logical mind and the example serves as a 
prelude to the logically related issues o f probability and cardinality.
Uncertainty is usually treated as a parametrically defined attribute w ithin the 
methodology reported in this thesis, but its role in decision making generally is 
central. Moreover, the treatment adopted is aimed to  be w ithin the general concept 
and criteria o f intended rationality explored in Chapter 2. For completeness, I 
therefore consider the adaptive implications o f uncertainty. It is apparent that the 
mental notion o f uncertain alternative futures, and the influencing o f uncertain 
alternative futures by action are concomitants o f Reason. It is also a sine qua non 
that a sense o f comparative likelihood, including equal likelihood, and cognition o f 
broad degrees o f likelihood is adaptive. But it is d ifficult to  go further and embrace 
any form o f probabilistic cardinality as adaptive and therefore intuitive. Comparative 
likelihood allows the ordinal ranking o f disjoint events which m ight be turned into 
scales akin to probability which m ight be suitable to a modem analyst for some 
purposes. Innate understanding o f a probability o f 0.5 is possible. However, we 
should otherwise be dubious about attributing cardinal probabilities to elicited 
subjective responses, from statistically untrained subjects, or which cannot be 
determined from objective considerations.
I go on to question innate comprehension o f cardinal measurement and the ability 
to  process number and quantity generally beyond that required for count and 
organisational arithmetic in the countable range. This leads into issues o f concepts o f 
value. Whilst the idea o f ordinal value and compensation would seem to be 
entrenched, the concept o f a scale o f value would not appear to have adaptive 
advantage and it is d ifficult anyhow to  see how a stable yardstick could be held in 
the mind. Nor would stable value and preference seem to confer adaptive 
advantage and this includes the weighting o f factors. On these grounds one should
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expect value to be imprecise and labile, as expressed value seems to be. This does 
not o f course invalidate value as a useful fiction for summarising preferences in a 
way which as far as possible renders them free from contradictions. I also debate 
the seeming facility for people most easily to trade-off only tw o factors, w hilst also 
having an ostensibly polarised facility for considering a mass o f factors holistically.
Finally I tabulate the cognition assumptions that I believe can reasonably be made 
and which act as a backdrop for the rest o f the work. In essence these emphasise 
human abilities as a "comparator"; to  make one-by-one binaiy comparisons and to 
order, rather than to  assess cardinal degree.
1.4.3 Chapter 4. The investment portfolio decision
A t this point I digress from discussion o f general decision analysis considerations, to 
introduce the problem to which the approach developed w ithin this thesis w ill be 
applied. I also summarise and comment on features o f Modem Portfolio Theory 
which is the basis o f existing "Quant" decision analysis in this area, where it is 
applied. There is a parallel thread in this thesis and I w ill return in Chapter 5 to 
further consider methodology w ithout special reference to this application area. A  
reader who wishes it could therefore alternatively address this chapter prior to  
Chapter 8 which places the developed approach w ithin the context o f this problem.
In this Chapter I start w ith a consideration o f the nature o f objectives and 
approaches to the investment portfolio decision problem, considering the extent to 
which private and professional needs and capabilities correspond. I introduce my 
personal tastes as a decision maker. I mention that amongst established professional 
analysis there are two major strands o f approach, Quantitative and Qualitative,
I then discuss Modem Portfolio Theory (MPT) which provides the theoretical glue 
underlying more formal quantitative professional analysis. I introduce the concept o f 
systematic risk, or Beta, and discuss aspects o f the Capital Asset Pricing M odel. I 
w ill later borrow from these concepts. I argue that MPT has lim itations as an 
exclusive normative methodology being very data intensive and, in essence, only a 
two-dimension model for which questions are begged. Its use by private investors 
is effectively precluded by cost. I conclude by suggesting that the traditional 
approaches can be considered as polarised paradigms. Each o f these viewpoints do
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not need to exclude the application o f the other, but the model based optim isation 
approaches, which occupy m iddle ground by characterising portfolio formation as a 
many dimensional problem are rare. Hallerbach, however, pursued the issue in his 
PhD thesis (1994) and the general arguments for such a framework were developed 
by Spronk and Hallerbach (1997) whose suggestion is referred to. They have 
subsequently continued to develop m ultiple dimensional analysis methods for the 
financial area.
1.4.4 Chapter 5. The Basic Technique
The follow ing sections seek to introduce the basic Dora-D technique (originally 
Decision Option Reduction Analysis using concepts from DEA), placing it in the 
context o f some o f the decision analysis and cognitive assumptions already 
discussed.
It starts by relating the structure to the taxonomy outlined in Chapter 2. In essence 
it can be stylised as the selection o f a single decision from mutually exclusive 
options characterised in terms o f the magnitudes o f a bounded set o f attributes. The 
selection is informed by qualitatively well understood but quantitatively vague 
objectives. Each attribute is related monotonically to the goodness or badness o f the 
decision. The data would normally be able to be represented in a complete matrix.
The inspirational origins o f the technique in, and its connection to, Data 
Envelopment Analysis, is discussed, highlighting important distinctions. First 
amongst these is that the approach here is centred on decision makers' values.
Next the approach is structured, highlighting the central analytic objective, the 
formation o f an additive linear value function. The concepts o f assessing each 
potential decision in terms o f a value function, which shows it in the best possible 
light, is explained and Maximal Comparative Advantage (MCA) and Comparative 
Advantage Function (CAF) are introduced. Initial Option Reduction is described, in 
which no decision maker's "values" (or just the most certain pre-emptive constraints) 
are specified. The concept o f reducing the Latitude o f the value function by seeking 
statements o f preference is introduced, a process which is effected during 
Subsequent Option Reduction.
21
An LP formulation for effecting the process is outlined. Alternative methods or 
Mechanics for structuring elicitation and representing preference w ithin the LP 
structure are outlined. The need for "breaking ties" is raised and approaches to this in 
Final Reduction are suggested. The approach is illustrated by an example.
Observations are then made concerning ancillary technical matters that m ight o f 
interest to a reader or analyst.
Potential applications are mentioned, and the Chapter concludes w ith a brief 
discussion o f the method in the context o f the decision cognition assumptions the 
w riter has made.
Sutton and Green (2002) constitutes an anticipation o f this part o f this thesis, 
although this Chapter amplifies some points. The structure was originally described 
in Sutton (1999), a transfer paper associated w ith this work, which suggested it as a 
concept for developing firm decisions from vague objectives.
1.4.5 Chapter 6. Extending Dora-D to portfolios by Frontier Probing
In this chapter the ideas introduced in Chapter 5 are extended to embrace 
portfolios. I start by reprising the characteristics o f problems that can be handled 
using Basic Dora-D, noting that it requires explicit designation o f options, but that 
there are significant examples o f problems for which the combinatorial magnitudes 
or the definition o f decisions in terms o f continuous variables rule this out. Many o f 
these can be described as portfolio problems.
I defer consideration o f Project Portfolios but consider the handling o f portfolios 
having the same structure as financial portfolios and use the term Financial Portfolios 
to embrace the generic class as well as the specific problem. I then structure this 
problem.
Such problems are characterised by combinatorially large or infinite numbers o f 
options and lesser, but still unmanageably large, numbers o f efficient options.
Frontier probing, a concept used in the attack o f the core problem, is then 
conceptualised. This involves the insertion o f explicit Frontier Constraints only when 
a violation o f im plicit constraints is observed. The method is illustrated w ith a 
worked example.
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The chapter concludes by a discussion o f the need for concavity in the function 
defining the interdependent portfolio attributes.
1.4.6 Chapter 7. Other methodological extensions
In this chapter I examine further features which can be used in association w ith 
Dora-D to ameliorate the problems o f the impaired decision maker, to cope w ith 
more complex valuation or to simplify analysis. I also discuss further extensions to 
cover additional problem structures.
I start by highlighting some alternative methods for handling complex decision 
problems. I highlight two, Decomposition and Holistic Integration, for further 
exploration w ithin the chapter. Looking first at decomposition, I observe that first 
one can break down decision selections into pairwise choices. Such binary choices 
themselves represent situations o f varying complication and, as a prelude to their 
simplification, suggest a method o f classifying them using an "[m,n] Complexity 
Indicator".
I move on to discuss how choices can be partitioned into groups o f sub-choices o f 
reduced complexity depending on mutual preferential independence. I mention the 
lim its to simplification in partitioning problems and discuss the circumstances in 
which expressions o f preference, relating to sub-choices, can im ply a preference for 
one o f the tw o options in an undecomposed pair.
Using the defined Complexity Indicator I refer to the most structurally simple case, 
classified [1,1], which I refer to as a Fundamentally Decomposed Choice. This figures 
in the discussion in a variety o f ways later in the chapter.
I then discuss Franklin's Prudential Algebra as an example o f decomposition. Based 
on his straightforward conceptualisation, I develop a modernised algorithm. Here I 
attem pt to partition the problem o f selection between a binary pair o f options into 
series o f partitions, lim ited to three o f the most structurally simple choice types, for 
which I suggest we are most likely to be able to express reliable preference. I do 
this in a way which is designed to maximise the prospects o f drawing a firm 
conclusion regarding the whole, from views expressed about the partitions. This I 
call Franklin Decomposition.
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I also mention an approach which I call Larichev Decomposition, which only makes 
use o f [1,1] choices. These are developed for a particular decision but are derived 
from the decomposition o f sets o f efficient options rather than individual options. I 
go on to describe a methodology for doing this in a way which allows the 
preferences expressed to be converted into value constraints in Dora-D. I also 
describe how the information declared in expressing preferences between Franklin 
Decompositions, can be used to  reduce value Latitude and other potential optima, 
not just the options subject to  the decomposition.
I then take the alternative perspective and show how holistic selections m ight be 
improved in a Dora-D framework.
1 also talk about how the scale o f a selection problem could possibly be reduced by 
only considering options which an impaired decision maker m ight reliably 
discriminate in value terms. The Representative Efficient Set is introduced. This 
concept reflects the ideas o f Principal Components Analysis (though depending on 
completely different mechanisms).
I then conceptually consider how four further types o f problem structure can be 
accommodated w ithin the approach being presented. First is the problem o f m ulti­
attribute decisions under constraints, the type o f problem that m ight otherwise be 
formulated in MOLP terms. An illustrative example is presented.
The second is a consideration o f how configural valuation can be brought w ithin the 
ambit o f the Dora-D structure. Particular consideration is given to the treatment o f 
the M odified Minkowski M etric introduced in Chapter 2.
I then consider the analysis o f project portfolio selection problems, using as an 
example a problem already examined by other authors. I finally examine the 
translation o f Voting" data o f the type generated in group decision making or social 
choice into Dora-D structure. Cook and Kress (1990) have tackled this problem w ith 
a data envelopment approach. The formulation suggested is little  different, but is 
somewhat closer to the principles o f Chapter 5, and offers alternative insights.
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1.4.7 Chapter 8 Using Dora-D in developing a personal financial portfolio 
In this chapter I seek to illustrate the use o f the approach in a practical application- 
the Core Problem. This is investment decision making- specifically my share decision 
making. I start by explaining my attitude to the problem and my approach to 
explaining this as, simultaneously, decision maker, analyst and researcher.
I describe my data sources and my Vague Objectives as decision maker. I then 
describe in detail the application o f the Basic method to a share purchase analysis 
conducted in 1998. This involves an explanation o f the Attributes I used and how I 
derived them, indicating problems I perceived and how I attempted to address 
them. I then describe a series o f runs from Initial Option Reduction and subsequent 
reductions in which I employ a number o f elicitation and representation mechanics, 
eventually homing in on a single CAF. I discuss the methodological conclusions I 
drew at the time.
I remind the reader o f the lim itations o f the basic method in a portfolio situation and 
go on to  discuss a more recent analysis based on May 2002 data using the 
Extended Model. I discuss the nature o f the risk I am seeking to ameliorate and my 
tastes and attitudes concerning the valuation and representation o f risk. I outline the 
risk measure incorporated.
I also describe how I use Beta, and a simplification that the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model allows me to make. I describe modifications to  Attribute definitions relative 
to the 1998 analysis. I also discuss the issues o f using a static model for sequential 
decision making and describe the approach that I chose to take in my role as 
analyst. I also discuss formulation short-cuts that can help to speed the NLP if  it is 
taking too long.
Before going on to the actual analysis, I describe my initial share portfolio and some 
practical aspects which need to  be acknowledged and taken account of.
I outline the issues involved in the selection o f a Reference Portfolio and the choice 
made.
In this analysis I make particular use o f the Larichev Decomposition and Attribute 
W eight Capping mechanics. M y preferences between decomposed choices and 
their representation w ithin the MP are discussed. The many analysis cycles involving
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capping adjustments are then outlined. This led to a single CAF which could be said 
to be my value function as decision maker. It also defined a theoretical portfolio. 
However practical problems had to be addressed and a series o f other analyses 
were performed before an implementable plan was created. I describe these.
1.4.8 Chapter 9. Testing the approach using simulation
In this chapter, I review the performance o f the methodology. I consider only issues 
o f the mechanical efficacy o f Dora-D to convert statements o f preference, which 
simulate a variety o f elicitation devices, into consistent and, for the expressed 
values, optimum decisions. Accordingly, I ignore issues o f the psychological 
reliability o f the elicitation device. Indeed, I assume that the simulated decision 
maker is totally reliable and consistent in the weights he or she attaches to 
attributes and, in binary preference situations, he or she can declare an accurate 
strong preference however slight the value advantage. The main purpose o f the 
simulations was to:
(a) Pragmatically demonstrate that Dora-D w ill progressively reduce the 
potential optima and find an optimum.
(b) Indicate the relative speed o f convergence for the mechanics used.
Most o f the simulations test variations in elicitation mechanics for the discrete 
decision linear model (ie the basic model), though a configural discrete model and a 
portfolio model are also demonstrated.
I start by outlining the data used. In order to  facilitate comparison between 
mechanics, ten standard sets o f data are predominantly used. These serve to 
represent problems o f moderate size and complexity.
An encapsulation o f the m ultiple attribute decision analysis is to find the weights 
that attach to attributes. In the simulations I use a concept o f revealing "Hidden 
Weights". Both the concept and values used are explained to  the reader. The 
simulated decision maker is assumed to express preferences exactly and 
consistently, in accordance w ith these values, but the simulated decision maker is 
deemed unaware o f the weights, which are only revealed to a simulated analyst 
through the expression o f preference, w ithin the analysis process being considered.
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Two criteria o f analysis performance are then discussed. One, the Information View, 
focuses on the number o f options that remain potentially optimal. The other, termed 
the Performance View, concentrates on the average value, assessed using the 
"hidden weights" o f the options, that at a particular stage remain potentially optimal, 
given the preferences declared.
The methodology used is briefly discussed which is centred on the Basic 
Methodology using the Andersen-Petersen variant. An issue arises here and the use 
o f a different option elim ination criterion in these simulations, from that 
commended for practical situations, is explained.
I then relate the various experiments undertaken. The first is by way o f context 
setting. A  decision by analyst and decision maker o f how many attributes to 
embrace in an analysis, is itself an expression o f value that influences both the 
number and identity o f potential optima, just as expressions o f preference do. A t 
extremes, it  either completely determines the optimum, or fails to  eliminate any 
options, w ithout the need for further analysis. Taking the Information view  only, I 
examine how the number o f potential optima is influenced by the number o f 
attributes considered for inclusion in an analysis, and seek to establish relationships.
Simulations 2 to 6 consider the impact o f reductions o f value function latitude, 
secured by expressions o f preference between options and different mechanics for 
identifying options for comparison. I address the extent to which reduction is 
achieved by Dora-D, if  such expressions are reliable. Different methods o f 
identifying options for comparison or prioritisation are examined.
Simulation 7 assesses the reduction achieved by the ranking o f attribute weights.
I go on to consider the mechanical efficacy o f W eight Capping, before examining 
tw o approaches to [1,1] decomposition.
Simulations 11 to 13 examine the effects o f mis-specifying a non-linear value 
mechanism as a linear one. Two true underlying value structures are investigated. In 
one o f these no major problems emerge. However, LP infeasibilities were caused in 
the other. Alternative methods o f proceeding are investigated, one appearing to be 
more effective.
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I then move to a situation in which non-linearity is considered possible, by 
assuming, within the simulated analysis, that the decision maker's values can be 
represented by the Modified Minkowski Metric. However, we still test this concept 
on a mis-specified model, by making the simulated decision makers "actual" value 
function correspond to a multiplicative model. A  model in which we simultaneously 
seek both the arithmetic weight and power parameters is considered first. This is 
unsuccessful. In Simulation 15 we consider the Conservative Fixed Parameter 
methodology discussed in Chapter 7, finding more encouraging results. Finally, 
w ithin this group, the relationship between the configural parameter and the 
number o f efficient options at Initial Option Reduction is assessed, demonstrating 
relatively low  variation.
1.4.9 Chapter 10. Round-up
I finally seek to round-up the work, hesitating to  refer to this as Conclusions. In the 
first section o f the chapter, I make some general observations concerning what the 
author has learnt and aspects that would be useful to  others. In the final sections, I
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list concepts and ideas developed in this thesis which I suggest are potentially 
publishable and highlight areas raised which would benefit from further research.
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Chapter 2 Some issues of Decision Analysis
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I explore some philosophical and psychological issues o f decision 
making and analysis to serve as a context for the author's viewpoint and analytic 
predilections. This serves as a backdrop to assumptions that are built into the 
approach to decision aid that is developed in this thesis.
I start by considering the purpose o f decision analysis and conclude, 
unexceptionably, that it is to  ameliorate human cognitive impairment. I suggest, 
however, that the mathematically-based models and methodologies intended to 
assist, may have paid insufficient attention to this, either taking the nature o f 
impairment as read, or not considering it at all. But consideration of, and 
assumptions about, the competencies we may have, and may not have, should be 
prominent in methodological design. This is as important as the valid ity o f the 
mathematical devices that we make use of.
I then discuss the concept o f decision maker s Objectives (later pursued in an EP 
context) and suggest that the solidity that seems to attach to the concept in 
organisational situations may be illusory and o f lim ited help in seeking to assign 
weights in many factor situations. In qualitative terms Objectives may be well 
understood but Vague, in the sense that weight or priority cannot easily be attached 
to them. I suggest, and the methodology developed here assumes, that a decision 
maker, nevertheless, w ill often have a clear and potentially quantifiable 
understanding o f the Attributes o f a potential decision to which he or she attaches 
value.
I then discuss the value orientation o f the method explored here. This is largely a 
question o f personal appeal and I do not seek to suggest that orientations that 
others find useful are wrong. M y main rationale is that, at root, m ultiple attribute 
decision problems are concerned w ith not being able to achieve everything one 
wants at the same time. Trade-off between one desirable outcome and another 
becomes the central issue, and this concept is the basis o f value. Other mechanisms 
may confuse this.
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This is followed by a consideration o f whether a cardinal yardstick o f value can be 
retained in the mind, w ithout reference to an external standard. I conclude that it 
probably cannot; the properties required o f interval, far less ratio, scales are not 
such that we are likely to have innate skill, in the absence o f an external standard. 
This is particularly so, as an infinity o f other "strategically equivalent" scales can 
indicate the same ranking o f options. Nevertheless, even if  the notion o f objective 
internal cardinal value is suspect, it is a valuable fiction that can be used to render 
statements o f preference free from contradictions.
The issue o f value, and the associated concept o f preference, is returned to in order 
to examine its potential stability or lability. Whilst stable values would not seem to 
be precluded philosophically, the mental capacity lim itations associated w ith 
establishing ordinal standards w ith fine discrimination, provisionally at least, 
m ilitates against this. I again prelude an EP consideration in which I can suggest that 
no adaptive purpose would have been served by stable values. I mention empirical 
conclusions that expressed values are labile, speculating that we m ight properly 
adopt the stronger conclusion that it is the values themselves that are labile. I 
buttress this by a discussion o f tw o types o f information process where the 
psychological foundations are more solid- the lim ited ability o f people to make fine 
distinctions in observing sensory phenomenon, and the lability o f judgement, which 
is evidenced by the success o f bootstrapping models o f judges.
The sovereignty o f people's present values over future values is addressed, 
questioning the view o f some that a decision maker should be attentive not just to 
present preferences but future values o f future consequences. I suggest that this is 
perhaps misconceived: a decision maker only has a duty to his or her present values 
whilst having a clear duty to recognise, w ithin present values, the future 
consequences o f present actions. This would resolve a paradox in which Elster 
suggests Ulysses m ight be considered irrational in taking what most people would 
feel was a sensible precaution. This has pragmatic importance and not just 
philosophic interest.
I move on to discuss the concept o f Rationality, finding it a more meaningful in a 
normative rather than a descriptive use, and I attempt a definition consistent w ith 
my personal viewpoint, exploitable w ithin decision aid design, based on the ideas 
o f valuation. A keystone o f this is that decision maker controls the criteria o f value.
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Recognising that, even w ith a definition w ith its central features controlled by the 
decision maker, there w ill be failures o f execution, I put emphasis on intended 
rationality. Nevertheless, I suggest that he or she cannot intend rationality, if he or 
she w ilfu lly ignores material violations in certain areas. I mention criteria which I 
suggest as tests o f intended rationality o f a decision maker. Some bear sim ilarity to 
mathematical axioms o f rationality, but others are included eg the role o f Conscious 
Process.
Prior to  the consideration o f a framework which operationalises these ideas, I 
consider the concepts o f Efficiency and Dominance in m ultiple attribute decision 
situations. I mention the traditional definition o f dominance, but prefer a value 
reformulation which, in most respects, is equivalent, but allows more simply for 
domination o f otherwise non-dominated options by combinations o f options. I also 
suggest that the view  o f normal dominance is satisfactory, provided we suppose 
that the set o f attributes considered is both comprehensive and relevant. But in 
practice one considers an arbitrary selection o f potentially relevant factors. I 
introduce the ideas o f strong domination and weak efficiency.
The importance o f sustaining a distinction between Indifference (one o f the relations 
o f classical decision theory) and Not Knowing (a common condition in the 
expression o f preference by real human beings) is then briefly raised. I make the 
point that practical expressions o f preference by people are usually statements o f 
Strict Preference (doubt, I suggest, is Fuzzy Strict Preference not Weak Preference). 
However, the practicalities o f analytic techniques, notably LP, which is used in the 
methodologies expounded here, and the requirements for conservative treatment, 
make it convenient, and minimally inhibiting, to treat such Strict Preference as if  it 
were Weak.
I then discuss a model structure to operationalise normative rationality. Later I 
concentrate on models o f deterministic structure, including risk as a determined 
property described by parameters. However, I start w ith a model relating a value o f 
a decision, to measures o f worth o f the decision under particular states o f the world 
and weights related to the comparative likelihood o f those states o f the world. The 
simple linear model which bears (only) a structural sim ilarity to an SEU model allows 
the decision maker sovereignty over his rationality, w ithin the constraint o f 
intending a rational model, and allows minimalist assumptions regarding cognition.
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In particular, it depends only on a decision maker's ability to  assess comparative 
likelihood (not objective probability) and comparative worth (not cardinal value). 
The decision maker is permitted to  generate a measure o f value using any 
parameter and designations wished, requiring only avoidance o f comparative worth 
and comparative likelihood violations. This generalised structure seems to 
accommodate familiar approaches as special cases.
Turning to the measurement o f the outcome desirability (either assuming a single 
state o f the world, as later I effectively do, or as prelude to the application o f a 
multi-state model), I introduce the concept o f attributes and set down some o f the 
principles governing how these m ight be evaluated and incorporated in a value 
model. These reprise some o f the principles o f rationality but introduce others, 
including what I call Qualified Self Awareness, on which I expand. This is the 
concept that a decision maker s values cannot be in a black box secret from himself. 
I argue that this ultimately enables an analyst, on behalf o f a decision maker, to 
derive, if they do not already exist, sets o f attributes which are mutually 
preferentially independent and can be incorporated in models which are additive 
and, ultimately, linear. Recognising the possibility o f controversy o f what may be a 
novel position, I underwrite the pragmatic safety o f value linearisation (which I w ill 
use extensively) using other arguments.
I then give special consideration to the issue o f configurality, which I suggest as a 
special and potentially difficult non-linear case. I suggest that disjunctive and 
conjunctive valuation can nevertheless be linearised using what I term the General 
Configural Model; a simple transformation o f the Minkowski metric.
I conclude by attempting a generic classification or taxonomy o f decision problems 
and approaches to their analysis. This is a prelude to the discussion o f the structure 
o f the proposed methodologies in Chapters 5 and 6.
2.2 Why analyse decisions? The Impaired decision maker.
Curiously, despite the many words written on how to analyse decisions, there is 
relatively little  on why it is necessary. We m ight expect early words o f any treatise 
to consider the issue and the follow ing are amongst the early lines o f a few works 
that address normative decision making.
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"Decisions permeate life. Indeed, many would argue that it is the ability 
to choose, to express free w ill, that distinguishes intelligent life from 
lower forms. However, we shall not rehearse that argument here.
Instead we shall accept as a matter o f empirical fact that each o f us has 
the power o f choice. Each day we make many decisions. Most are so 
unimportant that they can be left to  whim: for example, whether or not 
to put salt on a meal. But some, particularly those we encounter in our 
professional lives, are sufficiently important that we undertake a careful 
analysis before deciding on a course o f action." (French, 1986, p i 3).
"In an uncertain world the responsible decision maker must balance 
judgements w ith his or her preferences for possible consequences or 
outcomes. It is not easy to do and, even though we have a lo t o f 
practice we are not very good at it." (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p i).
"One o f the most important tasks faced by decision makers in business 
and government is that o f selection. Selection problems are 
challenging, because they require the balancing o f m ultiple, often 
conflicting objectives, criteria or attributes." (Olson, 1996, vii).
"Personal and management decision making can be complicated and 
confusing. The future o f your organization and the progress o f your 
career can be profoundly affected by what you decide, and yet most 
people receive little  instruction in decision making." (Kirkwood, 1997, 
xi).
"The key word is analysis, which refers to the process o f breaking 
something down into its constituent parts. Decision analysis therefore 
involves the decomposition o f decision problems into a set o f smaller 
(and, hopefully, easier to  handle) problems." (Goodwin and 
W right, 1991, p3).
Neither these works, nor others, address themselves at great length to why we 
ought to analyse decisions; though perhaps in these sentences we may find the 
main components o f an explanation. It is apparent that we make very many 
decisions throughout our daily lives, w ith or w ithout decision analysis. Later I shall 
suggest that the very "purpose" o f our rationality, the adaptive advantage that it
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gives us, is the analysis o f decisions. Contrary to Keeney and Raiffa, I suggest that 
we are in fact quite good at making decisions, or at least at making those types o f 
decision that mankind already familiar w ith before the advent o f our modem 
technological society. French suggests that decisions that we choose not to analyse 
are essentially trivial. W hilst I agree w ith him that professional life provides a 
particularly fertile ground for decision analysis, we m ight argue that the most 
important decisions in our personal life are the ones to  which we actually pay little  
analytic attention. We may analyse the selection o f a computer, car or hi-fi, yet, 
although the more im portant selection o f our homes or jobs may be partially 
evaluated, these seem largely to be left to  instinctual "holistic integration". The 
choice o f our partners, arguably the most important personal decision, I suspect is 
only superficially analysed, even by the most model oriented amongst us.
I suggest that we specifically analyse decisions that have both the quality o f 
importance and which we believe that we are not very good at. Our belief in our 
decision making ability may relate to our actual capabilities, or to our perception o f 
them. Both o f these may be influenced by specific experience (our direct fam iliarity 
w ith like decisions) and our adaptive experience (the environment o f critical 
problems in the era in which our reasoning and other skills evolved). Modem 
economic life both intensifies the consequences o f deviations from optimum choice 
and places most non-personal problems outside our adaptive experience, adversely 
affecting both our decision making abilities and our perception o f them. We are, in 
short, impaired w ith regard to  these problems and indeed we should analyse them, 
although often this impairment o f perception, o f cognition, also impairs our ability 
to recognise this. If there were no impairment there would be no decision 
problems. Optimal solutions would be intuitively obvious, and wisdom would be a 
universal quality.
I w ill later attem pt to formulate a checklist o f those elements o f decision making 
and analysis that people m ight be good or bad at. However, one o f our key 
impairments lies in the lim its in our mental capacity to  see to the lim its o f 
interacting factors, which for all real decisions are probably unbounded. As Simon 
(1957, p i96) observes in defining his concept o f Bounded Rationality, "The capacity 
o f the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small 
compared w ith the size o f the problems whose solution is required for objectively
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rational behavior in the real-world - or even for reasonable approximation to such 
an objective rationality". Simon (p i99) goes on to  suggest that someone making 
decisions nevertheless intends rationality and that this "requires him to  construct a 
simplified model o f the real situation in order to  deal w ith it. He behaves rationally 
w ith respect to  this model, and such behaviour is not even approximately optimal 
w ith respect to  the real world." It is im plicit that this process requires neither 
analysis nor conscious scrutiny, we just do it. Nevertheless, it also conditions all 
forms o f argued decision making, including normative decision analysis. But in 
addition to simplification, decomposition o f problems into separable parts o f 
importance but o f tractable size (the feature o f the Goodwin and W right quote), and 
the prioritisation o f factors or attribution o f weights, are important mechanisms for 
placing problems w ithin the bounds o f our rationality. It is the basis o f Benjamin 
Franklin's "moral or prudential algebra" in 1772 (quoted in Appendix 1, and 
examined later in this thesis), and, even further back in history,of Cecil's sixteenth 
centuiy assessment o f options concerning Mary Queen o f Scots. As DN Kleinmuntz 
(1990) also remarks, "Decision Analysis relies on the general principles o f problem 
decomposition: a large and complex decision problem is broken down again to 
representations consisting o f alternatives, beliefs, and preferences... An advantage 
o f this approach is the reduction o f information-processing demands since the 
decision maker can focus sequentially on simpler individual components o f the 
problem."
If the fact o f cognition impairment necessitating analysis seems unexceptionable, it 
is curious that decision tool designers seem to prescribe (the need for 
decomposition apart), either on the assumption that the nature o f our impairment is 
self-evident, or w ithout specific consideration o f it at all, w ith less safe 
consequences. An example o f this m ight be M ultip le Objective Linear Programming 
(MOLP). This is predicated on a host o f declared arithmetic assumptions and I 
suggest tw o im plicit cognition assumptions. First, that a decision maker cannot, 
prior to  the analysis, readily integrate the m ultiple objectives which conflict in their 
prescriptive implications, into a meaningful single overall measure o f preference. 
Second, the same decision maker can nevertheless make a meaningful selection 
between the decisions identified as efficient, or at least o f comparative preference 
between decisions represented by extreme points o f the feasible space. If the latter 
is not true or if  this comparison is not easier than prior integration o f objectives,
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then the concept may not be helpful. There are grounds for supposing that some 
binary comparisons may be cognitively difficult so there seems a legitimate question 
here. The same issue arises, for example, in the Zionts (1981) method for choosing 
between discrete alternatives.
If it is a sound argument that the reason for decision analysis is human cognitive 
impairment, it follows that the nature o f the decision maker's lack o f facility must be 
at the root o f the methods and models used to m itigate it. Such considerations 
may, indeed, be more important than the mathematical validity o f methods and 
theorems which receive emphasis in Management Science literature. Some aspects 
o f this are pursued in general terms in this Chapter and, from the perspective o f 
evolutionary psychology, again in Chapter 3.
2.3 Objectives and Vague objectives
Objectives (including goals, targets, missions, etc.; which some distinguish) are 
central to  our working lives, but also affect our private lives. We want to  maximise 
profits, maximise our salary, w in an Olympic Gold Medal, run a m ile in under four 
minutes, run as fast as possible, v isit China, have a nice garden, the best garden in 
the neighbourhood, maximise consumer satisfaction, be a good parent, pass our 
exams, maximise return, get home as fast as possible, minimise formulation costs, 
maximise growth, minimise risk, minimise rail fatalities, minimise rail fares, 
maximise punctuality, get a First, annoy Dad, achieve £100m o f profit, achieve 
consistent profit growth, and w in the Cup.
We feel that we understand these matters and to some extent we do. Certain 
lexicographic and binary objectives provide a clear guide to action, and are readily 
testable. We know whether we went to China, ran a m ile in under four minutes, or 
achieved a First. But, thereafter, difficulties o f one sort or another enter the concept. 
Objectives enjoining optim isation may provide firm guides to action and may be 
testable ("minimise formulation cost"), or their achievement may be subject to 
debate ("maximise profit"). But invariably qualifications enter the arena. These may 
be o f the "but also . . "o r  "subject to .." types. Sometimes these w ill be im plicit ("get 
home as fast as possible without causing an accident") others be can readily clarified 
("minimise formulation cost without detriment to product performance") but others 
require much more convoluted expression. Thus "maximise profit" may evidence a
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priority but cannot be actioned w ithout constraints or amplification. These, w ill often 
im ply the lower weighted inclusion o f non profit variables, which conflict w ith the 
main achievement variable. Other objectives may provide perfectly adequate 
motivation and guide prescriptive action, whilst leaving open the testable meaning 
o f the objective ("have the best garden in the neighbourhood"). Yet others may only 
reveal dilemmas w ithout providing meaningful guidance. Thus "safety is paramount" 
may show political concern but ultimately it is unsustainable as a decision objective 
and has to be balanced w ith fares, profits, passenger amenity, and service reliability, 
if the existence o f the operation is to  be sustained. Even then the problems do not 
stop, simple statements, unexceptionable at root, may act as a coverall for a host o f 
complex issues. Fares and profits may be manageable concepts (though accountants 
may warn us against hidden complexities) but what actually is safety, amenity and 
reliability?
Our facility w ith objectives, the ability to formulate and respond to  them, seems to 
receive little  research attention. Indeed, many works that descriptively address 
decision making or judgement do not include the word "objectives" in their indices. 
M y own professional, but non-academic, experience o f them could be said to  be 
extensive. I have interpreted them as an OR analyst and I have optim ised them in 
models. I have written them in Annual Operating Plans, Five Year Plans, Mission 
Statements, Job Descriptions, Managers' Work Plans for sections o f business and for 
businesses, as responsible manager and as a "staffer". From both perspectives, I have 
analysed and criticised such statements o f objectives o f others, and been required 
to operate under them. In response to them, I have watched the performance o f 
myself, and other people, in a business under my stewardship, and in other 
situations. I have been assessed and assessed others in the light o f them; or 
ostensibly so. The greater my familiarity, the more sceptical I have become o f the 
apparently well understood idea o f "objectives" as an intuitively easy concept, in all 
but the simplest o f idealisations.
I see the concept as capable o f working effectively at tw o ends o f the spectrum o f 
their representation. The first, m ight be called "Work Plan" mode, "Reduce number o f 
staff to  35, Launch brand X by 30 May, Work w ithin budget o f £ 1,5m, Research 
entry to Latvian market, etc". These provide for specific testable action. Whilst
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derivative decisions follow  from these, such statements have many o f the qualities 
o f decision promulgation and are not simply or mainly value statements.
The second we could call "Mission Statement" mode; "Seek to become the leading 
supplier in Europe o f electronics widgets, offering products at the cutting edge o f 
reliable technology. Build close, trusting relationships w ith our customers, so that 
they see us, not merely as partners, but as extensions o f their own businesses 
identified w ith their business ambitions. In our industrial operations, ensure that we 
do not merely respond to  pressures for environmental good citizenship, but lead 
the business communities in the countries in which we operate towards providing 
an environment in which our grandchildren would wish to live. Provide 
opportunities for a fu lfilling career for life for those o f our people that wish it, whilst 
ensuring that their skills are always being extended for their benefit, not just ours. 
Ensure a profitable long-term investment for our shareholders by being careful w ith 
the resources they have placed at our disposal, w ithout compromising our long­
term ambitions for short-term expediency".
Such statements probably do not provide direct actionable guidance but provide a 
context, an intention o f business style and climate, for people to develop actionable 
objectives for themselves. Despite ends and means being confused, the risk o f 
utopian ambition, and lack o f information on resolution o f conflicts, they provide a 
background o f considerations. Their merit lies in their qualitative articulation o f 
factors.
In between, in the area o f projects and in the resolution o f specific alternative 
decision choices, Objectives seem, at least to  me, to be less easily operationalised 
than the analytic models o f OR appear to imply. W hilst documentation o f cognition 
o f objectives is sparse, the suggestion is not unique. Lindblom (1959, p82) notes 
that people can more readily agree about policy (decisions) than ends (objectives). 
He writes, "Except roughly and vaguely, I know no way to describe- or even 
understand- what my relative valuations are for, say, freedom and security, speed 
and accuracy in government decisions, or low taxes and better schools than to 
describe my preferences among specific policy preferences that m ight be made 
between the alternatives in each o f the pairs." [My emphasis]. He makes a more 
radical point than mine, questioning the suitability o f what he calls the Rational- 
Comprehensive method, which involves isolation o f "ends" as a prelude to seeking
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the means o f achieving them. He contrasts this w ith Successive Limited 
Comparisons where the selection o f values/goals and the analysis o f needed action, 
are intertwined, and the test o f a good policy is that people find themselves 
agreeing on the policy, w ithout agreeing that it is the appropriate means to an 
agreed objective. He also remarks, 'The idea that values should be clarified, and in 
advance o f the examination o f alternative policies is appealing. But what happens 
when we attempt it for complex social problems". I would exclude the word "social". 
March (1978) too observes, "Human beings have unstable, inconsistent, 
incompletely evoked goals at least in part because human abilities lim it preference 
orderliness."
This lim itation in comprehension o f what we seek, may be thought o f as another 
manifestation o f Simon s Bounded Rationality, already mentioned. (Though he 
perhaps paid less attention to the complexity o f values than o f the complexity o f 
decision consequences). Nevertheless, the full expression o f objectives can be seen 
as similarly expanding from bald, simple statements, into a mass o f qualification, 
amplification, and supplementation, o f unbounded specificity, which we find it 
d ifficult to  get our minds around to  secure precision o f consequential action. I later 
suggest that we lack innate capabilities o f multiple objective juggling because our 
ancestors' problems were o f a simpler type, governed by roles not long-term 
objectives. Shorter term aims o f harsh sim plicity were handled as serial single 
objectives and decision situations (of adaptive consequence) generally involved 
simple trade-offs.
One o f the approaches o f the "Rational-Comprehensive" method has been to choose 
from qualitative statements o f objective, a primary quantifiable measure and then to 
include "subject toqua l i f ica t ions ,  in effect optim ising in one dimension and 
satisficing in all others. It could be coincidental that this structure finds a ready 
analogue w ithin the tools o f Management Science such as Linear Programming 
(though one m ight wonder whether ease o f computability o f such a structure is the 
thread linking the human mind and the software driven machine). The other 
approach commended for the professional sphere, is the progressive decomposition 
o f a few unquantified complex strategic objectives, into derivative sub-objectives in 
a hierarchical manner, until these can simply quantified or classified, or a suitable 
proxy can be identified for the objective. The relative value o f these low  level
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objectives is then elicited by a mechanic which satisfies analyst and decision maker 
(eg French, op dt, p i05; Keeney and RaifFa, op cit, p41; Kirkwood, 1997, p41, 
Olson, 1996, p9; Saaty, 1980).
Underlying this, is the notion that the sub-objectives and the values relating to them 
have an existence, ab initio, o f the same type as the primary objectives; that is that 
they are, in some sense, already in the mind o f the decision maker (or in the 
corporate mind) and we merely need to elicit them. Merely to state this in such 
bald terms, exposes that this can rarely be so. Following Keeney and Raiffa's 
example o f a postal service; suppose the overall objective is "to provide efficient, 
dependable service to the users o f the system and to  government". They suggest 
one sub-objective m ight be to "minimize the total cost o f handling the mail". A 
derivative o f this (mine not theirs) could be "minimise the perceived value to the 
customer o f the lost time in posting letters". A  further derivative could be "minimise 
the tim e spent by customers looking for post boxes". Would the decision maker 
have the latter tw o in mind when he or she started? Unlikely; but even were this so, 
he or she would not be cognisant w ithin his or her bounded rationality o f the 
myriad o f similar possibilities. It is more realistic to  see the process as sub-objective 
creation rather than elicitation. Quantification follows identification of, hitherto, 
unidentified issues. Such an identification is important but suggests that, whilst 
objectives may exist in the mind in a firm qualitative sense, they may not exist w ith 
actionable precision in the values attached to them. A  guide to the identification o f 
options is not the same as statements o f value that determine selection between 
them.
But, in any case, is this professional model the way we naturally think about 
decision problems? In our personal lives, we m ight have the objective o f finding a 
new home "a nice place, suitable for the kids we are planning to have, w ithin 
suitable reach o f work". We m ight then identify factors; the size o f the main 
bedroom, the kitchen equipment, the friendliness o f the neighbours, the proxim ity 
o f the nuclear power station, the distance to the railway station and to the shops, 
the size o f the garden, the availability o f good schools in the locality, the rail journey 
tim e to work, the state o f the decoration, the existence o f garaging, the distance to 
our parents, nearness to  the go lf club, the pleasantness o f the neighbourhood, and 
so on. We can get to such lists independently o f a tree o f sub-objectives. O f course,
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such a tree can prevent one missing relevant factors and it is useful for that purpose, 
but a top down approach is not insurance against omissions, anyway. Proximity to 
our parents, retail shops, recreational facilities and friendly neighbours were not 
w ithin our original objectives. Generally, I suggest we can find contributors to the 
goodness and badness o f a decision, and can have a strong belief about the relative 
importance o f such contributions, w ithout firm ly or precisely articulating our main 
objectives. Indeed, it is the integration o f such valuations which can constitute the 
articulation o f those objectives.
In this work I take the position that a decision maker often has a good qualitative 
understanding o f what he or she wishes, which is a composite o f many objectives. 
However, he or she has not articulated these quantitatively nor translated them into 
a hierarchy o f consequential sub-objectives. Moreover, whilst every decision has 
quantified or quantifiable defining Attributes associated w ith it, which reflect 
progressions in decision quality, its goodness or badness, related to fundamental 
objectives, they w ill often be highly derivative and not direct quantitative 
equivalents or branches o f the objectives. (This is different definition o f A ttribute 
from that o f Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p34) who see an attribute as a measurement 
used to  represent an objective). Nevertheless, I also take the position that a decision 
maker may well be able to articulate many o f the pertinent attributes in exploitable 
terms. Even if  these are not necessarily initially exhaustive, they may often cover the 
ground adequately or can be made to do so, w ith little  sophisticated intervention 
by the analyst.
It is in this sense that I describe a decision maker's objectives as "Vague". I ascribe 
this specialist meaning w ithin the thesis. It is defined here as "incompletely 
articulated" or "inexactly or only partially expressed in quantitative terms". The term, 
however, excludes elements o f the dictionary definition. It does not embrace 
"inexact in thought", and, particularly, does not im ply indecisiveness or woolliness.
In using "vague", I try to avoid confusion w ith the specialist connotations o f words 
such as "uncertain" and "fuzzy".
Vagueness m ight arise from tw o mechanisms. The first is an unwillingness or 
inability o f a decision maker to commit, or to commit yet, to  a firm  quantification. 
The second is a more speculative assumption, arising out o f the nature o f objectives, 
which prevents certainty in some more fundamental sense.
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I suggest that many objectives that can be simply and clearly expressed in 
qualitative terms and are in principle quantifiable, cannot be expressed by a single 
quantitative measure and are likely to be describabie only by an undetermined 
complex o f variables. Moreover, it is likely that only one or tw o o f a set o f multiple 
objectives w ill be easily expressible as individual measures. Usually one quantitative 
objective can be defined relatively straightforwardly. In business, money-value 
objective scales such as Net Profit, Opportunity Cost, DCF, Marginal Contribution 
etc. are frequently invoked and are readily manageable. Additional objectives may 
be less simple to express eg Increase market standing (market share, market 
penetration, or consumer loyalty?); maximise plant safety (how defined?); maximise 
profit growth (what period?)). However, objectives become quantitatively very 
much less specifiable, as more are included in the objective mix. Rather, the 
objectives become concepts. These give rise to sub-objectives in the traditional 
approach but, in the view  here, provide context in which value can be accorded to 
the effects o f decisions. Examples m ight be "Financial Risk", "Environmental 
Friendliness", or "Customer Satisfaction".
I do not suggest that this is cannot be handled w ithin existing approaches. Top- 
down hierarchic generation o f sub-objectives is a viable route. However, here, to 
deal w ith both the difficulty o f succinctly quantifying many types o f objectives, and 
a decision maker's likely vagueness in articulating individual objectives and their 
interact, I adopt an outlook in which the focus is removed from starkly stated hard 
Objectives. I propose to focus on the softer representation o f a decision maker's 
ambitions, the decision Attributes and their desirability. Attributes must be reflective 
o f issues o f importance and possible importance to  the decision maker and, as such, 
they w ill be objective-related, but the decision maker's commitment to them may 
be o f a lesser order. Attribute measures should relate monotonically to desirability, 
that is either more should be better to the decision maker, or more should be 
worse, throughout the scale range. Notwithstanding, concrete Objective measures if 
articulated, would sit compatibly w ithin this framework. Objective measures are also 
Attributes.
W ith this outlook, the Decision Analysis problem m ight be looked-upon as the 
progressive bottom-up synthesis o f a unique quantitative objective, expressed in 
terms o f the attribute variables, which metrically reflects a decision maker's
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preferences between packages o f attributes corresponding to  alternative decisions.
It is a synthesis process designed to operationalise the decision maker's vague 
qualitative objectives, converting them by stages to  a hard quantified one, or at 
least converging towards one, enabling the identification o f a preferred option 
and/or option ranking.
2.4 The concept o f Value In decision analysis.
The method explored here, and my personal disposition, reflects a Value frame o f 
reference. It is what Stewart (1992) characterises as a "Value or U tility Based 
Approach" in distinction to "Goal or Reference Point" oriented approaches, or the 
"Outranking Concept" o f Roy and others (eg Roy, 1968), for dealing w ith multiple 
factor problems.
W hilst I recognise that some may find the alternative approaches instructive, they 
have little  appeal to me. The issue relates to the idea o f Compensation. If all 
indicators o f decision quality point to  the same conclusion, no problem arises, the 
desirable conclusion is the single non-dominated option. If this does not pertain, we 
are forced to choose between options which are better in some respects and worse 
in another. We are forced to express a preference between a relative gain in one or 
more dimensions and a relative loss o f others. "I prefer the combination A, B and C 
to D, E, F" or, equivalently, "I place a higher value on A, B and C". This may be 
symbolised (as per Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p68 or French, 1986, p75; though 
formal consideration o f the existence o f u tility  functions which map preference pre- 
ordering, is attributable to Debreu (1959) :-
>- x2 <=> v (X j) > v(x2), Xj ~ x2 o  v (x 2) = v(x2) 
Where xn specify the magnitudes o f a "bundle" of 
attributes defining option n 
v(xn) = value o f attributes xn
(2.1)
Trade-off or Compensation, whether a gain on some measure is more valuable than 
a gain on another, seems to be at the root o f multi variable decision making and 
would seem most fruitfully to be tackled directly. If I may not have both what is the 
most valuable? To take refuge in approaches which, by some procedure, avoid the
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decision maker having to face specific relative value problems seems at best to  be 
generating indirect (and, ergo, likely inferior) expressions o f value, for example, in 
deviation metrics. More dangerous is that one hides the generation o f indicators 
behind complex arithmetic manipulation, which makes the attachment o f intuitive 
understanding to levels o f indicators and parameters difficult (for example, to 
concordance and discordance).
I except from this, lexicographic Goal Programming (GP) (eg Lee, 1972; Zeleney, 
1981), in certain situations. This m ight indeed be an appropriate technique, for 
example, if  there are marked non-linearities o f desirability over the domain o f 
hypothesised decisions, which m ight be adequately reflected in pre-emptive step 
movements. This could define a useful heuristic to guide the user to the vicinity o f 
an optimum. However, in the region close to  a practical solution, I would expect a 
more subtle trade-off o f factors, and therefore a different mechanic, to be 
appropriate. Stewart notes that GP can be seen as an operationalisation o f Simon's 
satisficing principle (eg 1965,p xxiv), but satisficing is a forced consequence o f 
man's Bounded Rationality. Whilst this may be a good mental heuristic rendering 
difficult problems tractable in the absence of other decision aids, it is not incumbent 
on the normative modeller to apply a corresponding principle. On the contraiy, he 
or she works to extend our rational bounds and must not be restricted to elaborated 
replicas o f the mental process. This risks missing an opportunity.
2.5 The internalisation o f value
In the world o f tangible measurement we adopt standards, until relatively recently, 
often physical objects, which we can touch and hold, that enable us to extrapolate 
one unit o f magnitude to  2, 1000, or 0.38276. W ith such standards we can adopt 
cardinal measurement.
In adopting a Value conceptualisation o f preference I make no assumption that I, or 
anyone else, carries around a cardinal yardstick o f value (as von W interfeldt and 
Edwards (1986, p 353) express it) "in his or her head waiting to  be elicited". I w ill 
discuss the lability o f preference shortly and this would seem to rule out an internal 
reference standard concept, but there are philosophic objections in any case. 
Although I equate preference w ith value, statements o f preference constitute 
statements o f ordinal value only. Whilst a value structure uniquely specifies a
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preference structure: a preference structure does not specify a value structure 
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p81). A  value function, which satisfies an ordering o f 
option preferences, w ill be no better nor worse than any strictly increasing 
transformation o f the same function (the square o f it, for example). It is only when 
one seeks to introduce first order Value Difference Measurement (French, p 82), to 
prefer the gain in benefit between tw o options to  the gain between tw o others, that 
any internal basis w ithin the mind exists for converting preference information to an 
interval scale.
This involves exchange statements o f the type, "I would prefer someone to  swap a 
vanilla ice cream for a coffee ice cream more than I would prefer someone to swap 
a strawberry ice cream for a raspberry ice cream". Although von W interfeldt and 
Edwards suggest, "Ordinal judgements o f differences on genuine subjective 
continua can also be constructed by a little  introspection", I wonder whether this can 
be done, sufficiently consistently and reliably, to  yield useful cardinal scales for 
many categories o f preference. I am not aware o f empirical evidence but would 
remark that, if first order preference is labile (which I w ill consider), second order 
effects, on which internalised interval scales depend, w ill be much more so.
Moreover, applying an Evolutionary Psychology test, such exchanges would have 
not arisen as adaptive, or even practical, choices in the environment in which we 
evolved. It is therefore unlikely that we would have evolved innate mechanisms for 
dealing w ith them. They are indeed rare as concrete propositions in the stated form 
in modem life. (We might, as per French (p 85), construct a scale o f value for 
quantities by asking a respondent if  the exchange a0 —> ax is o f equal value to an
exchange ax -» a2. But this choice is always hypothetical as ao and a\ cannot
simultaneously be available for exchange). Comparing a0 —> ax w ith an alternative
independent exchange a2 —» a3 is also unreal as perhaps the ice-cream example
illustrates. O f course one m ight be able to equate preferences to objective 
yardsticks o f value which are external to the decision maker, such as money; and if 
we allow comprehension o f cardinal probability we can construct scales o f utility. 
However, an innate comprehension o f probability may also be suspect, as w ill be 
discussed later.
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As we cannot readily define internal units o f equal value, a precondition o f the 
construction o f a mental standard, I reject the ability o f people uniquely to 
cardinalise value on an interval scale as an internal concept, that is independently o f 
external standards, and o f probability. Moreover, as w ill be discussed, the ability to 
develop additive scales o f value depends on value being a conservable quantity. In 
the presence o f mental lability this also seems doubtful as a strict proposition. 
Nevertheless, the assumption, in analysis, o f such a structure for inferential purposes 
appears useful and legitimate. I see the notion that the decision maker carries a 
value yardstick w ithin him or her as a Fictional Construct o f the type described by 
Vaihinger (1935) (p i 5): not a "copy o f reality" but, along w ith all constructs in the 
world o f ideas, an "instrument for finding our way about more easily in this world". 
One m ight envisage the process as a condensation o f preference to  get an assumed 
measure o f relative worth o f options, one o f many which m ight do the task, which 
summarises the decision maker's purposes. Essentially, the scale o f value expressed 
should render his or her declared preferences (expressed in a reliable way at a 
particular moment) free from contradictions, or as free from them as alternative 
candidates. Provided the decision maker behaves "as i f " he or she had the valuation 
mechanisms embedded w ithin him or her, he or she endorses the measure and its 
implications, and is an adequate representative o f other stakeholders in the 
decision, then the model has met the requirements o f validity. It does not need to 
be "true" in some absolute sense, it just needs to be one o f the many strategically 
equivalent scales that reflect explicit preference, from which identical conclusions 
would be drawn.
To illustrate, we m ight consider Saaty's Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty,1980).
This, inter alia, generates from comparisons o f qualitative importance between pairs 
o f characteristics, a ratio scale, which we m ight call "value", o f the various 
characteristics. This is based on finding the eigenvector o f a matrix representing the 
relative "importance" o f each pair o f characteristics. To construct this, Saaty assigns a 
numeric ratio o f relative importance to  each semantic statement, for example 5 to 
"Essential or Strong Importance". These assignments are arbitrary, and a user m ight 
assign different numbers to the same statements; for example, the square roots of 
Saaty's indices. Should he or she do so, each element o f the eigenvector would be 
scaled by approximately the square root o f each element o f the original eigenvector 
(this can be empirically illustrated and can be shown to  be precisely true for fully
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consistent matrices). The tw o scales would be strategically equivalent leading to the 
same ranking o f preferences (except where tw o characteristics are close in value 
and the subject had also made material mutually inconsistent responses). What 
represents the true scale o f importance or value, is whatever quantitative operation 
the decision maker feels should be attached to his semantic statements.
2.6 The stability of preference and value
If we cannot have a cardinal scale o f value w ithin us, can we have stable values, 
preferences and tastes. This is not necessarily precluded philosophically. One can 
note that, in the physical world, many o f the methods that give rise to  standard 
cardinal measurement are in reality ordinal operations. For example, a balance does 
no more than compare the relative weight o f what is in one pan to  that in the other. 
However, cardinal measurement allows one to be highly economic in the number o f 
reference standards kept; indeed, just a single standard o f weight allows one to 
construct a cardinal scale o f weight o f infinite extent and subdivision using only the 
simple, "ordinal", balance. Ordinal scales, however, do not have this property o f 
economy. For example the Moh scale o f hardness depends on the ability o f a 
sample mineral to  scratch or be scratched by specifically named minerals. A 
standard must therefore be held representing hardness for each point in the scale. 
Thus to have stability o f values, preferences and tastes w ithin an ordinal system, we 
must hold m ultiple reference points w ithin us.
This is not a formidable problem when we seek to  compare an option in a familiar 
domain in a single dimension (or a standard composite in m ultiple dimensions). 
Thus, for example, we could hold "within our mind" an ordinal scale o f preference o f 
motor cars, based on familiar marques o f car. We m ight be able to  "slot" a new 
"option" into this scale, dealing w ith perturbations from the most similar standard in 
the normal m ix o f attributes, in a trade o ff process. If such differences were 
relatively small, I suggest we could expect stability o f preference, that is, if a similar 
choice was presented at a different time, a similar selection would be made. If the 
choice is multidimensional, and not w ithin a familiar domain, this would not 
necessarily apply, nor would it apply w ithin a familiar domain if  attribute variation 
differed considerably from our references. But there is also an information issue. 3 
bits provides for an ordinal scale o f 8 references in a single dimension (or correlated 
multi-attribute) scale, allowing quite subtle discrimination. The same 3 bits provides
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for only binary classification in 3 dimensions allowing for little  trade-off 
discrimination. Accordingly, we need a considerably greater number o f ordinal scale 
standards for precision o f definition, and, thus, preference stability, in a m ulti­
dimensional situation.
I later examine the issue o f preference stability from an EP viewpoint. For the 
moment I briefly summarise my conclusion that it is d ifficult to  perceive an adaptive 
problem that stability o f preference in m ulti-objective trade-off would solve. In 
general, ancestral problems would have been disparate, often not repeated and, for 
the most part, single objective at the time a decision was made. I w ill argue that we 
were most likely endowed w ith evolved mental and biochemical abilities to select a 
priority single objective giving rise to an innate serial single objective "heuristic". 
Given such a mechanism, there would be considerable adaptive advantage in being 
able to exploit experience to improve accuracy o f assessment o f factors related to a 
current single objective, even when assessing the impact o f many inputs; and we 
can expect innate competence in this area. But that is not a value problem. We are 
unlikely to  have been endowed w ith a stable mental yardstick o f value, or an ability 
to reduce m ultiple attribute magnitudes into a finely differentiated structure o f 
consequential values.
Fischoff, Slovic and Lichenstein (1980, p i37) w rite, "Expressed values seem to  be 
highly labile. Subtle changes in elicitation mode can have marked effects on what 
people express as their preferences. Some o f these effects are reversible, others not; 
some deepen the respondent’s perspective, others do not; some are induced 
deliberately, others are not; some are specific to questions o f value, others affect 
judgments o f all kinds; some are well documented, others are mere speculation": 
but it seems that more than mere expression is labile. W ithin our language is the 
understanding that preference is mobile and ambiguous. We "are in tw o minds", we 
"change our m ind", we do things "against our better judgement". Are the values our 
own or assumed for others for whom we must act? Do they reflect our tastes and 
desires unmodified by conscience or strength o f w ill? We know that they are 
affected by extremes o f mental state (Alloy and Abramson, 1979) and that our 
assessment o f the likelihood o f positive and negative events also seems affected by 
induced mood (Wright and Bower, 1992). But are not values also likely to be 
significantly altered by subtle changes in emotional influences? A bright spring day
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puts a bounce in our step, makes us more optim istic than yesterday, and alters our 
values. Our values change after a drink, after sex, after we have "slept on it", and, 
perhaps, after a few minutes. "Positive or negative moods often seem to influence 
our attitudes and values, the judgments we form .., the way we speak.., the way 
we plan .., and even the way we relate to well-known others." (Forgas and George, 
2001, p4). Additionally, as March (1978, p i 55) observes," We avoid our 
preferences. Our actions and our preferences are only partly linked. We are 
prepared to say that we want something, yet should not want it, or wish we did not 
want it." He also considers (p i 54) that we construct our preferences in association 
w ith our actions that "we elaborate our tastes as interpretations o f our behavior": this 
would be impossible in a mind o f stable values. W right and Goodwin (1999) 
similarly emphasise that options inform values, as well as vice versa, and distinguish 
between unformed and labile values. They also debate the methodological 
implications that the prior intellectual consideration o f values associated w ith a 
decision in prospect, may be different from our feelings, and hence values, for it 
once made. They suggest simulation as a means o f looking beyond the decision.
But whilst this may diminish uncertainty, lability is likely to  remain.
This instability adds to the philosophic problem o f what a person's values actually 
are. Are they as just expressed? Probably not if  the person cannot explain his 
change o f view. They are likely to be snapshots, not o f a materially moving target, 
but a momentary expression o f equal validity to  those coming immediately before 
or afterwards. This would im ply that the conclusion based on any such momentary 
value may be perfectly satisfactory but that the value frame o f the person still 
remains unseen, hidden in a never expressed average, or even w ith no average at 
all.
O f course, the unstable nature o f preference m ight not in principle always preclude 
the statistical discrimination o f fine structure, should a model o f preference be fitted 
over enough observations. However, the nature o f the decision problem, in contrast 
to a diagnostic one, is that it is essentially one-off. Meaningful judgements can be 
expressed between relatively few expressions o f preference, and most decision 
problem structures do not lend themselves to increasing the number o f 
"experimental observations". (Indeed, multiplication o f elucidation tests, risks loss o f 
validity by compromising the sustainability o f the interest o f the decision maker). I
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suggest that, similarly to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle o f physics, there is an 
inherent unimprovable uncertainty in the expression o f preference. Moreover, 
attempts to discern fine or complex value structure by seeking to  examine 
preference, as if from an unconscious black box for which all options are open, w ill 
in most instances be spurious and misleading. It is doubtful that such derived 
values, unless they are consciously endorsed, can be considered rational. I w ill 
return to  this point.
W hilst one must remain open to the possibility o f mis-specification, this feature 
alters the "burden o f proof'. The task o f the modeller is not to  define a 
comprehensive "best fit" representation o f the mind o f the decision maker, 
independently o f that mind; in any case, as futile a task in a je lly world o f labile 
preference as taking a photograph o f an electron. Rather it is to  capture, as simply 
as possible, ail well-considered expressed preferences o f a decision maker in a 
transparent statement o f value that he can examine, modify and use to produce 
potential solutions and which can enhance (though not fix) the solidity o f his value 
and preference base.
One should note that lability o f Value does not im ply either, that people find it 
d ifficult to  identify issues or factors o f importance in a reliable and stable way, or, 
that their structuring is unstable. In fact, the contrary seems to be the case, as 
suggested, for example, by B Kieinmuntz (1990) in distinguishing the relative 
competencies o f men and machines, and Axelrod (1976, p i4) in commenting on 
the apparent stability o f cognitive maps.
2.7 Capacity as an insight into preference stability
I have suggested that we are unlikely to have been endowed w ith a stable mental 
yardstick o f preference, enabling translation o f attribute magnitudes into a finely 
differentiated scale o f consequential values. Can this view  be triangulated by other 
evidence?
Certainly, if  we have a restricted ability to discriminate in other areas o f importance 
to our survival, then it would not be reasonable to  expect our minds to be capable 
o f reducing multi-dimensional attributes into a more finely graduated scale o f value. 
W ithout that, stability o f value is impossible.
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M iller (1956) collated work by others from which he assessed channel capacity to 
discriminate and report psychological (mainly sensory) phenomena differing in 
degree on a single dimension to approximately 2.5 bits (the "magical number 
seven" as he approximated it). He amplified this by explaining, "First, note that 2.5 
bits corresponds to  about six equally likely alternatives. The result means that we 
cannot pick more than six different pitches that the listener w ill never confuse. Or, 
stated slightly differently, no matter how many alternative tones we are asking him 
to judge, the best we can expect him to do is to assign them to about six different 
classes w ithout error. Or, again, if we know that there were N alternative stimuli, 
then his judgment enables us to narrow down the particular stimulus to one out o f 
N/6". There were some phenomena for which at least a 3 b it capability was 
recorded but none as high as four. He noted that where the number o f dimensions 
in which a phenomenon was represented increased, so did the aggregate 
information discriminated, though the information capacity in each dimension 
diminished. He reached no firm conclusion on what the aggregate lim it o f 
multidimensional information was possible for people to discriminate, nor the 
number o f dimensions in which it was possible to make simultaneous meaningful 
distinctions. However, he noted an experiment by Pollack and Ficks who varied six 
different acoustic variables (frequency, intensity, rate o f interruption, on-time 
fraction, total duration and spatial location) and allowed each variable to  take one o f 
5 levels, ie 15625 different possibilities. Under these circumstances transmitted 
information rose to  7.2 bits corresponding to  150 different categories or just over 2 
sub-divisions per dimension.
Relative to  the variety o f variation o f any phenomenon in the environment (nearly 
always infinite), this degree o f discriminatory power (more rigorously, the ability to 
report discrimination) seems paltry. I w ill suggest later that this apparently lim ited 
capability is commensurate w ith the primeval "need" to discriminate.
However, if this capacity lim itation is reasonable it is an important indicator o f 
potential value precision. If we cannot hold an ordinal standard o f many bits for well 
practised and manifestly important sensory phenomena, it is unreasonable to expect 
that we could discriminate multivariable contributions to value w ith greater finesse.
If we can store less than 23 ordinal scale standards for single dimensional, and less 
than 28 standards for multidimensional sensory phenomena, we cannot expect
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contributors to value (of far less adaptive importance) to have more "in the mind" 
standards.
However, value integration over m ultiple dimensions is likely to be cruder than this. 
In the single dimension task phenomena were discriminated and ordered, but in the 
m ultiple dimension tasks they were discriminated but only ordered in each 
dimension (eg quite loud, half left and far away). They were not reduced to  a single 
dimension, such as, for the Pollack and Ficks experiment, to  a measure o f 
noticeability. Reduction to a single dimension w ill itself reduce precision and 
information, and we m ight expect a single dimension measure derived from 
m ultiple attributes to be reported w ith less reliability than an unmodified important 
phenomenon measured directly. If we cannot postulate a mechanism, or an 
adaptive advantage to  the species, should we not expect a weight defining a value 
trade-off to  be discriminated w ith less reliability than the 2.5 b it average that M iller 
suggests for specific sensory systems?
I am not aware o f any empirical research explicitly on this. However, Hayes (1962) 
conducted experiments on a simulated m ilitary problem for which m ulti­
dimensional information on factors relevant to the decision were presented to 
suitable subjects. Inter alia, he examined the amount o f information transmitted 
from available data to the solution o f the problem. This was measured in a manner 
which reflected the reduction in the variety o f decisions made as a result o f the 
information. For example, if  data reduced eight a priori equally likely options to two 
selections, each chosen w ith equal probability, there would be 2 b it transmission. 
Information transmission increased w ith a higher number o f options (8 rather than 
4), but there was no evidence that the provision o f extra information, in the form o f 
data on other relevant characteristics, resulted in more information being 
transmitted to the decision, nor were the decisions o f better quality. Also, 
remarkably (although Hayes makes no comment), the information extracted is low. 
In an experiment where particular attention was paid to the training o f subjects and 
there was improvement in transmitted information and decision quality, 
transmission was, in the 8 alternative case, typically 1.5 bits, a considerable 
reduction on the M iller discrimination. 1.5 bits constitutes an ability to classify 
reliably into only three classes. Even if the Hayes problem was argued to be difficult 
(the genre may be unfamiliar to many o f us, but there should is no reason why the
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problem should have been difficult for the subjects he used), it is hard to believe 
that better than 2 bit extraction is possible.
The failure to extract extra information by adding variables, adds support to the 
view  o f Larichev (1992) that people cannot reliably express preference between 
binary choices that simultaneously vary in more than tw o dimensions. When data 
on additional factors does not result in extra transmitted information, it is an 
indication that we cannot readily digest the implications o f multi-dimensionality in 
establishing our preferences. (Though, we should not ignore that a decision maker 
m ight be attaching zero value to  the additional dimensions). Capacity constitutes a 
"bound to  rationality", as Taylor (1975) points out when describing "cognitive strain". 
This bound appears quite lim iting to our value discrim inatory competence in 
m ultiple dimension situations.
In one matter, however, the translation from an attribute measure to value is clear 
enough. Favourable variations however small, if  in the same direction, w ill always 
be perceived as more valuable, and this conclusion may be argued to be finely 
discriminated. But the source o f this ability is apparent and distinct from m ulti­
dimensional integration. It does not depend on an in-the-m ind standard, it arises 
from properties o f the objects not o f the mind. Decisions in this case are literally "no 
brain" decisions.
2.8 Judgement as an Insight to  preference stability
Judgement in a multiple factor situation has much in common w ith choice in a 
m ultiple attribute situation. Indeed, we often say o f decision makers that they 
require the quality o f "judgement"; by this we mean that they should be good at 
translating multi-variable data into decisions. Unfortunately, the quality o f decision 
making is usually uncheckable by examining outcomes, except in the long run and 
then only poorly. Values which underlay the decision can rarely be checked and, 
because often the circumstances were unique, the maintenance o f those values and 
their "definiteness" cannot readily be examined.
On the other hand, Judgement, which we m ight define as the process by which 
information is processed to form a conclusion, is checkable against outcome, in 
some circumstances. Judgements may be o f the types: What is the best city for our
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Head Office? Is John more handsome than Peter? Is Manchester United the best 
soccer team this season? Is the accused Guilty or Not Guilty? W ill Brave Warrior win 
the 3.15pm at Chepstow? Has the patient got Chicken Pox? How long w ill the 
patient live? Some o f these are multi-variable decisions o f the type we are used to 
analysing (the first, for example): they involve value as well as factual assessment 
but are not checkable, unless best is pre-defined. Evaluation is also are confused by 
environmental circumstances differing from the assumptions which underlay the 
decision. Whether John is more handsome, or MU the best, are essentially decision- 
less expressions o f opinion dependent on private value Judgements. "Is the accused 
Guilty?", is a question o f fact not o f value, but is not checkable outside a process 
which gives rise to the same question. Brave Warrior's success in that race can be 
checked but the experiment is not repeatable and the unbounded number o f the 
factors m ilitates against generalisation. But whether the patient has Chicken Pox and 
how long the patient w ill live, do not involve value or preference, though the 
questions do involve valuation, and at least at some point the correctness o f the 
conclusion becomes clear. Moreover, the judgement o f facts relating to  the 
diagnosis and prognosis can be, and is, repeated many times, in sufficiently 
identical circumstances, for only variation in a bounded set o f clinical indicators to 
be relevant. It is for this reason that the quality o f clinical judgement can be judged, 
and, ve iy importantly, assessed in terms o f how information is processed to  draw 
conclusions on the consistency o f the valuation o f factors bearing on the problem.
We can argue that values, preferences, or tastes are the judgement determined 
"weights" from which knowledge o f magnitude o f factors is converted into 
subjective measures o f "goodness" o f each decision option. This is very similar to  a 
clinical judgement task o f valuation o f factors. The consultant must form, from a 
weighted composite o f cues, a subjective measure (in this case true/false) o f 
whether the condition is present. However, the differences (a well-bounded 
unambiguous problem, a clear goal, repetitiveness, an objective, if  unrevealed, 
association between clearly observable factors, and an observable end allowing 
retrospective testability), permits scrutiny o f the valuation process which is not 
present in most decision processes. It is also a problem where consultants can learn 
and improve w ith their own direct and vicarious experience o f other specific cases 
or research conclusions from them. In short it is an examinable problem, which 
reasoning players should do particularly well at, but is sufficiently similar in other
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respects, for broad conclusions to be translatable to decision analysis value and 
preference formation. Indeed, consistency o f application in cue weights in such a 
judgement process, is likely to  be o f greater order than the consistency o f the 
components o f a value objective or preference. Work on clinical judgement is likely 
to indicate an upper bound o f capability in value definition in more ambiguous 
circumstances.
A significant amount o f work has been done on judgement and consolidated into 
general findings (Goldberg, 1968, 1970; Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Dawes, Faust, 
and Meehl, 1989; B Kleinmuntz, 1990). The most intriguing o f these follow  the 
development o f models which relate factors, not to  proved medical conditions, but, 
to  clinicians' diagnosis o f medical conditions. Hoffman (1960) described such 
valuation simulating models as paramorphic representations o f the decision maker's 
judgement; a word he coined to  reflect that such models did not even attempt to 
m im ic the actual evaluative mechanism but merely the results o f such processes. 
Hoffman's linear models captured a considerable proportion o f the variability o f his 
subject judges. He also observed that increasing the complexity o f the models to 
incorporate the configurality (interaction effects) o f assessment, appeared not to add 
to the explanatory power o f the model.
Hoffman himself made no use o f the models he developed to  assist diagnosis but 
Yntema and Torgeson (1961), investigated both the mathematical adequacy o f 
linear models o f value and the linearisation o f value that subjects seemed to use to 
value non-linear phenomena. They suggested that such models o f judges could be 
more effective future predictors than the actual judgements, "The improvement 
achieved by averaging a number o f responses suggests an intriguing possibility. 
Artificial, precomputed judgments may in some cases be better than those the man 
could make himself if he dealt w ith each situation as it arose.". Bowman (1963) 
drew a similar conclusion in the production management area; "a decision rule w ith 
mean coefficients estimated from management behaviour should be better than 
actual performance" (p321). The conclusion that the model o f the judge appears to 
be better than the judge appears to be robust, and Baron (1988, p406) suggests,
" ..even for the cases that the judge has already judged." The methodology o f 
capturing the policy o f a decision maker/s in a model, often a simple linear model, 
and then using the model rather that the judge is termed Bootstrapping. Hoffman
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(1968) pointed out the methodological difficulty o f establishing the existence o f 
configurality in judgement processes, observing, for cases examined, that significant 
interaction effects were small relative to linear contributions. Siovic (1969) also 
challenged the suggestion that judges do not introduce configurality into their 
processes, looking in detail at tw o stockbrokers. However, the central issue, for the 
purpose o f this thesis, is not that judges are configural (which I am w illing  to  take as 
read), but that unsophisticated linear models o f judges outperform the actual 
judges, notwithstanding the additional factors such as configurality, special 
circumstance treatment, access to additional information, and whatever other 
intelligent use o f information they bring to the assessment.
Goldberg (1970) introduces an interesting qualification. W hilst models outperform 
single judges on which they are based, models o f the composite or average views 
o f several judges looking at the same evidence, may not outperform the composite 
judgements o f the group o f judges. Blattberg and Hoch (1990) also suggest that 
whilst a statistical (non-bootstrap) model may out-perform an expert, a composite 
o f statistical model and judge outperforms the model.
Dawes and Corrigan (1974) go further, questioning best fit representations and 
demonstrating that in cases that they examine, equal weight and random weight 
linear models also outperform the judges on which they are based. Dawes (1979) 
subsequently argued that such "improper models" chosen by nonoptimal methods 
have practical validity. Wainer (1976) further suggests that equal weight models 
often differ little  in predictive power from optim ally weighted models, have greater 
robustness, and are more appropriate. A  similar view  is also taken by Einhom and 
Hogarth (1975) outside the Bootstrapping context. However, whilst I am 
sympathetic to the concept o f avoiding gratuitous precision and the concomitant 
danger o f self-delusion that precise parameters im ply a precise model, it is illusory 
that such an approach removes view-form ing on appropriate weights from decision 
maker/ analyst. The selection o f variables, and the choice o f scale units on which an 
attribute is measured, may be viewed as im plicit weight selection. The fact that very 
simple paramorphic models outperform the judges on which they are based is not 
o f itself a reason to  eschew a more complete, but still paramorphic model, unless 
user accessibility compensates imprecision. Wainer's view  appears somewhat 
extreme; it is not difficult to synthesise counter examples. [In an illustrative test I
57
undertook, one could continue to get very good answers (ie explain a comparable 
percentage o f variance), if  equal weights were assumed when optimum weights 
were, say, .6 and .4, but not when true weights were .8 and .2. Then it appears 
better to ignore the second factor altogether. Moreover, there is a mid-ground 
where it appears that neither simplified heuristic is adequate. It is possible that a 
composite, in which equal weight, 2:1 weight, or 1:0 weight, are alternatively 
assigned, m ight have explanatory power close to  an optimum least squares model.]
The success o f paramorphic models relative to the judges on which they are based 
does not reduce the importance o f humans in being able to recognise patterns and 
to identify factors o f importance. However as Dawes, Faust and Meehl observe 
(1989, p i671), "The possession o f unique observational capacities clearly implies 
that human input or interaction is often needed to  achieve maximal predictive 
accuracy (or to uncover potentially useful variables) but tempts us to draw an 
additional, dubious inference. A  unique capacity to  observe is not the same as a 
unique capacity to predict on the basis integration o f observations. ...greater 
accuracy may be achieved if the skilled observer performs this function and then 
steps aside, leaving the interpretation o f observational and other data to the 
actuarial method." Ebert and Kruse (1978) provided specific evidence o f the 
applicability o f bootstrapping in the investment environment. They too suggest that 
analysts should concern themselves w ith the search for new cues and development 
o f search procedures rather than making judgements about future returns.
How m ight these findings be interpreted in a process model?
Let v = true value o f condition being assessed 
Vj = judged value o f condition being assessed 
£ j  =  random variable representing overall error o f judge's estimate 
xn = magnitude o f factor n (xn may embrace a constant term) 
a„ = true weight o f factor n 
en = judge's systematic error in weight for factor n 
en =  judge's random error in weight for factor n
S = contribution to value o f factors not in paramorphic model (perceived as random by 
the paramorphic model but discerned by the judge subject to error). 
es = judge's error in estimating contribution of factors not in paramorphic model
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S and es subsume all factors not incorporated in the paramorphic model o f the
judge, including unincorporated variables (including random effects) and configural 
modifications. We can thus w rite the true relationship describing the link between a 
judged phenomenon and the weight o f indicative factors as
v=5X*" +s (2.2)
all n
and the judged value according to the judge as
vj = E(a»+e»+e»K +s+^ (2.3)
all n
...and  the paramorphic estimate as
v  = = X(a„+e„ + 5 » K
all n alln
Where additionally
b„ = paramorphic model estimate o f a„ + e„ 
S„ = error in estimate o f a„ + e„n n n
(2.4)
What then becomes the issue is the accuracy o f the judge relative to the 
paramorphic model. Elements common to both are irrelevant, this includes both the 
actual weights and the systematic error o f the judge's error in assessing those 
weights which are embraced by the paramorphic model. The elements o f variance 
o f the paramorphic model from true, which are not also included in the model o f 
the judge, are the variances o f S , Sn jcn: Those o f the judge are es , en.xn. This
implies (assuming error independence) that, for paramorphic models to  be better 
than the judge:
The variance o f the paramorphic estimation error o f the judge's 
weights (multiplied by the factor magnitudes)
+The variance o f configural and other effects discerned by the judge 
but not in the paramorphic model
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must be less than
The variance o f the judge's random error in estimating weights from
occasion to occasion (multiplied by the factor magnitudes)
+The variance o f the error the judge makes in estimating configural
and other effects not in the paramorphic model
We might, arguably, assume that the variance o f the error that the judge introduces 
in considering special effects, is small compared w ith the error made in the 
paramorphic model as a result o f excluding them (allowing that an expert has the 
ability to discern significantly useful additional factors ). We are left w ith the 
conclusion that paramorphic model estimation errors plus the variance o f special 
effects considered by the judge but excluded by the model, is outweighed (and if 
the phenomenon is as robust as it appears, considerably outweighed) by the 
variance o f random errors o f weight estimation by the judge. In short, for 
bootstrapping to be viable implies that the judge must be highly inconsistent in the 
weights he or she adopts from one occasion to  another. (A t the tim e o f preparing 
the above argument, I was not aware o f Camerer (1981) who examines statistical 
conditions for the superiority o f bootstrapping, based on correlation coefficients. 
However, the view  here m ight provide a more revealing illustrative perspective for 
this purpose).
This adds further weight to the suggestion that people's inherent cardinal weight 
stability is low  on matters o f value. Despite the judge having a clear, defined and 
testable objective on a repeated task fine-tuned experience, he or she is 
inconsistent in assessing factors. A decision maker has no such solidity o f purpose 
w ith respect to a non-repetitive task. It does not seem reasonable that the decision 
maker's value weights should be intrinsically more stable. However there is a further 
issue: in the judgement task, whilst weights may vary from case to case, there is a 
central tendency, a long-run adherence to a stable cause-effect relationship. This is 
not present in unrepeated circumstances against a background o f Vague objectives 
that characterises general decision making. We m ight even reasonably argue that 
for this situation the concept o f a central tendency is not meaningful, it m ight be 
better imagined as a random walk. We are left w ith lability.
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Simon (1955, p246) observed, M y  first empirical proposition is that there is a 
complete lack o f evidence that, in actual human choice situations o f any complexity, 
these computations [o f trade-offs] can be, or are in fact, performed. The 
introspective evidence is certainly clear enough, but we cannot, o f course, rule out 
the possibility the unconscious is a better decision maker than the conscious".
Hayes, M iller, Bootstrapping, the EP perspective, the characteristics o f ordinal scale 
standards, and the meaninglessness o f unconscious value, triangulate the view; they 
make Simon s qualification seem unlikely.
Fischoff (1991) suggests research paradigms based on underlying assumptions 
about how people may assess value. A t one extreme is "Articulated values; People 
know what they want about all possible questions". A t the other is "Basic values; 
People lack articulated values on specific topic". The concept o f labile values w ithin 
a context o f Vague objectives would seem broadly compatible w ith the second o f 
these.
2.9 The sovereignty of a person's present values
March (1978, p i44) observes," Rational choice involves tw o kinds o f guesses: 
guesses about future consequences o f current actions and guesses about future 
preferences for those consequences." Eister (1979), considered that Ulysses, in 
seeking to avoid the seduction o f the Sirens, and to compensate for weakness o f 
w ill, was not fully rational in pre-committing himself to  an irrevocable action, 
thereby foreclosing options which he would otherwise have had. 1 suggest that both 
make an assumption concerning the rational actor which is unnecessary; that is a 
persons future values, as values independent o f the present, are relevant to current 
rational choice. I suggest that this distinction is redundant and that a decision maker 
has no duty to his or her future values. Moreover, the concept is essentially 
meaningless as the extent to which a decision maker anticipates them and makes a 
present choice between sets o f tastes or values, whether tagged temporally or not, 
he or she actually incorporates them in his or her present values.
Is such a view  morally sustainable? Should we not allow, for example, that our 
grand children w ill have different values from our own and have a right to  exercise 
them?
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The issue here is that we m ight (and, 1 consider, as a matter o f personal ethics, 
should) have regard in our present valuation and preference mechanisms to the 
future consequences o f our decisions and, for example, place value now on the 
future condition o f the environment; or we m ight, as a matter o f policy, avoid pre- 
commitment o f action o f little  direct relevance to this generation, leaving 
appropriate decision making to succeeding generations in the light o f their values. 
But this is a statement about our current values. It is also reasonable to imagine 
oneself in the future and, by attempting to anticipate "feelings" beyond the decision 
taking and the decision consequences, modify our present values. But we should 
only act on the considered values and consequential preferences, labile though they 
may be, that we have ourselves at the tim e we commit. When the present gives 
way to the future then, and only then, are new values relevant.
Our expectations o f the future values o f ourselves or other people, inasmuch as 
they are not incorporated in current values, are also relevant to current decisions as 
factors, in the same way that future consequences are. It is in this manner that we 
must judge Ulysses's rationality. If Ulysses had expected that his values would be 
unchanged, indeed, it would have been irrational to have pre-committed action. His 
future self would be a faithful agent o f his present self, and to  deny the opportunity 
o f changing or fine-tuning the decision, in the light o f unexpected changes in 
circumstances, would have been foolish. However, he saw his expected future 
values as contrary and inimical to  his present values. It would have been irrational 
had he not sought to prevent the potential corruption o f his present decision by the 
action o f a person (his future self) whose values he repudiated. He was perfectly 
able to judge an inferior outcome, given his present values, had he allowed his 
contradictory future values to have a vote in the disposal o f the matter.
The ethical position o f trustee, agent, or manager making decisions on behalf o f 
others, is similar. We could argue that he or she should put aside his or her own 
values for the purpose o f the decision. But what if he or she has more than one 
constituency affected by the decision and those interests conflict, or considers any 
o f them offensive to his or her ethics? Ultimately, the decision maker must resolve 
such considerations w ithin his or her personal value system which cannot be set 
aside (those values may be the very reason why they have been trusted w ith
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authority). The decision maker adopts the values he or she chooses. This may be in 
good or bad faith, altruistically or selfishly; but adopt values he must.
2.10 Rationality
Most decision aids suppose a rational decision maker, desirous o f making a decision 
based on rational principles; the aids themselves supposedly incorporate w ithin 
their model structures rational procedures. What does the concept o f rationality 
involve and how do I use this term?
M y dictionary says, "of or based on reasoning or reason" or "sensible, sane and 
moderate; not foolish absurd or extreme". Baron (1988, p3) suggests, "The best kind 
o f thinking, which we shall call rational thinking, is whatever helps us fulfil our 
personal goals... When I argue that certain kinds o f thinking are most rational, I 
mean that these help people fulfil their goals", and (p32) "Rationality concerns the 
methods o f thinking we use, not the conclusions o f our thinking. Rational methods 
are those that are generally best in achieving the thinker s goal". He goes on to 
point out that Rationality is not the same as correctness nor does it im ply a 
selfishness o f motive. One can subsume w ithin oneself the goals o f another or o f 
society. Evans and Over (1996, p25) point out "We have a goal when we aim to 
reach some state o f affairs - ie to make some proposition true - by means o f our 
actions." These im ply a process by which purposeful action is determined.
Eister (1986, p i2-13) expands this idea. He sees rational choice as an intentional 
process involving a 3 piece relation between behaviour (B), a set o f cognitions or 
beliefs (C), and a set o f desires (D). First the desires and beliefs should be reasons for 
the behaviour in the sense that given C, B is the best means to achieve D. However, 
C and D must cause B and do so "qua reasons", that is intentionally and not 
incidentally. He also suggests that rationality also requires that the "belief has a 
maximal degree o f inductive plausibility given the evidence". The belief must also 
be caused by the evidence and do so "in the right way" eg not as a result o f faulty 
reasoning.
However, Lee (1971, p i 5) suggests, "A fundamental assertion that "man chooses 
rationally (optimally) may be taken to be true by tauto logy.." and as Baron (p289) 
observes, "Many scholars (especially economists, but also some psychologists and
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philosophers) have been reluctant to adm it that people are sometimes irrational, so 
they have tried to develop criteria o f rationality that are consistent w ith our 
behavior."
Rationality connotes both issues o f process and criteria and seems to be used 
differently in descriptive and prescriptive contexts. Von W inderfeldt and Edwards 
(1986, p2) however suggest that, "The notion o f rationality is clearly prescriptive: in 
any version, it explicitly says some thoughts and actions are appropriate and others 
are not. But one can easily distinguish tw o kinds o f prescriptions. One has to do 
w ith ends or goals or moral imperatives ....A  quite different kind o f prescription has 
to do w ith selecting ways o f thinking and acting to  serve your ends or goals or 
moral imperatives."
Yet another view  is provided by French (1986, p28) who suggests "Veiy roughly a 
rational decision rule is compatible w ith certain principles o f good decision making. 
Thus the meaning o f 'rational' is context dependent; it depends on the principles o f 
good decision making being discussed." He goes on to  advise his readers to  distrust 
the word. Although he does not explicitly say, we m ight infer, given that his 
subtitle is "An introduction to the mathematics o f rationality", that the principles o f 
good decision making embrace at least to  some degree, conformity w ith axioms o f 
rationality. Lee (1971, pp7-9), however, whilst noting that rational decisions 
depends on the decision principle employed, that these may differ for different 
people, and are dependent on the relevant information available, comments 'The 
basic idea o f a rational decision is that it is in some sense a "Best" or "optimal" 
decision". Sutherland (1992, p4) makes the similar point, “ ...a  rational action is the 
one that, given the person’s knowledge, is most likely to achieve his end.
Rationality can only be assessed in the light o f what a person knows.."
It is this concept, the notion o f rationality as comment on the testable goodness o f 
the result, as an indicator o f what one ought to  do, as a normative concept relating 
to  the decision, that most appeals to me.
But even w ithin a normative view, rationality would seem to be something 
requiring a qualification: w ithin what constraints? As Simon (1957, p i82) comments 
in introducing his principle o f Bounded Rationality "The capacity o f the human mind 
for formulating and solving complex problems is veiy small compared w ith the size
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o f the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the 
real-world - or even for reasonable approximation to such an objective rationality." 
Rationality, to  be useful, must not be dependent on absolute assumptions o f M r 
Spock-like omniscience, but must deal w ith our information, ourselves, and our 
aids, as they are, w ithin a bounded domain. Because o f this Simon (1978) 
distinguishes Procedural rationality from what he calls Substantive rationality. We 
must accept that if  our capacity to handle information were different, our rationality 
would be different too. Moreover, an absolute concept is not useful to a decision 
analyst whose purpose is to expand the bounds, as, even armed w ith his tools, his 
own capacity, like that o f the decision maker, is still woefully lim ited and he cannot 
throw this off.
There is an additional problem which has already been mentioned; the nature and 
stability o f our goals and values. I w ill propose that we may not have been 
endowed by the evolutionary process w ith a sophisticated intuitive capability to 
handle strategic objectives o f any complexity and I have already suggested that our 
values are labile. Our goals, ambitions, desires, values, tastes and preferences 
would seem as March (1978) suggests, neither "absolute", "stable", "consistent", or 
"precise" but at any instant a pulsating mass o f imprecision, instability, variability and 
non-specificity. Rationality, as 1 would wish to define it, in this situation m ight seem 
illusory and it does require sleight o f hand. However, it can be secured 
operationally by an element o f imposed stability, not unchanging nor even slow- 
changing, but for an instant steady.
Such steadying can be achieved by definition or at least self-declaration o f the 
decision maker's ambitions or desires, even if  incomplete. It should be noted that 
this requires no more than a temporary conscious recognition, a commitment to 
memory o f sufficient duration to allow reflection or subsequent recall and conscious 
scrutiny, a check to fluidity. Such a process can set the ever-shifting sands o f our 
tastes, at least to the extent that is necessary for the demands o f traditional rational 
choice theory (as described by March) to apply. It comes at a price; possible self- 
delusion (that our true values are permanently as we assessed them at that 
moment) or poor sampling from the extremities o f the haze o f the person's desires. 
Nor does this, o f itself, extend the bounds o f rationality o f the decision maker. 
Indeed, it imposes artificial structure on the problem, additional bounding.
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However, I suggest it is necessary for the normal restrictions o f rationality to be 
extended by supplementary means.
2.11 Towards a normative rationality and material optim ality 
Once a person seeks to extend the normal bounds o f his rationality by some aided 
process (including self-aid, such as implied by a pen and paper analysis o f a 
problem), his rationality ceases to be entirely internal. He debates w ith himself. Just 
as desires and goals must in some sense be declared, so also must the concept o f 
rationality which he w ill seek to impose on himself. Normative considerations then 
must apply. Whereas before I m ight have goals and cognitions and 1 decide, now 
the element o f "ought" is clear. The concept o f criterion enters the arena. This is 
especially so as soon as the problem is to be shared between more than one mind, 
through discussion w ith other people or through an adviser-decision maker 
relationship. However, it is also true as soon as the extensions o f the bounds o f 
rationality is to be achieved by decision modelling, and the extension o f the 
computing powers o f the mind by electronic computing. A t this point Lee's notion 
o f positively seeking to  be "Best" must enter the concept o f rationality. Only when 
the problem is externalised or taken out o f its box to be subjected to some private 
but conscious process that we avoid the tautological quality (that he warns us of). 
Otherwise, if  the decision was not the best w ithin our "rational" facility we would 
simply have made another.
Now we must declare our purpose (at least im plicitly) in advance o f our decision 
and test against it. We may not be rational, we probably w ill not be rational, but we 
do not seek to be capricious (except possibly as political tactic outside the ambit o f 
our declared problem); we seek to be rational. Simon(1957 p p 196-199) makes the 
distinction between "intended rationality" and "objective rationality" and it is a useful 
one for normative decision analysis. We m ight say that the posture o f an objectively 
rational decision maker is to  intend to be rational in his decision making. Once, 
employing Procedural rationality, we decide to analyse normatively in order to 
extend bounds, we must adopt a formal or Substantive rationality to  take the matter 
further.
What then are the properties o f normative rationality? I suggest as a basis that:
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A decision maker makes a rational decision if  he can find no decision which 
is materially superior to  it, using such criteria as he judges best reflects the 
value to him o f the decision, given his perception o f the possible outcomes 
in terms o f the factors that he considers relevant, and his perceptions o f their 
likelihood. Where a decision maker believes that alternative criteria may be 
applied, there shall be at least one criterion under which this condition is 
met. He intends rationality if he seeks a rational decision.
This definition in effect allows a decision maker to  make the rules (any rules which 
he intends should be rational), which define the value to him o f a decision. 
Moreover, given that rationality does not require a person to  be o f fixed mind, he 
or she may change them flexibly. Rational decisions must then conform to those 
rules; irrational decisions w ill not. However, a critical issue is that a third party can 
never gainsay the subject on the basis o f the decision alone, though it is permissible 
to  challenge or recommend declared criteria o f intention. For clarity it should be 
made clear that such rules m ight not be accurately articulated or communicable. 
Indeed, as they are likely to be soft and qualified in subtle ways, they are unlikely to 
be. Thus they may not, indeed cannot be, perfectly reflected in the models used to 
assist the decision maker. These models are further downstream. These are 
simplifications o f reality and include simplification o f the decision maker's rules.
A lack o f conformity either indicates a failure to adequately reflect the rules or 
irrationality. Such a failure may not indicate invalidity o f the model. A  decision 
maker may reject a specific "suggestion" o f a formal model, adopting instead, say, 
the second option. Such decision may be rational and be so w ithout impugning the 
integrity o f the model, which could have been instrumental in highlighting the 
option. Moreover, the rationality or irrationality o f the decision could still have been 
clarified by aid o f the model.
We m ight also note that whilst a derivative model, seeking to reflect a decision 
makers rules, may involve searches for what the analyst may describe as an 
"optimum", the rationally intentioned decision maker w ill merely be seeking 
approximate or material optim ality. We should allow that any concept o f optim ality 
must also be owned by the decision maker and must embrace deviations that he or 
she may tolerate. There is no "ought" about implementing modelled or even real 
optima, but there is rational imperative in implementing approximate optima.
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This idea o f rationality does not, o f itself, require uniqueness o f rational decisions, as 
real rules w ill not be determinate even if  their mathematical approximations are. 
There may be m ultiple rules (which should not be confused w ith multiple 
objectives, as the former can embrace methods for resolving conflicts o f objectives). 
Use o f satisficing, for example, m ight also allow m ultiple rational solutions. 
However, the rationally intentioned decision maker must ultimately produce unique 
decisions and must resolve non-uniqueness (see below).
This basic concept o f rationality m ight be usefully supplemented by more traditional 
mathematical axioms o f rationality (eg French, 1986, p39). However, I prefer to 
weaken slightly these supplements by considering these as tests o f the intended 
rationality o f the decision maker, or recommendations to him or her, rather than as 
tests o f the rationality o f the decision itself. I suggest that a decision maker who 
intends to be rational should, given evidence that he has not done so in a material 
way, modify his criteria to comply w ith:
1. Samuelson's (1938) Weak Axiom o f Revealed Preference. This states that if a 
person reveals a preference for A  over B he may not also reveal a preference 
for B over A. A  may not be judged more valuable than B and also be less 
valuable.
2. Transitivity. A  rationally intended decision maker w ill not sustain any criterion 
that causes him to  conclude that A  is more valuable than B, which is more 
valuable than C, and that C is more valuable than A, in the face o f evidence 
that a material contrary effect has or could be produced. (Transitivity is 
argued by Sen (1986) to be implied by 1 above).
3. Independence o f Irrelevant Alternatives. A  decision maker may properly re­
examine his criteria for any reason, and this can be stimulated by the 
introduction o f new alternatives which may not, in the end, be candidates for 
selection. In this sense, an irrelevant alternative may legitim ately influence 
choice. However, a rationally intended decision maker w ill not sustain a 
criterion in the face o f evidence that it has a material inherent property, 
causing the dependence o f a selected option on the alternatives available, 
when these are not themselves suggested for selection under the criterion.
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Nor w ill he reject a criteria solely on the grounds that it rules-out a particular 
option as a candidate for selection.
4. Domination. A rationally intended decision maker w ill not sustain a criterion 
which causes him to  a prefer A  to B if  for every factor which the decision 
maker considers to  be relevant to the valuation, B is superior to  A.
5. Resolution o f Equivocation. A  rationally intended decision maker may apply 
criteria which do not reduce options to a single choice. When this is not so 
he w ill resolve the ambiguity by
- supplementing, condensing, combining, or replacing criteria.
- choosing between them by an arbitrary process. (Random 
selection is a valid rule).
In modifying criteria he w ill sustain his rationality w ith respect to  the original 
options.
6. Independence o f Value from Prior Circumstances. A  rationally intentioned 
decision maker should seek to place the same value on identical 
circumstances defining a decision outcome whatever gave rise to  them, 
whilst recognising that the value consequences o f a decision may be 
influenced by the State o f the World that is coincident w ith them.
(Within this rule, criteria such as Minimax Regret are acceptable, although 
they do not appeal to  me. A t first sight this does not meet the 
"Independence from Prior Circumstances" requirement. However, knowledge 
o f the characteristics o f rejected options, which seem attractive in hindsight, 
w ill exist after a decision. Such knowledge is a one o f the consequences o f a 
decision and can be anticipated. It is an issue o f ethics, not o f rationality, 
whether one seeks to avoid the discomfort o f knowing a better result could 
have been obtained, or to  avoid hindsight criticism.)
7. Conscious Process. A  rationally intentioned decision maker may express 
preferences arising from conscious or unconscious processes. However, if 
they arise from unconscious processes, he or she w ill consciously review 
them. Moreover, he or she w ill not sustain preferences which are
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inconsistent w ith a value mechanism which he or she consciously holds or 
adopts, though this may be reviewed at any time.
A rationally intended decision maker may properly tolerate immaterial deviations 
from the purer forms o f these statements. For example, the scores generated by 
Saaty's Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980) can be influenced by the inclusion 
o f irrelevant alternatives. A  rationally intended decision maker can ignore such 
objections if  the conclusion is robust to the incorporation, or produces a solution 
judged to  be close in value to what m ight otherwise be obtained. He ceases to be 
rationally intentioned if he recklessly ignores evidence that a particular result could 
be misleading for this reason.
2.12 Efficiency and dominance
Based on Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p68) we can define dominance mentioned under 
4  above as follows:
Let decision options a ' and a n have attributes
x l = ( ^ i  andx" = (x"ls.
where
X i(a'f) = x \  andX t(an) = x ”l / e ( l , ...,«)
Assume that X,  are mutually preferentially independent 
and that preferences increase in each X t 
Then x ' dominates x" if  
x \  > x ”n V / and 3/ x \  > x ”t
(2.5)
Under such circumstances a* may be a candidate for best but a "cannot be, as it is 
inferior in at least one attribute and superior in none. A ll non-dominated options are 
said to be efficient, pareto-optimal, or members o f the efficient set
If we assign any positive valuation weights to the x{ so that
vOO= X  brx 'i and v(x")=  ]T bt.x \
{=1 to n i= l  to n
Then if  x ’dominates x" 
v(x')>v(x")V&,.e{M :&,>()}
Where v(x) = value of bundle o f attributes, x
(2.6)
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This arises as the value contributions must be equal in all cases where the xt are 
equal and must be greater in the dominating option for all the other attributes for 
which, perforce, the xt are greater. In short, it is impossible to find an additive value
function w ith positive coefficients, which gives the dominated option a greater 
value. This opens up the possibility o f redefining dominance and efficiency directly 
by reference to valuation, as is done shortly. This is useful as the attachment o f 
value to decisions is part o f the perspective this work, but it importantly deals w ith 
a problem not accommodated in the basic definition. That is the case where a 
number o f options are not dominated but some w ithin them jointly dominate 
others; that is they are dominated by a convex combination o f efficient options.
For example, the options a, b, and c described by attributes (10, 0), (0,10), and (1,
1) are all non-dominated according to the basic definition. However, if  the structure 
allowed us to choose combinations o f a and b in our decision (as we could, for 
example if  a and b represented shares), we can say that a 50:50 or even a 10:90 
admixture o f a and b would dominate c. But even if  we are not allowed to "mix" 
solutions, value may allow us to  draw conclusions, provided we can make 
additional assumptions concerning the form w ith which attributes 1 and 2 relate to 
value. If we assume that value, is linearly related to the magnitude, we cannot be 
certain whether a is better than c, or b is better than c. However, we can be sure 
that c is inferior to  one or the other as no attribute weight assignment renders it 
simultaneously superior, that is o f higher value, to both, c is therefore inefficient. 
This would not be the case if, for example, the value to  the decision maker was the 
sum o f the magnitudes o f the attributes to the root o f 4. An equal weighting o f 
attributes would then render c superior to both a and b.
There is one other issue that makes the unmodified Keeney and RaifFa definition 
more complicated to  use w ithin the attribute oriented methodology proposed here. 
We may properly say that any real decision has an open-ended number o f attributes 
and those under consideration are selections from an infinite super-set. Over the 
infinite super-set no option w ill be dominated. (After we have considered all the 
usual grounds for choosing a computer printer, there w ill always be excluded 
considerations. An otherwise dominated selection may have a nicer colour, for 
instance).
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The im plicit assumption o f the basic definition is that all attributes relevant to the 
decision, and no irrelevant attributes, are included. The exclusion o f relevant factors 
is a continuous risk o f ail management decision and analyst support and there is 
nothing, in respect o f theory, to  resolve a mis-specified model o f which the parties 
are ignorant. However, I suggest that the inclusion o f attributes does not necessarily 
assert their relevance but only the possibility o f their relevance. We should, and in 
the method developed here I do, allow a decision maker to assert irrelevance o f a 
provisionally included attribute, that is to  assign zero (and not just infinitesimal) 
weight to  an included factor. This is particularly so where attributes are not 
objectives per se, but measures associated w ith objectives. It may also be that some 
attributes can be considered as alternative proxies for a vague objective, not all o f 
which should be given non-zero weight.
Given this view  we can only assert absolute superiority:
(2.7)if
x \ > x " , V i
We can use the expression x ' strongly dominates x" if  this condition is met. I 
describe an option that is not strongly dominated by an option or a combination o f 
options as weakly efficient In the value orientation, an option is strongly dominated 
if  no valuation o f factors can be found which results in the assessed value o f an 
option being absolutely greater than all other options. It is weakly efficient if  a 
valuation o f attributes can be found such that it is at least equal to all options, but 
no better than equal for at least one o f them. In this thesis I w ill also include weakly 
efficient options in the efficient set unless otherwise mentioned. The rationale is that 
such an option should remain under consideration until a positive weight is 
established for at least one attribute for which the condition x \>  x". applies; for if
zero weight is eventually assigned to all such attributes the option becomes co- 
optimal w ith another. Such an option should not be eliminated prematurely. It 
m ight in due course be necessaiy to break ties but this may be just as properly be 
done on the basis o f attributes outw ith the analysed set as those w ithin it that are 
assigned zero weight.
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Though this may be a fine point unlikely to be material w ith real data, it has a 
practical advantage. As w ill be seen later, it usually obviates the need for "epsilon" 
in the LP formulation which w ill be used, and which complicates computation in 
DEA. (If one allows that at least infinitesimal weight attaches to all attributes then a 
weakly efficient solution would cease to be optimal, though then one m ight ask 
whether there are excluded factors o f comparable importance).
2.13 Indifference and Not Knowing
Classical preference theory, as for example described by French (1986, pp61-96), 
assumes three relations Strict Preference {>■), Indifference (~), and Weak Preference
(£), the last implying either Strict Preference or Indifference. Indifference is an
equivalence relation implying exactly equal value. In the world o f decision making 
theory, one may be obliged to accept an archimedean view  o f Indifference. For 
example, if there exists a sum o f money M i which is strictly preferred to  having a 
pound weight o f tomatoes, and having one pound weight o f tomatoes is strictly 
preferred to  having a lesser sum M 3 , there w ill exist a third sum M 2 , M i>M 2 >M 3  
such that one is Indifferent between having a pound o f tomatoes and M 2.. But actual 
Indifference is, I suggest, rare in selection o f prior determined real life options and 
practical preference is expressed (even if not processed) in tw o different relations, 
Strict Preference, and Cannot Say.
True, in many situations, Don't Know may indicate closeness in value (we m ight say, 
a "Close To" relationship) and this may be exploitable, but our differing 
discriminatory competence in varying elicitation situations w ill mean that in many 
situations small differences in value could be discerned in some preference 
comparisons, whilst larger true differences w ill be unidentified in others. ("Close To" 
is much the same as Intransitive Indifference and leads to  semi-orders and interval 
orders; though the relational rules that attach to these, may not help us much in 
practice).
The formulations I discuss are expressed in a value rather than in the relation 
orientation, and in this frame Indifference implies Equivalence o f value. However, 
for the reasons above, I have been reluctant to invoke the concept o f Equivalence,
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except when no further information is available. Then, treating Close To as Identical 
may often be better than sustaining "No view".
Equally, the mechanics o f linear programming which I use, forces (in straightforward 
mode) the use o f the operators > and < for indicating the value o f a preferred option 
relative to  another; this corresponds to Weak Preference in the relation orientation. 
As far as possible, however, I seek the most certain statements o f preference, that is 
statements o f Strict Preference. Although one could say that one intends elicitation 
o f Strict Preference, their purpose is to minimise errors o f transitivity in a Weak 
Preference formulation. However, it is reasonable to say that this issue is of 
negligible practical importance, as a technically Weakly Preferred option could be 
converted into one that would be Strictly Preferred, by an increment o f infinitesimal 
value to one or more attributes.
2.14 An operationalisation o f normative rationality under conditions o f Impairment 
How can the idea o f rationality, and efficiency, be translated into quantitatively 
succinct equivalent representations that can actually be used downstream in analytic 
aids, in models? My aim here is to seek an operationalisation which retains, as far as 
possible, both the concept that the decision maker maintains ownership o f the rules 
by which a decision is considered rational, and at the same time makes no heroic 
assumptions regarding the cognitive facility o f decision makers. I do not insist that a 
rationally intentioned decision maker should make use o f explicit models, but I do 
suggest that, should he or she do so, they would wish to incorporate normatively 
rational model rules paralleling their internal criteria.
Although I w ill later concentrate on deterministic representations, at this stage it is 
appropriate to consider uncertainty. The minimalist representation I suggest 
assumes that the decision maker can discern and act on comparative likelihood and 
comparative value but does not depend on innate concept o f quantitative 
probability or an internal yardstick o f cardinal value. However, I w ill allow in the 
operationalisation that decision makers m ight be able to  assess quantitative 
probability or to  discern a cardinal scale o f value. (Later, I go further and suggest 
that comparative likelihood may actually be the lim it o f our innate competence). For 
sim plicity I break the description into tw o parts. First, (taking into account uncertain 
futures) given that a decision maker is able to assess comparative desirability for the
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outcomes for all decision options under alternative states o f nature, what overall 
preference order may be considered to  be rationally modelled? Second, given that 
desirability under any given state o f nature is manifest from the magnitudes o f 
attributes, what valuations o f attributes may be considered rationally modelled?
I here put aside for the moment the issue o f how the attributes o f decision 
outcomes determine decision value, considering initia lly the impact o f assessed 
likelihood o f alternative states o f nature, for the moment, taking the valuation o f a 
particular decision under a particular state o f nature as read. The first o f these issues 
is ultimately more central to  this thesis but 1 consider briefly the impact o f uncertain 
states o f nature w ithin the rationality framework. 1 propose first that a preference 
order may be considered rationally modelled if  there exists a valuation for all 
decision options i such that the value V{ o f that decision shall be greater or equal to
the value o f every less preferred option, and less than or equal to every more 




where qj (> 0) are prospectively determined weights for unknown states o f nature, 
states o f nature being mutually exclusive and where v/y is a measure o f desirability 
o f decision i , under state o f nature j , assessed prospectively in whatever rational 
manner the decision maker shall desire; provided that if  the outcome o f decision g , 
under state h , is preferred to outcome o f decision k under state / ,  then vgh is 
greater than vu and provided also that if  state o f nature m is more likely than state 
n , then qm is greater or equal to qn. In summary, any weighting o f value related to
likelihood is considered rational, provided that more likely events are given higher 
weight than less likely events and any valuation o f outcomes may be considered 
rational, provided a more preferred outcome is given a higher value than a less 
preferred one.
This structure can represent or simulate other approaches, eg
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Subjectively Expected U tility. q} become the subjective probabilities o f each
event j , and vi} (= v, for all j )  is derived by a u tility  transformation o f an
expression o f money value or another prim aiy yardstick. More complex 
transformations o f probability could also be accommodated, perhaps 
including those used in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Maximin Return. This could be simulated by specifying first that all q} are
equal whatever the likelihood o f each state j. Moreover the vtJ shall be
derived by a transformation o f primary value, such that each increment o f 
primary value shall have a very large actual value, compared w ith any 
corresponding increment from a higher primary value base.
Laplace's Principle o f Insufficient Reason. A ll are equal.
M inimax Regret. Provided Regret can be prospectively determined, it is in 
principle open to the decision maker to use his "anticipated regret" as a 
measure o f value, in effect saying that he values freedom from thoughts o f 
what could have been.
Equation (2.8) ensures that an absolutely dominated option, ranks below an option 
which dominates (ie is superior to  it under all states o f nature), but it also prohibits 
as rational choices situations in which weaker forms o f probabilistic domination 
apply. To illustrate, amongst alternative states o f nature let tw o options, 1 and 2, 
have identical vtj, except for vn ,v12,v21,v22. Further, let option 1 have the same value
result under state 1 as option 2 does under state 2 and vice versa ie vn = v22 and 
vi2 = v21, but let state 1 be more likely than state 2 ql >q2- The tw o options are only 
differentiated by the relative likelihood o f the tw o states. It is rational to prefer the 
option that is superior in the most frequent circumstance, ie if vn = v22 > v21 = v12, to 
prefer option 1.
The construct also ensures transitivity and independence from irrelevant alternatives.
Under the construct, a decision maker m ight rationally base his conclusions, for 
example, treating the most likely state o f nature as if it were absolutely certain, or 
averaging the four most likely, or giving the first 4  most likely, relative weights o f
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10, 9.5, 2, 1 (in order o f their likelihoods) regardless o f their objective probabilities. 
It would not be permitted, under this model, to  make the selection exclusively on 
the basis o f the second most likely state o f the world alone, or to  use the weights 
10, 9.5, 1, 2, if state 3 is more likely than state 4.
I now turn to  consideration o f the measures o f outcome desirability that a decision 
maker, or analyst on the decision maker's behalf, m ight develop, to which Equation 
(2.8) can be applied (and on which this thesis has greater concentration). These 
desirability outcomes w ill be defined by the magnitudes o f discernible factors or 
attributes consequential on the decision. I propose the follow ing characteristics o f a 
normative model, w ithin the context o f the operationalisation o f principles 
introduced, and, in part, reflecting the tests o f rational intention o f the decision 
maker:
1. Fixed scalar value. A  model o f decision desirability or value should relate 
anticipated outcomes or attributes to  a one-dimensional measure which is 
fixed, however temporarily. It should be noted that this automatically secures 
compliance w ith Samuelson's Weak Preference Axiom, and Transitivity.
2. Dominance. A  decision maker may discern for any set o f attribute 
magnitudes consequential on a particular decision, whether an increase in 
the magnitude o f each o f them is desirable or undesirable, or may be 
undecided. A model o f the decision maker's values w ill not assign a lower 
measure o f value to one decision outcome relative to another otherwise 
identical outcome, if  the direction o f differences in magnitude o f all differing 
attributes is favourable.
3. Independence o f value from prior circumstances. A  model should place the 
same value on identical attribute magnitudes defining a decision outcome, 
whatever gives rise to them .
4. Scales o f desirability monotonic w ith objective measures o f value. Some 
attributes o f decision outcomes may be measured on scales which are 
objective measures o f value, outw ith the value frame o f the decision maker, 
eg attributes specified in money value. It is open to the decision maker, 
perhaps w ith the assistance o f an analyst, to  transform them to conform to  a 
personal measure o f value or desirability. However, he or she should
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nevertheless build a scale which is monotonic increasing w ith the objective 
scale. Thus, for example, a rationally intentioned decision maker may assign 
different marginal values for equal increases in profit, dependent on the base 
level o f profit, but should not at any point accept a negative value on such an 
increase.
5. Qualified self awareness. A  rationally intentioned decision maker w ill not 
impute to himself, or accept as a result o f third party analysis o f his 
preferences, a more complex model o f value and preference than he can 
justify in terms o f his conscious value intentions. For example:
- Form o f relationship o f attribute magnitudes to value. A  decision 
maker should be able to define, in concept if  not in mathematical 
detail, how attributes relate to value, or how they might. An 
analyst may test that this is well considered, but a model should 
not reflect a more complex structure than that declared. In the face 
o f contradictions between declared intention and observed 
behaviour, the decision maker should be able to redefine the form 
o f any relationship, but declared intention is sovereign.
- Personal u tility  o f money value, or other scales o f worth. A 
rationally intentioned decision maker, in transforming such scales 
to those o f personal desirability, should be able to  justify the form 
o f transformation in qualitative terms. Thus he or she would not 
sustain points o f inflection, lack o f smoothness, or convexity or 
concavity in the transformation, w ithout conscious 
acknowledgement that it reflected his or her intentions in 
principle.
- Mutual preferential independence (see for example, Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976, p i01). A decision maker should consider whether his 
preference structure m ight include preference switches 
inconsistent w ith preferential independence. If it does not, he or 
she should not entertain options which could not be optimal 
w ithout such a breakdown, or allow a model which suggested 
such options. Where mutual preferential independence does not
78
apply, a decision maker should, w ith the help o f an analyst, 
redefine attributes in a way such that it does.
- Configural preference. A  rationally intentioned decision maker may 
wish to  be attentive to configural issues, for example, whether the 
potency o f one attribute is dependent on the magnitude of 
another, or whether his value frame is conjunctive (favouring 
general performance over many attributes) or disjunctive 
(favouring good performance on any). However, a model o f his 
behaviour should not reflect them if  he does not affirm them.
W ith regard to point 5, I intend a philosophically distinct point from the justification 
o f parsimony in other OR modelling. In the latter the OR analyst is seeking to model 
a system which is at least partly external to his client. It is a system that is rarely 
completely known. We m ight in these circumstances use simple models as 
adequate approximations, to ensure tractability or communicability, or, because, 
lacking sufficient reason to assume a more complex form, we invoke Occam's Razor. 
We remain entitled to  use these justifications in decision modelling. For example, 
we m ight approximate what we know to be a non-linear relationship by a linear 
one. However, I intend a more powerful obligation and I return to this issue shortly
Finally, w ithin this section, I consider forms o f representation o f the value o f decision 
outcomes. Where preference is dependent on more than tw o attributes, which are 
all mutually preferentially independent, then a decision maker's values can be 
represented by an additive value function o f the form:
vi= 0 ( X w fS * (a*X)
all*
Where ati=  the magnitude o f attribute k  for option i
w* = a weight factor (2.9)
0 ,  gk indicate functions defining
positive transformations
Where preferential independence cannot be assumed, preferentially interdependent 
attributes can be grouped into functions o f m ultiple variables, effectively converting 
them into mutually preferentially independent variables, eg
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V( = ^ ( X  W* g* (°IM > -> a w ) )
all*
Where akr,t =  the magnitude o f attribute r, o f group k, for option i.
Such functions can be inserted into probabilistic representations o f the type o f 
equation (2.8) or used directly, as is the predominant approach o f this work. It is an 
assumption o f this work that the transformation im plied by the functions g* can be
pre-determined, or adequately approximated, outw ith the process o f converting 
m ultiple dimension value into a single measure. They can thus be converted into 
linear form and this feature is an important part o f the approach developed here.
2.15 Implications o f Qualified Self Awareness 
In the last section I introduced the idea o f Qualified Self-Awareness and I amplify 
the concept and highlight some implications.
Importantly, the term is not intended to im ply "knowing one's own mind". This 
would be inconsistent w ith the premise o f a decision maker impaired by cognition 
difficulties. However, the decision maker is not looking externally. He is not even 
looking introspectively at his own suspected mental condition, about which he 
m ight be mistaken. He is declaring values which cannot be secret from himself.
O f course a decision maker may exhibit unconscious behaviour which is inconsistent 
w ith his asserted values. He or she may also base behaviour on "information that is 
not well represented in consciousness", as Bowers (1981) suggests. But we must 
not conclude that the decision maker therefore has unconscious values. For example 
a manager may exhibit disjunctive behaviour in the way he selects staff and this 
could be pointed out to him, but this says nothing about his preferences or values, 
unless he asserts that it this is indeed what he wants to  do.
Nor when the decision maker acts as an agent for an organisation or another party, 
rather than on his or her own behalf, is the situation different. For example, faced 
w ith  a hitherto unrecognised but now understood issue o f whether the business 
should use disjunctive, neutral, or conjunctive scoring in staff selection tests, the 
decision maker m ight indicate that he does not know. However, there is no answer 
to  be found in a hidden store o f value w ithin him that has not been accessed.
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Anomalies in his or her preference structure are that and no more, unless they 
trigger a conscious examination o f the conclusion. In the circumstance suggested, 
he should now articulate a position by thinking about the issues, or consulting 
colleagues. (Configural value, however, does involve some special issues and these 
w ill be discussed shortly).
This argument, o f course, allows a decision maker to change his conscious mind in 
the light o f the implications o f his behaviour. Indeed a review o f intention is 
important whenever behaviour is inconsistent w ith assertion.
Qualified self-awareness is intended to im ply that the decision maker knows what 
attributes contributes to the value o f a decision, and in broad terms the form 
(though not necessarily magnitude) in which they contribute to  that value. Thus, he 
or she should be able to nominate value-indicating attribute measures and units 
and, indeed, transformations to those units, at least to the extent o f correcting the 
compression or expansion o f a scale relative to another attribute under 
consideration. That is to say, he or she can, w ith technical help, establish a linear 
measure, at least to the extent that no other expression remains obvious, more 
likely, or more appealing.
As discussed previously, a decision maker probably does not possess an internal 
standard o f cardinality against which to linearise, however he or she can do this 
relative to  the scale o f another attribute pertinent to the problem (or an objective 
scale outside the problem which can be related to  those w ithin it, eg money value). 
Alternatively, a decision maker may be able to assume a linear scale, if  he or she is 
able to say that the intervals o f a scale, or a translation o f it, can be looked upon as 
having equal worth, or if  it cannot be said that they do not.
O f course, some attributes may not relate directly to an issue that the decision 
maker should value and there may need to be an analytic link. For example, a 
decision maker may not know the way in which environmental lead concentrations 
affect human health. This is a factual not a value matter, and he or she w ill depend 
on technical advice to make the link; but, having done so, he or she should 
transform a lead concentration measure to something approximately linear w ith his 
or her value set.
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If, as a result o f conscious thought w ith help and advice, the decision maker has 
done the best he or she can, even if they don't know whether they have succeeded, 
then nothing more can be done by plumbing the covert corners o f their m ind 
through indirect processes. What they are then consciously aware of, is all on this 
matter that they can by themselves be aware of.
If this view  is mistaken, and we m ight have pertinent values o f which we are 
unaware and cannot reveal by conscious thought, does this form o f linearisation 
matter? I suggest not, because:
(a) The expression o f preference and value seems unstable. First order 
parameters o f a linear model w ill themselves be subject to considerable 
uncertainty and this uncertainty would swamp all but extreme second 
order effects. Extreme effects are likely to be conscious.
(b) Should the expression o f preference indicate the possibility o f a second 
order effect, the phenomenon can be subjected to conscious scrutiny.
(c) The success o f linear bootstrapping models in judgement exercises, 
suggests that a decision maker is likely to benefit from a linear model 
rather than none at all, and that in judgement situations his or her ability 
to use interaction information is lim ited, even when he or she is overtly 
aware o f it.
(d) Even if unconscious value non-linearity exists and could be measured 
through behaviour, it may not be material to  the decision. First, the linear 
scale may be strategically equivalent, or sufficiently so, to  the "true" scale. 
Second, only material non-linearities in the decision space embracing 
potential optima (ie efficient options) are relevant. In the vicin ity o f the 
efficient frontier, a non-linear function m ight be approximately and 
sufficiently linear. In the simulations to be discussed in Chapter 9 ,1 tested 
sensitivity using 10 similarly constructed data sets each consisting 50 
options and 5 variables. A True" non-linear value function was assumed 
for each variable based on fairly extreme transformations as follows (one 
variable, squared; one, to  the power o f 1.5; one, unmodified; one to  the 
power o f 2/3; one, square rooted: all negative values unmodified). 
Amongst the 500 options, 134 were efficient in the "true" models. O f
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these 126 were also replicated in the linear equivalent models. Other 
simulations, explored the effects o f quite radical mis-specification and, 
w ith appropriate process methodology, these do not appear to cause 
severe problems even when a false linear assumption is obstinately 
maintained.
(e) Finally, it is arguable that im plicitly revealed unconscious preference not 
endorsed after conscious scrutiny, has less authority as a basis for 
decision making.
In summary, Qualified Self Awareness allows one to work w ith linear models, either 
by allowing a conversion to linear form, or considered acceptance that the form is 
as good as another. This view  can radically simplify decision analysis, but in an 
important sense it is less permissive. It allows fewer options to  be potentially 
optimal than w ith a complex model for which we allow a greater number of 
parameters to be fixed on a black box basis.
2.16 Disjunctive and Conjunctive value 
Configural value is a form o f non-linear valuation where the value potency o f one 
attribute is heightened, or diminished, by the magnitudes o f one or more others. 
Conscious and specific interactions between particular variables should be capable 
o f being handled w ithin the above approach.
However, there is a form o f configural decision evaluation warranting special 
attention. These are decision evaluations in which the decision maker seeks, on the 
one hand, general complementary performance over a variety o f performance 
measures, or, on the other, where exceptional performance is sought for one or few 
criteria rather than average performance over many. These are, respectively, 
Conjunctive and Disjunctive evaluation (Dawes, 1964). We may look upon linear 
models as being configuralfy neutral; that is, neither Conjunctive nor Disjunctive. 
Both Conjunctive and Disjunctive evaluation are important in decision making. For 
example, we may wish to recruit an excellent all-round General Manager, whom we 
m ight select using conjunctive methods; or an outstanding designer who has 
demonstrated talent in a specialist area, but not necessarily across the board, using
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a disjunctive approach. Can we accommodate these important forms o f configural 
valuation w ithin an additive and, preferably, linear framework?
Einhom (1970) examines use o f a generalised form o f valuation that accommodates 
any degree o f polarisation in either direction, based on the Minkowski metric, which 
he attributes to Dawes:
V ( X )  =  ( 2 a , X;
all i
Y
Where x, = variable defining attribute magnitude for attribute i
at =  constant
r  is a parameter defining configurality;
> 0 for disjunctive valuation;
= for fully disjunctive, maximise best, valuation;
= 0 for linear valuation;
< 0 for conjunctive valuation;
=-°o for fully conjunctive, maxi-min, valuation.
(2.11)
A t first sight this seems a model o f exceptional complexity. So it is, if it is the 
measure o f value, rather than the conclusions that are drawn from it, that is 
important. However, one should recognise that there are many valuation functions 
that are strategically equivalent to the above (ie that rank all options in an identical 
order). Moreover, one such is the above equation raised to the power o f r ; that is:-
F (X ) = 2 > ,* /
all i
(2.12)
I refer to this as the General Configural Model. The reader w ill note that this may 
now be considered as an equation o f additive and linear form, where the original 
variables have been transformed by a power transformation. The implication is that 
disjunctive and conjunctive decision making can be dealt w ith in a linear framework 
by exaggerating or diminishing the impact o f attribute differences at higher parts o f 
the scale relative to those in lower regions. If configural preference o f this sort is 
considered to be at work, data could be pre-processed using such a transformation
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or r could remain undetermined in the analysis. A  variation on the basic 
methodology explored, making use o f this form o f function is explained later.
M ultiplicative valuation (if it is consciously articulated) can be similarly treated, as a 
logarithmic transformation also generates a scale which is strategically equivalent to 
the (positive) scale from which it is derived.
The notion o f using transformations to  reduce the impact o f interaction terms was 
remarked on, incidentally to their main purpose, by Yntema and Torgerson (1961), 
"Another way o f dealing w ith interactions was suggested by one o f the subjects in 
our experiment on ellipses. He complained that we had stretched one end o f the 
worth scale, the scale on which the marker moved. In a sense he was right: 
transforming our arbitraiy scale so as to shrink the end to which he objected would 
have reduced the amount o f interaction. Perhaps this is what people do when they 
learn good judgment about practical matters. Perhaps they tend to  define scales o f 
worth in such a way as to minimize interactions.". They did not employ the 
expression "strategically equivalent", but the notion that in some sense people 
m ight establish internal linear measures o f worth, fixed by choosing that 
strategically equivalent scale that minimises interaction, is an interesting one.
I have empirically illustrated that the power transformation V(X)  = ax' +ax2r can 
reliably approximate a value function strategically equivalent to a cross product 
value model V(X)  = b.xvx2 over a very large range, perhaps indicating that we can 
assume this restricted family w ith tolerable safety, when the specific nature o f the 
interaction is not known and cannot be elicited.
Certainly, the General Configural Model allows treatment where a self-aware 
decision maker seeks or endorses configural assessment, which he or she does not 
attribute to specific interactions. As w ill be seen later, there are also interesting and 
exploitable relationships between options that are efficient w ith linear models and 
those which are efficient under corresponding configural assumptions.
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2.17 A  taxonomy
It is useful to  characterise the alternative structures o f decision and approaches to 
decision analysis, to place specific aids to decision w ithin a w ider context.
Stewart (1992) subdivides approaches w ithin MCDM as "Value or U tility Based 
Approaches", "Goal and Reference Point" methods, The Outranking Concept", "Fuzzy 
Set Theory" and "Descriptive Methods". He, essentially, subdivides the first o f these 
into (i) those methods designed to  help a decision maker to explicitly articulate a 
value function from the defined objectives, (ii) Saaty's "Analytic Hierarchy Method", 
which develops a metric scale o f value from qualitative statements o f relative 
importance, and (iii) interactive methods in which the decision maker is asked to 
articulate preferences between possible trade-offs in objectives in the vicin ity o f 
particular feasible solutions. What Stewart describes as Descriptive Methods, I 
perceive as methods o f condensation o f a large range o f criteria into smaller more 
manageable sets.
Korhonen, Moskowitz, and Wallenius (1992) also sought to classify analysis 
approach, in a review o f methodology. Borrowing from their ideas as well as those 
o f Stewart, I attempt here a more detailed classification. However, I do not attempt 
to  structure "unstructured" problems as examined in Mintzberg, Raisingham, and 
Theforet (1976).
We m ight accordingly describe approaches to  decision analysis in terms o f problem 
structure or, more correctly, the structures decision makers and analysts choose to 
approximate unbounded decision domains. We can conceive such a classification as 
a many dimensional specification o f decision and methodology properties w ith a 
categoric "scale" w ithin them:
Thus, we may have problems involving:
1. a. Single objectives/criterion including well understood multiple 





e. One main objective w ith secondary objectives treated as 
constraints.
2. a. Well specified quantified objectives w ith defined relationships to 
factors
b. Well specified quantifiable objectives w ith unspecifed relationship 
to factors at the outset
c. Weil understood qualitative or vague objectives w ith quantified 
attributes which are related to the objectives but, prior to analysis, in 
unspecified ways
d. Imprecisely understood objectives w ith explicit recognition o f 
relevant factors
e. Potentially definable objectives but predominantly non-quantifiable 
in the decision time-scale
f. Poorly understood objectives but clear binary preference for at least 
some factor trade-offs
g. Poorly understood objectives; no clear binary preferences
h. Undeclared objectives
i. Intertwined means and ends
3. a. Deterministic outcomes
b. Uncertain outcomes -quantifiable uncertainty determined by
-independent conditions o f the environment 
(alternative states o f the world)
-quantifiable uncertainty dependent on the 
decision
-unquantifiable environmental risk (complete 
uncertainty)
-environment independent risk






a. Relationships between factors/attributes and objectives are linear
b. Relationships between factors/attributes and objectives are non­
linear
c. Relationships between factors/attributes and objectives are 
lexicographic or Boolean
d. Relationships between factors/attributes and objectives are unclear
a. Relationship between decision desirability and objective 
achievement is linear and non-configural
b. Relationship between decision desirability and objective 
achievement is disjunctive
c. Relationship between decision desirability and objective 
achievement is conjunctive
a. Decisions in which there is no or only one constraint on 
factors/resources to be present in the implemented solution
b. Decisions where there is more than one constraint on 
factors/resources represented in the solution
8. a. Well defined metrically quantifiable factors
b. Well defined ordinal or categorical factors
c. Qualitative and loosely defined factors
9. a. Decisions where the objective related attributes are common and 
magnitudes can be traded-oflf in principle.
b. Decisions w ith incomparable or non-compensating elements
c. No objective related trade-offs necessary
10. a. Decisions having determined or definable options
b. Decisions having undetermined or open-ended options
11. a. Two discrete options (including action and no action alternatives)
b. Few discrete options
c. Many discrete options
d. One continuous decision defining variable
e. Several continuous decision defining variables
f. Portfolio decisions involving discrete selections o f decision 
components
g. Portfolio decisions involving continuous fractional selections o f 
decision components
12. a. One-off single decisions
b. One-off m ultiple decisions
c. Repetitive independent decisions
d. Multistage decisions, dependent on outcome o f previous 
components and or improved information
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e. Continuous tim e dynamic decision-making, dependent on outcome 
o f previous decisions
f. Involving dependence on one or many other decisions, or 
potentially influencing one or more other decisions, not necessarily in 
the analysis ambit
13. a. Decisions made independently o f other parties
b. Decisions involving co-operation w ith co-decision makers, w ith 
outcomes dependent on their actions
c. Decisions involving competition w ith other parties, w ith outcomes 
dependent on their actions
14. a. Unimportant or low impact or insensitive decisions




16. a. Urgent time-constrained decisions
b. Time non-critical decision
17. a. Decisions involving one decision maker or decision making entity 
or where one person or entity is "trustee" o f the value frame to be 
adopted.
b. Decisions where the conflicting interests and values o f tw o or more 
parties are to be accommodated
18. a. Decisions which are taken
b. Decisions which emerge
19. a. Decisions where analysis conclusions are dominated by models, 
analysis or computed assessment
b. Decisions where analysis informs a subjective conclusion
c. Decisions requiring cursoiy scrutiny
d. Decisions involving thought, consultation, the exercise o f 
judgement or unstructured or qualitative analysis.
20. a. Analysis emphasis on making a single recommendation
b. Analysis emphasis on generating a rank ordering o f options
c. Analysis emphasis on generating a short-list o f high-scoring 
contenders
d. Analysis emphasis on generating a short-list o f potentially optimal 
contenders (eg all pareto optimal options)
e. Analysis emphasis on elim inating no-hopers
f. Analysis emphasis on generating options/ identifying factors/ 
elucidating objectives or values, not conclusions
g. Analysis emphasis on identifying value free implications and 
illum inating the problem situation
21. a. Decisions using one analysis methodology
b. Decisions making use o f more than one, either sequentially or 
concurrently
c. Decisions using no specific or definable methodology
22. a. Value or U tility based approaches
b. Goal, Reference Point, Lexicographic, Satisficing methods
c. Methods depending on properties o f Binary Relations; the 
Outranking Concept; Linear order generation algorithms not 
dependent on proxies o f value
d. Methods not involving the definition o f formal decision criteria.
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In a lim ited sense, problems and solution approaches (whether trivial or strategic) 
can be seen as cells w ithin this multidimensional matrix. However, it is not 
suggested that the subdivisions represent all possible subdivisions, that they are 
always mutually exclusive, nor that all, or even a high proportion o f the many 
millions o f cells, define distinct problems. The hazard o f classification is that no real 
decision can be neatly compartmentalised. A  decision is inherently a function o f its 
own qualities and those o f the decision maker. Even that "reality" is subject to  the 
perspective o f the decision maker and analyst, as they extend their bounds o f 
rationality by force fitting the situations they face into jackets o f tractabiiity which 
make sense to them. It may be useful to amplify some o f the less obvious 
expressions above (where they have not been already discussed) and to illustrate 
them by seeking to classify some familiar problems and approaches w ithin them.
I distinguish ( lc  and Id ) between several objectives and criteria and many 
objectives and criteria as, some m ulti dimensional techniques may become 
unmanageable if the number o f criteria extends beyond a lim ited number. By the 
same token, in certain instances tw o objectives can be adequately managed by 
simple extensions to  single objective techniques, when a greater number presents 
too great a difficulty, allowing 1 b to be discriminated as a separate case. 3b, 
"Uncertain outcomes-defined by deterministically treated factors", refers to  the use 
o f statistical measures o f uncertainty (eg "variance") as determinate qualities, such as 
the tw o dimensional mean return and return variance descriptions o f portfolios used 
in Modem Portfolio Theory. Decisions w ith a single constraint eg a cost budget 
would be 7a. l id  may be exemplified by the setting o f an interest rate by a Central 
Bank, 1 le  by the length, breadth, height, weight and thickness in a packaging 
design decision. 11 f  distinguishes portfolio problems where for example individual 
projects are selected for, say, a research programme from 1 lg  , problems where the 
proportions o f individual elements are to be selected. This is exemplified by share 
portfolio formation which is the practical problem which is given considerable 
attention w ithin this thesis. 12a could be the selection o f a new lecturer; 12b the 
selection o f new intake o f undergraduate students; 12c the repetitive reordering o f 
stock items; 12d the selection o f a medical diagnostic test follow ing the results o f a 
previous test; 12e m ight be control decisions for a chemical plant or the adoption o f 
buy/sell rules for commodity purchases in the light o f price, consumption and stock. 
13b m ight be a bidding sequence o f partners at Bridge or the interdependent
92
decision making o f production, sales and engineering managers; an example o f 13c 
is a pricing decision in a competitive market.
Category 22 recasts Stewart (op cit). Methods seeking to  generate value and any 
cardinal metric o f decision desirability would be classified as 22a. Methods based on 
where one wishes to go to, improve upon, or what one wishes to achieve in 
respect o f any criteria w ithout using a compensation mechanic would be classified 
as 22b. Methods o f moving from statements o f preference to orders depending on 
the properties o f relations are 22c. Electre (Roy, 1968) and Zapros (Larichev and 
Moshkovich, 1995) are o f this type. AHP, as Saaty proposed it, is a method for 
translating semantic statements o f importance into measures o f value, ie is 22c. 
Were one to  use the same information to develop a ranking which minimised 
transitivity violations, perhaps by settling the relative positions o f outcomes 
involved in "absolute importance" parings before those w ith weaker statements w ith 
this would be a 22c method.
A  decision on what drink to buy at a vending machine, m ight be characterised as; 
1c, 2d, 3a, 4c, 5c or d, 6c, 7a or b, 8c, 9a, 10a, 11b, 12a, 13a 14a, 15a, 16a, 17a, 
18a, 19c, 20a, 21c, 22d. The regular use o f LP forming part o f a materials blending 
computer system m ight be represented as; la , 2a, 3a, 4d, 5a, 6a, 7b, 8a, 9c, 10a, 
l ie ,  12c, 13a, 14b, 15a, 16a, 17a, 18a, 19a, 20a, 21a, 22a; o ra  predominantly 
decision tree approach to a new market entiy decision as le , 2a, 3b i/ii/iv , 4d, 
5a/b/c, 6a, 7b, 8a/b/c, 9a, 10a, 11c, 12a, 13c, 14b, 15b, 16b, 17a, 18b, 19b,
20c/e, 21a, 22a
I w ill in Chapter 5 introduce the technique constituting the basis o f the approach 
adopted in this work and I w ill describe its domain o f applicability by reference to 
this taxonomy. Later I w ill characterise other problems that can be accommodated. 
However, the above serves to illustrate the massive range o f structural possibilities, 
and that the alternatives that I attempt to structure w ill be only a small sub-set o f 
them. It goes w ithout saying that, in any case, they w ill be bounded simplifications 
o f the scope o f real, inevitably unbounded, problems.
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Chapter 3 Generating assumptions of cognitive facility 
in decision making: An Evolutionaiy Psychology touchstone.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter i build a set o f assumptions which 1 use to underpin the 
methodology described in this thesis. I start by reminding the reader that the reason 
for formal decision analysis is because we suffer from some form o f impairment in 
our mental process o f decision information. It is important therefore that one makes 
clear, plausible and balanced assumptions o f what mental facility we have and do 
not have, which we exploit or seek to exploit in decision making and decision 
analysis. Unfortunately, a convenient digest o f appropriate assumptions is not 
available "off the shelf and accordingly I try to develop a "balanced" check list here. I 
attem pt to use some o f the ideas o f Evolutionary Psychology (EP) as a patterning 
method and debate what capabilities and concepts would accord adaptive 
advantage in the environment o f human evolutionary development in the light o f 
issues which impact decision making. Although only reasonable assumptions, and 
not research conclusions, are sought this, is subject to  broad triangulation, in 
particular by reference to  empirical work.
In section 3 .3 ,1 outline a basic description o f the EP concept and follow  this w ith a 
brief description o f how EP has been used to inform issues o f psychology and to 
develop hypotheses for examination. I go on to describe how I seek to exploit it 
here. I make use o f the test that if  one cannot postulate a mechanism by which a 
mental capability could have secured at least a distal impact on reproduction in the 
ancestral environment, it is not reasonable to assume its existence. As minimalist 
assumptions are sought, the criterion is safe and secures balance.
I then address a number o f decision-related issues from this perspective. I start w ith 
the more general issue o f Reason itself; our unique capability to  draw conclusions, 
action related conclusions, by connecting thought. I suggest that the adaptation is a 
powerful one but that the adaptive advantages accorded to survive in our difficult 
marginal niches only required moderately short-chain connections o f thought, not 
the long near-infinite chains that artefacts o f civilisation, which did not exist in the 
environment o f evolutionary adaptation, now allows. I suggest that long chain
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reasoning arose from a purely serendipitous property o f Reason, its capability o f 
bootstrapping itself. Accordingly, we should be cautious in attributing to the mind 
powers which are indirectly dependent on those artefacts, or assumes that we 
possess mental systems which are analogues o f sophisticated Iong-chain processing 
computers.
I then consider the nature o f decision in the ancestral environment, contrasting it 
w ith modem decisions. Our ancestors would have adaptively applied their 
intelligence to toolmaking, organisation, relations w ithin the group, and to the 
means o f exploiting the environment for food, often involving issues o f intellectual 
discrimination and judgement. Many would relate to  a single clear oft repeated 
purpose for which learning, from both one's own experience and communicated 
vicarious experience, would be more useful than fundamental examination that 
characterises many modem problems. Single purpose allows simple "hillclimb" to be 
an adequate control heuristic for securing desirable parameters in the type o f 
"design” problems that existed in our primeval world.
This presages a discussion o f objectives and optim ality. I suggest that no adaptive 
advantage attaches to articulated concepts o f Strategy and Objectives in the sense 
in which these would be understood today. Goals, probably im plicit, would be 
binary, and m ultiple objectives would be lexicographic or involve serial switching 
between single preoccupations. However, a considerable benefit would attach to 
weighing a m ultip licity o f factors related to a single goal. Optimisation, however, 
was not a concept that would have been needed to  have been understood, nor 
would it have secured adaptive advantage. Optimal behaviour can be achieved 
through non-intellectual mechanisms and, indeed, is, even by animals and simpler 
organisms. The concept o f relative improvement and the application o f intellect to 
achieve this is, by contrast, fundamentally adaptive.
To illustrate possible differences in adaptive thinking from classically logical thought 
I dissect an empirically examined stylised problem, the Wason Selection Task, 
where the classically correct conclusion is not intuitive. However, the intuitive 
responses do seem to relate to the information discoveiy processes that m ight have 
led to adaptive decisions. Whilst this is a veiy specific example it serves to  illustrate 
that an adapted mind is not a classically logical mind and the example serves as a 
prelude to the logically related issues o f probability and cardinality.
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Uncertainty is usually treated as a parametrically defined attribute w ithin the 
methodology reported in this thesis, but its role in decision making generally is 
central. Moreover, the treatment adopted is aimed to be w ithin the general concept 
and criteria o f intended rationality explored in Chapter 2. For completeness, I 
therefore consider the adaptive implications o f uncertainty. It is apparent that the 
mental notion o f uncertain alternative futures, and the influencing o f uncertain 
alternative futures by action are concomitants o f Reason. It is also a sine qua non 
that a sense o f comparative likelihood, including equal likelihood, and cognition of 
broad degrees o f likelihood is adaptive. But it is d ifficult to  go further and embrace 
any form o f probabilistic cardinality as adaptive and therefore intuitive. Comparative 
likelihood allows the ordinal ranking o f disjoint events which m ight be turned into 
scales akin to probability which m ight be suitable to a modem analyst for some 
purposes. Innate understanding o f a probability o f 0.5 is possible. However, we 
should otherwise be dubious about attributing cardinal probabilities to elicited 
subjective responses, from statistically untrained subjects, or which cannot be 
determined from objective considerations.
I go on to  question innate comprehension o f cardinal measurement and the ability 
to process number and quantity generally beyond that required for count and 
organisational arithmetic in the countable range. This leads into issues o f concepts 
o f value. Whilst the idea o f ordinal value and compensation would seem to  be 
entrenched, the concept o f a scale o f value would not appear to have adaptive 
advantage and it is difficult anyhow to see how a stable yardstick could be held in 
the mind. Nor would stable value and preference seem to  confer adaptive 
advantage and this includes the weighting o f factors. On these grounds one should 
expect value to be imprecise and labile, as expressed value seems to  be. This does 
not o f course invalidate value as a useful fiction for summarising preferences in a 
way which as far as possible renders them free from contradictions. I also debate 
the seeming facility for people most easily to  trade-off only tw o factors, w hilst also 
having an ostensibly polarised facility for considering a mass o f factors holistically.
Finally I tabulate the cognition assumptions that I believe can reasonably be made 
and which act as a backdrop for the rest o f the work. In essence these emphasise 
human abilities as a "comparator"; to make one-by-one binaiy comparisons and to 
order, rather than to assess cardinal degree.
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3.2 A  basis for declaring cognition assumptions
I suggested in Chapter 2 that the reason we resort to explicit analysis o f decisions 
(using the term in its broadest sense) is that we suffer, or believe we suffer, some 
form or degree o f cognition impairment. Assumptions o f cognitive facility, o f 
impairment o f facility, lie at the core o f decision analysis. If our capacity were to be 
unimpaired there would be no need for it. A  reliable intuitive appreciation would 
guide us inexorably to the best decision.
For some problems this may be possible, but im plicit in the existence o f the other 
techniques we adopt, is that we cannot reliably cope unaided w ith larger or 
structurally d ifficult problems. We are unable, or believe that we are unable, to 
extract and process information from the environment and generate the most 
effective action w ithout ancillary assistance outside the exclusive process o f our own 
minds. That assistance embraces the simple; we m ight ask another's opinion 
(expanding our own facility by the support o f another mind), w rite down pros and 
cons, or resort to  long division by pencil and paper as we find mental arithmetic 
difficult. Or, it may be more complex. We may never personally know, far less be 
capable o f remembering, the complex array or factors that we m ight recognise as 
relevant to determining the optimal operation o f a complex o f oil refineries, and 
may require the assistance o f computers to solve the differential equations that 
underlie the design o f an engineering structure. We may add to  the problems o f 
discernment, remembrance and process o f factors, the issue o f understanding the 
nature o f the criteria by which one seeks to judge effectiveness o f the conclusions 
one m ight reach.
We practically deal w ith such problems by such devices as decomposition o f large 
complex alternatives into smaller problem partitions, which can be assessed w ithin 
our cognitive powers; the re-presentation o f problems into simpler more restricted 
forms to which we can more clearly apply concepts o f rationality; the synthesis o f 
simple criteria w ithin our bounded rationality from cognitively complex 
unmanageable ones outside it; the formal paper or computer calculation o f value 
determining arithmetic which we cannot do in our heads nor estimate w ith 
adequate precision; the recasting the range o f options and factors which we choose 
to consider so that they can be accommodated w ithin our capacity for 
comprehension; the modelling o f the physical relationships o f decision situations
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and our value mechanisms which we can tractably "solve" outw ith our own 
processing capability using computers, and then map to the real world, etc.
I would be surprised if many would find this remarkable. However, w ith impairment 
at the centre o f the need for analysis it is incumbent on aid designers overtly to  
recognise it. An im plicit assumption is often made. An OR analyst may commend 
the use o f a linear programming formulation to solve a refinery scheduling and 
crude blending problem because he believes, though does not say, that a person 
w ill not be able to do the necessary optim isation calculations in his or her head. 
Given that I suffer strain w ith modest mental arithmetic, I am inclined to  accept this 
conclusion. However, in other model process situations facility may be less clear cut 
and, unless explicit, may dangerously im ply unexamined and unreasonable mental 
capability.
W hilst the mathematical assumptions and axioms on which our quantitative 
methods o f assistance are based, tend to be clear and well justified, the undeclared 
assumptions o f the skills o f a decision maker may move to less sure ground. 
Similarly classical discussions o f preference are based on premises that preference 
can be discerned and expressed as relations o f strong preference, weak preference 
and indifference, the last o f these being equivalent to  equality o f value between tw o 
options. It constitutes a powerful theoretical and useful construct but it is 
independent o f considerations o f how the mind can address these issues.
It is appropriate that similar or greater attention is paid to cognitive assumptions as 
to  the mathematical assumptions that underlie a technique. However, ultimately, as 
in the case o f mathematical assumptions, it is only necessary that such assumptions 
are overt, reasonable and balanced (in the sense that they should not be excessively 
fussy, demanding, and precise in one area, and excessively permissive and 
sweeping in another). It is not essential that they should be proved to  be "true". It is 
against this background that 1 seek a basis for assumption.
There is a major body o f empirical research governing the ability o f people to  make 
judgements. This particularly covers distortions or biases introduced into information 
assessment and the heuristics by which good, if  not optimal, solutions can be found 
to decision problems given the complexity o f information available and lim itations 
in our ability to process it. However, the research, whilst constituting a substantial
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and rich mosaic o f findings, is, from the perspective o f decision analysis, a collection 
o f largely independent conclusions w ithout a comprehensive unifying theory which 
can be directly used by the developers o f decision analysis techniques or the 
designers o f decision aids. In normative application it serves principally, and very 
valuably, to  improve decision making by increasing the awareness o f decision 
makers o f potential pit-falls.
This research also has varying depths o f coverage. Thus, for example, the lim itations 
o f human rationality, the propensity to satisfice rather than optim ise, and the 
impairment in our ability to assess probability, the dependence o f value conclusions 
on question framing and the lability o f expressed value, are well discussed. 
However, more incomplete are such questions as the capacity o f the human mind 
to cope w ith m ultiple factors in decision situations, the ability o f decision makers to 
compute value, and the ability o f the mind to discriminate between or to  express a 
preference between combinations o f factors. Whilst goals and objectives are central 
to  decision making and so familiar in business and institutional life, the literature on 
goal and objective formation and comprehension does not seem to have fully 
addressed issues in a form relevant to  formal decision analysis. Do we have intuitive 
facility in the formation and execution o f simultaneous m ultiple objectives beyond 
the rather trivial and undiscriminating wish list, "Maximise this and this and this; 
minimise this", for example?
A t the commencement o f this exploration I was content to declare my cognitive 
assumptions on empirically unclear issues, and to design an analysis aid based on 
an introspective view  o f my own needs and information processing lim itations, 
moderated by my practical but subjective and informal observation o f the behaviour 
o f other people in business and elsewhere over my working career. This was after all 
a personal exploration. I argued (and still do) that the validation o f a decision aid or 
normative business model in terms o f its usefulness to another person rests 
primarily in that potential user applying the test o f whether it make sense in his or 
her world view  for his or her problem: Does it pass the u tility  test? Do the 
assumptions seem reasonable? Nevertheless, there is risk in over-dependence on 
introspection even when validated by the subjective scrutiny o f others. I may 
delude myself concerning my own cognitive facility and the scrutineer may exhibit 
the same introspective flaw when judging reasonableness.
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There is also merit in developing aids which are in some sense minimalist in terms 
o f the cognitive assumptions made or which can accommodate conservative 
cognition assumptions, even if  some decision makers are more able or more relaxed 
in their ability to  process decision information. Some framework for assumption 
forming seemed appropriate.
Were the empirical findings balanced, tidy, and comprehensive for the purpose o f 
aid design, it would be straightforward to base assumptions exclusively on these.
As an alternative I attempted to suggest assumptions employing some o f the ideas 
o f Evolutionary Psychology. To construct a simple coherent structure o f decision 
analysis related cognition, I make use o f the follow ing tests to a generate an 
assumption list.
1. Is the assumption consistent w ith what we m ight judge to be an innate 
cognitive facility based on Evolutionary Psychology considerations?
2. Is the suggestion consistent w ith basic anthropological evidence 
regarding cognition capabilities in contemporary but prim itive societies? 
For this I rely principally on Hallpike (1979).
3. Is it consistent w ith the thrust o f empirical psychological work related to 
judgement?
4. Is it adequately consistent w ith my introspective view  o f my own 
capabilities and my subjective view  o f other people's?
5. Is it conservative?
It is essential that my purpose here, decision model formulation, remains clear, my 
lim ited purpose is to use the ideas o f EP to help to  suggest a balanced set o f 
m inimalist assumptions. It is possible that EP may have a more significant 
contribution to make regarding aspects o f cognition that affect judgement and 
decision making, possibly providing unifying theoretical glue. There would be 
substantial research simply to do this. Even if  I were to wish to be more ambitious, 
lack o f training and experience in these disciplines means I can merely scratch the 
surface in an elementary way. It is not intended to  provide more than a skeletal 
theory; patterned but hopefully plausible assumptions not materially contradicted by 
a weight o f contrary evidence.
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3.3 The Evolutionary Psychology approach
Evolutionaiy psychology has developed as a discipline in the last tw o decades and 
owes much o f its impetus to the ideas o f Leda Cosmides and John Tooby who 
remain prominent publishers in the field. It owes its origin to the concept o f the 
adaptation o f biological organisms to their environments by natural selection 
developed principally by Charles Darwin (1859 and 1998). It "is psychology 
informed by the fact that the inherited architecture o f the human mind is the 
product o f the evolutionary process" (Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow, 1992, p7). It 
presently remains centred on informing mainstream psychological and sociological 
issues and has not significantly spilled out into related areas. Nigel Nicholson has 
recognised its importance as an aid to understanding behaviour in management and 
work situations but I am not aware o f specific use to which it has been put in 
OR/MS.
A t the core o f the approach is the central assertion that "the brain is an adapted 
organ like any other" (Nicholson, 1997). 'The mind is a systems o f organs o f 
computation, designed by natural selection to solve the kinds o f problems our 
ancestors faced in their foraging way o f life, in particular, understanding and out­
manoeuvring objects, animals, plants, and other people." (Pinker, 1998, p21). Our 
interacting web o f emotions, cognitive facility, intelligence, intuitions, instincts, 
reflexes, senses, the brain led control o f other organs, and the brain involved 
biochemistry that encourages us to undertake particular courses o f behaviour or 
better enables us to deal w ith certain situations, are all evolved through natural 
selection to cope w ith the environment in which they evolved.
The concept is elegantly simple and independent o f the complexities o f modem 
genetics and embryology, unknown to Darwin, which give it effect. For evolution to 
occur we require that an organism replicates itself, though w ith at least slight 
perturbations serving to impact the effectiveness o f replication o f its descendant, 
and a selection mechanism. (Darwin, 1859, Dawkins 1986). Although plant and 
animal breeding by human selection had been going on for many centuries, it was 
Darwin's genius to recognise an auto-regulatory process, the ability o f the 
environment to select superior perturbations and to  accumulate small changes over 
hundreds o f generations. He encapsulates this (p63) "Can it, then, be thought 
improbable, seeing that variations useful to man have undoubtedly occurred, that
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other variations useful in some way to each being in the great and complex battle o f 
life should sometimes occur in the course o f thousands o f generations? If such do 
occur, can we doubt (remembering that many more individuals are bom than can 
possibly survive) that individuals having any advantage, however slight, over 
others, would have the best chance o f surviving and procreating their kind? On the 
other hand, we may feel sure that any variation in the least degree injurious would 
be rigidly destroyed. This preservation o f favourable variations and the rejection o f 
injurious variations, I call Natural Selection." If an organism has a tra it that enables it 
relatively to better reproduce the trait in a succeeding generation then that trait w ill 
grow in succeeding generations.
We must nevertheless recognise that modem genetics can lead to  unusual and 
"discontinuous" phenomena. For example pleiotropy, in which a single gene can 
influence more than one characteristic, one o f which may be beneficial and the other 
not; or heterozygous characteristics (arising from mixed combinations o f alternative 
alleles) which confer replicative advantage, whilst one or both homozygous forms 
are injurious. One should also note that complex systems can be converted to other 
complex systems by the alteration o f a single gene, an insect antenna to a leg, for 
example (Shepard, 1987, p268), and I w ill return to this point. The central issue 
remains that the tra it combination in the gene pool should be adaptive, that is serve 
to  contribute to the reproduction o f the organisms possessing them, and hence 
their own replication.
Along w ith the notion that the brain is an adapted organ, is the second pillar o f the 
EP approach- it was not adapted to solve the problems we face today. It evolved to 
solve the adaptive problems (that is problems "whose solution can affect 
reproduction, however distally" (Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow, 1992, p8) in the 
environment in which we evolved. Man (from Homo Habilis to  Homo Sapiens) has 
existed some 2m years, roughly corresponding to  the Pleistocene era, and o f course 
spent many m illions o f more years evolving to  that state. Neanderthal man, 
exhibiting organisation, perhaps arrived some quarter m illion years ago. Homo 
Sapiens (Cro-Magnon) emerged w ithin the last 100,000 years w ith other human 
species dying-out by 30,000 ya. M ithen (1996) argues from an archaeological 
perspective that man and its predecessors first developed General Intelligence and 
subsequently specialist modules including in broad order Social Intelligence, Natural
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History Intelligence, and Technical Intelligence. Finally in modem Homo Sapiens 
"cognitive fluidity" developed promoted by the emergence o f language. 
Nevertheless, over much o f that evolutionary time, including the Neolithic period 
(up to approx 5000 years ago), the environment was relatively stable, that is, 
despite marked climatic movements, changing at a rate that could be tracked by 
evolution. Thus, "Our species spent over 99% o f its evolutionary history as hunter- 
gatherers in Pleistocene environments. Human psychological mechanisms should be 
adapted to those environments, not necessarily to  the twentieth-century world" 
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1987, p280). Pinker (1998) expands the same thought "Our 
brains are adapted to that long-vanished way o f life, not to brand new industrial 
civilizations. They are not wired to  cope w ith anonymous crowds, schooling, w ritten 
language, government, police, courts, armies, modem medicine, formal social 
institutions, high technology, and other newcomers to the human experience.", as 
does Nicholson (1998, p420) "In the ancestral environment o f uncertainty and 
danger we evolved cognitive systems which now fit uneasily w ithin a world o f 
complex problem solving, rational calculus and probabilistic reasoning."
To bring the point directly to the subject o f this thesis, we know that modem 
organised life puts a premium on bringing to  bear on decision problems such 
concepts as precise calculation, extended compound calculation, classical logic, 
cardinal quantification and metric measurement, cardinal probability, dexterity w ith 
m ultiple quantified objectives, optim isation, stable and precisely articulated values, 
simultaneous m ulti-attribute compensation etc. But our brains w ill have been 
adapted to solve the reproduction affecting decision problems o f our ancestors. The 
extent to which modem economic man is also adept at solving his problems is 
determined by the characteristics o f the mechanisms necessary for the solution o f 
prim itive problems and whether those mechanisms can be brought to bear on 
modem decisions. This, at least in part, is determined by the structural sim ilarity o f 
the decision problem domains.
3.4 How is EP normally used?
Evolutionary Psychology is used to examine how the selective pressures o f the 
ancestral environment m ight work in order to  "generate hypotheses about the 
design features o f the human mind". In this way it is used to help discover 
previously unknown psychological mechanisms. (Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow,
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1992). Cosmides, Tooby and Barker also observe that the flow  from "Adaptive 
Problem" to "Psychological Mechanism" can be reversed to explain the adaptive 
function o f observed phenotypic characteristics.
Tooby and Cosmides (1992, p75) outline what they call an evolutionary functional 
analysis as defining an adaptive target, describing the background conditions in 
terms o f the recurrent structure o f the ancestral world that is relevant to  the 
adaptive problem, suggesting a design (" ..features in the organism that comprise 
the adaptation or suggested adaptation"), and then examining and evaluating its 
performance both in achieving its ends in the ancestral environment and assessing 
its impact on behaviour in a modem environment. They summarise the process as, 
" ... asking a series o f engineering questions: Would the proposed design have 
interacted w ith properties o f the ancestral world to  produce target adaptive 
outcomes? Does the proposed design interact w ith properties o f the modem world 
to produce outcomes than one actually observes in real organisms, whether these 
outcomes are adaptive or not? Is there an alternative design that is better able to 
generate adaptive targets under ancestral conditions?...".
It attempts to answer tw o types o f question: "What is the explanation for 
psychological phenomena that we can observe?" and "What behaviours m ight we 
hypothesise which we should seek to observe?".
3.5 How 1 use EP.
Here I seek to parallel much o f this process. For example, I seek to postulate 
decision making, judgmental, and evaluative competencies. I suggest the type o f 
decision problems, adaptive problems, our ancestors m ight have had to  face, 
notwithstanding that much the o f our prehistory must be conjectural. From this I 
hypothesise entrenched mental mechanisms, either intuitive capabilities, intellectual 
facility, or other systems, that they should have developed to deal w ith them. In 
some instances. I also seek, paralleling the reverse flow  methodology outlined 
above, to rationalise some aspects o f empirical research, which are not already 
patterned w ithin a coherent theory, by seeing how well they can be explained by 
evolutionary function. The objective is a list o f competence assumptions, making 
visible those products o f the evolutionary process which, unlike eyes and bones, 
cannot be seen.
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However, to  achieve that I must not only assume the existence o f some 
competencies but also the absence o f others for which there m ight not be direct 
evidence. W hilst such an extension requires extreme caution it can be justified 
w ithin the principles o f the approach. Dawkins (1986) makes use o f the image o f 
the watch drawn from William Paley s "Natural theology -or Evidences o f the 
Existence and Attributes o f the Deity collected from the Appearances o f Nature".
The watch had been used by Paley as an example o f a system that demonstrates by 
its complexity that it had been designed by man, to draw the conclusion that 
biological complexity must have been sim ilarly designed by God. Dawkins presents 
a statistical description o f the evolutionary process. Complex systems in organisms 
can and do arise by cumulative selection o f small changes. Evolution can 
accumulate extraordinary complexity by small degrees but the chances that such 
systems can arise by chance by spontaneous transformation are astronomically 
improbable.
The same argument also enables the assertion that no complex biological system 
should exist, including those relating human mental faculty, unless it served an 
adaptive purpose in the environment at some point in evolutionary history. In short 
unless this test can be met the system is not merely invisible and its existence 
unknown and unused, but it is astronomically improbable that it is there. Thus, for 
example, whilst we could have a sense o f direction and facilities to navigate over 
short distances, we cannot have in-built systems for navigating over thousands o f 
miles, as unlike birds, we never needed to.
If a system served an adaptive problem o f the early evolutionary environment which 
ceased to be relevant later, the system m ight be selected out, it m ight erode by 
genetic drift or mutation (in the absence o f any selection) or be adapted by natural 
selection to another purpose (as in the adaptation o f penguin wings from flight to 
swimming). But it m ight continue to  exist in adapted or vestigial form. One could in 
such circumstances envisage a progressive erosion o f such a capability resulting, 
perhaps, in an incomplete system. However, we m ight speculate (whilst 
acknowledging the hazard o f doing so) that w ired-in cognitive "electronics", could 
erode faster than physical structure and would need to be sustained by the 
functional needs o f man's later evolutionary history, though we should not expect 
this to extend beyond the Neolithic.
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Three factors muddy interpretation. One, already alluded to, is the ability o f 
profound phenotypic system change to be achieved by simple genetic changes.
This opens-up the possibility that a mind feature can arise by chance ideally suited 
to  modem life, for which our ancestors would have had no use. However, a new 
complex system cannot come into existence spontaneously as a new creation (for 
Dawkin's reasons) but only by a simple genetic change causing sea-change 
transformation o f an existing comparably complex system (eg by mutation). I 
suggest that the chance that such a complex alternative system being viable is 
inversely related in some manner to the complexity o f the system; there are 
compounding opportunities for there being an immediately fatal flaw. But an 
additional feature here is an immediate change o f transforming significance would 
not only have to  be immediately viable and potentially superior but immediately 
superior. A  "new" system w ill not be sub-optimised though w ill be up against an 
"old" system that is. It may thus be selected out before any inherent superiority o f 
the new system can be established, ensuring stability o f the "inferior" configuration. 
W hilst such gross transformations may occasionally have been converted into 
sustained adaptations it seems probable that they were rare. Indeed, physical 
characteristics which we can examine would seem to  have gradualist origin.
O f greater difficulty is the possibility that design o f value in the ancestral 
environment is made use o f in very different applications o f recent origin. Modules 
o f Pleistocene mental facility m ight be linked to  create a competence apparently 
only relevant to modem needs. However, in such cases we should be able to see 
both the ancestral features employed and the "work-arounds" used to adapt them to 
modem problems.
Finally we must recognise that w ithin our cognitive too lkit we have a vital 
multipurpose tool; the ability to think. This adaptation enables us to  fine-tune our 
responses to unfamiliar situations and radically transforms the potency o f a rather 
more common adaptation in the animal world, the ability to  learn. But the ability to 
think, powerful though this is, should not blind us to the puny lim itations o f our 
unaided mind and that this skill still depends on innate attributes. I discuss this later 
in this chapter.
Notwithstanding these complications, the lemma I postulate for judging the 
decision and judgement skills is:
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The human mind has no mechanisms, architecture or facility except those 
evolved to solve adaptive problems present in the Pleistocene environment 
or before apart from those which are concomitant by-products (spandrels) o f 
such features.
In generating assumptions o f the innate competencies o f the modem decision 
maker, I have sought to apply the test o f whether a particular skill could have 
improved the survival o f man in the environment o f evolutionary adaptation (that is 
his capability to reproduce) or be related to it in a describable way. If not I assume 
that it was not, and is not, there. This is to a large extent an experiment o f 
imagination, as perhaps EP more generally is, based on conjectured adaptive 
situations, and may seem ambitious. However, I remind the reader that I seek no 
more than to suggest plausible and minimalist assumptions. Thresholds can perhaps 
be more easily justified as they do not depend on knowing and understanding the 
full panoply o f ancestral life. I have sought to check these in terms o f whether other 
problems could be imagined for which extended facility would have had an 
adaptive function, indeed, whether they would even be practically useful for 
problems outside the modem era. I use EP as an alternative to  an arbitrary check-list 
and a means o f balancing it, not to im ply that the arguments here prove their truth.
It is a list o f such assumptions that is developed over succeeding sections. The list is 
summarised in Section 3.13 and the reader may wish to  refer to  this from tim e to 
time.
3.6 The reason for Reason
It is instructive to  discuss the concept o f reason w ithin the framework o f this 
investigation. As Evans (1983 p i)  observes "No subject in psychology has a longer 
tradition o f study than that o f thinking, which goes back well before the separation 
o f the disciplines o f philosophy and psychology." However, this investigation is 
directed to  practical matters and a simple definition o f reason may suffice in this 
context. I suggest that reason is the process by which people assess information by 
connected thought, that is draw inferences by conscious deliberation. (The phrase 
"connected thought" is drawn from an OED definition and I have also used Evans 
(op cit p7). Following, Barsalou (1992 p275). I propose, for purposes here, that 
thought involves a series o f transformations performed on the contents o f working
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memory, where these transformations and contents are conscious at least to some 
degree. I accept that this is incomplete, dodging as it does the meaning o f 
consciousness but suggest it is adequate for these modest purposes. (Hale (1999, 
p9-26) criticises various attempts to define it but does not come up w ith a succinct 
description. I ask the reader as a possessor o f consciousness to  recognise it).
Reason may in this model be looked at as a process w ith soft edges at one end o f a 
continuous spectrum o f activity primarily controlled by the brain (though supported 
and influenced by biochemistiy) ranging through such processes as Intuition (also an 
aspect o f intelligence), to the involuntary control o f the physical systems o f the 
body. In seeking to draw an arbitrary line in the spectrum between red (Reason) and 
orange (Intuition) we w ill allow that Reason embraces conscious internal scrutiny o f 
unconscious thought. For example, some people may "see" an anagram w ithout 
conscious process but w ill consciously confirm that it is correct. However, if there is 
scrutiny o f the conclusion, that the combination recognised, is indeed an anagram, 
then it is reason for our purpose. A  conclusion drawn w ithout conscious scrutiny 
(perhaps, a judgement o f an individual's character) I w ill describe as Intuition. We 
m ight also distinguish this from Instinct using this for a process in which 
environmental information is processed directly into action w ithout conscious 
intervention.
Although reason is the basis o f modem knowledge such as Astronomy and 
Philosophy, These and most other sophisticated knowledge cannot solve adaptive 
problems. Reason is too complex a system to be a spandrel. What then can we say 
about the adaptive problem that reason solved?
For there to be an opportunity for evolution to amplify a tra it there has to  be a 
reproduction affecting difference; in this case a difference in behaviour. But reason is 
a process o f connected thought. Therefore, it is in deliberate actions we can take 
that we would not have otherwise taken in the ancestral environment, using the 
information we extract from the environment and process by such connected 
thought, that constitutes the basis for adaptation. We may call this the exercise o f 
choice. Reason allowed considered choice leading to relatively superior action; that 
is superior by improving the reproduction o f the organism possessing the genes 
encoding the trait, relative to that that could be achieved by acting only the basis o f 
pure instinct, hormones, taste, smell and the other oriented adaptations operating
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within an integrated action system. Hale (1999, p i43), in slightly different terms, 
sees "human understanding" as the evolved capacity to acquire and use knowledge 
o f causal processes in the natural world. He identifies (p282) "faculty o f intention" as 
being a necessaiy complement to thinking and understanding, "which would be 
impotent w ithout it". This he perceives as the pre-disposition to  the implementation 
o f mentally conceived action plans. Damasio (1994, p i65) also suggests " ..tha t the 
purpose o f reasoning is deciding and that the essence o f deciding is selecting a 
response option, that is, choosing a nonverbal action, a word, a sentence, or some 
combination thereof..". This capacity for deliberate action enabled us to  inhabit 
environments to which we would otherwise be unsuited and to handle the 
complexity o f multiple, interface, or fast changing environments.
But we should look at this system and its importance w ithin the context o f other 
systems we possess and other organisms possess. It is perhaps worth reminding 
ourselves that we are possibly the only organism capable o f comprehensive 
reasoning. Other organisms are highly successful and live complex social lives, and 
in the animal world in particular, solve adaptively and practically similar problems to 
those o f our Homo Sapiens ancestors from whom we are indistinguishable. These 
species manage very well w ithout reason. We also remain dependent on a variety 
o f action oriented systems which are arguably far more immediately critical for 
species survival. If we lost our sex drives, child nurturing instincts, recognition o f 
pain, or immune systems, reason would not prevent the gradual loss o f our species. 
As so many other species manage to solve the complex problems o f survival and 
reproduction w ithout our special system, and we critically need many o f the 
systems that we share w ith them, we m ight argue that reason is merely a 
marginally useful adaptation w ithin the total scheme o f evolutionary importance. 
This is notwithstanding the high standing that we choose to attach to ourselves as a 
result o f having it.
This adaptive solution is nevertheless an extremely elegant one because o f its m ulti­
purpose versatility, it enabled us to occupy the "versatile environment" and what 
Hale calls "artefactual" niches. It is capable o f flexibly contributing to a variety o f 
adaptive problems; navigation, catching, picking, transporting, keeping, and 
processing food; keeping warm and safe, identifying, keeping and protecting mates; 
nurturing and protecting offspring; evaluating, co-operating, outw itting and
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communicating w ith members o f our group and other groups etc. In this respect it 
is distinguished from many other systems which are action specific.
The adaptation had one other profoundly significant feature, which is unique 
amongst adaptations. It was able to bootstrap itself independently o f the 
evolutionary process, to overcome lim itations o f memory on which its basic 
operation depended. It was able to gear itself, unconstrained by capacity lim itations 
which embryology and physics imposes on all other adaptations. Thus, in the 
current era we are able to use reason to chain thoughts into infinitely long 
sequences, unencumbered by the restrictions o f memory or the restrictions o f a 
single brain. Aided by language (probably an adaptation) (eg Pinker 1995), and, 
critically, w riting (certainly not one), thoughts can be committed to a more reliable 
and infinitely capacious long-term memory for subsequent process by ourselves or 
others, and transmitted w ithout deterioration over great distances and over 
generations. But the ability to  create long chain thought was not itself adaptive. 
Reason is the foundation o f civilisation, but it is fortuitous non-adaptive artefacts that 
gave it potency. This remarkable consequential power remains simply a spandrel .
This model was challenged by a question posed to me. Is poetry possible w ithout 
writing? Poetry in the terms o f this model are certainly long connections o f thought 
o f a complex and subtle type structured by form as well as content. M y answer is 
that it is possible (and legend, structured music, sophisticated law, and other 
accoutrements o f culture as well), making use o f our capacious long-term memory 
for which the adaptive advantages are clear, as a substitute for paper. But the 
essence o f long-term memory is that it contains leamt thought and whilst retrieval is 
speedy, storage is generally not. Paperless poetry depends on a process o f learning 
and refinement and, if  o f length and complexity, is likely to  be the result o f process 
o f several minds over generations. W riting provides pace, accuracy and capacity 
beyond even our large long-term memory.
Some support for the supposition o f simple capability can be found in the computer 
analogy. Simple machines w ith few logic elements can solve very complicated 
mathematical problems. Most people o f modest education could devise a method 
for working out square roots by reasoning, aided by pencil and paper; but how 
many could quickly calculate the square root o f 5 to  even one decimal place? Even 
those who can find it w ith difficulty are taking deductive short-cuts abandoning
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reason for memory and recognition; we know the squares o f 2 and 3. Hunter (1966 
p341) describes the skills o f a mathematician who, by contrast had prodigious skills 
o f mental arithmetic. He was able to retain more in his memory than most o f us, but 
largely depended on his knowledge o f numerical properties, and was still very less 
competent than a cheap modem calculator.
Yet our capability for recognition is o f quite a different order over that for reason.
M y computer has a character recognition program for the scanner; the program and 
the library o f subroutines associated w ith it occupies 12MB. It does a satisfactory job 
but frequently makes errors; for example, not distinguishing d irt from text. Yet the 
variety o f its task is trivial compared w ith the problem o f recognising faces or 
places, or identifying objects, tasks which we appear to do w ith ease. Standing 
(1973) found that people were able to recognise 6600 out o f 10,000 "Normal" 
pictures exposed for only 5 seconds each tw o days earlier. For "Vivid" pictures he 
considered "memory capacity is almost limitless"; abstract material was not retained 
so effectively. Against such unconscious power, our reason seems lim ited.
We should also avoid imputing to  ourselves innate abilities we may have as a result 
o f other facilities o f the mind. Our ability to learn means that "long chain" reasoning, 
can be "schooled" and we can acquire sufficient fam iliarity to believe we have an 
extensive innate ability. In reality the unsupported mind can still only get itself 
around "short chain" problems. Compared w ith the ability to  learn (an adaptation 
which we share in varying degrees w ith other organisms), reason is inefficient. It is 
superior in the solution o f essentially original problems but it is a wasteful for 
addressing the many more that we have solved before.
Reason gives us an edge. But reason isolated from modem artefactual procedure 
may make only a lim ited contribution to good decisions, relative to other systems 
w ithin us.
3.7 Decisions In the Ancestral Environment
Our ancestral environment cannot be known w ith certainty. We can say that we 
were Hunter-Gatherers for 99% o f our existence as distinct species, w ithout the 
benefit o f agriculture, far less civilisation or organised economy. Indeed it is possible 
that hunting is an explanation o f our speciation (H ill, 1982) and it is any case the
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determinant o f (or intertwined w ith) many o f the other adaptations that particularly 
characterise humans eg the use o f tools, sexual biochemistry and mores, gender 
roles, group size and relations, communication, bipedalism, sharing, reciprocation, 
co-operation and intelligence (Hill (op cit); Washburn and Lancaster, 1968; Laughlin, 
1968). Laughlin suggests, "Hunting is the master pattern o f the human species. It is 
the organizing activity which integrated the morphological, physiological, genetic, 
and intellectual aspects o f the individual organisms and o f the population who 
compose our single species". However, M ithen (1996, p46) questions this, 
believing it is incompatible w ith, for example, facility w ith creative mathematics.
For a significant proportion o f our evolutionary tim e we were people o f the African 
savannah, though descended from apes who are and were mainly creatures o f the 
rain forest designed for that environment. We may reasonably assume that we 
operated in relatively small hunting determined groups but w ith sufficient 
integration w ith other groups to facilitate exogamy (which H ill argues would have 
been necessary for economically viable sexual balance) and, possibly, to  negotiate 
avoidance o f gratuitous competition. Population would be sparse, though the range 
o f individual groups would be very large compared w ith other primates. Groups 
would expand to  fill the resources available in the good times, divide, and compete 
when conditions regressed. We can assume that the amazing versatility provided by 
our unique tra it Reason would enable us to exploit either temporarily or 
permanently, different, marginal and interface environments (perhaps rain 
forest/savannah boundaries), an ability evidenced by the range o f our species which 
is w ider than any other animal and includes habitats for which many o f our physical 
attributes constitute a severe handicap. (How would our hairless bodies manage to 
survive even in temperate zones, w ithout our intelligence? How else could we 
survive on the savannah w ithout a grazer's or browser’s digestion, or evade being 
hunted, w ithout living by our wits?).
Our environment would nevertheless have been stable. That is not to  say that life 
was devoid o f uncertainty or m obility; on the contrary at an individual level 
uncertainty and hazard would have been a dominating characteristic. But there 
would have been stochastic stability. Our ancestors would have faced the same 
types o f problems as their mothers and grandfathers. Unusual events would have 
occurred but rarely outside living memory or the inherited vicarious experience o f
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legend, available for the guidance o f action. Life would be lived in the fast lane o f 
action but the slow lane o f types o f action.
W ithin that environment we can assume that our intelligence would be applied 
(practically and adaptively) to  the production and use o f artefacts such as tools, 
clothing, and shelter. (The use o f simple tools is observed amongst other primates 
so this was likely an early skill). It would also be applied in like terms to 
organisation and the politics o f w ithin group. M ithen (op cit) noted that brain size 
increases in new species o f man correlated w ith and, he suggests, was causally 
linked to  group size, and he accordingly puts major emphasis o f the intelligence 
demands o f larger group living. More caution is required here. Organisation 
requires elements o f negotiation or instruction and the politics o f society may give 
an adaptive advantage to  the smarter human. But, many species live in large groups 
and "co-operate", and simple "unintelligent" rules can simulate quite complex group 
behaviours).
We can assume intelligence would be applied to  various forms o f taxonomic 
discrimination and other forms o f understanding the natural histoiy domain. 
Departing from a narrow species domain, food sources would cease to be "obvious", 
and abundant in any narrow range o f types. Food would need to be explicitly 
selected from a far greater range o f possibilities than usual in the animal kingdom. 
Intellectual classification secures reproductive advantage.
Tools brought the ability to hunt but our ancestors still suffered severe 
disadvantages. Behaviour o f potential prey, and those for which they m ight 
themselves be prey, needed to be understood and such facility would be adaptive. 
To be versatile environment-wise, we could not acquire domain specific instincts (an 
alternative mechanism). These could not evolve w ith sufficient speed to ensure our 
species survival in the face o f what, to the rest o f the biological world dependant on 
narrow environment adaptation, would be radical change.
Other parts o f the animal kingdom inter-relate w ith members o f their own species 
w ithout intelligence but given that intelligent "behavioural" appreciation o f other 
species is adaptively created, the skill would be available for "reading" and out­
manoeuvring our own. As there would be an adaptive advantage in doing so to 
secure more food, sex, desirable mates, allies, and the trappings o f power to
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underwrite these indefinitely and to dispense nepotistic privilege, the tra it would 
spread in the gene pool and be capable o f relation to  specific groups and 
individuals w ithin groups. The ability to track, navigate, plan, conspire, outw it, 
make, belong, build, use, correlate, classify, assess, explain, inter-relate, charm, 
frighten, control, submit, befriend, share, distrust, lead, follow, listen, persuade and 
to  do so discriminately are all traits for which there is adaptive advantage. The intra­
species application o f reason would give an advantage to individuals exercising it in 
this social way, though ultimately it has to demonstrate its viability exogenously in 
the "games" played by the species against the environment and other species w ithin 
the environment.
Now let us look at the mechanisms at work in some o f these facilities. Many o f 
them are decisions w ith a single clear purpose which are not determined from first 
principles and are predominantly dependent on our ability to  learn and consign the 
results o f experience to long-term memory. Plant taxonomy, navigation, artefact 
manufacture, and the implications o f reciprocation are simple examples, but the 
same principle applies to more complex tasks, say, a judgement o f trustworthiness. 
In the first example, a classification may be tagged w ith an action-oriented 
conclusion implying a pre-tabulated decision (eg "tasty"-» eat). We may also assume 
that decisions o f "how to do" whether in matters o f craft, domestic and providing 
skills, or organisation, were also principally o f demonstration, observation, and 
learning, as they are now. A young chimpanzee observes another breaking a nut 
between tw o stones and copies it, his success causes him to  repeat the experiment. 
He learns. So do people. Much o f such skill at this level m ight be considered to 
have no decision content beyond that o f securing the end that the tool or method 
enables.
However, issues o f design, selection, and approach, quickly enter the equation, and 
they require choice from options. What location for the shelter or trap, what people 
for the team, what piece o f wood for the shaft o f a spear, what forage plan? Guided 
by personal or vicarious experience a particular decision must be made cognisant o f 
the circumstances o f the moment. Then, as now, only so much could be taught or 
observed, accumulation o f experience then allows for more comprehensive 
classification, more explicit action tagging, or more effective design.
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We may note that many o f the these decisions are multi-factored and these may 
interact in quite complex ways. Thus even the simple spear shaft has to be selected 
and crafted w ith attention to length, thickness, hardness, straightness, weight and 
springiness. But its function (a predominantly single function), is clear and 
experience would lead us through feedback and "hill-climb" search heuristics to  an 
adequately optimum design decision, in control terms requiring no more perception 
than the ability to  relate a difference in parameter to  improvement in performance. 
So too w ith methodological or organisational issues; though here we m ight be 
tempted to use Lindblom's (1959) similar idea, Successive Lim ited Comparison.
The selection o f a mate may be a more difficult multi-factor and m ulti purpose 
choice and, as a one-off or occasional decision, there is less opportunity for 
corrective feedback. However, cultural ideals (arguably an encapsulation o f vicarious 
experience) biochemistry and our emotional systems make this complicated choice 
easier at least from the view  point o f individual parties. The structural complexity o f 
this decision would seem to arise not from its m ultiple factors, or unclear objective 
structure but from its m ultipartite structure. Games o f such complex structure are 
still unyielding to  computer optim isation. Thankfully, (thanks to evolution) even here 
we have w ithin us systems to avoid the indefinite stand-off at risk and, often, to 
convert an achievable compromise into a highly desired outcome. Ultimately this 
complex choice is simplified to  one o f winning, submitting to, or evading one 
person.
The other feature o f the ancestral decision environment is that in information terms 
it would have been "noisy". Accordingly the practical and adaptive premium on 
precision would have been far less than the practical premium today. Adaptive 
sensitivity would be far less than the sensitivity that attaches to the highly geared 
practical decisions o f modem commercial life. It would have been important to be 
competent, say, in judging who to  trust, but the precise weighting o f cues would 
be relatively unimportant as, however refined, mistakes o f trusting and o f not 
trusting would still be made. Adaptive decision making could be achieved w ith a 
broader brush.
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3.8 Objectives and Optim ality in the Pleistocene
For modem economic man, in his working habitat, decisions go hand in hand w ith 
Objectives. He lives in a world o f objectives, targets, strategies, and missions and in 
a world in which best is most or least, and is precise. They are central to  normative 
decision making. We know them and we often declare them. We want the most 
profit or the shortest time. We pro-act in the light o f them. We cope w ith these 
modem competitive needs and because we are so familiar w ith them we may think 
that we are innately adept at handling them. Are we? In Chapter 2 I postulated that, 
although we may have a strong qualitative ideas o f what we wished to achieve and 
an appreciation o f the attributes determining the goodness or badness o f decisions, 
we were Vague in the specification o f more than one (or, at most, tw o or three) 
objectives. What insights emerge from EP considerations?
Let us first consider objectives and strategies. Our ancestors would have had the 
most simple overall objective; to  survive, and insofar that this objective allows 
additional flexibility, to  do so as pleasurably as possible. But such an overall 
objective, even though simple, would have little  meaning, because objectives im ply 
pro-active purpose and provide criteria for the selection between possibilities. 
However, at least at the strategic level man would have been entirely reactive, the 
environment was stable. Life was to be lived in the same way as their Great, Great, 
....Grandparents did and their Great, G reat,... Grandchildren would. There was no 
strategy. Any unforced changes in the habit o f life would be by ve iy slow 
gradualism.
The same would also have generally applied at a personal level. There were some 
personal strategic choices, the means to secure our preferred mate, whether to 
befriend X, whether to  bid for leadership w ithin the group or whether advantage 
can be secured by submission to another. The task and options would be simple. 
Their solution would have been assisted by the application o f reason (although 
again our emotions would be at work) but the process would not have required 
concepts o f objectives or strategy anymore than these familiar problems require 
them in the animal world.
Our ancestors would o f course have had roles; and, w ithin these roles, tasks. These 
would have been basic; hunter/ provider, homemaker/ mother and, possibly, group 
leader and family head. A t least as far as the first tw o o f these were concerned our
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effectiveness in these roles would have been reinforced by the evolutionary 
selection o f reinforcing instincts, and we can perhaps discern these in our own 
natures. We can also see that there m ight have been adaptations to  suit some o f us 
for leadership
There m ight, in due course, have been other specialisation o f task w ithin basic roles 
(eg tracker, shaman, basket-maker, water carrier). Such specialist roles would not be 
adaptive (there are too many and the advantage o f particular roles may have 
emerged too recently in the evolutionary time-scale). Some may have been 
determined by tradition or inherited, but others simply determined by gender, 
anatomy, assignment or self-selection, as in any community there would be a 
natural but exploitable variation in the skill and physical profiles o f members. Facility 
to  flexibly adopt or assign complex roles would, however, depend on adaptations. 
In addition to the basic human trait o f reason these would include the facility to 
perceive those skill differences in oneself and in others and to make judgements o f 
relative advantage. A  group w ith these skills in these areas would be more 
practically and genetically successful than a group w ithout them. However, 
dexterity or intuitive fam iliarity w ith "objective setting", per se, would not be 
required as the profile o f roles necessary would be stable over generations.
However at the tactical level the situation changes. There are issues o f choice to be 
made on a fast changing tim e scale. If we consider the hunt for example, there are 
questions o f where to go, what to  try to catch, and how to do it. Goals and plans 
and the ability to  cope easily w ith them become important and competence 
therewith may be adaptive as genetic survival would no doubt be enhanced (but 
remember this is g ilt on the gingerbread, other carnivorous species cope w ithout 
these human skills).
It is nevertheless instructive to contrast such goals and plans w ith modem 
equivalents. Ancestral objectives are likely to have been im plicit, qualitative, 
classificatory, o f short duration, imprecise, liable to  pre-emption or replacement, 
w ith success measured on a binary or a simple classificatory scale, and one­
dimensional. Thus the objective m ight be to "catch a gazelle", "gather berries, 
"ingratiate myself w ith the son o f the Chief; it m ight be replaced by another if it 
rained and would have no validity beyond the day or trek or the natural time to 
complete a task. Generally one would judge success by crude measures, "nothing",
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"one elk", "enough", perhaps principally judged by exceeding or falling short o f 
unarticulated prior expectation. There would not be m ultiple objectives such as "get 
elk and boar": both m ight be possibilities for the mission but in a statement "get elk 
or boar" there is likely to have been a well understood hierarchy o f desirability. 
Quantitative considerations would be minimal. "Enough for the family or group" 
m ight be a an im plicit goal w ith "too much" being determined by practical 
constraints such as what one can cariy, eat, and protect. Often there would be a 
natural binary test o f goal achievement eg win-lose, sex-no sex, miss-hit, life-death. 
Matters involving degree would be governed by notions o f satisfying and satiation 
similar in kind to the modem criterion o f satisficing. They m ight be "converted" into 
binary conclusions by the emotional adaptations o f disappointment and elation 
when we failed at the hunt, or our sycophancy is rewarded w ith a token o f 
recognition. We can see our natural inclination to "binarise" in our modem lives; 
soccer goals to win-lose, exam marks to pass-failure, and our bonus into whether it 
was more or less than last year's.
There would nevertheless be a large number o f value assessments to  be made in 
determining goals, switching or modifying goals and executing goals. Is it best to  
try for boar or elk; is Fred reliable; does one stop to  pick up walnuts blown-off in the 
storm? Skill in such choices would be adaptive and that man would have acquired 
intuitive skill in such selections, but we m ight again assume imprecision would be 
tolerable. Moreover, as such choices would also often have been binary, sometimes 
w ith a few options, but rarely at one time w ith many, we should not assume innate 
facility w ith m ultiple option evaluation.
We can also look at objectives through our ancestors more basic needs. They 
sought food, sex, warmth, power, fun, and companionship. We are m ultiple needs 
organisms in our very natures are we not also m ultiple objective organisms? A  short 
examination shows that it is adaptive for our nature to  be the contrary. It is 
adaptively important for us to be interested in sex but not in flight or battle when 
greater dangers to our procreativity exist. We may seek power but it is not adaptive 
when we are hungry or cold. As Maslow (eg 1970) pointed out, we have 
hierarchies o f needs, m ultiple needs. "Man is a wanting animal and rarely reaches a 
state o f complete satisfaction except for a short time. As one desire is satisfied, still 
another comes into the foreground, etc. It is a characteristic o f the human being
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throughout his whole life that he is practically always desiring something" (p24).
Our wants "seem to arrange themselves in some sort o f hierarchy o f prepotency." 
(p25). We have serial objectives and the selection o f the objective o f the moment 
would be primarily or exclusively a matter o f adaptive biochemistry rather than 
reason; w ith reason contributing more to achievement. Even today we may find our 
more modem problems o f decision priority affected by primeval objective choosing 
mechanics, for example, by sexual game plays in office situations.
The concept o f the serial single goal obviously requires a concept o f priority and this 
m ight be seen to  parallel the modern need for relative values and weights w ithin 
m ultiple concurrent objective problems. However, there is no reason to suppose 
that a material adaptive advantage would have accrued through intellectualisation. 
The long-run balancing point for sex versus food, for example, would be resolved 
through evolutionary mechanisms largely independent o f the mind and at the 
practical level there would be insufficient stability in the sex versus food relative pay 
o ff for a "weighted objective" to  simplify future evaluation. Indeed, any individual 
exhibiting such a tra it would suffer reproductive disadvantage.
In the modem world our objectives lead us towards good action, indeed we seek 
the best or optimal action. It is therefore also instructive to examine the notion o f 
optim isation w ithin the context o f the environment o f evolutionary adaptation 
(prima facie, still a useful thing to thing to achieve). Were our ancestors to  have 
spent several hundreds o f thousand o f years evolving in oil refineries where 
procreative rights were linked to successful control o f the process, what would have 
happened? We can be certain that the operation o f the oil refinery would have been 
optim ised, but would this mean that we would have become good optimisers. If 
during evolutionary time, the crude oil offered to  the refinery varied over days in 
price, quantities, and characteristics, and the required products varied similarly, they 
could indeed have become brilliant intuitive LP optimisers inverting large matrices 
in their heads. If alternatively the oil demand and product prices remained steady 
but crude types and prices varied, we would have become expert dealers, knowing 
the value o f every crude on offer and literally smelling whether it could be 
economically blended w ith other types. If supply and demand and all prices 
remained steady we would become zombies whose reason had become vestigial, 
but we would be capable o f reflexively responding to  minute movements in
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temperature gauges. In all cases the refineries would be optim ised. But evolution 
would have taken its time and created optim ising adaptations suited to the 
environment. If the environment is strategically stable we do not need individually 
to be able to optim ise in order to operate in an evolutionarily optimal manner.
Optimal foraging (Harris, 1993; Smith, 1983) is an example. In principle the 
selection o f diet to  maximise energy intake relative to foraging time, subject to 
constraints on other nutritional needs, is a knapsack problem o f profound adaptive 
significance. But, it is a problem solved on an evolutionary time-scale by the 
development o f tastes (physical as well as mental) favouring one food rather than 
another and on a shorter one by societal preference or taboo. This would be a more 
efficient solution than providing an intellectual mechanism unless the ancestral 
supermarket habitually offered completely novel options. Moreover, as species 
w ithout the capacity to reason also show optimal foraging behaviour (Krebs, 1973), 
unicellular predators exhibit behaviours that constitute effective search procedures 
(Chamov, 1976), and foraging models w ith simple rules can be developed which 
deal w ith the survival needs o f the modelled "organism" Simon (1957), it is apparent 
that the fact o f optim isation does not require intuitive understanding or intellectual 
facility w ith the concept. I conclude that the concept o f optim ality and the capacity 
to  optim ise in original circumstances is not adaptive and not innate. Simon (1965, 
xxiv) observed that "Administrative theory is peculiarly the theory o f intended and 
bounded rationality o f the behaviour o f human beings who satisfice because they 
have not the w its to maximize". Administrative Man is much like his primeval 
ancestors; he does not have the w its to maximise because his forefathers never 
needed to.
I suggest that the concept o f long-term objective as a solid criterion for focusing 
and evaluating relative achievement is not itself directly hard-wired w ithin our 
mental mechanisms. We m ight plausibly argue that the step from short-term goal to 
long-term objective is not an issue o f quality but o f degree: a mind tuned to the 
former should not find the latter too alien. However, we probably cannot say that 
we are intuitively adept at defining objectives which are not im plicit in the roles we 
perform. Moreover, although we may readily perceive the interacting impact o f 
many complex factors to  a single end, we seem unlikely to be endowed w ith inbuilt
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mechanisms easily to perceive problems as simultaneously requiring the 
achievement o f m ultiple objectives or to balance m ultiple objectives.
Looking introspectiveiy and observing subjectively, we do seem to be adept at 
lexicographic objective formulations and the concept o f single objectives 
circumscribed by "subject to  .." qualifications. This seems consistent w ith Simon's 
notion that we satisfice and Lindbloms Successive Lim ited Comparison. We appear 
naturally suited to  moving dextrousiy between serial short-term objectives whilst 
moving the overall game plan by small adjustments to  established norms. We 
m ight intellectually recognise that some or many conflicting objectives m ight be 
simultaneously dealt w ith by striking a relative balance, but we remain vague about 
how to do this. Furthermore, we may not sustain a consistent balance between 
them. There were few evolutionary Brownie points for doing so. For the same 
reason, it is unlikely that we have unschooled mechanisms which graduate the 
achievement o f long-term objectives (in distinction from choosing the important 
objective o f the moment). We must question our facility w ith the idea o f achieving 
objectives better or more economically, in contrast to  merely achieving them.
This appears to  be consistent w ith the assumption I make in the approach 
developed in this thesis: that people do not have a innate affinity w ith complex 
objectives defined in any precise way to address economic problems, despite 
having good appreciation o f their broad intentions and the factors involved. They 
are vague. Objectives that can be directly mapped to decision desirability rarely 
exist and cannot readily be defined. They need to  be constructed.
3.9 Ancestral Logic
Modem analysis o f decisions depends on quantitative evaluation by decision maker 
or analyst but also quantitatively expressed judgement o f values, risks and, in some 
cases, o f factors. It thus depends on numeracy not only in the generation o f 
conclusions but in the provision o f information describing the mind o f the decision 
maker. I w ill explicitly discuss both issues o f number and risk shortly.
Both concept o f calculation and the ideas underlying statistics share common 
ground w ith the ideas underlying classical logic- the manner in which conclusions 
may be drawn from given propositions. Classical logic also lies at the root o f
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concepts o f normative rationality. If there are any grounds for believing that 
concepts o f testing thought which we call Logical are not innate, we are entitled to 
question our intuitive comprehension o f its close cousins.
I therefore explore in this section whether all ideas which we call logical would have 
adaptive value to our ancestors. In particular I examine the Wason Selection Task, a 
simple logical problem examined by empirical psychologists.
The ability o f a species to infer a logical proposition o f the type P -> Q ,
(P implies Q) or ( if  P then Q) , should afford an adaptive advantage. It should allow 
it to  select better food, better alliances, avoid danger, and hunt better than by 
employing an unreasoning or unconscious facility alone. Indeed, such a relationship 
is at the root o f an ability to reason action-based conclusion from facts, to analyse 
decisions, which I have suggested is the embracing adaptive problem to  which 
Reason contributes. Reason cannot be adaptive w ithout the ability to  discern P^>Q  
also being adaptive. It is the key building block o f connected thought. We m ight 
say that "Reason" —> "Facility for P -^ Q
Why is it then that we appear to be intuitively poor at the Wason Selection Task 
which explores this implication relationship? The task designed by PC Wason, 
together w ith subsequent research, assessing the effect o f content using the same 
problem, is described in Griggs (1983). In the test, subjects are presented w ith 
cards representing 4 logical conditions P,P(= not P),Q,Q(= not Q) on their exposed 
sides. On the reverse o f each o f P and P are corresponding conditions which may 
be either Q or Q consistent w ith a logical rule. Similarly on the reverse o f each o f 
the exposed Q or Q there is P or P  consistent w ith  the same rule. The subject is 
then asked to turn over tw o cards which can prove or falsify the proposition P —>Q. 
Thus he m ight be shown cards w ith E, K, 4 and 7 on one side and be asked to 
prove the rule that if there is an E on one side there is 4 on the other. The correct 
answer, to turn over P  (or E) and Q (or 7), is rarely chosen by more than 10% of 
subjects in abstract presentations. Even well-educated subjects perform poorly. 
Results are improved w ith content specific presentations but, except in one case 
mentioned by Griggs (op cit), are still quite poor. Why has not our intuition been 
tuned by evolution to lead us to the correct answer w ith greater reliability?
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Let us examine a Wason look alike that could have been faced by our ancestors. Let 
the four conditions be "Stripes", "No Stripes", "Dangerous", "Benign". A t first sight this 
seems a stylised version o f a useful problem for our ancestors to be able to  solve, 
(whilst recognising this and other danger discernment problems are facilitated by 
the selection o f traits o f fear, caution, learning etc.).
Nevertheless, the intellectual discrimination o f second order effects in order to 
appreciate nuances o f danger, or to deal w ith environmentally less familiar 
information, was a practical problem faced by our ancestors. As their success in 
solving it would have influenced reproduction, it was also an adaptive problem. An 
ancestral logician m ight therefore usefully ask whether "No Stripes" —> "Benign". He 
can investigate "No Stripes" well enough but when he asks his assistant to check 
"Dangerous" he is faced w ith a problem: No-one has placed "Dangerous" labels on 
the animals. The assistant may legitimately ask how he can tell and may also be 
excused for thinking why does he need to  know about "Stripes" and "No Stripes" as 
it is "Dangerous" or "Benign" that is actually the issue. Conclusions concerning covert 
qualities need to  be inferred from overt cues. It is not an answer to  see whether 
"Sharp Teeth" has "No Stripes" as that calls for another inference. Besides, even the 
logician's four-year old daughter knows that "Dangerous" is the one w ith "Stripes" 
demonstrating an ability to receive the implication P —>Q. This ability to  receive 
such information would be adaptively more important than to perceive it from first 
principles. She has every prospect o f passing her genes to the next generation but 
gratuitous curiosity could be fatally damaging to her genetic bequest!
Nevertheless, for some to receive others must perceive and Neolithic Logician has a 
role to  play. But he has a different problem from and epistemology to Classical 
Logician. The latter puts all facts w ithin propositions on an equal and symmetric 
footing; there is thus no quality distinction between "Dangerous" and "Stripes" w ithin 
a classical proposition such as, "All animals w ith stripes are dangerous". Moreover all 
classical entities are in principle observable and independent o f the propositionai 
structure. For example, in "Some small cars have four doors"; we can see both the 
cars and the doors. Neolithic Logician has a different task. He wishes to use reason 
and logic to add value to information by processing a less valuable organisation o f 
information into a more valuable one, to draw a conclusion from a directly 
observable fact or cue regarding unseen qualities. This requires a hierarchical quality
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o f prepositional facts, and an asymmetric relationship between "Stripes" and 
"Dangerous". He becomes interested in P —» Q only when Q is part o f a more 
valuable orientation o f facts than is P , moreover Q may frequently (perhaps, nearly 
always) be a covert fact or classification dependent on cues o f similar type to  P . 
Thus P 's in the ancestral environment would generally be observable but directly 
unimportant qualities such as "Stripes", "Avoids Eye Contact", "Athletic", "Upwind" 
and Q 's such adaptively important conclusions concerning unobservable but 
relevant qualities such as "Dangerous", "Untrustworthy", "Good father", "Poisonous", 
"Easy to catch"; properties which m ight be retrospectively tested but cannot be 
observed in advance except by using other cues or proxies o f type P . The essence 
o f the ancestral logical problem, the only problem, is to  infer exploitable hidden 
dependent facts from not directly useful observable ones. Our ancestors learned 
what was implied by P by observing over ve iy many occurrences what hidden 
attributes were subsequently revealed.
Nor would our Neolithic Logician have seen eye to eye w ith Classical Logician on 
another issue. He would find the range o f available logical options (ALL, SOME,
NO) an extremely lim iting classification. Frequently, in the classical view, the best 
that could be concluded would be o f the form "Some animals w ith stripes are 
dangerous", "Some animals w ithout stripes are dangerous", "Some animals w ith 
stripes are benign" etc. He needs categorisations which can be better related to 
action conclusions. Thus SOME would be more usefully split into MOST and FEW. 
As the action consequence o f MOST would be more similar to  that for ALL, and 
FEW to that for NO, the classical structure accords little  practical benefit.
Another issue is the parsimony o f the Wason structure. It is unexceptionable that 
the logically correct solution to the Wason Task provides the maximum conclusive 
power for the minimum o f information. But such economy has only puzzle merit; it 
is neither adaptive nor practical to  do the equivalent o f turning only tw o cards in 
the real life situation. Indeed, the natural selection process is the antithesis o f 
frugality. Evolution seeks to solve adaptive problems but its criterion is not 
information efficiency. Our ancestors would have solved the practical problem by 
the equivalent o f turning over all the cards, w ith a good few thousand others w ith 
varying labels such as "Spots", "Difficult to Catch" etc. on many hundreds o f 
occasions, together w ith absorbing the reports o f the experiences o f others. This
124
would have been integrated into a sophisticated classification w ith implication 
mappings o f a far more complex type than P -^ Q .  Skill in doing this would have 
been selected. This leads to the intriguing possibility o f intuitive skill in regression 
analysis. But there seems to be no mechanism for the selection o f an intuitive 
classical logic ability.
Wason subjects often turn the P card as their first choice (we can say that this is 
their intuitive choice) this is consistent w ith this model. If you want to know what P 
implies look. The Q card is apparently a frequent second choice. This too is an 
action that can be understood in terms o f adaptive decision needs before the dawn 
o f history. I w ill remember the characteristics o f an animal who attacks me and the 
body language o f a man who lies to me.
The importance o f this issue is that we indeed "ought" to  assess our modem 
practical problems through a rationality based on classical logic. We are tempted to 
believe that the same mind that comes to this view  w ill co-operate in its execution. 
But our actual cognition has been tutored in a different training ground.
3.10 EP, Risk and Uncertainty 
Although closely bound up w ith Number (which I discuss in the next Section), I 
consider concepts o f risk and uncertainty first as these appear to  depend on more 
fundamental considerations o f the operation o f the conscious mind.
To a large extent our ancestors' response to risk would have been programmed 
through the fear and apprehension mechanisms. Some modem psychological 
maladies m ight thus owe their selective origins to  avoidance o f dangerous 
situations (eg vertigo, agoraphobia etc.) Nevertheless, there could have been a 
selective advantage if  they were to  have acquired an intuitive appreciation o f the 
magnitude o f risk. To what extent could this have come about and what 
characteristics could we expect such a tra it to  have.
Let us consider what would be the attribute o f a person w ithout appreciation o f 
uncertainty. Such a person would respond to  events w ith  some expectation o f the 
future but blind to  the possibility o f more than one outcome. This deterministic 
outlook would require an in-built forecasting system and we could expect the 
person to have foresight selectively programmed to  be optim ally pessimistic or
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optim istic, a balancing act which would be performed by evolution to provide the 
m ix most successful at reproducing itself. However, life, although possessing the 
right balance o f optimism/pessimism, would be continuously full o f surprises. The 
perpetual capacity to be always completely surprised would require that such a 
person would not have the capacity to learn that things do not turn out as 
expected; and we cannot consciously learn at all w ithout the ability to assess a 
deviation from expectation, by which we can store some modified response for the 
future. Our subject would remain surprised for just an instant because he is unlikely 
to  recognise that there was more than one possible thread from the past if there is 
none into the future. Our deterministic man, not recognising the possibility o f 
alternative futures, would take actions independently o f the possibilities o f the 
future and in doing so he would have miss reproductively important opportunities 
to which he could have applied his trait o f reason. He would not always fail but he 
would fail more often than the person w ith the trait, which having an adaptive 
advantage would eventually dominate the gene pool. A  sense o f alternative and, in 
consequence, the concept o f an uncertain future, and decision making in response 
to uncertainty not only has to be adaptive but has a more fundamental status. It is a 
concomitant o f consciousness, reasoning, and thoughtful learning.
We can argue similarly that a capacity for appreciating comparative possibilities o f 
future scenarios would be built in. Our imaginary intelligent ancestors could hardly 
manage life where the full panoply o f futures was accessible but they were denied 
appreciation o f some form o f assessment o f the relative likelihoods o f those futures, 
that is to  say, they lived in conditions o f Strict Uncertainty. They would be little  
better placed to survive than their deterministic cousins. Naturally, Strict Uncertainty 
Man would develop an intuitive grasp o f the type o f modem heuristics suggested 
dealing w ith these problems, such as Minimax, but some recognition o f likelihood 
would give the person who had it a decision making advantage on adaptive 
problems. But we must be cautious in attributing facility which is more than 
sufficient for the task. I suggest it is reasonable to  attribute him w ith the following 
intuitive adaptations:
- the ability to recognise alternative futures
- the ability to judge or assign broad degree o f possibility to  futures or 
events (eg impossible, quite possible, likely)
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- the ability to assign broad comparative likelihood o f one future, relative to 
another (eg more likely than, most likely, sim ilarly likely)
- the ability to assign that an event is more, less, or sim ilarly likely to occur 
than not to occur (eg it is more likely to  rain tomorrow than not to  rain).
The fourth o f these is simply a special case o f the third but it is worth special 
mention as it provides a mechanism for graduation o f important events which m ight 
be described as moderately frequent. It also provides a basis for an intuitive 
appreciation o f a single point in a probability scale, 0.5.
Associated w ith the idea o f recognition o f alternative futures is that o f action- 
influenced alternative futures. If one accepts that the adaptive function o f reason is 
decision-making, or the selection o f choices, it is a sine qua non that one must be 
able to anticipate alternative consequences in order to effect a choice. Thus, again, 
reason could not be selected unless the notion o f an action dependent future was 
not also selected. I suggest we can therefore also ascribe to our ancestors and 
ourselves further additional intuitive competencies:
- the ability to  recognise that a course o f action m ight have a different 
relative prospect o f success from an alternative to  meet the intended end 
(eg that one is more dangerous or likely to be successful than another)
- the ability to assign a degree o f possibility to  particular outcomes o f 
action choices (eg, impossible, quite possible, likely)
- the ability to  assign comparative likelihoods to  particular outcomes o f 
action choices (eg more likely than, most likely, sim ilarly likely) and the 
consequent ability to  assign ordinal likelihood o f outcomes
This is not at all to  deny the possibility o f leaps which short-cut explicit prior 
visualisation o f the future in order to effect a decision. Experience or hard-wired 
processing o f present information may allow some decisions to be made w ithout 
the intermediary o f explicit anticipation o f consequences, but the ability to  short-cut 
requires that experience be gained through some retrospective review process 
dependent on similar mechanisms. Thus a person may, for example, uncritically and
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unconsciously assume that the best prospects o f success at fishing to be after it has 
rained in the evening.
We are now faced w ith the issue o f whether cardinal risk, probability, is an 
adaptation. I briefly mention that there must be some doubt that Chance, as we 
understand it, would be conceptualised. The historical and anthropological evidence 
suggests that people have a tendency to invoke an unseen agent, either 
superstitious or spiritual, to  explain what m ight otherwise considered to  be random 
events. They assume that they in turn can influence these events by ritual, talisman, 
or communication. It seems unlikely that this notion o f personal influence can go 
hand in hand w ith an intuitive concept o f chance. The adaptive value o f superstition 
and spirituality is outside the scope o f this thesis. However, in any case, I attem pt in 
the succeeding paragraphs to set aside unseen intervention and to review the 
possibility o f intuitive probability w ithout this factor. Naturally, some issues o f 
numeracy (which I have still to  consider) impinge here.
French (1986, pp 210-254) discusses the three philosophic outlooks o f probability 
from a decision analysis viewpoint. These are the Classical or Laplacian view  o f 
probability, Frequentist Probability, and Subjective or Personal Probability, o f which 
Bayesian statistics is one operationalisation (though the primary issue is that 
Subjective Probability relates to viewtaking about a future single event assembled 
from general experience rather than repeated incidence o f similar events). The use 
o f the terms "frequency", "chance", "odds" and "probability" are legitimate w ithin all 
these frameworks. I use the term Frequentist, as French does, to describe a 
philosophy o f probability which derives from observed incidence, not as Cosmides 
and Tooby (1996) who use the term when describing the encoding o f frequency 
w ith extra information by including both event instances and opportunities, as in 3 
out o f 30.
I start by looking at the nature o f uncertainty w ithin the environment o f evolutionaiy 
adaptation as a due to which philosophic frame our ancestors m ight have 
experienced. We can rule out a classical perspective. It is improbable that our 
ancestors had games o f chance, which used artefacts generating events o f exactly 
equal likelihood (as w ith coins or cards), until comparatively recent millennia, and if 
they had them they would not have formed the basis o f an adaptation.
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However they would have dealt w ith some environmental data to which a 
frequentist view  could be attached. For example, in principle they could have kept 
data on the frequency o f rainy days (though a question is posed here which I w ill 
return to). Less describable in frequentist terms would be, for example, the group's 
success at hunting. Indescribable would be the risk o f certain dangerous activities 
for which there would be an awareness o f risk but for which actual experience o f the 
risk was minimal or non-existent. A  Bayesian situation faced could be one in which 
there was well established experience o f a phenomenon in one area (eg hunting 
success) but no experience o f it in another; the group would need to progressively 
modify a prior view  o f prospects as experience was gained.
However, whilst frequentist information was available in the environment, could a 
frequentist approach have been applied to it. The answer here is likely to be no. A 
frequentist approach requires the maintenance o f statistics. The deferred issue from 
earlier is how? A  detailed memory o f such events can be ruled out on capacity 
grounds and writing, or even the marking o f incidents on tree trunks, are artefactual 
applications o f adaptations not adaptations themselves. There are further objections. 
W hilst frequentist data was available, it is difficult to  imagine that frequentist data 
relating to the consequences o f decisions could have been. Even in the modem 
world it is only under special conditions that we can acquire frequentist data 
relating to  the consequences o f decisions (in a laboratory experiment perhaps). 
Modem decisions are unrepeated events where the consequences o f the 
unimplemented alternative are not known or they are repeated but in different 
environmental circumstances. So also in the ancestral environment. Moreover, 
frequentist information would have been o f a passive type. One m ight know the 
frequency o f rainy days, but so what? How could this govern action? To know that 
there is a higher chance o f rain tomorrow could, but this is a non-frequentist 
question. Also to  know an edible fungus is available at the tim e o f year when the 
frequency o f rainy days is increasing is useful but clumsy. It is easier to look for 
them during damp days in Autumn. I suggest we can rule out an intuitive 
frequentist philosophic concept on practical grounds alone w ithout considering 
adaptation.
We are I suggest left w ith the concept o f quantified subjective or personal 
probability, albeit that it is likely to operate by the retention and processing o f
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sample size as well as relative incidence data, rather than by retaining only the ratio. 
(Cosmides and Tooby (op cit) report greater ease o f understanding w ith problem 
framing expressed in this form). What are the prospects that we have been honed 
by evolution to accurately (or sufficiently accurately) assess and process risk 
magnitude o f a single event possibility in a way that can be related to modem 
concepts o f measured probability, at least crudely, based on Kolmogorov's laws 
(French, 1986, p213)? In order to establish this we must at least establish that such 
a skill would solve an adaptive problem and do so better than skill in the 
assessment o f comparative likelihood married w ith  aptitude in broad qualitative 
assessment o f the possibility o f particular futures and outcomes, for which I have 
argued a case exists. The first issue is could an unbiased estimator exist?
We can readily argue that an unbiased estimator m ight serve the personal practical 
interests o f a organism. A precise estimate m ight enable it to  better calculate its self 
interest. Let us allow that an ancestor is able to  assess the follow ing matrix:
Table 1 Probability o f catching animal in hunt
if  Rain If no Rain
Option A 0.7 0.6
Option B 0.8 0.5
He m ight conclude that if the chance o f rain is 60% it is better to  take option B, and 
if  there is a 40% chance, option A. This is one o f the simplest pure probability (as 
distinct from utility) problems that we could conceive which stylises an ancestral 
choice. It is also a well differentiated problem in the magnitudes o f the data used; 
yet there is computationally just a 2% swing in each case. Would this be sufficient 
to secure a material adaptive advantage over a heuristic that concludes that when it 
is very likely to rain do B, if it is very likely to  be dry do A? If you can't te ll, choose 
the option that takes you by the nut tree, which is beneficial anyway. Even in such a 
manageable case one can see that the fine structure o f probability may be less 
important than ancillary considerations o f the unbounded problem. Knowledge o f 
the fine structure does not therefore lead one to  an inevitable conclusion about the 
best solution and even were it to  for practical problems, in evolutionary terms the 
adaptive advantage could well be swamped by system noise.
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However, there is a more critical objection. Objectivity o f the organism about its 
own best interest is not necessarily adaptive. Clearly there is some coincidence. If 
we did not have a survival instinct, we would soon place ourselves in sufficient 
danger to severely compromise the ability o f our genes to replicate the trait. But 
what we want does not always serves the best interest o f reproduction o f our 
genes. There are circumstances where the correct assessment o f risk was inimical to 
the interests o f the procreation of our ancestors' genes. We can argue that we and 
they would be anxious to avoid events which risk death. Accordingly, an objective 
personal view  could lead us to  take less risk, say, in the pursuit o f food, and this 
m ight indeed maximise our longevity at the price o f temporary hunger. But the life 
prospects o f our infant children (transmitters o f our genes), precarious at the best o f 
times, could be additionally and far more severely hazarded by our failure. 
Moreover, our mates, who propagate our genes, w ill have a completely different 
agenda related to their own propagation and could be largely indifferent to  the risks 
her mate takes. He seeks to  avoid his risk, she seeks to  increase his. This would 
generate the optimal admixture o f bravado and caution for the propagation o f the 
species but it is unrelated to  facility for unbiased estimates o f cardinal probability. 
Indeed, it is most probably adaptive for a provider to adopt strategies injurious to 
his personal prospects o f survival. We seem to be programmed for this problem 
w ith instincts that deal w ith it. But our programmed desperation to save the life of 
our starving child w ill not be realistically assisted by the balancing the finer issues o f 
probability. Indeed, we know our emotional systems kick reason out o f the w indow 
in such crises.
Bayes Law, is often suggested as a basis for the modification o f subjective 
probability but its one line formula belies a demanding computational problem. It 
requires a distribution o f estimated prior probabilities o f the observed event. It is a 
many parameter model requiring mental Integration, and on capacity grounds is 
suspect. In any case, it can only be applied to  relatively frequent events for which
an off-the-shelf instinctive, learned, or cultural response would be available. More 
relevant would be the assessment o f events that we m ight classify as infrequently 
observed but not yet familiar. However, it is likely that an adaptive behaviour for 
such circumstances would be to apply a simple heuristic which assesses risk
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conservatively. Assume danger until safety is demonstrated. W ith a robust simple 
heuristic, I can see no adaptive benefit in cardinal probability.
Before leaving this question it is worth commenting on the impact o f technical 
requirements o f a scale o f probability. Modem man w ith  some numeracy schooling 
and knowledge o f the properties o f probability (eg that probabilities o f disjoint 
events must sum to unity) may have little  trouble in generating a scale o f likelihood 
resembling probability. The innate skills o f assessing "degree o f possibility" o f an 
event and the "comparative likelihood" o f one event relative to another event or o f 
the event relative to its non-occurrence is sufficient to  generate a cardinal-like scale. 
Indeed this, though biased, m ight serve adequately for many modem decision 
making purposes. The additional requirement for a proper scale o f probability is that 
intervals o f likelihood must also be explicitly or im plicitly expressed (eg o f disjoint 
events; A  and B are equally likely, C has the same likelihood as either A  or B 
occurring). As events, in contrast to  roulette wheels, don't label themselves neatly, 
there is no basis for building a mental standard. Accordingly bias and inconsistency 
would seem largely unavoidable.
This conclusion would seem to be consonant w ith many empirically-based findings 
and views o f others. Keen (1977) suggests, "Man is not a good statistician. He has a 
poor sense o f variance and in clinical assessment or actuarial judgments, his 
performance is virtually always inferior to any simple linear regression model- 
assuming o f course there is enough historical data available to build the model. He 
relies on heuristics which are highly economical and usually effective but which lead 
to  systematic and predictable errors, such as insensitivity to sample size and prior 
probabilities and to the regression fallacy. He makes frequent errors o f logic, 
especially in dealing w ith negative examples, but is generally able to rescue himself 
from his mistakes because o f the self-correcting feedback o f language. In even 
simple gambles, he tends to be biased by the payoff, overestimating probabilities if 
the set can result only in a break-even or win." Fox and Tversky consider that there 
is ample evidence that people's subjective estimates are inconsistent w ith the laws 
o f chance and that estimates o f the probability o f the union o f disjoint events is less 
than the sum o f their estimated individual probabilities. Moreover, we should not 
be surprised given the EP scenario developed here to  find the difficulties and biases 
o f probability estimation described in the empirical literature (eg Tversky and
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Kahneman, 1974; Bazerman, 1986, pp 14-41; Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Estes, 
1976; Slovic, Fischoff and Lichenstein, 1982). Hasher and Zacks (1984), Howell 
(1973) and Jones and Jonides (1992) on the other hand, report creditable accuracy 
in encoding frequency in formal word and non-verbal recall tests, though one 
should note that excellent correlation o f reported frequency w ith actual can still be 
obtained even if  there is bias in estimates as seems to be the case in some o f the 
graphed results. Nor should we necessarily be surprised that the expression or 
framing o f probabilistic problems which are computationally equivalent may 
sometimes influence the conclusions reached (eg Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). 
However, Huber and Huber (1987), in addition to reporting the work o f others 
suggesting that both adults and child make preferential use o f comparative 
probability, tested and confirmed the application o f 6 formal principles o f 
comparative probability that they suggest, and found that even young children 
apply this concept remarkably well. This also seems consonant w ith the notions 
presented here. Simon (eg 1965, 1979) also challenged the need for assumptions o f 
heroic calculation o f the type used in SEU.
It is for these reasons that I only assume that comparative likelihood (ordinal 
probability) and broad generalisations o f degree o f likelihood are intuitive amongst 
probabilistic concepts and that ideas such as probabilistic arithmetic and SEU are 
unnatural although competence in objective cardinal probability for relatively 
frequent experienced events can be schooled. This is the basis for my suggestions 
in Chapter 2 concerning the operational definition o f rationality. We must 
accommodate as rational, views which are merely consistent w ith cognition o f 
comparative likelihood whilst allowing conclusions based on a more liberal view- 
provided that the latter is not gainsaid by the first.
3.11 Ancestral number, quantity and calculation 
If, notwithstanding, we temporarily allow that we have some cognition o f 
probability what o f other properties for which we take measurement for granted on 
which we depend in formal decision analysis. To what extent is measurement and 
calculation innate?
It is manifest that most animal species survive w ithout the ability to compute or to 
count (beyond some sort o f ability for some to  determine, say, that individuals o f
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their litte r are missing). Number and Quantity, however, permeate the life o f 
modem man w ith measurement o f time, money, length, and weight being 
preoccupations over very many centuries. Number also underlies much o f decision 
analysis, not only that which is normative (for which we can allow any effective aid) 
but descriptive decision modelling as well. This would be unexceptionable if it is a 
normative commendation or if it adequately encapsulates the consequences o f 
another process. However, if  it presumes a precise mechanism in which the mind 
weights a value o f a possible decision outcome by a measure o f likelihood (however 
we define it), integrates this measure over all outcome possibilities and compares it 
over all decisions, we must consider whether we could possess such sophisticated 
mental facility. Could numeracy be hard-wired w ithin us? Do we compute?
Let us examine the usefulness o f in-built numeracy in terms o f evolutionary 
function. Let us consider measurement first. Judgement and the ability to  learn from 
experience would certainly have been necessary in Palaeolithic times w ith respect 
to  functions which we now seek to measure, for example, in the manufacture o f 
artefacts or the construction o f dwellings. Individuals or groups having the 
engineering or manufacturing judgement sufficient to  perform the tasks, could be 
expected to  prosper in relative terms. However, before the era o f machine tools, 
patterns, and the high economic gearing that nowadays accumulates single activity 
inefficiencies into major living disadvantage, precise dimensional or resource 
measurement, and that aid to execution precision, calculation, would not have been 
critical to  survival. Design would have been based on experience or learning and 
such measurement as was necessary m ight have been performed by direct relation 
to person or thing for which or from which it was constructed- the cut skin to the 
body, the house dimensions to the tree. Indeed, we m ight imagine such metrics as 
were used would be measured imprecisely and tautologically in terms o f the 
conclusions that one would wish to draw from them or the purpose to which it 
would be put; "A day's march", A  hole big enough for a bear"; or perhaps for 
identification w ith only sufficient accuracy to avoid ambiguity; "the rock 10 paces 
high".
Accordingly it seems unlikely that we would be predisposed by the environment to 
measurement in the sense or precision that we now understand it, that is as a
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metric scale concept. Nevertheless we can suppose that certain aspects o f number 
would at least be closely Intertwined w ith an adaptive function, that is man's 
important and unique facility for pro-active organisation. Our ability to organise, to 
inter-relate for sophisticated mutually advantageous purposes, must be one o f the 
o f the major adaptations which has caused our species to survive. W ithout it our 
vulnerability and lim ited physical abilities would soon confine us to  oblivion in the 
d ifficu lt environments which we chose to adopt. Organisation requires an ability to 
plan, it requires a world which can be partly controlled by proaction, it requires 
communication and language, it requires the assignment o f roles, and it requires 
decision. Decision itself implies alternative actions, assessed results, and that some 
outcomes are superior in the light o f resources used. But organisation also 
necessitates at least a crude notion o f Economy: that resource should be assigned 
where it is most valuable.
Hand in hand w ith notions o f Economy go concepts, which we may view  as 
mathematically related. We m ight include in this relational ideas such as "More 
than", "Better than", 'Younger than", "Enough", "Large", "Best" (though the last would 
not connote Optim ality merely primacy amongst discrete choices)". Organisation 
requires dexterity w ith the notion o f Classes ("Men", 'Women", "Hunting Party", 
"Family", "My"), and hence Sets. One m ight expect an intuitive grasp o f set unions, 
"Men and Women", and intersections "Old Men". In certain content specific areas, 
say, defining relationships w ithin the groups, relational understanding could be 
complex.
W ithin this framework there would also be an absolute need for descriptive and 
instructional concept o f number, "5 men are needed in this hunting party". One 
m ight expect that in such a situation that facility w ith counting, as a system o f 
classification, would become natural. Based on fam iliarity alone we could expect 
descriptive arithmetic 'We had 5 chickens, we ate 2, we now have 3", and even 
deductive arithmetic based on experience "We picked 6 bags which we agree to  
share, that w ill be 2 for each o f the three o f us". This is not to  say that this level o f 
concept o f number would be o f itself adaptive, but unless our ancestors were at 
least able to relate to the idea by learning and accept the im m utability o f the 
relations, involved, including the notion o f conservation o f count, they could not 
have become effectively organised for which the adaptive value is very clear.
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However the need would In be confined to numbers in the pragmatically countable 
range to relatively small integers and simple fractions. Arithm etic would seem likely 
to  be sim ilarly confined w ith large holes in the multiplication table. Levels o f 
abstraction would be low. Large numbers o f units either being compounded into 
generalisations like "Many" or subject to the adoption o f another unit related to the 
practicalities involved for which there may be no explicit or constant equivalent. 
(Hallpike (1979, p i01) notes that Cape Coast fish traders in relatively modem times 
memorised tables to deal w ith variations from standard purchasing quantities which 
were handed down from mother to daughter rather than learning simple 
calculations.
We can, I suggest, say that Number in this organisational function is largely Number 
as language. It is adjectival. The quality o f sameness between, say, 5 fingers and 5 
eggs would be recognised (though we m ight be more suspicious that sim ilarity w ill 
be recognised between objects and intangible phenomena such as 5 paces and 5 
days). We can reasonably accept that a set o f 3 eggs and a set o f 2 eggs would 
have been perceived, w ith adaptive advantage, as being identical to  a set o f 5 
eggs. As this assignment o f precise equivalence is not a feature o f combinations o f 
non-numerical adjectives (as in man, selfish man, ve iy selfish man; or bobo, small 
bobo, small-small bobo) this marks the beginnings o f distinction from other 
language. However, the essence o f numeracy as calculation, is reasoning in abstract 
w ith number used as symbols. The adjectives are detached from the nouns, they are 
manipulated and the nouns are added back. It is doubtful that there would be 
sufficient domains o f sim ilarity in their numerical structure for content independent 
reasoning to  accord adaptive advantage. It is also d ifficult to  see many problems 
that would allow the non-schooled functional acquisition o f other components o f 
elementary calculation, eg sets o f sets, recursion, commutative and associative 
equivalence etc (though no doubt some would be aware o f curious properties 
which they could pragmatically exploit w ithout adaptive impact).
There is indeed anthropological support for very circumscribed untutored 
quantitative cognition, despite considerable classificatory dexterity. There are 
languages where the largest explicit number is 5 (Harris 1993) and indeed the 
Tauade have only 2 (Hallpike 1979 p61). Hallpike noted that in the latter case lack 
o f verbal numbers interfered w ith the practical issue o f ceremonial distributions o f
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pork, but in any case this does suggest that in prim itive societies and the similar 
societies o f our ancestors the need for number and calculation would not have been 
pressing. It is moreover difficult to  perceive natural numeracy w ithout a natural 
understanding o f the concept o f Conservation o f Quantity (ie that length, weight, 
area or volume are unaffected by the shapes into which they are transformed), yet 
studies amongst unschooled adults in New Guinea and Australia suggest that this is 
not intuitive and a high proportion do not conserve quantity (Halipike p60), though 
Halipike also refers to other work suggesting that conservation can be rapidly learnt 
when members o f traditional societies are given instruction. Later Halipike (p257) 
comments "We seldom find, as far as I know, that prim itives use terms for 
dimensions such as "weight", "length", "distance", and so on, as opposed to 
heavy/light, long/short, near/far, etc, .." He also remarks that prim itive modes o f 
thought tend to  view  concepts like lightness and heaviness as opposing absolute 
properties rather than as points on a scale and that there is unclear distinction 
between such properties as weight and size, for example. He also (p352) mentions 
the 1940 research o f Evans-Pritchard on the Nuer who although having a system o f 
lunar units w ith which they could describe the occurrence o f an event "it is w ith 
great difficulty that they reckon the relationship between events in abstract 
numerical symbols". (My emphasis). (However, I have difficulty w ith one implication 
o f Hallpike's observations concerning Conservation. It may be that volume as a 
general measure would not be inter-related between one subject and another, for 
example a volume o f liquid to the volume o f a box or a house. However, it is 
d ifficult to  conceive that as a specialist liquid measure (notably o f water) 
conservation would not be understood. Its conservation in being moved from 
container to  container o f different shape would be too familiar).
We can, I believe, attribute intuitive ordinal and relational skill to  our ancestors; 
reason would seem difficult w ithout it. We can also assume content explicit 
classificatoiy dexterity as these accord clear adaptive advantages. It seems doubtful 
that one can go further. However, If an inbuilt general numerical facility (involving 
innate cardinal appreciation and calculation^ dexterity) seems unlikely, could we 
have domain specific capabilities in the decision evaluation area, perhaps to  weight 
value (a concept I w ill shortly come to) by likelihood, or otherwise, in complex 
ways? I think not. I have argued that objective cardinal probability assessment is in
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any case unlikely to be intuitive and I w ill discuss issues o f Value which are sim ilarly 
inhibiting.
Risk problems, I have already suggested, would have been adequately dealt w ith 
(from an adaptive perspective) by simple heuristics and non-deliberative 
mechanisms. Similar arguments could be advanced for other complex computations 
o f value. Simple non-calculating search algorithms can be shown to be effective 
mechanisms for finding nutrition (eg Simon, 1957). Simon concluded, "The principal 
positive implication o f the model is that we should be skeptical in postulating for 
humans, or other organisms, elaborate mechanisms for choosing among diverse 
needs". Even for modem day judgement and decision problems strong arguments 
have been presented that sophisticated arithmetic actually does not matter and 
straightforward heuristics can cope adequately in m ultiple factor problems (eg 
Wainer, 1976; Dawes, 1979; Edwards and Barron, 1994; Barron and Barrett, 1996; 
Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). I only disagree to  the extent that the long chain 
reason facility provided by decision theory and the computer, today provides an 
opportunity to  do better and the gearing o f modem economics makes small gains 
normatively important in commercial and administrative organisations.
Even so is there still a possibility we possess a sophisticated unconscious complex 
calculating system in the same way that we possess vision- after all we could not 
conceive the idea o f vision if we did not possess it. We could allow the possibility 
for the primeval problems we still face today, but one which we can also apply to 
modem problems presents difficulty. Such problems must have a conscious 
interface to be used for conscious problems. This seems implausible in the same 
way for example that we cannot hi-jack vision to image temperature profiles. It is 
likely we use relatively simple rules. Evolution fine-tunes the simple rules but would 
not generally extend their structural complexity excessively and w ill not do so at all 
if  the computational payload exceeds the benefits. However, I w ill qualify this view  
to  some extent shortly when I discuss what I w ill call holistic integration.
As w ith probability I conclude for working purposes that comparative and ordinal 
concepts are innate, together w ith count in the practical range. Adjectives o f broad 
magnitude are innate, and, perhaps, small integer arithmetic. Concepts o f cardinal 
measurement, scale and quantity other than count, and calculation are concepts
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which need to be learnt. Decision concepts which may depend on them, need to be 
carefully qualified.
3.12 Concepts o f value and compensation, and the availability o f standards. 
Concepts o f a value and preference, what causes us to choose, would appear to be 
quite complex operations o f the mind depending w illy-n illy not just on the 
intellectually reasoned contributions which in a basic neurophysiological model o f 
the brain such as in Sagan (1977) m ight be controlled by the neo-cortex, but also 
on our emotions, and on instincts for aggression and territoriality, controlled by the 
more distantly evolved features o f the Limbic system and the reptilian R-complex. 
Damasio (1994) further suggests that the emotions and "somatic markers" are 
essentially entrenched in actual human as decision making mechanisms themselves 
(not just as value influences) and are necessary to constrain the otherwise open- 
ended nature o f all decisions problems. In any view, value influences on the 
decisions we take are multi-functional activities o f the whole mind.
In our single money-scale modem economic view o f value we have entrenched 
value into our civilisations for many hundreds o f years as a hard, conscious and 
measurable concept. They are familiar and incredibly useful to  the solution o f 
problems o f the organised world, but are they innate? We again ask the extent to 
how reasoned and conscious ideas o f value, particularly as a metric, would have 
been necessary amongst our ancestors to secure adaptive advantage in their 
environment, the necessary and sufficient pre-condition.
The concept o f value is helpful as a descriptive mechanic as soon as one allows at 
least binary choice. Faced w ith two possibilities I must choose one. "Which one? The 
one I prefer. Which is that? The most valuable". O f course such an argument would, 
unmodified, also apply to animals but becomes tautological. An animal chooses 
what it chooses but value is perceived by humans independently o f the action.
Value is the conscious property which causes us to prefer one outcome from 
another prior to the commitment o f action designed to achieve the preferred 
outcome. Once we allow conscious choice, value comes in by the same door. 
Choice can only be adaptive if  a sense o f value is associated w ith it. Accordingly we 
must suppose that at least the ability to  make comparative value selections between 
binary choices is innate, notwithstanding any wider capability.
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How much further do we expect our unschooled ancestors to have been able to  go. 
Clearly if  he can make a value distinction between 1 Elk and 1 Buffalo he can 
distinguish between 1 Elk and 2 Elk, and between 2 Elk and 3 Elk. A person unable 
to  do so or who believed that 2 Elks were less valuable than 1 would be less likely 
to  pass on their genes. Do we have then the basis o f an intuitive cardinal scale o f 
value? I suggest this ultimately becomes the basis for money, but only once a need 
for money, to store value on a standard measure however temporarily, is 
established as a practical need. But this is a necessity o f only the last few millennia. 
4  Elk may be more valuable than 3 Elk but do we actually need 5 Elk. This would be 
true o f spears, sons and all else w ithin the countable range. On these grounds an 
inbuilt concept o f an extendable cardinal scale o f value involving intervals o f equal 
worth seems unlikely, despite facility w ith comparative value.
Trade also evidences some type o f concept o f value and this could be deeply 
entrenched. Neolithic flin t tools have been found many hundreds o f miles from their 
place o f manufacture. Chimpanzees display "reciprocal altruism" (Goodall, 1986, 
p380) and have been observed giving away "low value" food items to  avoid being 
pestered by begging members o f the group: surely rudiments which can build 
towards a concept o f value? However, as Harris (1993, p255) observes, "Modern- 
day price markets and buying and selling are not universal traits. The idea that 
money can buy anything (or almost anything) has been alien to most o f the human 
beings who have ever lived. Two other modes o f exchange- reciprocity and 
redistribution - once played a more economic role than price markets." Some 
prim itive trading systems which bear some resemblance to barter, offer packages o f 
mixed goods to the other "party", who in turn offer a tranche o f other goods. The 
whole exchange takes place or none at all. This is a trade system largely dependent 
on receiving goods o f "value" for surpluses o f small value from a party who sees the 
process in exactly reciprocal way, cardinal value is not in the minds o f either party.
It involves only binary comparative assessment o f the type I argue is adaptive- "Do I 
value what I am offered more than what I have?." Trade does not im ply a scale o f 
value.
If we are nevertheless tempted to argue that the existence o f money is a modem 
manifestation o f an innate internalised scale sitting w ithin the mind, one should be 
aware that single scale money is not a universal given in all money-using cultures.
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Specific forms o f money may be used for specific purposes and not be subject to  an 
"Exchange Rate" between them. W ithout such reduction we still have problems. 
Moreover, we know that were an internal scale imagined, that it would be no more 
effective operationally than that scale raised to any arbitrary power which would be 
a strategically equivalent scale leading to the same operational choices. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, w ithout the existence o f tw o exchanges o f designated equal 
value a value interval cannot be fixed. What phenomenon would make a particular 
mental scale better than another?".
I suggest only the existence o f a Standard. Scales depend on standards, things we 
can look at (literally until comparatively recently for the Imperial system). From one 
yard, or gallon we can by successive binary comparison find an equal measure from 
which we can then define tw o units and we can m ultiply or subdivide our scales 
indefinitely using the laws o f physics or geometry. The concept o f money, once 
sim ilarly dependent on the use o f quantities o f precious metals, provides modem 
man w ith a conceptually identical scale for value. Whilst older "scales", say based on 
the length o f a man's pace, had a descriptive value and helped to  organise an 
understanding o f the world they were not available as precise concepts w ithout 
precisely engineered artefacts. We have only lim ited ability to retain in the mind 
things for which artefacts do exist. It is far more difficult to  perceive that one could 
retain in the mind as an invariant something that does not exist in physical 
substance, such as a scale o f cardinal value. The notion o f probability is alternatively 
used to  standardise measures o f value through expected U tility but use o f this 
mechanism itself depends on an internal concept o f well defined cardinal probability 
which I have already questioned. In the modem era we may be able to benchmark 
our internal value through external standard o f common use- money value, but it is 
not inherent.
Can we then go beyond comparative testing o f value o f binary choices? The 
situations tested by our ancestors would often be binary alternatives but they would 
certainly involve measures o f degree. Thus choices such as 1 Thin Pig or 1 Fat Elk or 
between 1 Fat Elk and 2 Thin Elks and, importantly, notwithstanding a lack o f 
conception o f cardinal measurement, choices somewhere between Fat and Thin 
would be frequent in the environment. A trade-off between one quality and 
another, a mechanism for comprehending compensation, would be calied-for. We
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can imagine there being sufficient two variable trade-off choices generally to accord 
adaptive advantage to those able to discriminate; whether food for effort, illic it sex 
for risk, current favour for future return.
If we go beyond 2 variable qualities, the situation becomes more difficult. Larichev 
(1992) considers that we cannot reliably express preferences in situation involving 
the trade-offs o f more than 2 variables, other variables being held constant. Looking 
introspectively I feel unsure when examining more complex situations. I illustrate 
the problem in what I call the "child's sweet dilemma". If a child is offered the 
opportunity to  trade 1 Humbug for 1 Jelly Baby he or she is likely to  exhibit a quick 
preference. If the problem becomes 2 Humbugs for 3 Jelly Babies I suggest that the 
problem is not inherently more difficult and only requires extra consideration if  we 
h it a combination around his or her indifference level. However, if  the offer is 2 Jelly 
Babies and 1 Chocolate Bar for 3 Humbugs and 2 Bubble Gum the decision could 
present a dilemma and lead to subsequent tearful regret w ith greater frequency 
than the simple 2 variable choice.
3.12.1 Innate Holism
Yet despite our difficulty w ith explicit value trade-offs beyond tw o factors, our poor 
intuitive grasp o f m ultiple objectives or long-term strategy, and our inability to  deal 
w ith cardinal quantity or to  compute, our ancestors would very commonly face 
adaptive problems that had the characteristic o f being many factored and frequently 
urgent. Palaeolithic decision making analysis based only on a potentially tim e- 
consuming factor by factor trade-off does not seem a convincing approach for many 
o f the decisions faced, given the combinatorial computation issues that would 
quickly emerge. In large part, at least, our ancestors would have secured an 
adaptive advantage in assessing the relative merits o f alternative courses by quick, 
unarticulated, subjective leaps to  a comprehensive evaluation in a process which we 
m ight call holistic integration.
Such a process still involves reflective comparison although it may be intuitively 
based. We can observe in our modem lives that we confidently take many 
important and complex decisions w ithout excessive analysis or soul-searching; the 
mate or friends we choose, the career or job we select, the pastimes we participate 
in, the clothes we wear, are problems o f great and unprogrammable complexity,
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even if  not all are o f consequence. Complex decision making is something that we 
believe is inherently simple. It is usually the OR Analyst who believes that a 
problem cannot be efficiently solved by subjective methods; not the decision 
making manager. The latter often confidently believes in his abilities to do so 
effectively and needs convincing that formal analysis can provide instructive insight. 
This is not surprising as his ancestors have been decision making for hundreds and 
thousands o f years and doing it sufficiently successfully for their genes to be handed 
on to him. (One m ight add parenthetically that decision confidence is the 
evolutionary antidote for the counter-adaptive tra it o f prevarication. But the same 
confidence in the same intuitive decisions in our modern world w ill frequently be 
misplaced).
The nature o f mechanism to achieve this is even more speculative. However, we 
can rule out one possibility and favour others. We are certainly pre-programmed to 
evaluate certain situations in certain ways. For example, avoidance o f venomous 
snakes. There is evidence that humans are predisposed to  acquire a fear o f snakes 
(Hinde, 1995). In an environment o f venomous snakes, a Snake—> Fear—> Caution 
production would have reproductive advantages and this may be extended to 
embrace "Risk o f Snake". Could we not have extended facility o f this type? The 
difficulty is that it encodes a ve iy lim ited, domain specific, decision valuation. Whilst 
it is possible that over millennia that a few dozen environment-general but specific 
situations m ight be encoded, the mechanism cannot encode the circumstances o f 
particular individuals. Moreover, even were it to  be possible to do so, the quantity 
o f information that would need to be hard-wired in inherited structures would 
quickly become impossibly large. A soft-programmed structure, based on the 
environment that the individual lives in (that tree, that ford, that potential ally) and 
that can cope w ith normal changes in it, may remain formidable but is potentially 
orders o f magnitude less capacity-demanding.
One can envisage a holistic system based on recognition and learning. In effect an 
experience based system, though embracing not just information in the hands o f 
the individual but vicarious experience, cultural expectation, and the injunctions o f 
the powerful. However, unmet circumstances, and the variation from the norm 
would also need to be accommodated. Saarilouma (1995) debates the process by 
which chess players "apperceive" chess problems and experts exhibit superior skill.
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A  major factor he identifies (p62) is that experts have "seen thousands o f positions 
and this has created in their long-term memory a large store o f chess specific 
information" and "If skilled subjects select their cues properly" they can access this 
though they do not have a capacity to "generate long move sequences" (p91). 
Experience maps the area in broad terms and a mechanism for relatively lim ited 
deviation enables navigation into uncharted territory. So possibly w ith a more 
general holistic appreciation.
A  holistic integration model is not necessarily incompatible w ith a binary 
compensation model, although at first sight they appear to be extreme alternatives. 
Indeed, the latter may be necessary to the operation o f the former. How would an 
ancestral or contemporary decision maker judge factors deviating from his or her 
experience? How does he or she audit the success o f the m ultiple variable outcome 
o f the quickly made decision before consigning the experience to long-term 
memory? Hindsight processing can, after all, take place at leisure. A  trade-off o f 
factors is likely for both, and binary trade-offs may be sufficient for the task w ithout 
capacity for innate multi-way competence. Indeed, this may be computationally 
efficient. After all the Simplex Method o f Linear Programming effectively reduces to 
a succession o f binary trade-offs.
As a footnote I should note that what I have termed holistic integration is similar to 
what Khatri and Ng (2000) describe as intuitive synthesis. Their work illustrates the 
effectiveness o f intuition, which they describe as "...a  complex phenomenon that 
draws from a store o f knowledge in our subconscious and is rooted in past 
experience". Drawing on Prietula and Simon (1989) they suggest that "It is a 
sophisticated form o f reasoning based on 'chunking' that an expert hones over years 
o f job-specific experience". In the work here I have envisaged an unconscious leap 
to  decision as being effectively a processing o f value. However, an interpretation o f 
the Khatri and Ng view is that the intuitive decision is made w ithin a larger domain 
o f facts.
W hilst its mechanism should remain open, for the purpose o f this thesis I recognise 
the possibility o f a special, and exploitable human skill, in overall assessment o f the 
complicated alternative options in domains where the subject has considerable 
experience. However, I do not assume that competence would be o f the same
144
precision as binary trade-offs.
3.12.2 Stability of the value fame
An adaptive advantage accrues from being "good at" comparative value estimation 
and a facility for trade off. However, does an advantage accrue from stability in the 
values that we retain w ithin our mind? The suggestion that we are better at 
handling multiple objectives serially rather than simultaneously already casts doubt 
on the matter as this is equivalent to  altering the value o f the objective or objectives 
we choose (or our biochemistry chooses) to  bring to the fore at any one time. 
Seriality seems to depend on value lability.
We may see why stability o f value seems useful today. In a complex modem world, 
slow-changing policy is advantageous as our environment is principally 
endogenously determined (in a species sense) by a myriad o f human policies which 
are in turn determined by community values. Stability o f policy (eg in our schools or 
railways) follows stability o f value. This causes us generally to favour slow 
movement in value in our institutions and economic systems, despite the process o f 
politics causing intensive and continuous review o f those values. But this does not 
make us innately capable o f maintaining stable values as individual people.
In the era o f evolutionary adaptation, the environment was principally exogenously 
determined. Accordingly, stability o f values, the stability o f binary compensation 
relationships, would have a less clear link to  stability o f policy. Indeed, learned 
behaviour would seem more important than assessment from first principles from 
established values, in these inherently slow changing circumstances. Having 
evaluated and implemented a particular policy in a particular situation, the learned 
outcome becomes an important factor in the determination o f future policy. 
Moreover, It is arguable that better learning goes hand in hand not w ith stable 
values but w ith labile values. We can anyway confidently assert the converse, fixed 
values im ply no learning.
Moreover, fixed and precisely determined values is a concomitant o f finely 
discriminated decisions. If achievable, this may have m erit today but not necessarily 
in the ancestral environment. Selection is unable to test for decision optim ality in an 
environment where no tw o situations are identical, so precision itself is unimportant
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over quite broad lim its. We m ight go further, the fast changing nature o f (individual) 
ancestors lives required that value frames not only need not be stable but should 
not be. Fixed values also im ply unrelenting obstinacy. The man who always distrusts 
the man who w ill not look him in the eye may overlook that this young potential 
ally may do the same thing for different reasons, or who always values a fat elk as 
more than a thin one may be disadvantaged far from home. Value in the ancestral 
environment would be frequently determined afresh from almost entirely internal 
considerations.
This is not to deny that there would have been slow changing constraints on the 
formation o f value: The family must be fed, honey is always a treat, and a physically 
fit husband is a better bet than an old frail one. Moreover experience would 
ameliorate haphazard valuation, T can see from my sisters problems that a fine 
physique does not compensate for laziness in a provider." That a good provider is 
valuable may be invariant in broad terms, but its comparative value cannot be.
Quite apart from the additional difficulties caused by effecting a physical mechanism 
for a mental Standard, there is no functional reason to  expect that we should have 
an innate value and preference stability.
Value issues and their relationship w ith decision analysis were discussed in Chapter 
2 and this included a discussion o f labile preference and value, and the evidence for 
it. The empirical evidence for the lability o f expressions o f preference and for 
sensitivity to  problem framing would seem well founded. I attempt to make a 
stronger point here suggesting that it is preference itse lf not just expression that is 
labile. This seems consistent w ith the findings related to Judgement and the ability 
o f the human mind to discriminate sensory phenomena which I also discussed in 
Chapter 2.
In summary whilst we can properly assume an innate recognition o f comparative 
value and some facility to compensate the value o f one attribute for another, we 
have no reason to suppose an ability to attribute cardinal value nor to  have 
sustained stable values or preferences. We should be cautious about depending on 
these ideas in normative decision analysis.
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3.13 Summary o f cognitive assumptions in decision making 
Based on the discussion above, supplemented by observations made in Chapter 2 ,1 
suggest the working assumptions o f cognitive competence for the purposes o f this 
thesis, which are summarised in the follow ing pages. I believe these are consistent 
w ith  the main empirical research and the other subjective trianguiators I referred to; 
introspective assessment o f my own capabilities and pragmatically observed 
behaviour o f managers and people making decisions in everyday life.
An overall encapsulation is that humans are competent comparators but are less 
capable in operations requiring assessment o f degree, and we have not been 
moulded by the evolutionary environment to be adept w ith the concept o f 
simultaneous multiple objective or conscious trade-off o f m ultiple attributes. 
However, we may have skill at undeliberative holistic assessment.
In the follow ing tables, the third column represents a view  on the 
ease o f the concept described in column 2, and the fourth the 
basis o f that view in terms o f adaptive function, supplemented by 
an indication o f empirical support, if  any, usually attributed more 
fully in the text.
Ngl= Negligible, SAP= Solves adaptive problem, UAE=
Unnecessary in adaptive environment, FAE= Familiar in adaptive 
environment (though adaptive value may be unclear), FMP=
Familiar modem problem or approach, CAC= Can acquire 
competence, PCA= Possibly counter-adaptive K&T = eg 
Kahneman and Tversky amongst others,
DXY= derivative or consequence o f item Y in list X.
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Objectives and Goals (O)
1 Appreciation of relevant factors Intuitive SAP
2 Formulating single "pass-fail" goals Intuitive SAP
3 Formulating single "more is better" objectives Adept DV1
4 Formulating multiple simultaneous "pass-fail" goals Adept SAP
Simon




6 Prioritising multiple "pass-fail" goals Intuitive SAP
7 Condensing multiple objectives using cardinal 
arithmetic weights
Ngl facility UAE
8 Setting satisficing standards CAC D 04
9 Setting lexicographic thresholds CAC D 08




11 "Successive Limited Comparison" Intuitive SAP,
FMP
Lindblom
12 Precise specification of objectives Unnatural UAE
Lindblom
13 Stability of Objectives Unnatural UAE
14 Serial switching of objectives Intuitive SAP
Number, Quantity, and Measurement (N)
1 Counting in practical range Intuitive SAP
2 Concept of comparative magnitude (eg bigger, 
biggest)
Intuitive SAP
3 Concept of graduated classification (eg small, large, 
very large)
Intuitive SAP
4 Quantity, cardinal magnitude, scales. Unnatural UAE,
FMP
5 Relationships and association Intuitive SAP
6 Objective causality Unnatural UAE
7 Basic arithmetic with small integers using leamt 
relationships
Adept SAP
8 Geometry Unnatural UAE
9 General purpose calculation methods. Concept of 
square and cube. Mental arithmetic
Ngl facility UAE
10 General concept of conservation of quantity for 
cardinal metrics (eg area)
Unnatural UAE
Halipike
11 Specific conservation of quantity for countable items 













Probability and Uncertainty (P)
1 Recognition of unpredictable futures Intuitive FAE
2 Recognition of action influencing uncertain outcome Intuitive SAP







4 Concept of probability as an enduring property of 
systems and events
Unnatural UAE





6 Concept of cardinal probability Unnatural UAE
7 Realistic estimation of objective probability CAC, possibly UAE
DQ1
8 Realistic estimation of subjective probability Ngl facility UAE
PCA
K8.T
9 Probabilistic arithmetic; Kolmogorov's Laws Unnatural UAE
10 Intuitive Assessment of SEU Unnatural D 8  
Simon
Perception of Value and Trade-Offs (V)
1 More/less is better Intuitive SAP
2 Value scales; value having continuous relationship 
with magnitudes of attributes of choices; value as an 
additive concept
Unnatural UAE
3 Preference between choices varying in 2 attributes Adept SAP
Larichev
4 Break-even points for 2 attribute trade-offs Unnatural UAE
5 Preference between choices varying in few (3+) 
attributes
Difficult See text 
Larichev







7 Ranking value weights of multiple attributes CAC Similar to 
0 1 0
8 Stability of value (Related to D4) Unnatural DD 2,3
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Discrimination, Preference Stability and Precision, Configurality (D)
1 Discrimination of small differences in unidimensional 
magnitudes.
Adept SAP
2 Reliability of classification of absolute judgements of 
unidimensional magnitudes. (Transmission or 
channel capacity of subject)
Limited UAE
Miller








4 Constancy/ endurance of preference Unnatural UAE 
DD 2,3 
Chap 2




6 Ability to process complex interactive information Limited UEA
7 Ability to be configural in unextreme (eg 
Minkowski) forms
Limited UEA





Chapter 4 The investment portfolio decision
4.1 Introduction
A t this point I digress from discussion o f general decision analysis considerations, to 
introduce the problem to  which the approach developed w ithin this thesis w ill be 
applied. I also summarise and comment on features o f Modem Portfolio Theory 
which is the basis o f existing "Quant" decision analysis in this area, where it is 
applied. There is a parallel thread in this thesis and I w ill return in Chapter 5 to 
further consider methodology w ithout special reference to this application area. A  
reader who wishes it could therefore alternatively address this chapter prior to  
Chapter 8 which places the developed approach w ithin the context o f this problem.
In this Chapter I start w ith a consideration o f the nature o f objectives and 
approaches to the investment portfolio decision problem, considering the extent to 
which private and professional needs and capabilities correspond. I introduce my 
personal tastes as a decision maker. I mention that amongst established professional 
analysis there are tw o major strands o f approach, Quantitative and Qualitative,
I then discuss Modem Portfolio Theoiy (MPT) which provides the theoretical glue 
underlying more formal quantitative professional analysis. I introduce the concept of 
systematic risk, or Beta, and discuss aspects o f the Capital Asset Pricing Model. I 
w ill later borrow from these concepts. I argue that MPT has lim itations as an 
exclusive normative methodology being ve iy data intensive and, in essence, only a 
two-dimension model for which questions are begged. Its use by private investors 
is effectively precluded by cost. I conclude by suggesting that the traditional 
approaches can be considered as polarised paradigms. Each o f these viewpoints do 
not need to  exclude the application o f the other, but the model based optim isation 
approaches, which occupy m iddle ground by characterising portfolio formation as a 
many dimensional problem are rare. Hallerbach, however, pursued the issue in his 
PhD thesis (1994) and the general arguments for such a framework were developed 
by Spronk and Hallerbach (1997) whose suggestion is referred to. They have 
subsequently continued to develop m ultiple dimensional analysis methods for the 
financial area.
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4.2 The Core Problem background
One o f the more complex private decision problems that can be undertaken by an 
individual, who chooses not to use advisers, is the selection o f investments. The 
w riter is one o f many private investors who do this for themselves or w ithin 
investment clubs. The Core Problem addressed in this thesis is the development o f a 
methodology to facilitate selection o f a portfolio o f UK Equities for him and his wife.
It is appropriate to  briefly examine the investment methods that can be adopted by 
private investors and the fundamentals o f the model-based approaches that are 
available to professional managers. A t root the issue is simple; "How does one 
choose a selection o f "good" shares, which as a jo in t package have desirable 
characteristics, and decide when to buy and sell them in a way which maximises 
future value o f purchased assets?1. Although presentable as separable concepts, the 
tw o elements w ithin this question are interdependent. Thus, one feature o f a good 
share is that its value is expected to appreciate or that it has a low  risk o f declining.
Nevertheless it is probably reasonable to distinguish tw o polarisations in a spectrum 
o f approaches to investment:
(a) Those whose primary interest is in calling the tim ing- judging the turning 
points in the market or an individual share price so that, in a perfect world, 
they are invested in the market on the climbs and liquid in the declines.
(b) Those whose primary interest is in finding shares which are good value for 
money over the long-term, judged from fundamentals.
The first group are likely to be interested in trends, charts, economic developments, 
and other situational reasons why the market or sector is over or under-valued. They 
may also depend on intuition to judge whether the market may be topping or 
bottom ing out. Potential movements tend to be judged over a tim e scale that is 
short compared w ith the income generation rate o f the enterprises which underlie 
the investments. (A t the time o f editing o f this paragraph tw o weeks after the 
September 11 World Trade Centre disaster, the stock market is reeling and there is 
talk o f recession. But w ill the market continue to  tumble as consumer confidence is 
sapped, or is the present lack o f purchasing merely the result o f the emotional and
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temporary shock and unexpressed view  that at such times self-indulgence is 
unseemly, which m ight change soon).
However, it may be argued there is little  point in attem pting to forecast the market 
in this way. The Efficient Market Hypothesis could be invoked to suggest that all 
available public information would be discounted. I am disinclined to accept this as 
an absolute statement. There seems sufficient (albeit non-scientific) evidence that 
financial market actors' attitudes feed on each other enough for the independence 
requirement to be questionable; which the canny observer could exploit. Witness 
the boom in dot-com stocks that could not be justified even in foresight by any 
realistic earnings model. Nevertheless, I have neither the tim e that would be 
necessary to  read the changing influences, nor, I suspect, the insight to  beat the 
market at price forecasting.
The other approach is to judge investments in the same way as a business m ight 
look at a capital expenditure, new product, or acquisition project; and to do so on a 
longer time-scale. W ill what we get out o f it justify what we commit? Is there 
something better? Does the expected return justify the expenditure in the light o f 
the risks? Is it good value? This is what some describe as the Value approach to 
financial decision-making. It depends, though not exclusively, on consideration o f 
Fundamentals, that is by examining the characteristics o f the business that underlie 
the shares. The investor is likely to look at the hard facts o f the business's financial 
performance, both historic and future forecasts. However, he or she may also look 
at softer considerations. Is the sector growing? Is their declared marketing strategy 
convincing? Is the management staid or do they recklessly seek change w ithout 
regard to  its true benefit to  the business? What do other people think the prospects 
are, and so on? A  private investor m ight depend for his data on the financial pages 
o f newspapers, or magazines such as Investors' Chronicle, Stockbrokers' reports and 
recommendations, companies' Reports and Accounts, digests o f financial statistics, 
on line sources o f share prices and other share data etc. I subscribe, for example, to 
Company REFS (a regular CD providing common basic financial data, news and 
reports summaries, details o f key shareholdings, Directors, and a summary o f key 
stockbrokers' forecasts), and an on-line source o f share-price and key events data.
Predominantly, private investors are likely adopt an essentially qualitative approach 
to  assessing the overall value o f a share (though may use their calculators to
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calculate key statistics such as Price-Eamings ratio, Gearing, or Dividend Cover etc if 
these are not already calculated for them in the papers they read). Certainly, the 
style o f press information supports this approach. They assess shares (anticipating 
the description o f the Core Technique, we can say they assess the Attributes o f the 
shares) against their Objectives whether firm or confused. Some investors may 
make use o f filtering methods or test options against an index o f desirability. REFS, 
for example, provides both a means o f short-listing shares against attribute 
thresholds and also calculates "PEG", an index intended to identify good value 
shares by highlighting those w ith good growth relative to their Price-Eamings ratio.
The principles adopted in portfolio formation by private investors are unlikely to be 
sophisticated though they may pay attention to exhortations in the money-advice 
sections o f newspapers, for example, to split their portfolios into different 
investment types on the basis o f their attitude to risk and their financial situations. 
They may also follow  more detailed advice in books directed towards them eg 
Graham (1973) (which commends attention to  choosing securities suited to  the 
tim e and interest available to  manage them). Not putting all one's eggs in one 
basket is a powerful risk-mitigation concept that prudent people may adopt 
instinctively. However, other considerations may prevail. An investment club o f 
which I was a member seemed to want to find room for an attractive share w ithout 
applying a relative test. More shares implied a more interesting portfolio and it was 
the dealing costs o f small share parcels that seemed to keep the portfolio to  around 
a dozen.
Some professional fund managers' approaches to share selection and portfolio 
formation may not be very different in principle. It seems that some houses are 
happy to depend on the flair o f their individual managers, and perhaps their 
approach is akin to the qualitative private investor approach. However, their 
objectives, which describe fund specialisations, are likely to be quite explicit and 
they w ill be more explicitly aware that they are diversifying to  reduce risk. The 
qualitative and quantitative data available to them w ill be far more extensive and 
through their own research staff, purchased research services, brokers' reports, their 
reading o f the financial press, discussions w ith colleagues etc they have the 
opportunity to understand sectors in great depth. Their back-up analysis is likely to
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be considerably more thorough, but at root it remains a judgement or intuitive 
process.
Other "Quant" Houses may be more attentive to objective and quantitative 
assessment o f value. One major fund management company I had discussions w ith, 
evaluated shares using tw o approaches. They paid great attention to the assessment 
o f future cash generation, and its prospective variability, o f the companies 
underlying candidate shares. From this they calculated a measure o f fundamental 
value using Discounted Cash Flow principles. From a model o f how the market 
seemed to translate share characteristics into share values, they also assessed 
possible movement in the market valuation o f the shares. The bases for valuations 
were generated through a group process and accordingly the same corporate 
assumptions were made for all candidate shares. The relative attention paid to each 
o f these figures depended on the objectives o f a particular fund. Individual fund 
managers, who had discretion in portfolio formation could simulate the properties 
o f alternative Portfolios' attributes across many factors, using a database based on 
the common data developed and an in-house analysis program available to  them. 
However, they did not use computational optim isation.
Some professional houses, at least in part, develop decisions based on 
mathematically optimal portfolios using packages developed from Modem Portfolio 
Theory (MPT). MPT is a model based statistical approach owing its origins to  work 
by Markowitz (1952) (expanded in Markowitz (1959)), It is described in full by Elton 
and Gruber (1987).
4.3 The elements of Modem Portfolio Theory
MPT shares w ith M ultiple Criteria Decision Analysis and Data Envelopment Analysis 
the concept o f efficient sets, choices and frontiers. It focuses on Return and Risk 
which it translates into the expected value o f return and its variance. It seeks to 
define relationships which define for any combination o f investments constituting a 
potential portfolio, its Expected Return and estimated Variance o f that return.
The information used to develop the evaluation are the estimated return means, and 
variances for each o f the individual investments which are candidates for inclusion in 
the selected portfolio, and, in principle, the covariance o f return w ith each candidate
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investment w ith each other investment. Following Elton and Gruber (op cit) the 
expected return o f a portfolio is:
=  X  XA
;=1 ton
Where R = expected return o f the portfolio
X t = proportion o f investment i e (1,..., n) 
in the portfolio 
R, = expected return o f the investment i
(4.1)
The variance o f the portfolio return is given by
0? = X  X fa f  + X  X  X A P t
1=1 to n /=1 to n j =1 to n , i * j
Where g 2p = variance o f the portfolio return
G 2 -  variance o f the return o f investment i 
Gtj = covariance o f the returns from 
investments i and j
(4.2)
Markowitz developed this fundamental formulation in the relatively early days o f 
mathematical programming and before the availability o f easy, cheap and powerful 
computation. He accordingly developed special solution methods to  trace the 
efficient frontier or path, tracking maximum return for increasing levels o f portfolio 
variance, or conversely, minimum variance for increasing levels o f return.
Nowadays, the problem structure presents no great computational problems and is 
easily manageable using standard non-linear programming software. However there 
are tw o features o f the above equations which have significant impact, one 
sim plifying and one complicating.
The first o f these is that as the number o f investments in a portfolio gets bigger (ie 
as typical X i becomes smaller), the weighted sum o f variances term tends to  zero
but the value o f the covariance term tends to Gt j, the weighted average o f all the
GfJ. Thus the covariance terms come to dominate. A t least w ith the number o f
investments likely to be included in professional portfolios, individual share variance
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is unimportant. This element is frequently referred to  as diversifiable risk. The double 
summation o f covariances is the systematic risk on which MPT tends to concentrate.
Ignoring for the moment the approach to calculating the covariances, it is manifest 
that a severe data problem exists. A portfolio analysis involving selection from 300 
investments requires 45,000 parameters and there m ight o f the order o f 30,000 
items o f data concerning investment return required to calculate them. Professional 
portfolio selections m ight be from a pool o f potential investments at least ten times 
bigger than this. This was unmanageable in the fifties and would be formidable now, 
even were it to  be appropriate. Much o f MPT concerns itself w ith work-arounds.
The most basic o f such simplifications is the single-index model:
R ,-a i +PiRm +et 
Where et = a random variable 
such that E(e{) = 0 
E(etej) = 0
at = return o f investment i independent o f the market 
Rm = return o f the market
Pi = proportion o f the market return reflected in the 
return o f investment i
(4.3)
One can establish (eg Elton and Gruber, op cit, p i32) that
a ,,=
Where a i  = variance o f the market return
(4.4)
Pi is sometimes referred to as the systematic risk, the Beta risk or, simply, the Beta
o f the investment. It depends on correlation w ith the market return and is equal to  
the correlation coefficient o f the investment w ith the market, m ultiplied by the ratio 
o f the standard deviation o f the investment return and that o f the market. Statistics 
o f Beta measured on an uncomplicated basis are available, for example w ithin REFS, 
and data providers supply suitable statistics to investment houses. This approach 
can be extended to m ulti-index models such as industry or market sector indices or 
macro economic indicators. One m ight also condense the information w ithin the
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Covariance matrix by seeking its principal eigenvectors and thence the principal 
components, a method which produces orthogonal or independent components.
However, returning our main attention to the single index model, it should be 
noted that Beta has a valuable property. The Beta risk for a portfolio is simply the 
weighted average o f the Beta's o f the individual investments which comprise it. That 
is:
& = I 4 A> =1 (4.5)
all i a ll!
This implies that that A/3 is a conservabie quantity w ithin the market (at least for the 
tim e that the Beta parameters for individual investments are unchanging) in much 
the same way as volume, energy or gold. A decision maker can thus attach linear 
value to it. It is also the property which gives rise to a key element o f the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
The first "leg" o f the CAPM is that if  an optimum well diversified risky portfolio Pi 
w ith  a defined return, Rj, and Beta, p i , exists; and there is also an optimum "no risk" 
investment, Po ,which gives the maximum return w ith zero Beta; then the return R2  
for any other optimum portfolio, P2  , w ith different Beta, p2 , is identical to the return 
given by that linear combination o f Pi and Po which has a Beta o f p2 . This to say, the 
returns o f all optimum portfolios when plotted relative to  their Beta w ill lie on the 
straight line joining Pi and Po(see figure 4.1).
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This can be easily seen. If a portfolio exists w ith a return that lies below that line it 
w ill be dominated by the portfolio o f corresponding Beta which can be formed from 
the combination o f Pi and Po which has the same Beta. If one lies above the line 
then Pi cannot be optimal as a superior portfolio could be formed by generating a 
portfolio w ith pi by buying portfolio Pzand selling Po ("short" if  necessary). This is 
true for any individual, however he or she estimates the individual investment 
returns and Betas.
The CAPM then goes further. Working on assumptions akin to those o f the perfect 
competition assumptions o f economics (and other simplifications o f conditions, 
enumerated in Elton and Gruber (op cit) which I w ill overlook here), it asserts that all 
investments w ithin a market w ill be positioned on the same line. This can most 
easily be explained in terms o f there existing a market for investments o f a 
particular Beta. If we assume that there are known returns associated w ith those 
investments, an actor in the market w ill wish to  replace all investments w ith below 
average returns, w ith investments o f higher return. This creates a demand for the 
latter, which w ill boost their prices, and hence lower their returns, at the expense o f 
the former whose price w ill drop. This opportunity w ill persist until all investments 
are restored to the line, when there w ill be no incentive to  buy one investment and 
sell another.
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In one sense this is unexceptionable, almost tautological. The capital market line can 
be said to  represent the market view  (in terms o f being an average o f all the 
players), and, for a given expected Beta, the corresponding point on the line can be 
said to  represent the market expectation o f the return o f an investment o f that Beta. 
However, one can neither say that the market expectation o f return is "true" (ie the 
market actually correctly assesses all information, appropriately discounts it, and 
correctly weights all the factors that contribute to value), nor that "return" is the 
common unidimensional objective known to ail players and to which they operate. 
Investments are differentiated and although traded as commodities they are more 
akin to  brands such as perfume or motor cars, than to  single u tility  goods like iron 
ore or Bonny Light. Were these not to be the case one could just select one's Beta 
and relax in the full confidence that whatever investments one may choose they w ill 
all be just as good at meeting one's objectives. W ith all avoidable risk diversified 
out, one could have confidence that they would track the market index in the 
expected way to the sensitivity required. O f course, Betas, may be expressed in 
m ultiple dimensions and, as Berry, Burmeister, and McElroy (1998) argue, one 
m ight extend the nature o f risks embraced, but on this and related theories we can 
be sure o f a pareto-optimal solution even if  it we cannot be sure whether it meets 
our preferences related to this complex o f risk, were they to  be determinable.
This is not the view  that the w riter (as decision maker) has taken but it is a consoling 
long-stop: if  all portfolios are automatically optimal there is no point in spending 
sleepless nights worrying about the correctness o f one's specific decisions! (It is also 
possible that it is "sufficiently true" to place doubt on whether fund managers and 
advisers can secure incremental value added for their clients sufficiently, in excess o f 
their remuneration for attempting to do so).
The w riter (as decision maker) whilst not using the CAPM uses Beta and depends to 
some extent on "leg 1", that an individual’s diversified optimum portfolios track a 
straight line.
4.4 Issues o f MPT
For all its apparent sophistication MPT presents simultaneously an over-simple view  
o f the market, some philosophic difficulties, and, as a normative mechanism, begs 
important issues. The theory is only bi-variate seeking to balance return and a
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measure o f its uncertainty. Moreover, and critically, were investments to  be neatly 
labelled w ith their expected returns and Betas, or Beta vectors, in the way in which 
the theory assumes, would we then perceive ourselves as having a serious problem 
in making investment choices. It is the characterisation o f investments in this 
manner, the specific reduction o f other information into these terms, that would 
constitute the most valuable contribution in the analysis process. Were that to  be 
available in reliable form, the investors wealth would be assured. The subsequent 
process o f the assessed parameters into portfolio suggestions is a technically 
interesting issue but the incremental contribution it would make is o f far less 
importance.
We may also have difficulties in the meaning and measurement o f the terms 
Expected Return and Variance o f Return, and the extent to which the latter, and the 
way it is compounded in a portfolio, constitutes a meaningful measure o f risk. The 
first perhaps presents less difficulty o f principle. We can conceive a stream o f cash 
flows generated by the business in which the investor has an equity stake, we m ight 
formulate a basis for attributing to an investment a capital value on disposal at some 
distant horizon, we can conceive a method o f aggregating them (perhaps, using a 
DCF technique w ith the discount mechanism being as subtle as we like) we can 
generate a present value, and we can compare this w ith  what we m ight have to 
pay now to purchase those cash flows.
The difficulty comes in how market prices are introduced into both return and more 
particularly the variance o f return. It is beyond reproach to say that a return on 
investment is the amount we sold it for less the amount we purchased it for, plus 
any net dividends, interest, or capital returns we received in the interim. It is 
reasonably unexceptionable also to say that over a long period an unrealised 
change in the value o f the investment should be perceived as part o f the return. It 
would not be acceptable to count this as increment to  profit in the books o f a 
company, but increment to asset value can realistically be considered return in the 
investment context. But what about the shorter term? A possible approach is that 
the long term is merely the sum o f the short term and to adopt the same argument. 
However, I suggest that a shortening o f the period at least causes a need for 
questioning o f the valid ity o f the concept. Let us consider what m ight be happening 
over a period o f a month. If the share price drops (but the income earned by the
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company whose share constitutes the investment stays the same) the return is 
deemed to  have dropped by an amount which w ill frequently swamp the 
fundamental return over the same period by many orders o f magnitude. But why 
d id the share price drop? It m ight have dropped because the expectation o f future 
fundamental returns dropped and here is the first dilemma: is it right to  assign all 
aggregate changes in the future expectation o f return and place them in a small 
period o f tim e as an actual? True if  we were to close o ff the books by now selling 
future expectations we would have to  "dump" all differences from the previous 
periods into the latest period but is this not a very different situation?
However, that is not the only issue. Future expectations o f earnings may not have 
changed at all, but market's valuation o f their worth, the discount factors, may have 
altered. Is it still appropriate to consider this as "return"? Progressively, the 
disconnection from the fundamental is eroded.
W ith Expected Return we could if we wish resolve the issue by taking a long-view, 
that is periods o f several years. However, as we move on to  consider variance, to 
which MPT seems to attach the same logic, further factors come into play. The 
dominant part o f the return variance becomes the variance o f inter period 
investment price differences, the number o f observations required for reasonable 
assessments severely aggravates the problem. If reference periods are o f short 
interval, these become distal from fundamental return uncertainty. Now, even 
temporary differences in market assessment, which owe nothing to changes in 
return, are translated into variance. Thus we m ight have an assessment made in one 
month being reversed in the next- the price rises and then drops back. The 
aberration has no long term consequences in terms o f overall market valuation or 
return, but the methodology has recorded an increment to variance forever. 
Movements in sentiment are likely to be more important than true return variability. 
So the detachment from fundamental meaning intensifies. What do covariances now 
mean? Do we expect deviations from mean in successive periods to be 
independent? Unlikely. What is the stochastic character o f the tim e series o f 
deviations, what is the appropriate sub-division o f the tim e division over which the 
betas o f the return variance are calculated? In physics the atomic view  o f matter is 
necessarily different from the macro view. In the same way, in this area should we 
necessarily expect the logic that we attach to the long view  to also apply to the
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short period view  (where changes o f subjective evaluation overwhelm physical 
income)?
The issue can be side-stepped by detaching the measured variance o f a price tim e- 
series from the expression "Variance o f Return", simply considering it as price 
vo la tility. By any standard, the way in which investment prices co-vaiy w ith the 
market (their market sensitivity) and w ith other prices, and the ability o f portfolios to 
deviate from the market is risk; possibly the most important single risk. MPT 
arithmetic can be applied to it. It is used by the w riter (as decision maker) in this 
way. It is also has an important advantage as it is observable, at least historically.
This leads to the next issue. To what extent is the past a reliable guide to  the future? 
Good past business performance is likely to be some sort o f an indicator o f future 
success. Moreover, we can conceive that analysts m ight reliably project the past 
into the future and, after appropriate consideration o f future-influencing 
management and economic issues, generate an unbiased estimate o f Return by 
some means. Variance is more problematic. What is it that relates past variances to 
future ones? The answer is far from dear. We should not necessarily expect unusual 
characteristics to be sustained and bias w ill result. Indeed, Elton and Gruber (op cit, 
p i42) report work o f Blume and Levy which illustrates the tendency o f investment 
Betas to  regress to unity. Naturally, this is not an indefinitely sustainable 
phenomenon: the future produces new special circumstances. These cause what 
prospectively may be considered random variations in Beta, probably resulting in a 
very similar dispersion o f Betas amongst all investments, to the dispersion that 
persisted before. The implication is that an existing portfolio, which seems relatively 
riskless on the basis o f past performance, w ill typically become more risky and a 
risky portfolio less so. However, provided that a positive correlation between the 
past Beta and their future values exists, the concept is still exploitable. It is used by 
the w riter (as decision maker) on this basis.
We should also note that there are w ider dimensions o f risk and other indicators o f 
it, some o f which m ight not translate into investment price variability (until 
realisation). For example, high financial gearing could imperil a company and there 
could be perceived vulnerability to mismanagement. This m ight result in a lowering 
o f the price o f the underlying share, but it need not necessarily cause variability to 
be reflected in the share price; and if it does, it m ight not be reflected in the
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variability in a proportionate way. Decision makers may also wish to insure against 
an unspecified but finite possibility o f an unforeseen risk, which again may not be 
reflected in a time-series's variance.
However, the main lim itation o f the approach, in the view  o f this researcher, is that 
it does not tackle the most difficult aspects o f the problem. It pre-supposes a tw o- 
dimensional objective. Whilst the body o f published thinking and the models to do 
this are formidable, at root they do not directly tackle even three-dimensional 
statements o f objective. This necessitates a reductionist approach in which the rich 
complex o f m ultiple objectives and the many dimensions o f investment attributes 
must be reduced to tw o (return and its variance). But it is the translation o f facts 
concerning investments, to appropriate exploitable reductions and the translation o f 
investor values to  appropriate balancing o f those reductions, that is the essence o f 
the investment analysis. It is instructive that the financial press usually argues from 
basic facts in many dimensions (historic earnings growth, projected PE ratios, 
gearing, product portfolio, management strategy, sector prospects, management 
track record etc.) to normative conclusion (Buy, Sell), w ithout overt regard to 
intermediate condensations on which MPT depends.
4.5 The Core Problem
The approaches mentioned (Qualitative and Quant) are separate approaches; even 
alternative paradigms. One loose, vague, unstructured, flexible, using many 
variables, open-ended qualitative data but lim ited quantitative data; the other firm, 
specific, structured, quite rigid and in, ultimate process, only involving tw o criteria 
variables, but a mass o f quantitative data.
Professional financial analysts, or the company's that employ them, may tend to 
favour one approach over another. However, they w ill generally have access to and 
may employ a combination. Nevertheless, it appears that there is no intermediate 
integrated methodology in regular use in the industry that attempts to 
quantitatively analyse the many Attributes o f investments, whilst sustaining their 
multi-dimensional quality, into the determination o f efficient sets o f individual 
investments and the generation o f efficient portfolios.
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This lim itation has been recognised by Spronk and Hallerbach (1997). They write, "In 
this view  [the extended framework they commend], when buying a security, an 
investor is actually buying an exposure to various attributes. The issue o f m ulti­
attribute portfolio selection is to balance the attributes o f the individual securities on 
the portfolio level. That is ..the attributes o f his portfolio must be fashioned in a way 
that suits his particular circumstances and attributes best". They discriminate 
between "Directly return-related attributes" and "Indirectly return-related attributes" 
which they relate to  the Markowitz concept. However, the central issue is that the 
Attributes reflect objectives but are not representations o f them. [Spronk and 
Halierbach's use o f the word "attribute" appears similar to  my own, that is as 
characteristic related to objectives, and not necessarily in line w ith the Keeney and 
Raiffa usage]. Hallerbach (1994) had earlier developed a m ulti dimensional 
implementation o f the principle and further papers pursuing the concept, distinct in 
approach from that adopted by this author, have been recently published or are 
about to  be published by Hallerbach and Spronk and their associates (eg Hallerbach 
et al, 2003)
It is this problem that the w riter has also sought to address, as a private investor 
seeking to apply a quantitative investment and portfolio formation approach to  his 
own decision making. There was in any case one ancillary factor which m ilitated 
against the use o f traditional MPT. First, suitable, cheap, off-the-shelf, pre-processed 
data, suitable for applying MPT, was not available, and, given that most private 
investors are unlikely to have the skills or interest to  apply the principles, is unlikely 
to  become so.
I refer to this personal application, which is intended to  serve as a practical example 
o f the "core decision analysis technique" as the "core problem". The approach 
adopted may be thought o f as an alternative to MPT and as a more flexible 
approach in its principle and better able to cope w ith smaller scale problems. The 
methodology differs in one other respect. Unlike MPT it is not specific to this 
application area. Indeed, the methodology may attract greater interest for 
applications outside this area. Its application in the investment area is intended to 
be an example o f its applicability, not a delim itation.
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Chapter 5 The Basic Technique
5.1 Introduction
The follow ing sections seek to  introduce the basic Dora-D technique (originally 
Decision Option Reduction Analysis using concepts from DEA), placing it in the 
context o f some o f the decision analysis and cognitive assumptions already 
discussed.
It starts by relating the structure to  the taxonomy outlined in Chapter 2. In essence 
it can be stylised as the selection o f a single decision from mutually exclusive 
options characterised in terms o f the magnitudes o f a bounded set o f attributes. The 
selection is informed by qualitatively well understood but quantitatively vague 
objectives. Each attribute is related monotonically to  the goodness or badness o f the 
decision. The data would normally be able to be represented in a complete matrix.
The inspirational origins o f the technique in, and its connection to, Data 
Envelopment Analysis, is discussed, highlighting important distinctions. First 
amongst these is that the approach here is centred on decision makers' values.
Next the approach is structured, highlighting the central analytic objective, the 
formation o f an additive linear value function. The concepts o f assessing each 
potential decision in terms o f a value function, which shows it in the best possible 
light, is explained and Maximal Comparative Advantage (MCA) and Comparative 
Advantage Function (CAF) are introduced. Initial Option Reduction is described, in 
which no decision maker's "values" (or just the most certain pre-emptive constraints) 
are specified. The concept o f reducing the Latitude o f the value function by seeking 
statements o f preference is introduced, a process which is effected during 
Subsequent Option Reduction.
An LP formulation for effecting the process is outlined. Alternative methods or 
Mechanics for structuring elicitation and representing preference w ithin the LP 
structure are outlined. The need for "breaking ties" is raised and approaches to  this in 
Final Reduction are suggested. The approach is illustrated by an example.
Observations are then made concerning ancillaiy technical matters that m ight o f 
interest to  a reader or analyst.
166
Potential applications are mentioned, and the Chapter concludes w ith a brief 
discussion o f the method in the context o f the decision cognition assumptions the 
w riter has made.
Sutton and Green (2002) constitutes an anticipation o f this part o f this thesis, 
although this Chapter amplifies some points. The structure was originally described 
in Sutton (1999), a transfer paper associated w ith this work, which suggested it as a 
concept for developing firm decisions from vague objectives.
5.2 Generic problem structure
5.2.1 Categorising this approach
The technique developed here may be described as a m ultiple objective selection 
method. In basic form it is capable o f handling many objectives (Id  in the 
taxonomy), indeed, as many strategic objectives as are ever likely to be practically 
required and sufficient objective related attributes for most normal problems.
It has been argued in this thesis, and it is an assumption o f this method, that our 
ancestors were not required by the exigencies o f the environment in which they 
evolved, to  articulate strategic m ultiple objectives, nor to quantify them, and 
accordingly we are not now innately able to quantitatively relate factors to such 
objectives in a dear manner, prior to  analysis. I have suggested that one 
quantitative objective can often be defined relatively straightforwardly (eg in 
business, money-value objective scales such as Net Profit, Cost, DCF, Opportunity 
Cost, Marginal Contribution etc.) but additional objectives may become 
progressively less simple to express, the more that are included for consideration. 
Objectives become concepts which are representable by cocktails o f quantifiable 
measures. However, such packages o f proxy measures may not necessarily be 
reducible to an aggregate measure prior to the decision analysis, and, even if  it 
seems possible, it may not be wise.
Nevertheless, I have asserted that people often have a good intuitive but qualitative 
grasp o f what they wish to achieve, a clear perception o f the factors that relate to 
those objectives, and a firm understanding o f their connection to the goodness or 
badness o f the decision under scrutiny. People, I have suggested, have Vague 
objectives: but they "know what they like". A t least in principle, they can be
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persuaded to declare trade-offs between one objective related Attribute and 
another. This is summarised as 2c in the taxonomy and the technique is built around 
this level o f objective articulation. The technique can also cope w ith harder 
statements such as 2a or 2b. Less precise statements can be improved using other 
elicitation techniques. (However, extensions o f the technique, to be discussed later, 
can be used to develop improved decisions in cases where means and ends are 
intertw ined or objectives are undeclared, requiring only that possibly relevant 
attributes are specified and that the decision maker is prepared to suggest 
solutions).
The technique deals w ith deterministic outcomes, 3a, as well as uncertain outcomes 
where these are defined by statistical parameters which are treated in the same 
manner as deterministic attributes (the last sub-categoiy o f 3b). It handles many 
defined factors or attributes, 4d; but open-ended problems, 4e, must be 
represented by bounded approximations.
In basic form it deals w ith linear relationships, 5a/6a, between attributes, objectives, 
and overall decision desirability. Indeed it builds a linear and additive value 
function. However, insofar as material non-linearities exist in a decision maker's 
values, it is assumed, using the concept o f Qualified Self Awareness discussed in 
Chapter 2, that they w ill be conscious and therefore that non-linear attributes can be 
converted into adequately approximate linear ones, prior to  analysis. Nevertheless, 
the conditions for an additive value function are assumed to apply, that is that all 
relevant attributes are mutually preferentially independent in the case o f problems 
w ith three or more attributes and the Thompsen Condition applies in the case o f 
tw o attribute problems (eg French, 1986, p i 10). I shall discuss later how decisions 
evaluated using lexicographic or satisficing algorithms (but where the decision 
maker's "true" value mechanism is assumed to be continuous) can be improved 
using the method. In basic form, the method assumes that decision value is linear 
and non-configural, but I shall also later discuss how disjunctive and conjunctive 
assumptions, or the possibility o f them, can be accommodated.
The methodology primarily handles 7a type decisions, that is there is no explicit 
constraint, or that option attributes are defined relative to  a usage o f one (or a few) 
scarce resources (eg Plant Capacity/ £ o f capex). However, I shall discuss later how
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problems w ith more complex constraint structures, usually formulated as MOLPs, 
can also be investigated using the approach.
The approach is primarily oriented to processing well defined metrically quantified 
attributes 8a. It can embrace binary categoric attributes w ithin 8b. One can include 
some ordinal variables w ithin the LP structure adopted, though this is demanding o f 
analysis resources as, inter alia, a separate LP variable must be assigned to each 
point in the ordinal scale. It is also open to the user to  treat ordinal scales, or 
modifications o f them, as cardinal scales, if, in the opinion o f the decision maker, 
steps approximate equal intervals o f value. 8c can only be accommodated to  the 
extent that the decision maker is able to assign metric quantities to  qualitative 
statements.
The methodology suits it for decisions firm ly w ithin categories 9a and 10a.
In basic form the methodology is suited to 11c type problems w ith many, even 
large numbers o f discretely defined options. But the main extension considered in 
this thesis is for problems o f type 1 lg . 1 I f  problems are also manageable, and their 
treatment is discussed later in this thesis.
The method is suited to 12a and 12c decisions.
The method is for decisions made independently o f other parties (13a) and has no 
"Game" elements w ithin it.
The approach is analysis intensive and therefore appropriate for 14b and 16b but it 
can be used for strategic level unrepeated decisions 15b and repetitions o f already 
structured routine decisions 15a.
It requires that a decision maker is the custodian o f the values for the decision (17a) 
or that, if  the conflicting interests o f more than one party is a feature, the analysis 
treats the m ultiple interest group as if  they were a single decision maker. There is 
no conflict resolution mechanic w ithin the Basic technique, though a ready 
adaptation o f the technique would allow the identification o f sets o f options w ith 
are pareto-optimal w ith respect to  the values expressed w ithin the conflicting value 
group. The application o f similar methodology to  Group Decision Making and Social 
Choice is discussed later.
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The method can inform an emergent process (18b) or lead more specifically to  a 
recommendation for a firm explicit decision (18a). It is principally a 19a support 
device. On the other hand it can inform all modes o f analysis emphasis summarised 
under 20, except 20f. It depends on the identification o f options, relevant 
attributions and the quantification o f those attributes being available or becoming 
available though other independent methodology.
I see the method as a hard quantitative technique w ithin a soft process, but 
generally I would not expect it to  be mixed w ith other m odelling techniques. A  
variety o f preference elicitation methods could be used. The enumeration o f 
objectives, options and attributes could be front-ended by a variety o f creativity 
stimulating approaches.
The technique is unequivocally in the camp o f Stewart's "Value or U tility Based 
Approaches" (22a).
5.2.2 Antecedents of the technique
The basic formulation for the prospective evaluation o f decision choices bears a 
structural sim ilarity to that used in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), first 
introduced in mathematical programming form by Chames, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978) for the retrospective evaluation o f efficiency. Stewart (1996) commented that 
DEA potentially allows the maximum extraction o f (im plicitly factual) information 
from decision data. Others including Belton (1992), Doyle and Green (1993) have 
also pointed-out the promise o f DEA for insightful decision support. Doyle and 
Green (op cit) and Cook and Green (2000) have sought selection indicators, looking 
mainly endogenously w ithin the data describing options. However, Bouyssou 
(1999) suggests dangers in using DEA for more than convex efficiency analysis 
w ithout the introduction o f preference information. Sarrico et al (1997) introduce 
value judgements into a decision situation, though their interest remains primarily in 
generating general measures o f performance efficiency rather than estimating fully 
defined value or u tility  functions for the decisions o f individuals.
Techniques cannot extract what is not there and raw DEA can only identify the 
potentially optimal options o f the efficient set. Approaches that go further in 
reducing the options w ithout the explicit introduction o f additional information are
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introducing preference "information" w ithin the technique itself. For example, it may 
be perfectly reasonable to  adopt a procedure which isolates the efficient option 
which is "closest" to  the (non-efficient) average o f all efficient options. This "centre o f 
gravity" option may have properties which favour its use in conjunctive decision 
making, or approximate to a least radical choice, or one having the "most evenly 
weighted" objectives. But if these effects are incidental rather than intended 
objectives, the decision maker has either surrendered the responsibility to reveal 
how he or she really wishes to resolve matters or is not aware that there are other 
rationally acceptable choices which m ight better secure his or her aims.
The formulation here uses some o f the ideas o f DEA, including the notion o f finding 
weights which show the performance o f options in their most favourable light. This 
not only highlights good options on the basis o f options’ factual content, but, far 
more importantly, provides a framework to  e licit and use information that is 
exogenous to the options which enables a selection to be made between them. 
Specifically, it seeks to elicit the information reflective o f a decision-maker’s 
ambitions or what Simon (1965, p45) distinguishes as the value or ethical content o f 
a decision. In this method we seek a progressive quantitative articulation o f a 
decision-maker’s objectives, which may be qualitatively well-understood, but which 
are initia lly quantitatively undetermined, by interactively building an explicit linear 
valuation function.
In the method, Linear Programming is used to  parameterise an additive value 
function consistent w ith a decision maker’s preference declarations; in this respect 
resembling Bell (1977).
5.2.3 Model structure and concept
Consider a set o f n discrete decision options, each characterised by k attributes o f 
magnitude aiS (reflective o f the factors which the decision maker considers to  be
relevant to  the efficacy o f a prospective decision), where i is a specific attribute and 
S is a specific option. Notwithstanding that a decision maker may, initially, only 
have expressed his or her objectives in qualitative terms, we may in principle 
(under linear assumptions which we comment on later) express the value, vs , o f 
every option S , by a weighted value function:
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vs =  X w.-a«
all i
(5.1)
The identification o f the best option and a ranking o f others follows directly, if  one 
can articulate, w ith adequate precision, the valuation weights w< through a value or 
preference eliciting process.
The use o f weights in this way shares common ground w ith  other Value or U tility 
Methods o f decision analysis and also the m ultiplier representations o f the Chames, 
Cooper, Rhodes (CCR) model (op cit) and other models o f DEA. However, there are 
crucial distinctions between the use o f weights here (together w ith those generated 
by other decision analysis methods) and their use in DEA. In the first they are 
internal to  the decision maker and representative o f his or her values excluding the 
facts characterising the options. Moreover, generally, after normalisation only one 
such function, albeit imprecise, can ultimately represent those values. In pure forms 
o f DEA they are entirely endogenous to the Decision Making Units, reflective only 
o f their facts (not the user’s values). Also, several sets o f weights (usually one per 
extreme point or efficient DMU) may be meaningfully extant.
Notwithstanding our initial lack o f quantitative information concerning attribute 
weights which reflect the decision maker’s values, we can nevertheless find weights 
for each decision option that shows it in its most favourable light. We can use this 
interactively to aid the decision maker to refine a value function, whilst 
progressively reducing the list o f options which remain potentially optimal, 
eventually to a single option. An explicit value function consistent w ith all 
expressed preferences can be developed as an economic expression o f decision 
makers' values which can be fed-back to the decision maker to validate analysis 
conclusions. It can also be used for the evaluation o f new options or to define a 
consistent linear order.
We start by defining a Maximal Comparative Advantage (MCA) for each decision 
option. This constitutes the valuation obtained for the decision using the set o f 
attribute variable weights which maximises the option valuation, subject to  that set 
o f weights not giving rise to a valuation o f greater than an arbitrary constant (eg, \ , 
as used hereafter) for any other available decision, and not violating any other 
valuation constraints that m ight be imposed. Under these conditions, the valuation
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function defined by the attribute weights in the form o f equation 1, is referred to as 
the Comparative Advantage Function (CAF) for that option.
A ll decision options, which are not dominated by any other option or convex 
combination o f options would emerge from such an analysis w ith MCAs greater 
than or equal to one. However, the valid ity o f the methodology does not depend 
on derivations from the standard definition o f dominance (eg Keeney and Raiffa 
(1976 p69)) discussed in Chapter 2. It requires only that for an option to  have an 
MCA o f less than one, at least one other option must have a value o f 1 when 
evaluated using the same valuation function. Accordingly, an option w ith an MCA 
o f less than one cannot be optimal under any feasible parameters o f the valuation 
function as all other candidate functions w ill be no better.
In addition to  generating a reduced set o f options that includes all candidates for 
the nominal optimum (the Efficient Set), one can also obtain the set o f 
corresponding criteria, the CAFs, which generate the MCAs o f each efficient option. 
These are effectively candidates for the decision maker's value function w ithin a 
cone o f temporarily permitted criterion space. However, we must ultimately hone 
down that space until an optimum option and, if  required, a corresponding value 
function and a complete ranking o f options is identified.
I refer to the process by which the MCAs and CAFs are first calculated as Initial 
Option Reduction. The subsequent problem (Subsequent Option Reduction) is one 
o f progressively reducing the “ latitude” o f the criterion space by seeking statements 
o f preference which rule out regions o f the hitherto permitted criterion space. 
Whether the latitude needs to reduce to nil is a dependant on the circumstances o f 
the problem. Generally a unique optimum or a unique ranking w ill not need a 
unique value function, but a simple encapsulation o f policy is often valuable and 
facilitates confirmation that the analysis has reflected the decision maker's 
intentions.
The broad methodology outlined here is referred to  by the abbreviated acronym 
Dora-D; Decision Option Reduction Analysis using concepts from DEA. Basic single 
decision selection based on a linear value model, as introduced in this chapter, is 
referred to as Basic Dora-D. Variations to deal w ith  decision portfolios and other 
special situations are discussed later.
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5.3 Operationalising the concept.
5.3.1 The formulation for Initial Option Reduction
We can express the problem o f finding the CAF and MCA o f any decision option 
w ith lim ited information on a decision-maker's objectives or preferences as a Linear 
Program o f the follow ing form:
For each decision option S e  { 1 , . . . ,  n)
Maximise v5 = ^ w iS.aiS ( 5 . 2 . 1 )
all i
Subject to
X wis'aij ^ 1 V /e  {1,...,/I: y *  S} ( 5 . 2 . 2 )
all i
wiS> a t V ie  {!,...,£} ( 5 . 2 . 3 )
(5.2)
Where n = number o f options 
k =  number o f attributes
atj = value o f an attribute i for option j .  There is no restriction 
on the signs o f a(J. 
vs = value o f option S. Max vs = MCA o f option S.
For simplicity it is assumed here that value increases with 
increasing magnitude for all attributes i, scaling by -1, 
if  necessary, to achieve this. 
wiS = weight assigned to attribute i o f option S.
When Vyis maximised, wiS are the parameters o f the CAF. 
As the value of an option increases with increasing aiS, a{J 
the corresponding wiS have imposed positive sign.
= finite and positive real number considered by the decision 
maker to be the minimum weight (zero permitted) that can 
be taken by an attribute i (i =  1 to m) in the valuation 
function for option j  ( j  = 1 to n).
The close relationship o f this structure to  that o f DEA may now be apparent. A  CCR 
model in which the wiS are all output weights and each DMU has a single input o f
magnitude 1 would be o f identical form, subject to  including an Andersen and 
Petersen (1993) adjustment in equation (5.2.2), and the inclusion o f negative 
variables. The distinction between inputs and outputs, which characterises DEA, is 
not meaningful here
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In DEA the metaphor that a DMU “chooses” weights that show o ff its performance 
in the best possible light, is sometimes used. Here a corresponding metaphor is that 
an option “proposes a case” for being selected by “nominating” a weighting 
function that favours it to  the decision-maker. The decision maker “ responds” by 
providing extra information on what he or she wants and the options “ revise their 
cases” accordingly.
The LP is solved for each option. This identifies the MCAs and CAFs for that option, 
as well as the Efficient Peers (or Reference Set) o f inefficient options. These are the 
options which have a value o f 1 when evaluated using the CAF for the inefficient 
option.
The constraints (5.2.2) are referred to as Frontier Constraints to distinguish them 
from Value Constraints which are introduced shortly.
5.3.2 Subsequent Option Reduction
The nominal optimum choice is contained w ithin the Efficient Set identified and one 
can concentrate subsequent attention on this. We now seek to progressively reduce 
the latitude o f the criterion space.
This is achieved by eliciting the decision maker’s preferences. Every statement o f 
preference serves to eliminate all criterion space, and all hitherto efficient options 
(“candidates” for the optimum choice) inconsistent w ith  it. Each preference is used 
to  specify a linear constraint to  be included in subsequent LPs. In subsequent runs 
impossible CAFs are eliminated. New MCAs are sought using revised CAFs which 
are consistent w ith the value declarations o f the decision maker. The MCA for any 
option w ill thus be less than or equal to  the MCA for the prior stage. Decision 
options which had MCAs equal or greater than 1 may have their MCAs drop below 
1. These cease to be potentially optimal candidates.
Preference expressed in any o f a number o f forms can be incorporated w ithin the 
calculational framework. The methodology is also sufficiently flexible to 
simultaneously accommodate more than one mechanic. The follow ing are 
mechanics that could be used, (though the reader should note that they are 
included if  they are mathematically manageable w ithout regard to whether they 
would facilitate the most cognitively reliable statements o f preference):
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(a) Option Preference. The preference o f one potential decision over another 
(strictly, the preference for the combination o f attributes corresponding to 
one decision over those o f another). This can serve to eliminate criterion 
space, whether or not one or both decisions are in the hitherto efficient 
set and whether or not the preference contradicts, or is consistent w ith, 
the ranking o f the decisions by the CAFs so far calculated. A  variation o f 
this method is to seek a partial ordering o f a lim ited number o f options 
w ithin the hitherto efficient set, from the decision-maker. It should be 
noted that this is not tautological: an explicit statement o f preference o f A 
over B may reveal an im plicit preference for C over D. I originally 
favoured this approach. However, real option comparisons are not 
necessarily psychologically reliable even though this basic approach 
seems mathematically efficient.
(b) W eight Capping. The specification o f an upper lim it for the weight o f a 
particular attribute (or a combination), if  the decision-maker considers its 
contribution to the MCA o f any option to  be excessive. A  method I now 
favour.
(c) W eight Thresholds. The lower bound equivalent o f (b). If mixed w ith  (b) 
their seems to be a greater risk o f generating mutually inconsistent value 
constraints.
(d) Contribution lim iting. Performing a similar function to W eight Caps and 
Thresholds, this lim its the value o f the contribution that an attribute can 
make to  the MCA o f an option. It should be used w ith caution as it can 
disqualify a particular set o f weights for one option whilst allowing it for 
another. This is at variance w ith the objective o f finding a valuation 
function which applies to all. I favour examining contributions but if  a 
particular contribution appears excessive, lim iting the corresponding 
weight
(e) Attribute Trade-off Preferences. Several approaches can be adopted. I 
favour “Preference Bracketing” . In this, a decision-maker, faced w ith a 
hypothesised adverse movement in one variable, specifies tw o levels o f 
favourable movement o f another; one as large as possible but which
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he/she is sure represents inadequate compensation and one as small as 
possible but which he/she is sure is more than enough. This approach is 
consistent w ith that commended by Larichev (1992) who favours only 
changing tw o variables simultaneously. It is one operationalisation o f 
Fundamentally Decomposed Preference, which w ill be discussed in 
Chapter 7.
(f) Preferences between artificially generated efficient combinations o f 
attributes. A  Base Case is created, for example, corresponding to  the 
average attribute levels for options in an efficient set. Several efficient 
attribute mixes are then generated using LP, in turn optim ising an 
attribute subject to  the others not being inferior to  Base Case levels. The 
decision-maker is then asked to rank the generated cases, or indicate 
preferences between pairs.
(g) Rank ordering o f attribute increments. Attribute "swings" are ordered by 
value, in a comparable manner to that used in the initial stages o f the 
SMARTER technique (Edwards and Barron, 1994). Weights m ight also be 
compared directly. This seems a potent mechanic and is consistent w ith 
the cognitive assumption that man is a good comparator.
(h) Fundamentally Decomposed Preference (FDP) by:
- Efficient Larichev vector ordering. An integrated search elicitation 
methodology based on a combination o f methods (f) and (g), owing 
its inspiration principally to ideas w ithin ZAPROS (Larichev and 
Moshkovich, 1995) but also SMARTER (Edwards and Barron, op cit). 
This approach is referred to in this thesis as Larichev decomposition.
- Franklin Decomposition. A  methodology based on Franklin's often 
quoted but rarely promoted 1772 "moral or prudential algebra" is also 
described later.
FDP, Larichev Decomposition and Franklin Decomposition are special 
cases o f (f); they are fully discussed later. I consider that methods based 
on these mechanics have good prospects o f deriving reliable expressions 
o f decision makers' values. Provided feasible fundamentally decomposed
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choices are generated, it is possible to ensure that mutually inconsistent 
constraint sets are not generated.
The form o f constraint equations to be included in the LPs to  reflect preferences, 
corresponding to the above, are:
For Preferences between Options
^  YJwls.alpl
a l l/  a ll/
Where P I = a decision option that is no less
preferred by the decision maker than P2
(5.3)
This follows from
V ( a iP l > * * ' » f l / P l v > ^ J t P l )  — V ( f l l P 2 v > f l /p 2 > * * '» f l * P 2 )  ^  W iS 'a iP l ~  ^ j W iS 'a iP2
a l l/  a ll/
Where v( al j =  the value to the decision maker
o f the attributes o f option j  .
(5.4)
For Weight Caps or Thresholds
W/s ^  Wt or wiS < Wt 
Where Wt =  Constant for attribute i. (5.5)
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For A ttribute Preference Bracketing
W mS * ( a mB a mA )  — W nS '( .a nFl a hB )  
wms-(amB- a ^ ) <
Where are arbitrary reference levels for attributes m and n
is an arbitrary level for attribute m, adverse with respect to 
anFl is the highest level o f attribute n for which the decision maker is 
confident that v i a ^ a ^ )  < v(amB ,a nB) 
is the lowest level o f attribute n for which the decision maker is 
confident that v ia ^ a ^ )* .  ,0 ^ )
v(ak,a  ) is the value o f any decision with variable attributes ak,ap 
all other attributes constant.
(5.6)
[For example a decision-maker in assessing the trade-off between Gearing 
(G) and Return (R), for an investment decision, may define a Base Case 
(G=50%, R=5%) and wish to assess the return reduction that is equivalent to 
a Gearing o f 70%. H/she may be confident that value o f (G=70%, R=6%) is 
less valuable than the Base Case and that (G=70%, R=7%) is more valuable 
than the base. If so we can bracket the weights -10wGJ < wRS < -20 wGS; or
10wOT < < 20wGS, if the Gearing scale is inverted].
For Rank Ordering o f Attribute Increments
fr/l'Vs s bnw<i,s s biywlis > . . .> blnwms 
Where ik = the index / o f the attribute for which the value o f the 
increment bik is ranked k amongst all the attribute 
increments considered, 
eg i f  attribute 3 is ranked 4, i4 = 3
(5.7)
For Fundamentally Decomposed Preference 
See Chapter 7.
The inclusion o f constraints on weights also resembles methods used in some DEA 
implementations (eg Chames, Cooper, Wei and Huang (1989), Dyson and 
Thanassoullis (1988), Thompson, Langemeir, Lee and Thrall (1990), Wong and
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Beasley (1990), Allen et al. (1997)) where they are also used to reflect user values. 
However, in DEA their role is ancillary; to  moderate conclusions based on purely 
factual descriptions o f DMUs. Here where the user’s value frame is primary issue, 
they are central to  the process. A ll constraints expressing such preference are 
referred to  as Value Constraints, whatever mechanic is used in their specification.
The specification o f preferences is an iterative and interactive process, in which the 
rank ordering o f each successive set o f MCAs and the CAF valuation functions for 
the Efficient Options inform the expression o f further preferences and the inclusion 
o f further LP constraints, circumscribing the latitude o f the criterion space. It 
continues either until a single option remains or the decision-maker is unable to 
discriminate.
5.3.3 Final Reduction
Constraints should be added circumscribing the latitude o f Equation (5.1) until only 
one option remains. A t that stage the CAF can be normalised to give the optimum 
option a valuation o f 1. A  valuation function as per (5.1) would have been 
developed and the suffix S can be dropped.
If, despite every effort to  e licit articulation o f further preference, the decision maker 
is no longer able to express preferences or further delim it weights, a tie-breaking 
procedure may be invoked to  generate an explicit value function and a 
corresponding ranking.
Under these circumstances, there is effectively "non-transitive indifference", at least 
in terms o f expressible values. We can argue that the value o f the remaining 
Efficient Options are all highly valued and an appropriate valuation function is one 
which values them ail the most highly (and, if a feasible value function exists that 
allows it, o f equal value). One operationalisation o f this goal would be to find the 
function that maximises the value o f the worst o f them, subject to none having a 
value o f more than one. Alternatively, one m ight maximise their mean subject to 
the same upper bound. The resulting weights can be validated by the decision 
maker as satisfactorily representing his or her objectives. If a single function can be 
found which allows more than one option to  simultaneously have a value o f 1, the
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remaining options can be construed as being on an efficient facet or edge; and the 
tie w ill persist. A t this point it may be fair to assume immateriality.
Figure 1
The Option Reduction Cycle
Obtain suggested MCA rankings with few pre-emptive constraints
(Repeat as
Use ranking suggestions and CAFs to ^  needed)
elicit specific preferences of DM
Use stated preferences In LP to limit Value 
Function latitude le reduce criterion “space”
Obtain new rankings
Decide
Move towards explicit Valuation Function 
consistent with all declared preferences
Obtain corresponding best option or mutually consistent ranking
5.4 An example
This example uses the same decision situation as Sarrico et al ( l 997).
Jenny is a student who expects outstanding results in her "A levels" (the last formal 
examinations in English secondary schools). She intends to go to University and 
wishes to prioritise her UCCA application. She undertakes an analysis based on the 
9 classifications used in the Times Good University Guide 2000 to construct the 
League Table, summarised in Table 5.1.
Jenny puts particular store on teaching quality and the likely teaching attention 
implied by staff-student ratios. She is interested in how effective the institutions are 
in producing graduates with good degrees, though she notes a strong correlation 
between the proportion of students graduating w ith lsts or Upper 2nds and A level 
intake scores. She is only interested in the extra achievement o f the various 
institutions relative to the intake standard. She takes a similar view on completion 
rates, though she gives this a low priority as she is confident in her ability to apply 
herself and complete the course. She puts some priority in facilities, for which she 
considers rates of expenditure a reasonable proxy.
She is not especially interested in research standards, per se, but she puts value, 
though not a high one, on being part of a community w ith a high research 
reputation. Jenny had been ambivalent about the relevance o f entry standards. She
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had thought that this could be a negative factor, as she favours the principle o f 
extended access and she should meet the entrance standards o f all the institutions 
in the list. Vanity wins and she decides to put a positive value on going to a 
university that people know has high entry standards. She is less concerned w ith 
“Destination” , again because she felt that she had the personal qualities to open the 
necessary doors upon graduation. However, to  the extent that it was a factor, the 
Times figure was inclusive o f the effects o f degree quality and she wished to 
synthesise a measure which excluded this.
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Table 5.1 The Times 2000 League data
University T R As St L Fac Deg Des Com University T R As St L Fac Deg Des Com
Aberdeen 86 66 72 53 70 78 76 95 86 Leicester 84 71 72 50 69 73 65 91 95
Abertay Dund' 76 23 30 50 72 62 59 86 90 Lines & Humber 64 21 42 44 66 60 50 70 85
Aberystwyth 81 61 60 38 68 78 66 88 93 Liverpool 84 66 74 53 68 73 60 90 91
Anglia 76 20 42 47 61 67 66 86 80 Loughborough 94 68 70 47 69 84 68 95 93
Aston 87 58 70 42 69 79 74 96 93 LSE 93 97 93 40 79 67 80 92 94
Bangor 81 53 55 44 72 71 59 90 93 Luton 81 20 34 44 63 62 43 96 76
Bath 82 81 82 50 84 94 80 93 96 Manchester 87 77 81 47 73 72 74 96 93
Birmingham 89 73 82 57 68 79 78 94 94 Metropolitan, Le 70 22 53 32 60 62 56 88 82
Bournemouth 63 19 43 50 62 62 52 89 87 Metropolitan, M 82 27 47 36 61 58 52 87 86
Bradford 68 67 58 40 67 84 55 90 89 Middlesex 73 29 44 35 66 63 57 78 84
Brighton 82 32 49 40 66 69 59 89 87 Napier 75 21 47 44 64 69 65 91 71
Bristol 90 76 89 62 71 100 84 95 97 Newcastle 89 69 77 53 80 83 75 89 91
Brookes, Oxford 86 33 51 53 64 82 62 96 88 North London 74 27 29 36 66 70 49 85 70
Brunei 80 58 60 40 64 66 57 94 85 Northumbria 87 23 55 44 65 56 56 87 87
Caledonian, G 80 25 49 47 58 57 60 89 72 Nottingham 92 73 87 50 73 75 85 95 97
Cambridge 100 100 100 67 88 71 100 95 100 Oxford 97 96 98 62 100 65 91 99 99
Cardiff 83 75 77 44 67 77 70 96 89 Paisley 77 19 36 42 65 57 54 76 74
Cent England 73 23 48 33 58 65 51 82 77 Plymouth 80 32 51 53 66 61 59 84 92
Central Lancs 77 21 49 38 63 63 50 91 83 Portsmouth 75 32 51 35 61 66 53 84 86
City 77 47 67 57 67 73 60 91 84 Queen Mary, L 89 65 65 67 72 77 64 93 88
Coventry 79 25 45 38 64 68 48 84 80 Queen's, B'fast 87 59 79 47 67 82 63 95 93
De Montfort 72 33 45 40 62 68 68 85 77 Reading 86 72 68 57 68 77 68 82 92
Derby 67 21 43 31 64 67 50 87 83 Rob't Gordon 78 26 52 50 66 67 60 97 88
Dundee 83 61 65 62 68 77 67 91 84 Roy Holloway, L 84 72 71 53 68 85 74 95 87
Durham 91 76 85 38 69 82 73 90 99 Salford 77 57 52 35 62 62 51 91 83
East Anglia 85 73 72 38 66 76 74 90 94 Sheffield 92 74 84 44 66 75 72 95 89
East London 69 27 40 40 67 71 52 66 70 SOAS, London 95 76 73 57 91 69 77 82 83
Edinburgh 89 82 89 53 83 87 87 88 95 South Bank 73 23 37 44 64 69 44 76 74
Essex 87 80 58 50 70 83 61 91 93 Southampton 86 72 75 53 70 74 66 93 91
Exeter 83 64 76 47 67 69 76 95 95 St Andrews 93 76 84 62 73 82 88 96 95
Glamorgan 80 20 40 38 65 72 36 83 80 Staffordshire 75 25 45 36 63 67 57 87 87
Glasgow 90 63 79 53 71 72 83 91 86 Stirling 87 62 66 44 72 76 72 93 86
Goldsmiths', L 73 69 63 50 65 65 67 92 90 Strathclyde 89 60 68 44 64 74 67 94 87
Greenwich 75 25 39 38 69 73 47 84 79 Sunderland 76 25 41 42 60 72 56 87 78
Guildhall, L 72 24 41 33 65 62 42 84 72 Surrey 83 66 67 57 67 76 62 100 90
Hallam, 80 27 54 38 66 75 57 88 88 Sussex 79 77 71 50 72 73 67 94 88
Heriot-Watt 80 59 62 29 76 87 53 93 88 Swansea 82 59 63 47 65 72 73 88 89
Hertfordshire 67 25 44 40 69 66 63 94 89 Teesside 70 21 43 44 63 66 49 84 85
Huddersfield 66 29 45 36 61 64 59 89 84 Thames Val 69 17 31 26 61 61 43 83 84
Hull 88 62 66 53 70 63 69 96 90 Trent, Nott' 78 27 56 40 62 70 56 96 85
ICL 99 87 92 100 79 93 77 95 93 UCL 92 86 84 73 78 76 78 93 89
John Moores 74 27 49 42 64 62 47 87 85 Ulster 78 45 64 42 65 64 67 86 90
KCL 85 73 79 80 72 68 70 100 87 UMIST 82 80 76 57 66 76 61 100 85
Keele 80 66 67 44 59 65 74 91 90 Warwick 97 87 87 47 72 76 77 96 96
Kent 84 62 67 44 70 71 58 94 92 West of 89 25 56 44 61 65 52 89 85
Kingston 87 25 46 44 65 69 52 92 87 Westminster 78 27 44 44 69 68 60 83 82
Lampeter 75 59 46 35 67 69 49 85 89 Wol'hampton 74 20 43 40 60 77 59 87 82
Lancaster 90 82 72 42 70 83 72 90 90 York 97 81 83 57 69 76 70 90 97
Leeds 87 74 79 50 71 74 73 90 93
Key T=Teaching assessment, R= Research assessment, As=A levels (entry standard), St=Student-staff ratio,
L=Library and computer spending, Deg=First and Upper Second degrees, Des=graduate destinations, Com=Completion
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Jenny recognised that the Times data were not complete (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, 
p50), specifically that course variations were not included. She fe lt that a general 
analysis was a useful first step which she would amplify w ith some course focussed 
data later. She noted some attribute redundancy (for example the ability o f an 
institution to  produce graduates w ith good degrees should itself be related to 
teaching quality and stafF-student ratios). She did not feel she would be entrapped 
into double counting provided she remained alert.
Jenny used the Times T, R, As, St, L, Fac variables unmodified (except for re-scaling 
as described below). In three cases she fe lt that the unmodified variables did not 
properly reflect the institutional value-added she wanted to use. Having noted that 
Degree Quality (Deg) was related to Entry Standards, she estimated the effect o f this 
using a simple regression analysis and then removed it to  create a new variable 
"Degree Quality Gain" which she used instead o f Deg. She similarly developed new 
variables instead o f Des, and Com, “removing” the effects o f entry standards from 
Com, and Degree Quality from Des, as follows:
Degree Quality Gain, DQG -  Deg - 0.0047As2 - 0.0088As - 43.8 (5.8)
Destination Gain, DG = Des - 0.246Deg - 74.1 (5.9)
Completion Gain, CG = Com - 0.292As - 69.3 (5.10)
All variables were linearly transformed so that the value for the lowest institution 
was zero and for the highest equalled 100. This was done to simplify Jenny’s 
relative weight perception. She fe lt that these approximated ratio scales but noted 
the later comments on Measurement Scales in this paper. The transformed variables 
used are included in Table 5.2.
Jenny ran the Initial Option Reduction finding for each option the CAF valuation 
function showing the option to its greatest Comparative Advantage and noted the 
resulting scores for each alternative, w ithout any pre-emptive lim itations on the 
latitude o f each valuation function. Some 25 were efficient. She considered using 
Weight Capping to  restrict the valuation latitude at this stage but she had a firm  
idea o f her ordinal priorities. She resolved to restrict the weights so that the 
follow ing weight-value relationships were maintained.
W T  “>  >  Y XT >  W T  1 1 7  ^  W T  W T  W T  W T
(5.11)
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for all Institutions, S.
This proved to  be a powerful filter reducing the number o f options that remained 
efficient w ithin the reduced valuation latitude to  two; ICL and Cambridge. She 
examined the weights for the CAF valuation functions o f leading contenders. She 
noted that ICL had been “given” high weights for the T and St attributes; too high in 
her view . Cambridge was also highly polarised. Oxford and Bath, whose 
comparative strengths were in attributes lower down in Jenny’s batting order, had 
been given completely flat sets o f weights. Both extremes were unreasonable in her 
view. W ith some experimentation she progressively imposed the follow ing Caps, 
Thresholds and relative weight relationships, in addition to her previous constraints.
w T s < 0.005
W T,S  —  l * 2 w st>s
W L,S+  W Fac,S — ( W T,S +  W St,S+  W DQG,s) 
W DG,S ~  0 . 0 0 0 1
(5.12)
for all institutions, S.
This did not affect the leading contenders but Jenny was more satisfied w ith the 
shape o f the valuation functions. However, the latitude o f her im plicit valuation 
function had not yet reduced to  a single vector. She felt unable to distinguish 
between Cambridge and ICL and decided to force the LPs to  give them equal value. 
This further reduced the function latitude but did not result in an explicit function. 
She therefore decided to  minimise dispersion between the top ten institutions, 
finding the function which maximised the average MCA for these. This fixed the 
function to  her satisfaction and she prepared her batting order on the basis o f this. 
See Table 5.2.
The derived valuation function reflecting Jenny’s priorities was
Relative Value = 0.00218wT S+ •00182(wst^ +w DQG S+wL S+wFac S) 





Under some circumstances, options which are dominated w ill record MCAs o f 1 at 
the Initial Option Reduction stage. I refer to these as Weakly Efficient, a concept 
introduced earlier. A  Weakly Efficient option may be dominated, but can become 
co-optimal w ith an option which dominates it, if  a decision maker chooses to  assign 
zero weight to  particular attributes. Accordingly, I suggest these are retained as 
potential optima and I define all decisions w ith MCAs o f 1 or above (whether 
dominated but weakly efficient, or non-dominated) as members o f the Efficient Set.
The justification is that it is no more reasonable to  break ties by reference to 
"irrelevant" criteria w ithin the considered set than on the basis o f criteria outside it. 
Indeed, the existence o f ties could properly initiate reconsideration o f the value o f 
hitherto excluded factors.
This is a different view  from that im plicit in DEA, which takes pains to exclude 
Weakly Efficient DMUs which are not also strongly efficient (ie those DMUs that are 
dominated but not strongly dominated). DEA seeks to  guarantee Strong efficiency 
by the introduction o f a Non-Archimedean Infinitesimal as a lower bound on 
weights. This is usually denoted by e and is often referred to simply as Epsilon 
w ithin textual discussion. Rather than this being represented in LPs by a small 
archimedean number, it is considered more rigorous to solve the equations using a 
special tw o stage algorithm. A llow ing Weak efficiency during the refinement o f the 
CAF latitude, therefore has the additional advantage o f perm itting the use o f 
standard LP software.
After the incorporation o f preferences, some Strongly Dominated options can be 
assigned values o f exactly one. We are thus not entirely absolved from the 
problems o f infinitesimals, as is discussed in the follow ing section.
5.5.2 Preference within the context of an LP formulation
As mentioned in Chapter 2, LP is an approach which deals happily w ith "greater 
than or equal" constraints o f the form x > y , not those o f form x > y . However, 
when a person expresses a preference for one item , a , over another, b , it is likely 
that it is intended as a statement o f Strict Preference, that is that the value o f a , is
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greater than b . This may be written as v(a) > v(b) or v(a) > v(b) + e . However, LP 
can only simply deal w ith v(a) > v(b) which is the value form o f the Weak 
Preference relation a is "not less preferred" than b .
In once sense, this can be considered to be a conservative formulation: options are 
not elim inated unless so indicated by statements o f weak preference. Nevertheless, 
it  is possible, after stages o f Subsequent Option Reduction, for options to have 
MCAs o f 1 when a decision maker has made declarations o f what he or she intends 
as Strict Preference and which on the basis o f those preferences would be directly or 
im plicitly, definitely "not preferred". There is a particular risk, when some efficient 
options are directly compared. However, this is not practically a severe issue. Such 
options can be retained temporarily and are clearly "tagged" in the AP formulation; 
they have MCAs o f exactly 1. It w ill also be dear what expression o f preference led 
to  that condition.
Notwithstanding, if  the issue seems relevant, one can take a quantitative view  on 
the minimum quantum o f extra value that a statement o f preference implies. We 
can include expressions o f the type v(a) > v(b) + y . Here gamma, unlike epsilon, can 
be considered as finite and archimedean. Values o f / o f  approximately 0.01 (when 1 
is the standard upper lim it o f value) w ill provide adequate computational distinction 
and represents a much finer scale o f discrimination than a decision maker could 
competently distinguish in making a statement o f strict preference. A  higher figure 
o f 0.05 could generally be used.
It should be understood that this issue is distinct from the issue o f Weak Efficiency, 
already discussed. There the decision maker has not pronounced on the weights o f 
attributes and he is at liberty to assign zero weight to one or more. Here, if  he has 
made a statement o f strict preference, he has pronounced a strict superiority o f 
value.
5.5.3 Value Function form
Attribute measures should be linear w ith value or approximate to linearity. This is 
demanding in principle, but it has been argued that in many practical problems a 
linear additive value functional form w ill be developable, and that sufficient 
information can be elicited from the decision maker to transform non-linear
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components to adequately linear form. I have already suggested that the concept o f 
Qualified Self-Awareness should generally make this practically achievable. (I except 
from this circumstances where the General Configural Model, m ight be applied, 
which w ill be discussed later). W ithin the basic Dora-D model, where the need for a 
transformation is apparent, but its parameters are unclear, a non-linear term can be 
introduced in the form o f an additive function o f more than one variable provided 
that the undetermined parameters are all m ultiplicative weights.
Thus the value contribution o f a primary attribute aiS could be represented in 
Equations (5.1) or (5.2) as a composite o f the form
■ fi! («« ) + wns ■ fn K  >+-+«W • fim ( a,s ) I (5-1'
For example, a polynomial form could be used. A  non-linear interaction term, if 
relevant, can be introduced by the inclusion o f an additional variable for the cross- 
product.
5.5.4 Convergence, redundancy and inconsistency
Each added preference constraint serves to reduce the latitude o f the value function, 
if  it intersects the hitherto feasible space. Under these circumstances the procedure 
converges towards a single function. However, there is no general guarantee o f 
intersection and the previous feasible space may be left wholly on the feasible side 
o f a new constraint (indicating redundancy) or on the infeasible side (indicating 
inconsistency). These possibilities become more severe as value latitude diminishes. 
The introduction o f new constraints is best done in small sets to  facilitate 
backtracking when necessary. Certain o f the forms o f preference elicitation can 
reduce the problem. For example, Capping is easy to backtrack and can be taken in 
smaller steps when indicated.
One m ight also use Method (f) or (h), Section 5.3.2 to generate efficient attribute 
"bundles" w ith characteristics that facilitate cognitively reliable elicitation, whilst 
reducing the risk o f inconsistency. In certain instances feasibility can be guaranteed. 
An equation representing a preference between tw o choices w ithin the hitherto 
feasible space w ill necessarily be feasible. I return to this issue later.
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5.5.5 Measurement scale issues
Where the scales o f measurement can be so constructed, it is useful for the 
attributes to be represented on ratio scales. Under such circumstances, the value 
function obtained w ill represent a ratio scale o f value. If the origin o f an attribute’s 
ratio scale is mis-specified, or no natural zero exists, then the value scale ceases to 
be a ratio scale. Nevertheless, it remains a strategically equivalent interval scale that 
properly reflects the difference in value o f each option from each other option.
5.5.6 Consistency of dimensionality of attributes
Though not always essential, it is valuable to  maintain dimensional coherence 
between the attribute variables used in analyses. For example, in developing 
attributes to construct investment portfolios, I use tw o primary classes o f variable. 
These are, firstly, variables indicative o f money value per share and which m ight be 
assumed to be proportional to  it (eg Earnings per share, Growth in Earnings per 
share, Cash Flow per share, Sales per share etc) and inherently dimensionless 
measures (eg Gearing, Relative Strength, Beta). The first group are transformed to 
dimensionless measures by divid ing them by Price per share (obtaining, for 
example, Earnings/Price (“Earnings Yield” ), Growth o f Earnings/Price etc).
5.5.7 Including the option under consideration within the Comparison Set
Equation (5.2.2) is structured in a similar manner to  Anderson and Petersen (1993). 
Excluding the case j=S from the Comparison Set is optional. The method works 
satisfactorily if  it is included. Generally, I favour the AP-type exclusion, as:
It generally provides a non-degenerate solution w ith a unique CAF and a single 
optimum.
It provides an automatic unambiguous indication o f the next best efficient option/s, 
assuming the CAF represents the decision maker's value function.
It provides a measure o f the maximum degree o f superiority (and hence a measure 
o f potential materiality) o f a particular efficient solution.
It distinguishes between strongly efficient options (for which the MCA is greater 
than 1) from weakly efficient options (for which the MCA is exactly equal to  1)
These, for me, outweigh the disadvantages o f :
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A  slightly more complicated analysis procedure, as, for each option considered, the 
constraint for the previous option examined must be reinstated and that for the 
current option excluded.
A  need in the final stages to re-normalise the CAF so that the optimal option has a 
comparative advantage o f 1, when it is concluded that the CAF represents the 
decision maker's values.
5.6 Applications
The method above can be used for many single choice selection decisions, eg
(a) M utually exclusive, defined investment choices
(b) M utually exclusive market entry brand selection decisions
(c) Staff selection and promotion planning
(d) Contract/tender selection
(e) Project selection and capital investment decision making
(f) Facilities location decisions
(g) Corporate strategy selection
it could also be used, w ith little  adaptation, for composite or multi component 
decisions involving interaction, where the characteristics o f any given alternative can 
be explicitly enumerated (at least by computer) and the number o f combinations is 
w ithin bounds that could be represented by an LP constraint. One could, in 
principle, address problems w ith several thousand potential solutions.
More substantial adaptations are necessary once the number o f solutions becomes 
very large or represented by continuous variables. The treatment o f such problems 
is discussed Chapters 6 and 7.
5.7 Relationship w ith  cognition issues
I suggest that this structure particularly lends itself to  the process o f hardening 
choice and developing quantitative objectives from well understood but Vague 
qualitative objectives. The assumption is that these should enable the clear 
identification o f relevant and quantifiable attributes.
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The process o f "normalising" value function coefficients by the maximum valuation 
that can be generated by them is also helpful. Normalisation, say, to  ensure that 
coefficients sum to unity, m ight in solution methods be arithmetically convenient 
but does not contribute to insight. In this formulation, contributions to value and 
relative contributions to value can be clearly seen against a clear yardstick. (If we 
retain the AP construction to the end o f an analysis we confess that "1" is the value 
o f the second best option. But this does not alter the transparency o f the measures 
and, like Jenny, we can re-base the derived function).
The inductive or implication orientation is useful. As an impaired decision maker, I 
may not know my values. I may also not know whether a particular option is 
desirable in the light o f my values. But if  you can suggest a set o f values which 
would cause a particular option to  be optimal, presented in a way that I can discern 
contributions to value o f particular attributes in particular options, I may be able to 
te ll you that I do not like them and why.
Dominance and efficiency as mathematical descriptions are also blunt guides to  
discrimination. The latter w ill embrace the optimal, but includes the materially non- 
optimal. A t the same tim e it excludes the near optimal. MCA, however, measures 
the "degree" o f efficiency. Indeed, the reader w ill recall that the corresponding term 
in DEA is also used as a metric not just as a classification, follow ing the concept of 
economics and engineering.
The model structure permits a variety o f preference elicitation mechanics I believe 
that most expressions can be translated into LP constraints. W ithin this flexible 
framework, it is open to a decision maker and analyst to use any method they feel 
meaningfully exploits reliable expressions o f preference. It is not incumbent on 
users to  adopt the minimalist standards which the w riter favours. Nevertheless, the 
methodology w ill accommodate preference expressions which, I w ill later argue, 
are the most basic that can be envisaged. These are the various forms o f 
Fundamentally Decomposed Preference, later characterised as [1,1] choices.
Finally, in the contexts o f lability o f value, the related suggestion that people are 
inherently unable to discriminate or transmit ve iy large amounts o f value 
information, and the proposition that Qualified Self-Awareness allows relationships 
to  be adequately linearised, the Dora-D technique would appear to be a more than 
adequate means o f addressing the classes o f problems targeted.
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Chapter 6 Extending Dora-D to portfolios by Frontier Probing
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter the ideas introduced in Chapter 5 are extended to embrace 
portfolios. I start by reprising the characteristics o f problems that can be handled 
using Basic Dora-D, noting that it requires explicit designation o f options, but that 
there are significant examples o f problems for which the combinatorial magnitudes 
or the definition o f decisions in terms o f continuous variables rule this out. Many o f 
these can be described as portfolio problems.
1 defer consideration o f Project Portfolios but consider the handling o f portfolios 
having the same structure as financial portfolios and use the term Financial Portfolios 
to  embrace the generic class as well as the specific problem. I then structure this 
problem.
Such problems are characterised by combinatorially large or infinite numbers o f 
options and lesser, but still unmanageably large, numbers o f efficient options.
Frontier probing, a concept used in the attack o f the core problem, is then 
conceptualised. This involves the insertion o f explicit Frontier Constraints only when 
a violation o f im plicit constraints is observed. The method is illustrated w ith a 
worked example.
The chapter concludes by a discussion o f the need for concavity in the function 
defining the interdependent portfolio attributes.
6.2 The difficulty w ith portfolios
The capability o f Basic Dora-D is characterised by three special features which are 
common to many problems, but by no means all; even those w ith a hard bounded 
structure. These are:
- A ll options are discrete, ie capable o f being explicitly 
and individually defined in terms o f their attributes.
- They are mutually exclusive.
- There is a finite and manageable number o f such 
options.
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We should note at this point that mere scale is unlikely to constitute a practical 
impediment. Several thousand options could be accommodated; more than 
sufficient to  deal w ith any realistically imaginable problem o f this structure.
The difficulty is that many problems may be:
- Im plicitly defined by decision variables which are 
continuous, or
- Consist o f assemblages o f interdependent sub-options or 
components that can be adopted together w ithin 
defined constraints, or
- Both
Examples o f such decision problems m ight include the location, number and 
capacity o f a network o f warehouses, the determination o f an international 
marketing and production strategy involving both a determination o f countries to  be 
entered and products to be launched, the determination o f a research programme 
consisting o f selections from a number o f candidate projects, the selection o f 
investments or the principal design parameters o f a new aircraft. These are 
examples o f characteristics 1 le , f, g  o f the taxonomy in Chapter 2. The first three o f 
these may be considered selections o f interdependent sub-options and the last tw o 
the selection o f continuously defined parameters defining an option, in the 
penultimate example by specifying the proportion o f components. A ll bar the last o f 
these can properly be called the selection o f a Portfolio (and the last could be 
described as the selection o f a portfolio o f features).
Not all problems o f this type are beyond representation in the basic method. For 
example if  there were 10 projects available to form part o f a research programme, 
the one thousand combinations (precisely, 210 -1 ) could be quite readily handled. 
However, the one m illion combinations o f 20 projects and the one billion o f 30, 
present different propositions.
I w ill return to the issue o f Research Portfolios o f this type in Chapter 7 but w ill 
address first, and principally, portfolios which consist o f continuous blends o f 
portfolio components. These are not necessarily confined to  decisions o f the 
financial type but I w ill call them Financial Portfolios as this is an important example 
and, indeed, central to the Core Problem described in this thesis. Here the potential
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components could be a population o f many hundreds and, moreover, they can be 
chosen in any proportions, not just on a binary in-out basis.
6.3 Structure of the Financial Portfolio problem
We can characterise the extended problem in the follow ing way. There exists a set 
o f n discrete potential portfolio components (index h) which are analogous to 
options in the Basic Method. Associated w ith these components are k additive 
attributes o f magnitude aih (reflective o f the factors which the decision maker
considers to  be relevant to the efficacy o f the prospective decision), where i is a 
specific attribute and h is a specific potential component. A  specific portfolio p is
constituted by a proportion f ph, ( L f *  = 1) o f each potential component h .
all h
We can define the additive attributes for any portfolio p by:
(6.1)A pi ^  fphaih> {!>•••>£}
h=1 ton
We may in principle also associate any portfolio w ith m overall value related 
p ro p e rtie s ^  , where / is a specific property, which are not additive. Each such
property may be a function over all h o f the functions g, which are themselves 
functions o f the proportions o f the components w ithin the portfolio and may be (but 
need not be) parameterised by e additional attributes bhd associated w ith the 
potential components.
Bp — ^ liSnifpi* b] ]5...j b]d,...b]e),...,glk (fPh,bM,...,bhd,...bhe),..., gln(J'pnibli:li...tbmn... )) (6.2)
In this generic form there is opportunity for some flexib ility and complexity. 
However, in the writer's opinion, great complexity is generally unlikely to be called 
for. Indeed, on parsimony grounds, excessively parameterised models are likely to 
be suspect, e may be 1 or 2 (or there may be no bhd at all). Examples are:
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Bpl ~ ^jfph^h ( 6 . 3 . 1 )
all/i
V all h
( 6 . 3 . 2 )
Bpl = 5 jfph 1°§2 fph ( 6 . 3 . 3 )
all h
Bpl = l/m a ( 6 . 3 . 4 )
(6.3)
Similarly to  the basic model, under linear assumptions V/> , o f every option P  can be 
represented by a weighted value function:
all i all /
The effective computational task is the same as in the basic method; that is, for any 
portfolio, find that value function which shows the portfolio in the best possible 
light, subject to  no feasible portfolio having an assigned value o f greater than one, 
when evaluated using the same value function. Thus, paralleling the formulation in 
Basic Dora-D, we specify the task o f finding the MCA and CAF o f a portfolio (where 
no prior value indicating preference constraints have been specified), as:
For each potential portfolio P eP








w ^ a , V * e { l , . (6.5.4)
w ',P > a ’, V/e {l,...,e} (6.5.5)
Where ocn a \  = a positive (archimedien) number or zero
P= the set o f all feasible portfolios
Other variables and parameters are as defined above
(6.5)
The reader should note that, whilst in Basic Dora-D I favour the exclusion o f the 
option under consideration from the Comparison Set o f other options, it is generally 
here neither practicable nor meaningful to  exclude the portfolio under 
consideration, P , from P. Constraints o f the form o f (6.5.2) are referred to as 
Frontier Constraints in distinction to  Preference Constraints which may also be 
included.
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Alternatively, or additionally, one may specify constraints on the Bpl or directly 
constrain the f ph, eg:
CL S  £ / , *  l0 &  fph ~  C U OT ( 6 ‘6 1 )
all A
/ p a = { 0 , [ c p c 2 ] }  ( 6 . 6 . 2 )
(6.6)
On the face o f it such structure suggests formidable solution problems. There is an 
infinite number o f portfolios for which to find MCAs and there is an infinite number 
o f alternative portfolio value constraints involved in determ ining for each o f those 
solutions. It is the non-linearity o f the Bpl in the f ph that presents the problem.
Were there to  be no such feature, this problem would condense to the Basic 
Method.
6.4 Introducing Frontier Probing
The characteristic o f having an infinite number o f candidate portfolios to evaluate is 
an issue that we cannot directly resolve, but here I outline an approach to lim iting 
the otherwise infinite number o f constraints on the valuation o f the alternative 
portfolios in the Comparison Set, against which a test portfolio can be assessed.
It is a trivial observation that constraint equations only need to be included in 
formulations if they would otherwise be violated. Indeed, the simplex method o f 
linear programming may be considered as simply a device for determining which 
constraints are relevant for the particular objective function being optimised. It 
ceases to  be trivial if  one can identify, from w ithin the infinite or unmanageable 
number o f potential constraints, a manageable number which are relevant or, as I 
w ill now refer to them, critical.
Such critical constraints m ight be found by seeking violations and introducing 
constraints where observed. Nothing is gained if  one must explicitly search an 
infinite number o f constraints. However, it may be possible on any occasion simply 
to identify the "most critical" constraint, to  make it explicit, and repeat this process 
until the measured violation o f successive "most critical" constraints are no longer 
material. The iterative procedure below solves this problem for the structure 
outlined above.
197
In this procedure an almost completely relaxed set o f Frontier Constraints is in itia lly 
specified: metaphorically, the frontier is poorly guarded and allows illic it violation. 
Non-linear programming is used to find "most critical" constraints by seeking 
constraints from the infinite set which gives rise to  maximum violation: that is, 
probed to find how far into illic it territory it is possible to go. An explicit constraint 
is then interposed: in the metaphor, blocking-off that portion o f the frontier that was 
successfully penetrated. This process can be formalised as follows:
Partition the infinite set of Frontier Constraints specifying the maximum values that 
each feasible portfolio may have, £, into two disjoint sub-sets; 
specified constraints, a finite set, £s ,and 
unspecified constraints, an infinite set, <ZV, 
ie
<CS \j £ v =<£,<£* n £ „  = 0  (6.7.1)
Specify a test portfolio P.
Find the constraint CM within set Cv that has maximum violation 
given that vp is maximised for the test portfolio s.t. £s, 
ie
CM = (C, € : (V(C,) = max (V (C ,)): (max vp : <ZS)} (6.7.2)
VCjG &u
Where V(CX)=  the violation o f constraint Cx, 
measured in the same units as the constraint definition.
CM is the constraint corresponding to the portfolio with maximum value using the 
weights corresponding to max vp, andV(CA/) = max (V(C,)). Its violation is the
assessed value of that portfolio, using the same weights, less 1.
Form new sets of specified constraints £ 's, and unspecified constraints, 
by adding Cm to and removing Cm from £Vi ie
C '^ ^ u C .a n d  C W tfN C ., (6.7.3)
(6.7)
The sets € 's , £ v are then renamed respectively <ZS and Cv and the procedure is 
repeated. The specification o f a new Cs alters the V(CM ) in an unsteady way, when 
vp is maximised w ithin the new <£s . The procedure is therefore repeated until 
V(CM) < d over several iterations, where 8 is a number such that violations are 
considered immaterial. It is then, subject to observations later in this section, 
stopped. A t this point there are no relevant constraints w ithin .
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It should be noted that this involves only a one way movement from a partition o f 
unspecified constraints into a set o f specified ones. Not all the constraints m igrating 
in this way typically remain critical and accordingly there may be immaterial 
constraints w ithin the explicit set <ZS. However, the essential issue is that the total 
number o f explicit frontier constraints w ithin this set w ill be finite (and should be 
moderate). Although there remains an infinite number w ithin , the point when
none are material is reached quite quickly. A t least one constraint (just one is 
sufficient if  it involves non-zero finite weight o f all potential components) is required 
to  be in the initial set (ts to prevent an unbounded solution to  the first calculation o f
m a x :CS.
The heuristic o f selecting the constraint w ith maximum violation on each occasion 
may be supposed to  generate a reasonably effectual set o f material constraints 
(though it is unlikely that it would constitute the most parsimonious set). It may be 
imagined as generating a minimalist set o f tangent hyperplanes which collectively 
form an envelope o f the continuous hyper-surface defining efficient portfolios in the 
relevant region.
This recursive approach particularly lends itself to the portfolio structure already 
outlined and it is illustrated in Figure 6-1. The weights o f attributes that are 
nominally optimal, w ithin the specified frontier constraints, for a particular test 
portfolio can be used to evaluate any other portfolio. Any portfolio found which has 
a valuation o f above 1, using this set o f weights, indicates a violation w ith respect 
to  the unspecified constraints. Mathematical Programming is used straightforwardly 
to  find the highest valued portfolio and hence, most violating portfolio, from 
amongst these. This portfolio corresponds to the most critical constraint CM. That 
opportunity for violation is "blocked" by adding CM explicitly to  the specified set C5
and the frontier is "probed" again for other violations. The process continues until a 
"stop" judgement is made.
The procedure enables the identification o f the MCA, CAF and the Efficient Peer 
portfolio o f any portfolio Pt it is desired to test. Although described w ithout the 
incorporation o f Preference or Value Constraints, such constraints and any other 
solution restricting constraints may be simultaneously incorporated. The ability to 
accommodate Preference Constraints w ithin the formulation is suggested as an 
attractive feature o f this approach.
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Figure 6-1
Is valuation of 






Specify any required 
Preference Constraints
Specify the portfolio, Pt for 
which the MCA is sought




constraint/s to ensure 
bounded solutions
Form Frontier Constraint 
limiting CAF so new 
valuation of Pc<1
Use LP to find CAF for Pt 
within specified frontier 
and other constraints
NLP to find the portfolio P, 
with highest valuation 
using CAF found.
The routine illustrated in Figure 6-1 finds the MCA and CAF o f any pre-specified 
initial portfolio under quite complex conditions. By finding the portfolio w ith the
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maximum MCA w ith the CAF that shows the Test Portfolio in its Best Possible Light, 
w ithin the identified critical constraints, one identifies a very close approximation to 
its efficient peer. It should be emphasised that, although in most structures it w ill 
not be the exact peer, it w ill always be fully efficient, and this quality does not 
depend on the cut-off point; every critical constraint found corresponds to  an 
efficient portfolio. Efficient portfolios which are near peers are incidentally identified 
in the analysis
Some words o f caution are appropriate. As constraints are introduced and the CAF 
is refined, the calculated valuation o f the test portfolio reduces on each cycle and 
relatively quickly tends to an asymptotic value. However, although the extent o f 
violation 8 found for the most critical constraint on each cycle generally moves 
towards zero, it does not follow  that in a subsequent cycle, using a different 
evaluation function, 8 cannot be higher. The user can legitim ately strike a level o f 
immateriality for 8 but must confirm that it is not exceeded for a number o f cycles 
(I suggest a number o f cycles comparable to the number o f included attributes). 
Users can also pragmatically observe how the characteristics o f the critical 
constraints change. These tend to  be closely related as the degree o f violation 
diminishes.
The reader should also note that whilst one part o f each cycle is an LP (ie finding the 
CAF o f the Test Portfolio), the generation o f a critical portfolio w ill generally be a 
non-linear problem. Towards the end o f an analysis series, the user should take care 
to  ensure the software package used does not lock into a sub-optimal solution, by 
testing different NLP initial solutions. (Using What's Best, I found that if initial 
component proportions were somewhat greater than zero, and less than one, for all 
components, problems were rare).
It w ill be noted that in this formulation we do no more, at this stage, than find the 
efficient peer and the value o f one explicitly stated initial portfolio. Despite the 
number o f efficient portfolios being orders less than the number o f possible 
portfolios, they remain infinite in number. However, in a decision situation the gain 
made is important and the function developed can form the basis o f value elicitation 
to  generate an optimum, by introducing elicited preference constraints to 
progressively reduce CAF latitude, just as in the basic method.
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Moreover, in many circumstances an initial solution may be a subjective but sound 
nominee for selection as a practical portfolio and indicative o f a decision maker's 
values. Accordingly, its efficient peer m ight be an appropriate superior (in the 
absence o f further information, optimal) selection. Frontier probing then effectively 
answers a decision problem stylised as, "What is the optimal portfolio corresponding 
to the CAF o f this suggested portfolio, subject to  conformity w ith the follow ing 
additional statements o f preference, ..?". If the preferences fully constrain the CAF, 
the initial nomination does not matter. If there is latitude, the initial solution w ill fix 
a specific CAF and optimum solution, whether a decision maker chooses to express 
no, few or many additional preference constraints.
The use o f "pet" solutions as indicators o f value w ill be further discussed in 
Chapter 7.
6.5 An example
To illustrate the method, consider a situation where we seek to  form portfolios from 
50 potential components. Associated w ith each o f these are differing magnitudes o f 
5 additive attributes, A t , ..,A 5. These combine pro rata w ith the fraction o f each 
component in the portfolio as discussed, to generate the magnitude o f that attribute 
w ithin the portfolio. Attribute magnitudes for each component are as in Table 6.1.
There is one further interdependent attribute, Bp, associated w ith a portfolio
constituted by these, which is a non-linear function o f the proportions o f each 




Table 6.1 Attribute Ma gnitudes for Potential Com ponents
Attribute Final
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 Mix
Com ponent 1 0.421617 2.577996 h 0.210297 1.886558 f  1 .627006 2 .2 %
2 0.85464 1.894861 0.153858 -0 .41216 0.261113 1.4%
3 3.028773 -0 .62774 1.211986 1.58146 1.41028 2 .8 %
4 -0.63005 -0 .18004 0.88057 -0 .15807 1.706016 1 .1 %
5 1.431091 2.446579 -0 .27216 2.176979 1.332321 2 .6 %
6 2.074086 1.639907 2.557087 0.178121 -0 .20893 " T o %
7 0.64463 -0 .92866 0.636306 -0 .28376 -1 .35312 1.4%
8 -0 .73108 1.475175 1.016333 1.476973 -0 .71422 1.7%
9 2.678422 0.446666 0.218628 0.397301 -0 .07177 2.3%
1 0 1.079067 -0.19506 0.421254 1.785324 1.037148 2.3%
1 1 1.950481 0.732582 1.338229 70747254 2.537337 1.7%
1 2 0.694562 0.692959 0.338443 -1 .37695 -0 .19584 1 .0 %
13 2.505223 1.501461 0.962622 1.094424 1.472007 2.5%
14 1.076458 1.85493 0.87425 1.607017 2.274748 2.3%
15 1.904263 0.15342 0.26923 0.430366 -0 .27613 2 .1 %
16 1.734171 3.087236 1.648946 2.128951 2.515755 2.7%
17 1.484014 1.149537 1.362469 r  0 7 6 0 0 7 5 0.256682 2 .1 %
18 -0 .09558 1.384864 1.945445 -0 .19757 1 0 .6 5 4 9 5 9 1 .2 %
19 4.401074 0.716213 0.727346 1.815355 -0 .37855 3.3%
2 0 1.232452 1.992793 0.76283 0.983743 0.23082 2 .1 %
2 1 1.352845 2.235073 1.96903 -2 .14729 1.552977 0.9%
2 2 0.12337 0.874019 h -6740968 1.842647 1.874049 2 .1 %
23 0.046149 0.090196 1 428993 0.514869 1.235833 1 .6 %
24 1.193947 2.291828 -1 .14614 h l 5 2 0  964 2.459553 2.3%
25 0.361031 0.102281 2.004507 0.061588 -1 .8107 1.5%
26 -0 .52377 -0 .90184 2.316901 -0 .03278 1.543198 1 .2 %
27 1.656519 1.133541 0.900118 1.331432 0.392523 2.3%
28 h  -0 .41924 2.074902 0.284926 0.678089 ^ 1 5 9 5 9 5 2 1.5%
29 0.711911 0.957339 2 .470967 2 .706289 1.160065 2 .6 %
30 0.352565 0.867616 0.810494 2.366384 1.061582 2.4%
31 2.224805 2.029007 0.147053 -0 .25618 -0 .0734 1.9%
32 3.232609 r 0 J 8 0 1 0 5 1.939599 h f .  148453 1.876405 2.7%
33 -0 .06123 1.13717 0.503823 -0 .07232 1.478602 1.3%
34 1.328928 0.576033 0.054676 0.168756 1.69341 1 .8 %
35 0.415365 1.051544 -0 .29837 0 .555523 1.438069 1.7%
36 0.386348 1.448873 h 0.860977 0.582385 -0 .45513 1.7%
37 1.080141 0.129197 0.328509 3.783854 ^~0l659016 3.1%
38 0.255068 0.612664 1.622913 1.279648 1.201358 1.9%
39 0.926688 3.608504 1.231666 2.216106 O 8 9 5 0 4 3 2.5%
40 -0 .15733 17451582 -0 .27148 0.597861 0.338063 1.5%
41 1.267021 1.353172 .818345 -0 .33365 1.959049 1 .6 %
42 1.781267 r  1.676099 3.601664 0.864761 -0.05241 2 .2 %
43 2.338321 1.408118 0.630579 h )  .359811 1.161383 2 .2 %
44 1.722503 -1 .03117 0.228658 1.234731 0 .868464 2.3%
45 0.460344 -0 .09516 -0 .2822 0.33186 1.366229 1 .6 %
46 1.802199 -0.190547 -0.9271 F -0 .26498 0.968363 1 .8 %
47 1.14768 2.85797 2.887111 1.974551 0.841484 2.4%
48 1 9 8 8 6 7 1 1.409864 0.554847 0.776106 2.591152 2 .2 %
49 2.022536 1.276706 0.816877] 1.386428 0 .914178 2.5%
50 0.279482 0.055751 1.207294 1.104264 -0 .63149 1.9%
We must choose a portfo lio for examination (the Test Portfolio) which I define to  
consist o f 0.1 o f each o f the components 1 to  10. This portfo lio  has the fo llow ing 
portfo lio  level attributes:
Bt =0.684 A r ={1.085,0.855,0.703,0.863,0.503} (6 .9 )
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The initial task is to find the efficient peer o f this portfolio.
We must also define an arbitrary portfolio to serve as the basis for a bounding 
constraint. This may be any real portfolio having positive magnitudes in all 
attributes, it is not ultimately material. In this case I use the portfolio constituted by 
all portfolio components in equal proportions. Its attributes are:
B t =0.859 A f= {l. 141,1.062,0.891,0.836,0.864} (6.10)
the corresponding constraint is:
0.859w'T + 1.141wir + 1.062w2r + 0.891w3r +0.836w4T +0.864w5T <1 
Where w \  = weight o f Portfolio attribute B T
wiT = weight o f attribute A iT derived pro-rata from the
attributes o f the components forming portfolio T
(6.11)
Using LP, we now seek the weights which maximise the value o f the test portfolio, 
ie:
Maximise vr = 0.684w,7.+1.085w17. +0.855w2r +0.703wiT + 0.863w47. +0.503wST 
Subject to 0.859w,r +1.141w17. +1.062w2r +0.891w3r +0.836w4r +0.864w57. <1 
w/r £0 V /e{l,...,5}
(6.12)
The weights which maximise this are:
w'T =0 w r = {0,0,0,1.197,0}





Maximise vp =  § £ p + 0 .AP1 + 0 .AP2 + 0 .Ap3 +1.197 A p4 + 0 .A PS (6.14.2)




X / * =1 (6.14.5)
all h
f ph> 0 V A e{l,...,50} (6.14.6)
(6.14)
In principle, this is an NLP though the solution is trivial in this instance. The 
maximum value portfolio consists entirely o f the component having the highest
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value o f attribute 4; that is potential component 37. The value o f this portfolio 
calculated using the weights given is 4.528, which is a massive violation o f the 
virtual constraint requiring that no weights shall cause any portfolio to  have a value 
o f greater than 1. The attribute values o f a portfolio consisting entirely o f potential 
component 37 are:
Bt = 0 A ,={1.080,0.129,0.329,3.784,0.659} (6.15)
This implies the need for an explicit frontier constraint:
O.vv'y. +1.080wir + 0.129w2r + 0.329w3r +3.784w4r +0.659wsr < 1 (6.16)
to  ensure that no weights can be suggested which w ill let that portfolio violate 
again. We then again find the weights which maximise the value o f the test 
portfolio, using the now extended LP:
Maximise vT = 0.684w'7.+1.085w]7. + 0.855w2r + 0.703w37. + 0.863w4r +0.503w57. (6.17.1)
Subject to 0 .859w '7. + 1. 141w ]7. +1.062w2T + 0.89lw37. + 0.836w4r + 0.864wsr < 1 (6.17.2) 
0.w'r +1.080wir + 0.129w2T + 0.329w3T + 3.784w4r + 0.659w5T <1 (6.17.3)
wiT >0  ie  {1,...,5} (6.17.4)
(6.17)
The procedure is continued, recalculating the weights o f the test portfolio and 
progressively adding in critical frontier constraints, as tabulated in Table 6.2. The 
weights o f the eventual CAF o f the test portfolio and the attribute values 
corresponding to its efficient peer correspond to the last row o f Table 6.2. The m ix 
o f components o f the portfolio is shown as "Final Mix" in Table 6.1. The MCA o f the 
test portfolio is 0.802, which we can interpret as its value relative to its efficient 
peer.
We can go further by adding value constraints reflecting decision maker's 
preferences as in the Basic Method and (or to add further Preference Constraints, as 
it is also legitimate to include such constraints ab initio). Nevertheless, if the Test 
Portfolio were to be a well-considered reflection o f his or her values, it m ight be 
acceptable to halt the procedure here. In this instance the test portfolio was an 
arbitrary selection w ith no preference-indicating value constraints. A  high weight 
was assigned to variable B , and this m ight be expected given the character o f the 
initial portfolio.
Table 6.2 Illustrating Frontier Probing


































Cycle 1 0 0 0 0 1.1967 0 1.0326 0 1.0801 0.1292 0.3285 3.7839 0.6590 4.5281 3.5281
Cycle 2 0 0.8637 0 0 0.0177 0 0.9525 0 4.4011 0.7162 0.7273 1.8154 -0.3785 3.8332 2.8332
Cycle 3 0.7667 0.1340 0 0 0.2260 0 0.8647 0.6262 2.2738 0.9918 1.0198 2.3131 0.8886 1.3076 0.3076
Cycle 4 0.9153 0.1877 0 0 0 0 0.8296 0.7057 2.7724 0.8445 0.9847 0.9770 0.7928 1.1663 0.1663
Cycle 5 0.9682 0.0830 0 0 0.0886 0 0.8286 0.7938 1.9257 1.1860 0.9609 1.6251 1.0151 1.0724 0.0724
Cycle 6 1.0786 0 0 0 0.0885 0 0.8139 0.8291 1.2135 1.2158 0.8906 1.5402 0.9725 1.0306 0.0306
Cycle 7 1.0626 0.0480 0 0 0.0394 0 0.8127 0.8410 1.5700 1.1324 0.8971 1.2090 0.9308 1.0166 0.0166
Cycle 8 1.1125 0.0057 0 0 0.0459 0 0.8065 0.8509 1.2152 1.1212 0.8845 1.1896 0.9129 1.0081 0.0081
Cycle 9 1.1076 0.0300 0 0 0.0178 0 0.8052 0.8542 1.3718 1.0920 0.8955 0.9893 0.8941 1.0048 0.0048
Cycle 10 1.0800 0.0280 0 0 0.0395 0 0.8030 0.8490 1.3868 1.1219 0.8914 1.1704 0.9179 1.0020 0.0020
Cycle 11 1.1099 0.0159 0 0 0.0305 0 0.8025 0.8543 1.2774 1.1038 0.8898 1.0745 0.9009 1.0012 0.0012
Cycle 12 1.0931 0.0274 0 0 0.0291 0 0.8022 0.8524 1.3664 1.1064 0.8930 1.0783 0.9052 1.0005 0.0005
Cycle 13 1.1083 0.0221 0 0 0.0232 0 0.8019 0.8548 1.3176 1.0965 0.8926 1.0241 0.8962 1.0003 0.0003
Cycle 14 1.1016 0.0218 0 0 0.0290 0 0.8019 0.8536 1.3212 1.1041 0.8915 1.0699 0.9022 1.0001 0.0001
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6.6 Concavity o f value o f compound attributes
It is desirable that functions defining values o f portfolio attributes incorporating non­
linear terms in the proportions o f potential components, should be concave, ie:
B(x3 ) > p £ (x t ) + (1 -  p).B(x2)
Given that x3 = p.xt +  (1 -  p).x2, Vxj, x2 e  {all feasible x}; V/? e  (0,1) (6.18)
I conjecture that, under these conditions, either the procedure converges to a 
unique efficient peer portfolio or, if  there is more than one efficient portfolio 
described by a vector, then the convex combination o f any o f them w ill also be 
efficient.
In financial portfolios diversity is desirable; im plying that the value o f a portfolio o f 
any convex combination o f other portfolios w ill be more valuable than, or equal to, 
the weighted average (found using the same proportions) o f the values o f the 
constituent portfolios. Functions meeting the above condition are necessary to  
reflect this.
Practical portfolios problems calling for a convex value form would be very unusual 
but could be meaningful in some situations (a premium could be placed on 
polarisation, for instance). In these circumstances the technique could still be used. 
However, local optima would exist. The technique should find at least one locally 
efficient peer portfolios o f a test portfolio and (if a series o f alternative starting 
solutions were experimented w ith) possibly all the material ones. To reduce the 
possibility o f perverse solutions in such cases, it may be desirable to impose an 
additional constraint that the magnitude o f any attribute shall not be less than the 
magnitude o f that attribute in the test portfolio.
Frontier probing is the basis o f the solution method used to address the Core 
Problem, which is described in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 7 Other methodological extensions
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter I examine further features which can be used in association w ith 
Dora-D to  ameliorate the problems o f the impaired decision maker, to cope w ith 
more complex valuation or to simplify analysis. I also discuss further extensions to 
cover additional problem structures.
I start by highlighting some alternative methods for handling complex decision 
problems. I highlight two, Decomposition and Holistic Integration, for further 
exploration w ithin the chapter. Looking first at decomposition, I observe that first 
one can break down decision selections into pairwise choices. Such binary choices 
themselves represent situations o f varying complication and, as a prelude to  their 
simplification, suggest a method o f classifying them using an "[m,n] Complexity 
Indicator".
I move on to discuss how choices can be partitioned into groups o f sub-choices o f 
reduced complexity depending on mutual preferential independence. I mention the 
lim its to  simplification in partitioning problems and discuss the circumstances in 
which expressions o f preference, relating to  sub-choices, can im ply a preference for 
one o f the tw o options in an undecomposed pair.
Using the defined Complexity Indicator I refer to  the most structurally simple case, 
classified [1,1], which I refer to as a Fundamentally Decomposed Choice. This figures 
in the discussion in a variety o f ways later in the chapter.
I then discuss Franklin's Prudential Algebra as an example o f decomposition. Based 
on his straightforward conceptualisation, I develop a modernised algorithm. Here I 
attem pt to partition the problem o f selection between a binaiy pair o f options into 
series o f partitions, lim ited to three o f the most structurally simple choice types, for 
which I suggest we are most likely to be able to express reliable preference. I do 
this in a way which is designed to maximise the prospects o f drawing a firm 
conclusion regarding the whole, from views expressed about the partitions. This I 
call Franklin Decomposition.
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I also mention an approach which I call Larichev Decomposition, which only makes 
use o f [1,1] choices. These are developed for a particular decision but are derived 
from the decomposition o f sets o f efficient options rather than individual options. I 
go on to describe a methodology for doing this in a way which allows the 
preferences expressed to  be converted into value constraints in Dora-D. I also 
describe how the information declared in expressing preferences between Franklin 
Decompositions, can be used to  reduce value Latitude and other potential optima, 
not just the options subject to  the decomposition.
I then take the alternative perspective and show how holistic selections m ight be 
improved in a Dora-D framework.
I also talk about how the scale o f a selection problem could possibly be reduced by 
only considering options which an impaired decision maker m ight reliably 
discriminate in value terms. The Representative Efficient Set is introduced. This 
concept reflects the ideas o f Principal Components Analysis (though depending on 
completely different mechanisms).
1 then conceptually consider how four further types o f problem structure can be 
accommodated w ithin the approach being presented. First is the problem o f m ulti­
attribute decisions under constraints, the type o f problem that m ight otherwise be 
formulated in MOLP terms. An illustrative example is presented.
The second is a consideration o f how configural valuation can be brought w ithin the 
ambit o f the Dora-D structure. Particular consideration is given to  the treatment o f 
the M odified Minkowski M etric introduced in Chapter 2.
I then consider the analysis o f project portfolio selection problems, using as an 
example a problem already examined by other authors. I finally examine the 
translation o f "voting" data o f the type generated in group decision making or social 
choice into Dora-D structure. Cook and Kress (1990) has tackled this problem w ith a 
data envelopment approach. The formulation suggested is little  different, but is 
somewhat closer to the principles o f Chapter 5, and, offers alternative insights.
209
7.2 Outlooks o f Decision Analysis revisited
W ithin the model o f an impaired decision maker w ith vague objectives, one can 





One can perceive the essence o f decomposition as the partition o f the problem into 
more cognitively manageable bites in a conscious, or largely conscious, process. 
Simplification, inevitably forced upon us by our bounded rationality, is a recasting 
process, which may be imagined as a form o f decomposition in which some 
elements are discarded as unimportant. Holistic integration is a leap through 
unconscious or partly unconscious process directly to an inspired or intuitive 
solution, but subject to  conscious validation.
We can also reasonably assume that in an unaided process each o f these may be 
undertaken adequately or poorly, but, in any case, imperfectly. Moreover, formal 
decision analysis assistance w ill not enable perfection but may improve all. In the 
first case a decision maker can be aided to cognitively reliable or more complete 
decompositions; forms o f expression could be invoked that can be more reliably 
analysed, partitions that can be more safely discarded m ight be identified, or 
deductions may be made more reliably from the decomposed problem than a 
decision maker would him or herself make. In the last we m ight, perhaps, induce 
understanding o f a decision maker's values that led to a specific proposition and 
deduce a better suggestion using the information.
We can also envisage a composite analysis which starts w ith an assumption o f 
holistic integration and improves the decision making process by decomposition.
I discuss how ideas relating to decomposition and holistic integration can be 
effected or exploited w ithin the Dora-D framework.
7.3 Gassifying com plexity o f paired choices
Decomposition as a decision analysis process is a mechanism for breaking down a 
complicated m ultiple factor preference problem, about which the decision maker
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may only be able to  make unreliable direct statements, into a series o f other 
preferences which are easier, w ithin his or her cognitive capabilities, to discriminate 
meaningfully. Then to reconstitute such preferences into a preference inference 
relating to the whole.
A  selection between pairs o f options is a straightforward first stage decomposition 
to which all disjoint m ultiple option situations can be reduced. Much o f the 
succeeding discussion is therefore centred on paired comparisons. In this discussion 
I make a distinction between an option and a choice. An Option, which is a special 
case o f a Choice, constitutes a package o f attributes corresponding to  an actual 
decision possibility. A  Choice constitutes a package o f attributes about which a 
decision maker m ight be asked to venture a value opinion, but is not necessarily an 
available implementable alternative. A  decision maker cannot express a preference 
for a set o f attributes but can express a preference between binary sets o f attributes, 
that is to  say between choices.
Let us assume that the magnitude o f all the relevant attributes o f tw o choices differ 
in magnitude, but are defined on a scales oriented so that increases in the 
magnitude o f any attribute, are always perceived as being more valuable. Let us 
further define the magnitude o f the attribute for any choice as consisting o f a base 
level bt , being the lower o f the magnitudes for attribute i (of n ) for each choice,
and an additional amount et .
We can then express the pairs o f choices, for which preferences are to be 
expressed, in terms o f attribute sets expressed thus:
{£>j +  eilt...,bn +£nl},{Z>1 + c12 t - t ty  +  ei2,...,bn + e n2}
en,ei2 e {M :en > 0,ei2 > 0,enei2 = 0}
(7.1)
The last expression ensures that only one o f en9ei2 can be non-zero
We are dealing here w ith  only tw o choices. It is therefore legitimate to express the 
preference as a deviation from a base case {f\9...9br ..,bn} , that is:
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{bx + ell,...9bi + en,.. ,,bn + enl} >- {bx + e^29...9bt + ei2,...9bn + en2} 
{eU9...9en,...9enl} y {el2,...,ei2,...,en2}
(7.2)
We can therefore equivalently describe the pairs o f choices as:
Where eM= magnitude o f an attribute excess h favouring option ke {1,2} 
= 0 i f  A: is not favoured
(7.3)
Each o f these sets thus consists o f positive numbers and zeros. If there is a zero in 
the first set there w ill be a positive number in the corresponding position o f the 
second set and vice versa.
We can, perhaps, use this as a basis for classifying the complexity o f choices. W ithin 
the class o f binary expression can we identify "easier" choice problems? One way o f 
ranking choice complexity m ight be through the number o f attributes that differ in 
the binary choices presented. We may thus say that a problem varying in 10 
attributes is more complex than one varying in 3. However, mere variety is not a 
sufficient indicator. A problem varying in ten dimensions becomes trivial if all the 
attributes favour a particular choice, as that choice dominates the other.
I suggest alternatively that we can characterise a choice by a pair o f numbers 
indicating the number o f positive eL associated w ith the first option and the number
associated w ith the second, eg [5,3]. The sum o f the elements o f this pair w ill be 
the number o f attributes o f unequal magnitude (n). I w ill call this pair the 
"Complexity Indicator". We can claim that a choice structure is more complex than 
another, if one or both elements o f its Complexity Indicator is greater, and neither is 
less, than the elements o f the Complexity Indicator o f the other. Thus a [6,4] or [6,3] 
choice is inherently more complex than a [5,3] (or [3 ,5 ]) choice. The latter w ill also 
be referred to as a "Reduced Order Choices". Reduced Order refers to the 
characteristic where a binaiy [m ,n ] choice has m < m'and n < «'when compared w ith 
a binary choice classified [m,n]. Higher order is the converse.
We can perhaps also argue, though from less solid ground, that a more polarised 
choice involving the same total o f varying attributes is simpler than a less polarised
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one. Certainly, [4,0] is simpler than [2,2]; the first o f these describes a dominating 
situation and involves no choice at all. However [3,1] m ight also be cognitively 
easier to deal w ith than [2,2]. Attention can be concentrated on a single attribute 
and a decision maker may feel better able to judge whether ail other factors 
collectively outweigh the attribute or are outweighed by it, than to make the two 
versus tw o choice. If the reader is prepared to bear w ith  this assumption, the three 
most simple non-trivial structures are [1,1], [1,2] and [1,3], The first tw o should be 
unexceptionable; [1,2] is o f higher order than [1,1] but o f lower order than all other 
possibilities. It is simply assumption that [1,3] is cognitively simpler than [2,2], its 
only contender. I w ill shortly discuss a decomposition methodology, dependent on 
cognitive competence in the discernment o f preference o f choices characterised by 
up to [1,3] complexity.
I w ill also give special consideration to the [1,1] case.
7.4 Decomposing options and choices Into paired sub-choices 
But the above formulation is not only a basis for classification.
Let us make the additional assumption that attributes are mutually preferentially 
independent (and, if  not, recast them so that they are). We can partition elements 
from the above single pair o f sets into two pairs o f sets. We can do this by moving 
positive elements from a choice in the original pair (and the corresponding zero 
element o f the other choice o f the pair) into one or other o f the tw o new pairs, 
placing zero's in both elements o f the other pair, in such a manner that the sum o f 
the corresponding elements o f the tw o partitioned sets, is equal to  the magnitude 
o f the elements o f the original sets. (We could o f course meet the second condition 
by transferring part o f an element to one and the residual to  the other but there is 
no merit in anything but an exclusive transfer to one or the other). There may be 
many allowable partitions.






{0,3,0,0,0} and 10,0,0,0,4} 
or more generally:
{ ^ 1 1 V  • J e i 1J • • • J e n 1 } » { ^ 1 2  V  • » 2  > • * •» e n 2 }
(7.4)
into
Uin** ••>^ ill}>{ 1^21’" •»^ /21 * * * * » A i 21 }
and
{^ 112 * *” > 1^2 » * ‘» hl2 }»{^122 »' //22, .. .,  ln22 }
Where — + 1/J2 » hjl»lyl ~  0
(7.5)
It should be noted that where there is a zero in any position in the original set there 
w ill be a zero in that position in both partitions. Moreover, as a positive element in 
one o f the original sets must be matched by a zero element in the corresponding 
position in the other, it follows that if a set representing a partitioned choice has a 
positive element, the corresponding element in all the other partitioned sets must 
be zero, as is the case in the example.
We can then say that:
If Ej =  {ell9...i eil i . . . i enl} E 2 = {ej2 ,...,ei2,...,£„2}
1^1 ^ 11 2  »***» ^ifl2 »* ‘ ’  ^nl2 }■ ^ 2  —  ( A  22 * * * * ’  ^/22 »* * * » 2 2  }"
Then E / and E /' are partitions o f E t 
and E2' and E2" are partitions o f E 2
Let us now consider how preference implications can be drawn from such a 
structure.
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Let {^,0,0,0} >- {0,0,a3,0} (7.7.1)
and {0 ,a2,0 ,0} >3 {0 ,0 ,0 ,a4} (7.7.2)
{^,0 ,0 ,0} >- {0 ,0 ,a3,0} <-> {ax,a2,0 ,0} >- {0 ,a2,a3,0}
from preferential independence (7.7.3)
{0 ,(Z2,0 ,0} >z {0 ,0 ,0 ,a4} -> {0 ,a2,a3,0} £  {0 ,0 ,a3,a4}
from preferential independence (7.7.4)
{ax, a2,0,0} >- (0,0, a3, a4} from (7.7.3) and (7.7.4) (7.7.5)
It therefore follows
{ax, 0 ,0 ,0} >- {0 ,0 , a3,0} n  (0 , a2,0 ,0} >3 (0 ,0 ,0 , a4}
-> {^,^2,0 ,0 } >- {0 ,0 ,a3,a4} (7.7.6)
Moreover any or several a can stand proxy for multiple elements
eg {a190 ,0 ,0} => {bx,b2,0,0 ,0 ,0} and {0 ,a2,0 ,0} => {0 ,0 ,63,64,0 ,0}
permitting generalisation to
(E j' >- E2  ^r» (E ," £  E2") —» E, >- E2 (7.7.7)
(7.7)
That is to  say that if  the partitioned choice E !' is preferred to E21 and partitioned 
E j" is preferred to E2", then unpartioned Et is preferred to E2. In the example 
{5,0,2,0,0}H0,0,0,4,0} and {0,3,0,0,0}H0,0,0,0,4}
->{5,3,2,0,0}H0,0,0,4,4}
We can also similarly decompose value into independent additive components:
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Assume there exist commodities v that can be held in association with 
attributes and over which a decision maker can express combined preference. 
We can define such a compound of attributes and commodities by a set
Assume there is a v, = v(ai ) such that the decision maker is indifferent 
between an attribute and corresponding commodity, ie: 
{0 ,...,a,,...,0 ;0 ,...,0 ,...,0 }~ {0 ,...,0 ,...,0 ;0 ,...,v(a<),...,0 }
Vie { 1 ( 7 . 8 . 1 )  
Subject to mutual preferential independence we can say
an ...,a„;0,...,0,...,0} ~ {0,...,0,...,0;v(a1),...,v(a/),...,v(a„)} (7.8.2)
If the commodities are identical and conserved a decision maker will be 
both indifferent to their position in the set and indifferent between a sum 
of quantities in one position and the same quantum distributed, ie: 
{0 ,...,0 ,...,0 ;0 ,...,vt ,...,...,v/ ,...0) ~ (0 ,...,0 ,...,0 ;vt ,v/,...,0 ,...,0 ,...,0 )
~ {0.... 0,...,0;v* + v,,0,...,0,...,0,...,0) (7.8.3)
Thus
-{ 0 .... 0,...,0; £  v(a,),0..... 0,...,0} (7.8.4)
(=1 to n
We can call the commodity "value" and rewrite the above
v f a , a , ) - *  X  VW  (7.8.5)
i=\ to n
(7.8)
The value o f attribute differences for pairs o f choices may be similarly 
disaggregated.
From this we can conclude that:
(a) We can simplify problems for which our cognitive facility may not allow  a 
direct comparison o f preference, by decomposing them into partitions o f 
reduced order, from which a decision maker may make more reliable 
binary preference statements.
(b) We can relate binary preference to additive value allowing the attachment 
o f some sort o f scale o f value, notwithstanding the previous objections to 
the objectivity o f a unique scale o f cardinal value, w ithout an external 
standard.
The dependence o f the existence o f an additive value function on mutual 
preferential independence is a well known finding o f decision analysis theory (eg 
see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, p104), though they note its origin to  Debreu (1959, 
p56). Keeney and Raiffa's style o f illustration is somewhat different from the above.
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However, the idea o f relationship to a "conservable commodity ", perhaps allows 
judgement o f the validity o f such concepts in the light o f cognitive assumptions to 
be made more readily.
Two observations are necessary concerning the usefulness o f partitioning. Firstly, 
direct decompositions are only useful if partitions can be matched up in a manner 
such that all partitions for one option are not inferior to  one or more partitions o f the 
other option, w ith all partitions in the second group being accounted for. Secondly, 
there are many ways o f partitioning choices and, w ith care, partitions may be 
constructed in way which enables this to be established.
7.4.1 The idea of "Fundamentally Decomposed Preference", and Larichev 
Decomposition
The reader w ill note that any binary choice other than [m, 1 ] can be partitioned into 
choices o f reduced order and reduced complexity. A ll choices can thus be reduced 
ultimately into a series o f [m ,l] partitions: m may often be a small integer.
However, the [1,1] characterisation is o f particular interest. Although he did not 
classify choices in this way, Larichev (1992) considers this is a preference form that 
allows psychologically reliable elicitation. Larichev and Moshkovich (1995) depend 
only on this in their ZAPROS technique, designed to  evaluate options involving a 
lim ited number o f discrete levels o f several attributes, (though a rather different 
form o f problem from that considered in this thesis).
We can in any case also view  this choice structure from an alternative perspective. It 
is the basic, the most elementary, building block. If a decision maker cannot make 
meaningful distinctions between choices o f this form, there would seem to  be little  
else structurally that can be done. If a decision maker is not capable o f 
distinguishing binary choices o f this simplicity, we cannot find more revealing 
expressions which could be distinguished. Moreover, if  a decision maker is not able 
to express a preference between such a pair o f choices, we can more safely 
interpret this as implying choices o f approximately equal value. We are less able to 
assert this w ith more complex choices where a failure to  discriminate can be due to 
incapacity to express preference, rather than it not existing. Because o f its bald 
simplicity we may suppose that bias in the expression o f preference is also less
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likely, (though the framing o f the expression o f choices could still influence 
preference elicitation, even in these straightforward cases).
It is for this reason that I refer to the reduction o f choices to such [1,1] expressions 
o f preference as "Fundamentally Decomposed Choice" and the concept as 
"Fundamentally Decomposed Preference". I refer to any reduction o f an overall 
decision problem into fundamentally decomposed binary choices for selection by a 
decision maker as Larichev Decomposition. In naming it so I should stress that this 
naming (as well as Franklin Decomposition, referred to shortly) is intended to 
indicate and honour the provenance o f the ideas and distinguish alternative 
methods. Neither person, as far as I am aware, explicitly described their approaches 
as decomposition nor sought to classify decision decomposition.
I would comment parenthetically that in the decision structures that Larichev and 
Moshkovich (op cit) consider, they are not generally able to generate full linear 
orders when depending only on such relationships (and the assumption o f mutual 
preferential independence). However, allied w ith a structured relationship between 
attribute magnitude and value, we can be more ambitious. If we can find the right
[1,1] comparisons, it may be possible to define the relevant value structure fully and 
economically. I w ill describe shortly how this m ight be used in the Dora-D 
framework.
7.4.2 Prudential Algebra and Franklin Decomposition
Benjamin Franklin in w riting to Joseph Priestly in 1772 described what he called 
"moral or prudential algebra". I reproduce the full text o f his letter in Appendix A. 
The letter is often quoted but perhaps not taken sufficiently seriously.
What Franklin effectively recommended was a procedure for a decomposing a 
single complex binary decision option into a series o f simpler preference choices. 
Thus an [m,n] decision option could perhaps be decomposed to  an [r,s] choice and 
an [m-r, n-s] choice. These can in principle be further decomposed. If each o f these 
decompositions favours a particular option, (or a binary choice is viewed by the 
decision maker as presenting a choice o f equal value), then that decision option 
should be preferred in its entirety. Franklin balances o ff pros and cons seeking to 
find attributes o f one option which balance the "respective weights" o f attributes o f 
the other. He then "strikes out" those attributes and addresses his attention to  those
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that remain until he can see "where the balance lies". It is instructive that he was 
prepared to  balance three attributes against two, im plying that he felt no cognitive 
inhibition in the evaluation o f type [3,2] choices. However he possessed one o f the 
most brilliant minds o f his generation and I suggest that such choices should, if 
possible, be avoided. Franklin in seeking and elim inating balancing or, more strictly, 
approximately balancing, combinations, proposes a powerful pragmatic tool which 
should still be taken seriously as a decision aid today. It, nevertheless I suggest, can 
be improved by lim iting complexity o f choices posed to [1,1], [2,1] and [3,1] types 
and not seeking "balance" but merely that the decomposed choices on one side are 
all preferred to  their alternatives.
I refer to the process o f decomposing individual decisions in this style as Franklin 
decomposition (distinguishing it from Larichev decomposition which uses only 
Fundamentally Decomposed Preference but also focuses on the entirety o f the 
decision situation, not necessarily individual decision pairs). We can turn the Franklin 
concept into a modernised decomposition algorithm, depending only on strong 
preference relationships and the three choice types above. The algorithm which can 
be looked upon as a special knapsack algorithm, is outlined below:
1. Consider tw o options. Hypothesise that one option A is preferred to the 
other B. Rank those attribute differences that favour A in order o f 
perceived value, call these A t, ...,A m. Rank those attribute differences that
favour B in order o f perceived value, call these B i Bn. Produce a single
overall ranking, placing attributes o f B below those attributes o f A  which 
are valued more highly and above those which are less highly valued.
2. Consider whether the highest ranked (or the remaining highest ranked)
Ax is preferred to the highest ranked (or remaining highest ranked) Bx . If 
Ax is preferred to Bx , go to 3, if Bx is preferred to Ax, go to 5. If there are 
no remaining Bi but A| remain, the hypothesis is validated. If there are 
remaining Bi but no Aj the hypothesis fails and the alternative that option 
B is preferred to A  should be examined. Stop
3. Seek amongst the list o f B| (excluding Bx) the highest ranked By such that 
Ax >^ BX+By. If none, then note the relationship Ax >-Bx, exclude that Ax
and Bx from further consideration, and repeat procedure from 1. If found, 
continue.
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4. Seek from amongst the list o f Bi (excluding Bx and By) the highest ranked 
Bz such that Ax >~BX+By+Bz. If none, then note the relationship Ax ^Bx+By,
exclude Ax , Bx , and By from further consideration. If found, note the 
relationship Ax >~BX+By+Bz, exclude Ax, Bx, By, Bzfrom further
consideration. Repeat procedure from 1.
5. Find amongst the list o f Ai (excluding Ax) the lowest ranked Aw such that 
Ax+Aw >-Bx . If found, then note the relationship Ax+Aw >~BX, exclude that
Ax , Aw and Bx from further consideration, and repeat procedure from 1. If 
none continue.
6. Find amongst the list o f Ai (excluding Ax) the highest ranked Ay. Seek 
also the lowest ranked Aw such that Ax+Ay+Aw >^ BX . If found, then note
the relationship Ax+Ay+Aw >-Bx, exclude that Ax, Ay, Aw and Bx from
further consideration, and repeat procedure from 1. If not found, there are 
no three A| remaining which outweigh Bx; the hypothesis fails. The 
alternative that option B is preferred to A  should be examined. Stop
The algorithm in effect packs up to three "packages" Bj into one "knapsack" A |, or 
shares the load o f one "package" Bj amongst three "knapsacks" A |, w ith minimum 
wasted "capacity". A  worked example is shown in Figure 7.1.
It should be noted that both the hypotheses can fail. This may arise from one o f 
three reasons:
(a) The overall preference cannot be determined w ithin preference 
declarations o f complexity [1,3] or less.
(b) The preferences are too close for the decision maker reliably to 
discriminate the strong preferences required.
(c) The heuristic is non-optimal. An alternative decomposition m ight 
discriminate.
W ith a little  added complexity, the method could be extended to cope w ith (b). I 
w ill leave aside the resolution o f other issues in this thesis. The purpose o f the 
suggestion o f this technique was not primarily to  proposes another "stand-alone"
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decision aid for but to serve as an introduction to how such decomposition can be 
used in the Dora-D framework.
Figure 7.1 An exam ple o f Franklin Decomposition
In a decision situation involving 2 options A and B, the attribute differences are ordered by the decision maker's value of the 
attribute difference. Those favouring option A are designated A1 through A 11, and those favouring B, B1-B10.
The decision maker orders his perceived valuation of the attribute differences as follows: 
A1>-B1>-A2>-B2>-B3:^A3>-B4>-A4>-A5>-B5>-A6>-B6>-B7>-B8>-B9>-A7>-A8 >-A9>-A10>-B10>-A11









Leaving A5>-A6>~B6>-B7^B9>~A7>-A8 ^A 9xA 10
Then A5vB 6
Leaving A6>-B7>-B9>-A7>-A8 >-A9^A10
Then A 6^B 7 Leaving B9>-A7>-A8 ^A 9^A 10
7.4.3 Using Larichev Fundamentally Decomposed Preference in Dora-D
I have thus far in the description o f the Basic Technique and its portfolio extension, 
presented the technique as a flexible mechanism that can exploit a variety o f means 
by which preference information m ight be revealed. Nevertheless I have also 
argued that processing techniques should not just be processors o f data taken w illy-
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nilly at face value, but they should be compatible w ith reliable forms o f elicitation 
from decision makers whose impaired cognitive systems were designed for another 
time. Some mechanics would seem to be reliable. Ordering o f swing weights 
should be reliable because placements effectively involve only [1,1] type 
preferences. Capping should also be reliable. Though it does not express a binary 
preference, it depends on starkly revealed implications.
The expressed preference between real options, if  reliable, can also be used w ith 
the technique, but the decision maker must be able to express meaningful choice. 
Unprocessed options w ill generally be [m,n] choices, which are difficult in principle, 
particularly when n and m exceed 3. They may not always be d ifficu lt in practice. 
Options w ithin the efficient set w ill often have radical characteristics which can be 
used as basis o f discrimination. Some options w ithin a provisional ranking may also 
be obviously "out o f order". However, many choices w ill present difficulty. It is also 
possible for mutually incompatible preferences amongst options to be expressed 
leading to LP infeasibility.
In this section I propose a method o f generating artificial choices, bundles o f 
attributes, for consideration by the decision maker, which:
(a) Depend only on [1,1] Fundamentally Decomposed Choices.
(b) Is intended to maximise discriminatory power.
(c) Largely avoids the risk o f infeasibility.
The principle is to generate a set o f efficient choices each differing from a base case 
only in the magnitude o f one attribute. These choices are then ordered. The [1,1] 
quality is met by definition. Good discriminatory power is met by the insisting that, 
as far as possible, choices should be as close to efficiency as possible and the 
incidental implication that if [1,1] comparisons are made then the vectors being 
compared are mutually orthogonal w ith respect to  the attributes. It is thought that 
this implies that the vectors can be ranked w ithout risk o f infeasibility, provided no 
other preference constraints have already been incorporated. However, as I shall 
discuss, a full set o f such choices cannot always be ranked w ithout risk o f 
infeasibility, if other preference constraints have already been specified. (To 
demonstrate, one should note that a set o f such constraints does not always reduce
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value latitude. It follows that a repetition o f an already incorporated set o f [1,1] 
choices m ight in this situation be proposed for decision maker ranking. A  different 
ranking o f any tw o o f them would then generate an infeasible constraint). 
Nevertheless, in general, except where a previous set failed to  secure reduction, 
some feasible comparisons should be found. In tests, problems did not arise until 
substantial reduction (ie where the number o f options were comparable or smaller 
than the number o f attributes) had already been achieved.
The procedure is described below in terms o f its use w ith the basic Dora-D model 
but can also be used w ith the portfolio extension.
7.4.4 Finding [1,1] Choices
The reader w ill recall the basic formulation outlined in Chapter 5, which is 
reproduced here. The definitions remain as outlined there.
For each decision option S e  {1,.
Maximise v5 = ^ w iS.aiS
all i
Subject to
VIss> e *  S )
all /
wiS> a t V/
(7.9)
Initial Option Reduction is first carried out, as previously described. This identifies 
initial efficient options, and their CAFs. The attributes o f each efficient option can 
also be found. We now identify the best artificial choice which is dominated by all o f 
them. We w ill call this the Best Dominated Choice (BDC). This is the vector o f nadir 
attribute magnitudes; that is a choice corresponding to a package o f attribute 
magnitudes, such that the magnitude o f any attribute is equal to the lowest o f the 
magnitudes for that attribute amongst all the efficient options, ie:
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Let {P'u
= sets o f attribute magnitudes for efficient option J  
o f N  efficient options 
Then {ani...9au,...,a0f} V /g (1,...,£}
= sets o f magnitudes o f attribute i over the 
N  efficient options 
Then i f  at =m in{an,...,aLJ,...,aiN} V /e {1 ,...,£}
{al,...,ai,...,ak} = A
= set o f attributes defining the Best Dominated Choice (BDC).
(7.10)
We now seek an artificial choice w ith the highest possible value A, for each 
attribute in turn whilst all other attributes remain at the values o f the Best 
Dominated Choice, and a set o f weights Wa corresponding to it, such that the
valuation o f the artificial choice is equal to  one and the value o f none o f the real 
options exceeds one. Moreover, each such choice should be w ithin the hull defiiied 
by the efficient real options.
This could be set up as an MP, however, the solution is trivial. The weight assigned 
to all attributes that remain at the magnitudes o f the Best Dominated Choice, will be 
zero (ie Wa =0 V i *  I ) .  This most favours the artificial choice, as all real efficient 
options have higher attribute magnitudes for those attributes and we seek to  give 
them the lowest possible value relative to the artificial choice. The level o f Aj is the 
maximum level o f that attribute that occurs in any o f the real efficient options; its 
weight, Wu , is its reciprocal. This w ill give the artificial choice an MCA o f 1. If 
option J  has the maximum au amongst all options for that attribute, then AI = 2U. 
We can then define our synthesised artificial choices for comparison as:
(7.11)
Each artificial choice, A 7 , is efficient (generally, weakly efficient) w ithin the terms o f 
the definitions used in this thesis; it is usually dominated by the real option J  frcm
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which it derives. We w ill refer to  each o f these as the Maximal Efficient Choice 
(MEC) for attribute I .
It w ill be seen that every MEC has a [t ,1] relationship w ith respect to every other 
MEC, and accordingly we can conceptualise the set o f MECs as a fundamental 
decomposition o f the efficient options from which they are derived. Under linear 
assumptions a valuation o f these choices, together w ith the BDC, would enable 
valuation o f any option in the feasible space by a positive weighted sum.
We would then ask the decision maker to rank their comparative preference for 
each o f these choices. Desirably we obtain a complete linear order, though we can 
ignore relationships where the decision maker is unable to express a preference and 
exclude such from the LP. The preferences should be those o f strict preference. In 
the early stages o f analysis, the representation o f these as weak value inequalities is 
unlikely to  be material. However, as the latitude o f criterion space reduces the 
remaining real efficient options to  a few, ties may arise which can be avoided by 
strong constraints. Therefore one can either express preferences as:
im e k)
-> v(A((1) -  A) > v(A((!) -  A) >... > v(A(tt) -  A)
~ * (^ 1/1) _ a(l\))'W(il) — (^/2) ~ atl2 )) 'W{<2) — — — ( A i t )  ~ a( t t ) ) 'W(tt)
Where v(A(/m)) = value of the set o f attributes A(/1), (7.12)
for maximal efficient choice im, which 
corresponds to attribute im, being the 
mth ranked amongst the MEC.
w(im) = Weight of attribute im.
or, in strong form:
v( A(/d ) ^  v(A(/2) ) + a  ^  ^  v( A (ik) ) +  ( k - 1 )a im e  {1
-> v(A(/1) -  A) > v (A (;2) -  A) + a  >... > v(A(rt) -  A) + (k -  l )a
->  (4 /d  “ 4/1) ) -% )  -  (4 /2) + a  *  -  ^  (4 ») ” 4»))-w(*) + ( ^ - 1) «
(7.13)
Where a= in  principle, a non-archimedean infinitesimal but, practically,
a finite number which is inconsequential relative to the 
ability o f a decision maker to discriminate.
Other definitions as above.
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These manipulations are o f greater sim plicity than they m ight appear. They reduce 
to finding the difference between the highest and the lowest magnitude o f each 
attribute amongst the efficient set o f options (w ithin such value constraint that may 
already have been specified); placing these in order o f preference; and then using 
them as coefficients for the weights in LP constraints. These vectors correspond to 
the ranges or swings o f Edwards and Barron (1994) though they are used w ithin 
Dora-D in a different way.
The set o f constraints can be conceptualised as a hyperplane "hinged" along each 
axis in such a manner that it cannot go past the horizontal for any hinge. We m ight 
expect that this degree o f restriction would substantially reduce CAF latitude and 
the number o f options that remain potentially optimum. Also, were the choices to 
be real options, we could guarantee elim inating at least as many options as 
preferences expressed. These provide grounds for supposing that the approach 
could constitute a potent elimination mechanism. However, it provides no 
guarantees. Applied successively, it seems to reduce options to a single option or 
to  a group on an edge or facet o f the criterion space (these are options for which a 
CAF exists such that they simultaneously have an MCA o f one). However, I am not 
clear whether this is mathematically inevitable.
7.4.5 An example of option reduction using Larichev Decomposition in Basic Dora-D 
As an example I use the 5x50 Set 1 data (see Chapter 9), w ithout prior constraints. I 
assume that a decision maker acts consistently, on the basis o f an underlying 
preference o f equal weights o f the five attributes. This information is "hidden" from 
the analyst except to the extent that it is revealed by the expression o f preference. 
The Basic Method is used to identify the efficient options amongst the 50 
candidates. There are 10 o f these. From amongst these 10 only, the highest and 
lowest magnitudes for each attribute are identified. The difference between these is 




1 4.40 0.71 3.69
2 3.61 0.13 3.48
3 3.60 0.33 3.27
4 3.78 -0.47 4.26
5 2.59 -0.38 2.97
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The decision maker places these attribute differences in the order that he or she 
would prefer, all other differences being zero. O f these differences the decision 
maker considers that a difference o f 4.26 for attribute 4, is preferred to  3.69 for 
attribute 1, is preferred to  3.48 for 2, is preferred to 3.27 for 3, is preferred to 2.97 
for 5. Thus:
4.26w4 >3.69wj >3.48w2 >3.27w3 >2.97w5 
(or if  the other preference had been expressed 
2.97w5 >4.26w4 >3.69^ >3.48w2 >3.27w3 )
(7.14)
(As an alternative example, should the decision maker have valued a difference o f 
2.97 for attribute 5 more highly than the others he or she would have amended the 
order by saying 2.97 for attribute 5 is more valuable than 4.26).
Having inserted these constraints we now move to subsequent option reduction 
and run the routine again. We now obtain 4 efficient options which are consistent 
w ith the constraints imposed. The highest and lowest incidence o f the various 




1 4.40 1.08 3.32
2 3.09 0.13 2.96
3 2.89 0.33 2.56
4 3.78 1.82 1.97
5 2.52 -0.38 2.89
These attribute differences are ordered in like manner and further corresponding and 
complementary constraints are developed. The LPs are run again, this time reducing 
the number o f feasible efficient options to one.
In 10 trials w ith similarly structured data (50 options and 5 attributes), the number 
o f initia lly efficient options (ranging from 10 to 18) was reduced to 1 in 2 
subsequent rounds in tw o cases, and in one case to  1 in 3 subsequent rounds.
There were 4 instances in which a reduction to 2 efficient options was achieved in 2 
subsequent rounds, w ith a further round demonstrating that no further reduction 
could be achieved w ith the method. In one case reduction to 4  options was 
achieved in 2 subsequent rounds, w ith reduction to  2 and confirmation that no
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further reduction was possible taking 3 further rounds. In tw o cases reduction to less 
than 5 options was not achieved using the pure method. Supplementing it by 
Franklin decomposition (see below), ultimately reduced the efficient options to  2, in 
one instance, and 3, in the other. In all instances the true optimum was confirmed 
to be w ithin the efficient set and in practice was the option w ith the highest 
measured MCA(AP). The latter seems fortuitous and did not happen w ith tests on 
the same data using pure [1,1] Franklin decomposition.
The excess o f the MCA above 1 is a measure o f the opportunity cost o f not 
choosing an option when it is the "true" optimum. In most instances, the level o f 
this parameter for the second highest MCA in an irreducible efficient set, was well 
w ithin the practical ability o f a decision maker reliably and stably to  discriminate 
value (eg under 1.05). However, if  this is not achieved supplementary tie-breaking 
methodology is required (though it should be recognised that final short-lists from 
this method tend to  be on facets which cannot be broken using the methods 
described for the basic method). Often a failure to break ties was associated w ith  
the true values o f the options being close but, again, not always. A  high MCA for 
the second option is a good indicator o f the need for the further investigation using 
a supplementary approach.
The reader should note that in using Larichev Decomposition w ith portfolios, a BDC 
cannot readily be found. A  Reference Portfolio is used in its place. The methodology 
is otherwise identical. This is discussed further when considering the application in 
Chapter 8.
7.4.6 Using Franklin Fundamentally Decomposed Preference in Dora-D
When options are reduced to two, the formulation described above reduces to  a 
Franklin decomposition, but one using only [1,1] choices. It is open to  the analyst 
and decision maker to confine their attentions ab initio to  the comparison o f pairs o f 
real options in this way. Prioritising o f the attribute differences obtained, serves to 
constrain valuation latitude w ithin the Dora-D framework and to  reduce potentially 
optimum options, in a methodology which in other respects replicates the above 
procedure. The preferences adduced for the pairs o f options decomposed in this 
way, m ight be used directly to eliminate one or other o f the decomposed pair but,
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within Dora-D, the same information is also used to examine, and possibly 
eliminate, other hitherto efficient options.
It is, in principle, possible for a decision maker to compare any options in this way, 
provided one option does not dominate the other. However, the comparison o f 
efficient pairs does directly highlight and seek an opinion on those features of 
potentially optimal solutions that make them potentially optimal. One m ight expect 
more potent discrimination. Accordingly this is recommended.
There is also merit in avoiding arbitrary selection between efficient options. I 
commend the comparison o f the tw o options, not already compared, having the 
highest MCAs under AP conditions. This may be loosely rationalised in terms o f 
putting the tw o presently leading contenders for the optimum, head-to-head in a 
closer comparison. Alternatively, it may be thought o f as comparing the two 
contenders whose valuations are least constrained by the other and, ergo, constitute 
the "most contrasted" pairing.
It Is also possible to switch between Larichev and Franklin. As pure-Larichev can 
stick w ithout complete reduction, this is also desirable.
Generally speaking, the Pure Franklin approach obtained similar ultimate reductions 
to those obtained using the Larichev approach followed by switching to Franklin, 
when a group o f three or more efficient options could not otherwise be reduced. In 
one case out o f ten tested, the pure Franklin approach reduced to  a single option 
w hilst Larichev decomposition followed by Franklin did not reduce below 2. In tw o 
other cases Larichev Decomposition reduced the problem to a single option whilst 
Franklin reduced to two, in one case, and three, in the other, The number o f cycles 
required in the pure Franklin approach tended to be greater and only in one case 
was this not true. Larichev was invariably either more effective than, or equal to, 
Franklin in elim inating options in the early cycles. Moreover, whilst it is possible to 
switch to Franklin when Larichev "sticks", one essentially has to start again in order 
to  use Larichev after Franklin.
I recommend Larichev followed, if  necessary, by Franklin. Although, the ideas 
underlying Pure Franklin decomposition m ight be more accessible to some decision 
makers.
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7.5 Limits to Reduction and infeasibility of Larichev and Franklin Decomposition 
in Dora-D
The application o f neither o f the above methods guarantees reduction to a single 
option, though in tests no case was observed o f failing to  reduce to no more than 3 
options. In ail cases examined all reduced options constituted an efficient facet. It is 
open to  an analyst and decision maker to adopt another methodology to reduce 
further, eg Capping or Preference Bracketing. It may also be possible to derive more 
refined Fundamental decompositions.
It is a feature o f both o f the decomposition mechanics expounded here, that a 
binary preference can be expressed between any two choices generated by the 
methods, w ithout risk o f LP infeasibility, notwithstanding that other preferences 
m ight already be incorporated. This is because each choice generated, whilst not 
generally a practical option, is a technically feasible solution w ithin the decision 
space. It w ill always be possible to express a feasible preference between points in 
the hitherto feasible criterion space and that feasible preference gives rise to a 
feasible constraint.
I also conjecture that, when no prior preferences have been specified, all the vectors 
representing the MECs can be ranked in any order, w ithout disrupting feasibility.
This is because, being mutually orthogonal vectors, each preference w ill involve a 
"new" attribute and can be introduced w ithout contradicting a previously specified 
preference. It is not guaranteed that feasibility w ill be maintained when all choices 
w ithin the set o f Maximal Efficient Choices are ranked if  there are existing 
constraints; I have already mentioned a counter-example. I also conjecture that if 
not all the options are on a facet, and the ranking o f all the choices in a set o f virtual 
options is infeasible, reduction may nevertheless be achieved by introducing the 
leading elements o f the ranking only. Accordingly, one may be able to  reduce 
options to a facet under all circumstances, using the mechanic.
This issue is pragmatically examined in the test simulations.
7.6 Choice as a value statement. Using Dora-D to assist Holistic Decision Making.
Let us assume that a rationally-intended decision maker, apparently arbitrarily, 
asserts that a particular solution to  a multiple-objective decision problem is the best
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solution. What should an adviser do? Clearly, he or she has a duty to ensure that 
the decision maker has considered as many identifiable options as m ight realistically 
embrace the optimum and that the decision maker is properly informed about facts 
relating to the options that he or she considers are relevant. The adviser may also 
explicitly present alternatives, which she considers strong contenders, for special 
consideration by the decision maker and offer models and heuristics which provide 
insight. Quietly she m ight also satisfy herself that the judgements o f the decision 
maker properly represent all the decision stakeholders. However, if  the assertion o f 
the decision maker is sustained notwithstanding, then the only basis for 
disagreement is if a demonstrably superior decision exists on the basis o f the option 
facts assumed by the decision maker. The decision maker is sovereign on issues o f 
value whether she chooses to declare them or not; and moreover may be 
cognitively competent to make such a holistic judgement.
A  demonstrably superior decision then exists only if  another option dominates it; 
that is, in the terms used in this thesis, provided there is an option which is superior 
to  the nomination, whatever valuation weights are placed on the attributes 
determ ining decision goodness. If the nominated decision is non-dominated, the 
decision is not just a candidate for the best solution it is, in the circumstances I 
describe, at the moment o f the assertion, the true optimum. The solution cannot be 
gainsaid except on the basis o f an alternative judgement o f value.
But if  it is dominated how should one proceed. We can assert tw o essential 
condition for the true optimum:
(a) It should be efficient
(b) It should dominate the nominated solution
However, there w ill be several or many o f such solutions in many practical 
situations. How m ight one proceed?
We can argue that in nominating the particular solution suggested, the decision 
maker was effectively asserting an im plicit valuation function which valued the 
nominated option more than any other. He or she was wrong. However, the 
nomination was intended to be efficient. I suggest we can, in the face o f this failure, 
alternatively assert that he or she was nevertheless governed by a value function
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which would give the nominated option the highest possible value, consistent w ith 
an arbitrary upper lim it on the value o f its dominant peer/s.
Under the circumstances discussed for the basic and portfolio models, there 
generally w ill be one function which maximises the valuation o f such a nominated 
solution, subject to  none having a value o f more than one; that is the CAF. The 
MCA o f the nominated solution w ill be less than one. Nevertheless, the nomination 
maps to a fully determined value statement from which the relative value o f any 
other option can be determined. This value function minimises the degree o f 
violation o f the nominated option's optim ality. In the absence o f further information 
it would be reasonable to assume that this function represents the value function o f 
the decision maker.
In the case o f portfolio decisions defined by continuous decision variables, the 
mapping would be to a single optimum. In the discrete case, there w ill still usually 
be one such function, but it may not correspond to a single efficient peer. 
Notwithstanding, it can be looked upon as being in the "centre" o f the criterion 
space which define better options.
In these circumstances, the decision maker w ill be unable to  maintain that the 
nominated decision is superior to  the option or options found in this way (provided 
all relevant facts have been revealed). However, the decision maker may 
legitimately adopt any other value function w ithin the feasible space. If none is 
forthcoming, I suggest there is no demonstrably better criterion that can be 
adopted, whilst sustaining the assumption that only efficient solutions dominating 
the original nomination should be entertained.
We can thus provide a simple policy prescription to  a decision maker who has a 
"pet" project. If it is efficient choose it. If it is not, then choose its efficient peer (or 
one o f them in the discrete case). As usual she may modify the value function at 
w ill.
This provides an operationalisation o f the ideas mooted by Kasenen, Wallenius and 
Wallenius (2000), though their structure attempted to  characterise "pet" projects by 
the scope o f attributes necessary to achieve non-domination.
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It can also be argued that an intuitive decision maker may unconsciously bring into 
play attributes which are not overtly considered relevant, using weights which 
overwhelm overt considerations. I believe that "qualified self-awareness" should 
enable such attributes to be elicited and the above mechanic may be useful for this 
purpose. It can facilitate the identification o f additional attributes, bringing them 
w ithin the ambit o f conscious analytic examination. There is little  externally 
observable distinction between the inspiration o f a superior talent and the mere self- 
indulgent adoption o f an undefended whim by someone w ith power. The difference 
lies in the ability to bring it w ithin the realm o f conscious appreciation. A  rationally 
intentioned decision maker should seek this.
7.7 Exploiting infadlily. Generating Representative Efficient Options and 
Formalised Indifference 
It is a predicate o f this work that our impaired decision maker w ill discern variations 
o f a single objective w ith precision, but he or she is unlikely, w ithin his or her innate 
cognitive capabilities, to discriminate value variations in a m ultiple objective 
situation w ith anything like the same finesse. The weights she attaches in the 
formation o f an overall objective w ill neither be precisely specifiable nor temporally 
stable. Thus though a decision maker can and should be sensitive to  a very small 
variation from an efficiency ideal, he or she is unlikely to be able to discriminate 
much larger differences in value between efficient solutions, even though they 
m ight be very different in value when measured w ith respect to  a single objective. 
He or she may have no better than 3-bit ability to discriminate. Indeed, I have gone 
further, believing that objectives themselves are usually vague.
The selection o f decisions in m ultiple attribute situation seems often to  be based on 
an assumption that the decision maker has, contrary to this view, an inbuilt fine 
scale o f m ultiple attribute value which generates complexity o f procedure and a 
concomitant need to explore a large number o f options. However, whilst this w ill 
not lead to  "wrong" answers much o f the effort may be gratuitous. Although the 
number o f efficient options may be very many, a selection between a few may be 
quite sufficient.
Could we generate an economic short-list o f non-spurious choices? One m ight (and 
this researcher would) believe that a decision maker could not meaningfully
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discriminate between tw o efficient options if  the second has measured value o f at 
least 90% (let us use this arbitrary, possibly conservative, figure) o f the first, when 
measured using the CAF o f the first, and the first has measured value o f 90% o f the 
second, when measured using the CAF o f the second. If one then identifies a set o f 
efficient options such that any feasible CAF w ill result in at least one o f that set o f 
options having an MCA o f more than 90%, then no option outw ith the set could be 
designated (within the discriminatory competence o f the decision maker) as 
superior to all w ithin it. If we then concentrate on discrimination between them, we 
should have done all that is w ithin the decision maker's competence to do. I shall 
call such identified options a Representative Efficient Set.
An alternative way o f expressing the above condition is that no efficient option 
excluded from the Representative Efficient Set shall have an MCA o f greater than 
1/0.9 (for sim plicity say 1.1) when measured using a CAF such that the valuation o f 
all options within the identified set, measured using the same valuation function, 
shall be no greater than one. If such exists, it must be added to  the identified set.
In the basic discrete case this means that all efficient options having an MCA o f 
greater than 1.1, when measured under normal Andersen-Petersen conditions (with 
all other options in the Comparison Set), are required to  be in the representative 
set. However, as then demanding restrictions are placed on the CAF, further options 
must be added to the Representative Efficient Set until the condition outlined in the 
previous paragraph ceases to  be violated. In the Basic structure where all options 
are explicit, this approach is demonstrably practicable.
Using the 5x50 Set 1 data, there were 10 efficient options. O f these 8 had MCAs o f 
above 1.1 and 5 above 1.2. Neither o f the tw o options initia lly excluded under the 
1.1 cut-off were reintroduced into the Representative Set under the refined 
procedure. One o f the five excluded at a 1.2 cut-off was reintroduced. In this 
example, and another using Set 2, only a small gain was made.
In the financial portfolio extension the situation is more complex. One m ight 
conjecture that whilst there may be an infinite number o f efficient solutions, the 
number o f Representative Efficient Options w ill be finite. Nevertheless, two issues 
arise. This researcher has not found a systematic search procedure for generating a 
Representative Efficient Set in the portfolio case, which one can be sure does not
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miss relevant options. (NLP can be used but find local optima). Moreover w hilst the 
number may be finite it may still be too large to usefully use.
The w riter performed tw o searches using portfolio data based on the Core problem. 
In the first o f these he sought specific options maximising MCA, introducing 
constraints when any was found w ith an initial MCA in excess o f 1.1. The measured 
MCAs for the last 10 solutions found, out o f 100 identified options before ceasing 
the search, were:
1.225 1.311 1.570 1.509 1.362 1.312 1.282 1.165 1.322 1.367
This high and fluctuating level suggested that there could be hundreds more 
options before all those in excess o f 1.1 were eliminated.
In the second test, the threshold was set at the high figure o f 2.0. Twenty-five 
options were still found, although there could well have been further elusive 
options. The reader should note that the thresholds were applied to the MCA when 
newly identified. (The introduction o f subsequent constraints tends to suppress the 
MCAs already identified). Both these tests suggests that for the portfolio problem 
the development o f a comprehensive representative set may not be helpful or 
practicable. Nevertheless used in conjunction w ith some o f the other tools 
proposed, the concept may still be useful. It would enable one to set a standard o f 
Formal Indifference. This may be considered as a standard o f closeness such that, 
even though a decision maker may declare preference, we must doubt the decision 
makers competence to resolve a distinction; whether he or she really cares about 
the policy difference it makes, or would express the same preference tomorrow. O f 
course an analyst may accept such a preference where declared, provided it is 
consistent w ith previous declarations, but he or she should not do so expecting it to 
add very much.
7.8 [1,1] Decomposition in association w ith Dora-D to  analyse decision problems
structured as M ultip le Objective Linear Programming problems
One may use the concept o f virtual frontier constraints, in association w ith a Dora-D 
formulation, to solve MOLP formulations o f decision problems. In such formulations 
one may consider each alternative Objective as an Attribute. The task is then to  find 
weighted sums o f those Objectives such that no option w ithin the decision space,
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defined by the linear constraints on system variables, can be assigned a value o f 
greater than one; ie:
Maximise v -  Y  wt .Oi
all 1=1 to a
Subject to Ot = Y, PijXj
all] = l  to b
V ie  {1
X  cvXj < Ck
all y= l to b
Vfce {1
X
all 1=1 to a
V/w e {all vertices}
wl > 0 V /e  {1,...,«}
IV o Y /e  {1 ,...,6}
Where Oi = Objective i, a linear function o f decision variables Xj
°im = X  Pi!**
all y= l tob
= value o f objective i at vertex m 
xjm = value o f variable xy at vertex m, total unknown 
Ck = system constraint
Pij = coefficient defining weight o f variable j  in objective i 
Cy = coefficient describing the contribution o f variable j  to 
constraint k
w{ = weight o f objective i in combination o f objectives 
To be solved for all wi and simultaneously
(7.15)
As w ith the Financial Portfolio, method it is not necessary explicitly to specify 
each Y  wim .Oim <1 constraint. Frontier Probing can be used. When a value o f
all i = l  to a
v = Y  wi.Oi is found o f greater than one, the Ot correspond to  a new efficient
all i= l to a
vertex in criterion space. A  new constraint can be inserted and the maximisation 
repeated. (One or more arbitrary constraints must be inserted initia lly to  suppress 
unbounded solutions). The formulation is a non-linear program but readily solves 
w ith standard inexpensive software (eg What's Best).
Left to  its own devices the routine w ill identify a number o f optima (nominally 
"local" optima but actually co-valid pareto optima) and then "lock into" one. The 
routine can then be "jogged" into generating new optima by using randomly
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generated vectors o f ^variables as a new starting points. The routine can be
stopped when an arbitrary number o f new starting points have failed to  generate 
any new optima. This procedure should generate an extensive sample o f efficient 
points but not a comprehensive census. It may miss points corresponding to  small 
enclaves in the starting solution space. Such elusive optima are unlikely to  be 
materially superior to identified options even given a valuation function 
corresponding to their CAFs, for real decisions. As they are revealed only in the fine 
structure o f starting solutions, value differences for solutions in contiguous areas 
should be small.
An indication o f the prospective significance can be established by considering the 
extent to which a different list is generated if  the analysis is repeated from the 
beginning. The method was used to  identify optima corresponding to  the follow ing 
problem from Steuer (1977):
Maximise 15*, + 5 x 2 + 1 2 x 3 —8 jc4 +2jc5 + 7 x 6 - 1 7 x 7 - x 8 -1 4 x 9 + 9 x l0 
and - 1 7 * !  -  19jc2 - x 3 +  3x4 -  4xs - 1 8x6 +  14jc7 +  4jc8 -  16jc9 - 1  1jc10
a n d -3 x , +  3x2 +13x3 + 8 x4 +15x5 +18x6 +17x7 -19jc8 +14jc9 -1 9 x 10
Subject to
18xj +1 1jc6 +  6xg +  3x10 <100  
4x1 + 1 9 x 3 +  15x4 +  x5 + 1 lx6 +  13x7 <  100
8x2 + 3x4 +1 lx8 <  100 q  j
12x5 + x 6 + 5 x7 + 3 jc9 + 4 ^  <100  
13*! +  4x3 + 9x5 +  7jc6 +  3x7 +  13jc8 + 12x9 +  3x10 <  100
4jc3 + 19x5 + 8jc9 + 9x10 <100 
8*! + 3x2 +1 8x3 + 3xs +  2 x7 + 2jc9 + 5x10 <100 
xl +9x4 +13jc9 +19jc10 <100
xj  - 0  V /= {1,...10}
In tw o runs the optimal points (in criterion space) were as shown in Table 7.1.
Alternatively, the approach m ight also be used interactively to  generate solutions 
consistent w ith preferences declared between one solution found and another that 
immediately preceded it, short-cutting the need to identify an extensive set o f 
efficient options before choosing. However, whether one attempts an extensive or 
interactive identification, the approach retains the characteristic o f other MOLP that
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this w riter questions. It is doubtful that it is cognitively less taxing to choose directly 
between the [m,n-m] choices implied by the comparison o f such optima, than to 
make a prior determination o f weights from which a single optimum can be 
straightforwardly identified.
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Table 7.1 Example o f Solution Differences In Repeated Dora-D MOLP Simulations
Efficient Points, Run 1 Efficient Points from Run 2 
not found in Run 1
Efficient Points from Run 1 
not found in Run 2
186.1,-434.7,105.5 3 34.1,-124.9, 227.8 7 144.5, -162.6, -12.6
185.6, -421.8, 64.0 -130.8, 107.7, 130.8 66.7,-15.4, 105.1














96.6, -362.4, 265.3 4
70.5, -152.3, 217.7





-113.4, 81.0, 202.8 2
-136.7,131.4, 18.3
-170.4, 29.6, 233.3
However, we may use the principles o f decomposed choice developed above to 
generate, for each succeeding pair o f options, a set o f n (=the number o f 
objectives), [1,1] Franklin choices, which can be placed in order o f preference. The 
constraints thus generated can be included in the next attem pt to  generate an 
efficient vertex, ensuring that any newly generated efficient vertex w ill be consistent 
w ith this and other sim ilarly generated preferences. When no new vertices can be 
found, it is necessary to reassess all those previously revealed, elim inating those 
which can no longer be optimal. [1,1] Franklin comparisons can be made between
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all solutions not eliminated, and not already directly compared. The translation o f 
these comparisons into valuation constraints may further reduce the potentially 
optimal vertices or, w ith decreasing likelihood, allow the generation o f new ones.
This procedure may not reduce to  a single option but should result in a set o f 
options which cannot be discriminated w ithin the confines o f [1,1] choice 
expression. It is also possible that the decision maker s true optimum could remain 
unidentified but the w riter conjectures that material failures would be rare.
In a simulation o f finding the optimum solution to the Steuer problem above, when 
the decision makers hidden value objective was an equally weighted function, 
seven efficient vertices were revealed in the order shown in Table 7.1. [1,1] Franklin 
comparisons were made as they emerged, that is 1 w ith 2, 2 w ith 3, 3 w ith 4, 4 
w ith 5, 5 w ith 6, and 6 w ith 7. Comparisons were also made o f 2 w ith 5, and 2 w ith
6. Options 2, 5 and 6 remained after this. Option 6 was the true optimum 
confirmed by ordinaiy linear programming. Option 2 had a relative value o f .972, 
and Option 5 one o f .991.
7.9 Configured Dora-D
I have argued that the concept o f qualified self awareness, generally precludes the 
need for assumptions o f non-linearity which are not consciously recognised by the 
decision maker, at least as a possibility. I have excepted configural valuation from 
this view, recognising that a decision maker may behave configurally, w ithout 
articulating a prior intention, and may subsequently argue the desirability o f so 
doing.
I discuss here how configural issues can be approached w ithin the methodology for 
selection problems, which in other respects correspond to the structure tackled in 
the basic model. I have commented that the Minkowski metric V(X) = (^ j alxir)llr
has been suggested as a transformation for configural valuation o f positive 
attributes, allowing graduations o f disjunctive valuation w ith rvalues o f greater than 
1, and conjunctive valuation w ith r  below it. I have pointed out that the simpler 
transformation V'(X) = ^ a (Xir (which I refer to  as the General Configural Model)
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w ill produce strategically equivalent valuations. O f course many other configural 
models could be proposed including, for example, those w ith cross-product terms. 
Nevertheless, the modified Minkowski metric appears to be a powerful and versatile 
approximation.
To illustrate, I postulated a situation in which there were 100 options defined by 
combinations o f every ^  and x2, each o f these running from 0.1 to 1.0 in intervals 
o f 0.1. A  true valuation function o f v = x1 jc2 was assumed. A  M odified Minkowski 
function o f xx and x2 (ie v = k.(x]r +x2 ) ,  which correctly replicated the leading 
options when ranked according to their true valuation, was then sought. W ith a 
power parameter o f 0.1 all options were ranked w ithout error.
Four possible approaches to the configural problem, based on the basic 
methodology but using the General Configural Model, suggest themselves:
(a) Simultaneous Dora-D Parameterisation
(b) Conservative Configural Formulation
(c) Supplementary Variables
(d) M ultiple Parallel Models
7.9.1 Simultaneous Dora-D parameterisation
This approach is mentioned for completeness. An attem pt was made to use 
mathematical programming to estimate r , simultaneously w ith attribute weights. In 
practice the What's Best optim iser was not well behaved, identifying true optima 
w ith poor reliability. The method is complicated, unreliable, and unnecessary.
7.9.2 Conservative Configural Dora-D formulation
When I embarked on the simulations to test the previous method, I expected that 
potential optimum options would have an upper and lower bounded range o f 
Modified Minkowski parameters, over which a particular solution was efficient. 
During the analysis it appeared that whilst such options were in general efficient up 
to defined upper bounds o f r , they appeared to remain efficient in the other 
direction to  very small values o f r . This suggested an intriguing and potentially 
valuable empirical property, that if an option was efficient under a particular set o f 
circumstances, it m ight also w ithin the General Configural Model be efficient under
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all more conjunctive circumstances. This could be exploited in a simpler approach to 
that outlined above and was investigated further.
For each o f the ten sets o f data designated in Chapter 9 "5x50data_2810" (modified 
as used in Simulations 12-14), efficient options were established using r = 0.2, 1.0 
and 2.0, w ithout pre-emptive preference constraints. For some data sets, other 
intervening values o f r were also examined. In all data sets there were no instances 
occurring where an option that was efficient for a particular value o f r was not also 
efficient for all lesser values o f r . For example, all options that were efficient for the 
disjunctive valuation w ith r = 2 were also efficient for the radically conjunctive 
situation w ith r = 0.2. (The converse was not true, typically there were several 
options that were efficient under the conjunctive assumption that were not efficient 
under the disjunctive one).
This condition appears to be a general one and seems to  be true for any positive 
concave transformation o f positive attribute magnitudes. I suggest a basis for a 
proof in Figure 7.2, though I have not contrived a concise one.
The implication o f this property is that one can address the solution o f the General 
Configural Model, when the Minkowski parameter is unknown, using a fixed 
parameter formulation. If one assumes a sensible conservative transformation, all 
options which would be optimal over any less conservative parameter, w ill be 
revealed as efficient and reduction can take place from that base; for example, using 
Larichev and Franklin reduction. (As people may have a less intuitive grasp o f the 
interpretation o f weights in configural conditions using other mechanics, I commend 
this). The cost is an additional option elim ination load but, as w ill be seen in Chapter 
9, this can be small even for large parameter swings. If disjunctive configurality is 
suspected, the linear model suggests itself as a conservative model. If a conjunctive 
model is possible, the issue is less clear cut. However, even a parameter as low as 
0.2, which radically discounts marginal increments at higher attribute values, may 
not severely add to the reduction load.
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Figure 7.2
To demonstrate that if an option is efficient under a 
particular valuation of its attributes it will remain efficient 
under a concave transformation of the same valuation.
If x0 is efficient there will exist convex combinations of the remaining 
options that it dominates, ie:
3 X. > X  X0J -  X  f i x<i V-/
/=1 to n i=1 to n
Where f  = ( £  f ,  = 1; f ,  S 0 Vi)
1 = 1  to n
For any such j ,  the xtJ can be regrouped into two disjoint subsets 
to generate new variables xXJ and x2j 
such that f txtj  = t.xXj + (1 -  t).x2j,
/=1 to n
Where t =  ^  f r nx, w, = 1 if i is within subset 1,= 0 otherwise
/=] to n
Thus x0J > t.xXj + (1 -  t).x2j = xfQj
For x0 to remain efficient under a positive concave transformation g 
requires that under transformation g
g(xoy)>  t.g(xXJ) + (1 - 1).g(x2J) wheneverxQJ > t.xXJ + (1 -  t \ x 2J 
and we require to demonstrate this.
From para 2
xoj ^  xoj g(*o; ) ^ g(*oy ) %(xoj ) ^ g('-*i; +  C1 “  0 -x2j  )
If g is concave, by definition
gO'-tt + (1 -  r )y2) > r%(yx) + (1 -  r)g(y2), 0 < r  < 1
; +  C1 “  0 * 2 j  ) ^ g(*iy) +  0  -  0- g (*2 j  )
••• g(*oj ) ^  Z(tx \j + 0 “ f)'X2 j ) - t-^(X]j)  +  (^ ~ 0 -g(*2j ) 
g(x0j) -  ^g(^u) + ( l - 0 - g ( ^ )  
for all j  and all possible xXJ, x2j meeting the required condition.
All points originally dominated, remained dominated in transformed 
form. Accordingly, an efficient option defined by positive attributes, 
will remain efficient under a concave transformation.
This includes the power transformation, y0 = x / , 0  < p <  1.
243
7.9.3 Supplementary configural variables
It is open to an analyst to introduce configural variables as separate attributes w ithin 
models. This m ight be appropriate if  the Modified Minkowski approximation is 
unsuitable, for example if  specific value interactions o f the cross-product type are 
assumed.
7.9.4 Method of Multiple Parallel Models
The Best Possible Light concept that underlies Dora-D, does not need to  be the best 
possible light for parameters chosen w ithin a single model. The best o f one or more 
alternative representations may be chosen. Options may thus be evaluated 
according to more than one model, and selected as potential optima if they have 
CRVs o f one, or greater than one, for any o f the alternative formulations. Such 
models would be run independently.
However, the elicitation o f preference needs to  be interdependent and constraints 
derived during the reduction process must be fed back into all models. Any model 
going infeasible, after the introduction o f constraints corresponding to  well 
considered preferences, or no longer generating efficient solutions, would be 
deemed to be ruled-out as a description o f the decision maker's values.
Alternative models can be general or quite specific. For example, they could be 
several archetypal models w ith fully determined weights.
7.10 Project Portfolios
Cook and Green (2000) developed a methodology to  select a group o f projects to 
form a portfolio, (we may also use the word "programme"), in a m ultiple criteria 
situation under resource constrained conditions, using a Data Envelopment Analysis 
Approach. Their method is essentially value independent (or more properly the 
value selection is embedded w ithin the methodology), although they do suggest 
the use o f "assurance region" extensions which can be used to delim it decision 
makers' values. In consequence only a single optimum is derived. However, there 
are, in reality, ve iy many efficient solutions and the selection from them is, 
desirably, dependent on the values o f the decision maker.
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Here I develop an alternative procedure, based on the Frontier Probing 
methodology described in this thesis. I illustrate the method by reanalysing the 
problem that they examined, which was in turn drawn from data from Oral, Kettani 
and Lang (1991).
The reader w ill recall the general discussion o f portfolios and the financial portfolio 
formulation in Chapter 6. The Project Portfolio problem differs as follows:
(a) There is no non-linear value component.
(b) There is no fixed sum proportional inclusion o f portfolio constituents.
(c) The inclusion o f portfolio constituents, individual projects, is determined 
by binary integer "in-out" variables.
(d) One or more resource constraint w ill exist, restricting project inclusion.
The formulation becomes:
For each potential portfolio P e P cz P 
Maximise vp = '£4wiP.APi
a ll/
Subject to
]T wiP.Api< \  VpeP
all i
f p h = {  0,1} V/re{l,...,*},V/>eP
wiP > (Xf V/ e{  1,...,&}
Where P  = { p e P : X / ^  ^ , , Y / e  {l,...,m}}
all h
A p , =  X fphaih V /efl,...,*}
h=  1 to n
aih = magnitude o f benefit attribute /,o f  k\ for project h, of n. 
rJh = magnitude o f resource,y, o f m; for project h.
P=  all possible combinations o f projects 
P= all combinations o f projects within resource constraints 
P = the portfolio under investigation
p  = any combination of projects irrespective o f resource feasibility 
f ph = 1, if  project h is a constituent of portfolio p  
= 0 , otherwise 
wiP = coefficient of attribute i in value function 
or CAF of portfolio P 
a t = a positive archimedean number or zero
(7.17)
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We face the same difficulties w ith regard to  the scale o f this problem that we did for 
financial portfolios (combinatorially large numbers o f potential programmes for 
testing, each w ith a combinatorially large numbers o f frontier constraints associated 
w ith the Comparison Set) and we can tackle it using Frontier Probing in the same 
way. For one or any number o f Test Portfolios, P , we can find its efficient peer in 
identical manner. Thus, find the value function which maximises the value o f the 
test portfolio. Then find the portfolio, within P , w ith the highest value under that 
function, positively ensuring that the conditions for Pare met. This is accomplished 
by adding the resource constraints ^  f phrjh < R.to the LP.
all/i
If a portfolio, meeting the resource constraints, violates the im plicit frontier 
constraint, insert an explicit frontier constraint preventing it. Repeat the process until 
there are no material violations. This develops the MCA and peer portfolios o f the 
Test Portfolio.
One could then develop a value function using the type o f preference eliciting and 
representation mechanics explored elsewhere in this thesis. However, I suggest that 
this is an area where the concept o f "choice as a value statement" (discussed above) 
can be employed. It is probable that a decision maker in this area (eg, a Director o f 
R&D) w ill have a "good" starting plan which embeds the organisations values. 
Finding the Efficient Peer o f such a plan could w ell constitute a veiy reasonable 
solution or, if not, the basis for one.
The method also provides a convenient means for suggesting what Cook and Green 
(op cit) call a "robust core". We can do this by defining as a new Test Portfolio, a Test 
Complement, which contrasts maximally w ith it. This is a portfolio in which all f ph
o f value 1 in the Test Portfolio are rewritten as zero, and all those o f zero rewritten 
as 1. The projects common to both the Efficient Peers o f both the Test Portfolio and 
the Test Complement may be said to be the "robust core".
To illustrate the use o f the formulation, we make use o f the data used by Cook and 
Green and by Oral et al. This is shown in Table 7.2. This describes the benefits o f 37 
prospective projects against 5 criteria. In the terms used in this thesis these are 
Attributes which when weighted define the value o f the project. Also associated
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w ith a project is a cost which we treat as the single constrained resource, lim ited by 
budget.
We define the task here as one o f finding the Efficient Peer o f a nominated 
programme. I use here the Cook and Green solution as a Test Portfolio, recognising 
that they sought a slightly different objective, to  maximise benefit per unit of cost 
whilst remaining w ithin budget, whereas the task as formulated here is simply to 
maximise the value o f outputs within a budgetary constraint.




















1 67.53 70.82 62.64 44.91 46.28 84.20
2 58.94 62.86 57.47 42.84 45.64 90.00
3 22.27 19.68 6.73 10.99 5.92 50.20
4 47.32 47.05 21.75 20.82 19.64 67.50
5 48.96 48.48 34.90 32.73 26.21 75.40
6 58.88 77.16 35.42 29.11 26.08 90.00
7 50.10 58.20 36.12 32.46 18.90 87.40
8 47.46 49.54 46.89 24.54 36.35 88.80
9 55.26 61.09 38.93 47.71 29.47 95.90
10 52.40 55.09 53.45 19.52 46.57 77.50
11 55.13 55.54 55.13 23.36 46.31 76.50
12 32.09 34.04 33.57 10.60 29.36 47.50
13 27.49 39.00 34.51 21.25 25.74 58.50
14 77.17 83.35 60.01 41.37 51.91 95.00
15 72.00 68.32 25.84 36.64 25.84 83.80
16 39.74 34.54 38.01 15.79 33.06 35.40
17 38.50 28.65 51.18 59.59 48.82 32.10
18 41.23 47.18 40.01 10.18 38.86 46.70
19 53.02 51.34 42.48 17.42 46.30 78.60
20 19.91 18.98 25.49 8.66 27.04 54.10
21 50.96 53.56 55.47 30.23 54.72 74.40
22 53.36 46.47 49.72 36.53 50.44 82.10
23 61.60 66.59 64.54 39.10 51.12 75.60
24 52.56 55.11 57.58 39.69 56.49 92.30
25 31.22 29.84 33.08 13.27 36.75 68.50
26 54.64 58.05 60.03 31.16 46.71 69.30
27 50.40 53.58 53.06 26.68 48.85 57.10
28 30.76 32.45 36.63 25.45 34.79 80.00
29 48.97 54.97 51.52 23.02 45.75 72.00
30 59.68 63.78 54.80 15.94 44.04 82.90
31 48.28 55.58 53.30 7.61 36.74 44.60
32 39.78 51.69 35.10 5.30 29.57 54.50
33 24.93 29.72 28.72 8.38 23.45 52.70
34 22.32 33.12 18.94 4.03 9.58 28.00
35 48.83 53.41 40.82 10.45 33.72 36.00
36 61.45 70.22 58.26 19.53 49.33 64.10
37 57.78 72.10 43.83 16.14 31.32 66.40
Source Oral e t al (op dt)
The procedure goes through 7 cycles finding violating constraints which are 
progressively inserted. The measured value o f the violating programmes using the
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Table 7.3-Summaiy o f Results o f R&D Programme Optimisation.
Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4 Cycle 5 Cycle 6 Cycle 7
Test CAF
Attr 1 0 0 0 0.0008 0.0011 0 0.2393
A ttr2 0 0.0014 0 0 0 0.0007 0.7179
Attr 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attr 4 0 0 0.0025 0.0009 0.0002 0.0008 0.0438
Attr 5 0.0165 0 0 0 0 0 0
Value of 
m ax violation
10 1.339 1.269 1.057 1.022 1.026 1.001






Project 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Project 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Project 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Project 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Project 7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Project 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 9 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Project 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 11 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Project 12 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Project 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Project 15 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Project 16 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Project 17 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Project 18 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Project 19 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 21 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Project 22 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Project 23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Project 24 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Project 25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 26 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Project 27 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Project 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 29 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Project 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 31 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Project 32 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
Project 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Project 34 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Project 35 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Project 36 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
Project 37 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
CAF o f the Test Portfolio drops from initia lly (an imposed) 10 to 1.0001 during this 
sequence.
The main results are summarised in Table 7.3. The measured MCA o f the Test 
Portfolio was 0.982 and aggregate cost 999.4. The final solution only differed from 
the Test, (Cook and Green's solution) by excluding Project 16 and including 29. This
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is hardly surprising as the difference in our respective objectives was a subtle one 
and the Cook and Green solution was efficient w ith respect to their criteria. It should 
be noted that the portfolios developed at the end o f cycles 2, 5 and 6, proved to be 
co-optimal w ith that derived at the final cycle. The portfolios formed in cycles 3 and 
4 were efficient but, not in the end, efficient peers o f the Test Portfolio, and hence 
not optimal w ith respect to the developed CAF. Only the portfolio developed in 
cycle 1 was not efficient.
In practice it would be open to  a decision maker to adjust or constrain the CAF, for 
example if the heavy weights on attributes 1 and 2 (which maximise the value o f 
the Test portfolio) is not to his or her taste.
I also sought the efficient peer o f the Test Complement. The Test Complement was 
an infeasible portfolio w ith respect to the budget. Its efficient (and feasible) peer is 
the set o f 16 projects {1 ,2 , 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 31, 34, 35, 36}. 
The robust core is thus the 12 projects {1, 14, 15, 17, 18, 23, 26, 27, 31, 34, 35, 
36}.
I also used the example solution o f Oral et al as a Test Portfolio. This was {1 ,5 , 14, 
16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37}. The MCA o f this portfolio is
0.965 and its efficient peer programme is {1, 2, 9, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21 23, 26, 27,
31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37}; 5 and 29 drops out to be replaced by 2 and 9. Whilst 
project 15 o f the robust core is excluded from this solution, a co-optimal 
programme is in fact obtained when all members o f the robust set are forced in.
7.11 Data Envelopment and Social Choice 
A  data envelopment approach can also be applied to  social choice and group 
preference evaluations, as in Cook and Kress (1990). This fits comfortably w ithin the 
framework developed.
To do this it is convenient to  take a different perspective from that traditionally 
adopted, originally by Arrow (1951), where the focus is the manifestation o f social 
preference for entities, through the preference ranking o f those entities, by 
individuals. The alternative view  in this framework is that society places value on the 
"opinion" o f Representatives, though not necessarily equal value, and that the 
valuation o f options by those representatives in aggregate, is taken to be the value
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to  society or the organisation. However, the values o f representatives are largely 
hidden and are only manifest in the rankings they assign to entities.
Alternative "constitutions" could be envisaged. The follow ing "meritocratic" one is a 
possible operationalisation:
1. A  ranking o f all options by all representatives is declared, but no other 
information on their valuation is available.
2. A ranking o f representatives is declared.
3. The aggregate o f the value to representatives is strategically equivalent to  
the valuation o f society or the organisation.
4. Any value may be attributed to any option nominated by a representative, 
except that:
a. No assignment o f value to rankings by representatives may be 
made which values option ranked m, by representative ranked n, 
more highly than the value o f option m -1, by representative n, or 
than the value o f option m, for representative n-1
b. Where a representative is indifferent between options it shall be 
assumed that in the view  o f the representative they are o f equal 
value and shall be attributed a value no higher than the option or 
options that ranks next highest.
If any values for rankings by individuals can be found w ithin these constraints, which 
result in the valuation o f an option being superior to  all other options, that option is 
a potential group optimum.
A democratic constitution, where the same valuation is given to  particular rankings 
for all representatives, can also be imposed.
We may then seek value weightings for each rank level which shows each option in 
its Best Possible Light. This may be formulated in similar structure to basic Dora-D, 
for the more complex constitution as:
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For each decision option S e  {1,
Maximise v5 = ^ ^ w ikSrikS
alli a l l*
Subject to
- 1  v ^ ’ e  : j  *  si
a ll/ a l l*
wiks ^ w«k+i)s V/e {l,...,/w},V£e {l,...,n-l}
■^*S  ^W(«+1)JK V/G {l,-,w -l},V^e {1,
>0 V/e {1 ,...,/m},V£g {1,...,w}
Where « = number o f options
m = number of representatives 
w/AS = valuation weight assigned to option ranked A; by the 
"representative" ranked / when evaluating option S 
rikj  =  1 when option j  is ranked k by representative /
= 0, otherwise
Under the simpler democratic constitution, the suffix / is omitted and 
the equations wikS >  w(i+1)jts are redundant.
(7.18)
The democratic version o f the above is identical in intent and similar in formulation 
to Cook and Kress (1990). However, the option under consideration was included in 
the Comparative Set by them and is excluded in the methodology here. They also 
include what they call a 'discrimination intensity function" to  ensure material 
differences in the valuation weights for different valuation ranks, which is not 
necessary in this variant.
It is thought that, under formulation (7.18) weights, can usually be found which w ill 
give all options a value o f not less than 1. Efficient options are therefore those for 
which the LP finds solutions for which vs is greater than 1. In this instance the 
possibility o f absolute superiority must be demonstrated.
The values o f vs which can still be described as constituting the Maximal
Comparative Advantage o f options, provide an indication o f the materiality of 
options which have valuations o f greater than one, (thereby constituting an 
advantage for excluding the option under consideration from the Comparative Set). 
Other procedures remain necessary to reduce the remaining set. For example,
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further reduction m ight be achieved by securing consensus amongst the delegate 
group regarding bounds to the rank weightings.
The methodology was tested for the "democratic" constitution using the data 
outlined in Dyer and Miles (1977) which they used to  aid the selection o f trajectory 
pairs for the Mariner project. In this, some 32 alternative pairs were ranked in value 
by 10 science teams. In the Dyer and Miles study, cardinal valuations were also 
developed, but here I use only the ordinal data. The teams' rankings are indicated in 
Table 7.4.
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Table 7.4- Ranking by Mariner Science Teams o f alternative Trajectoiy Pairs
Team 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Trajectory
Pair
1 5 28 13 21 17 23 14 15 22 19
2 5 24 21 24 21 4 7 19 9 18
3 9 14 4 27 5 27 28 27 6 24
4 9 6 25 20 2 27 27 26 6 25
5 9 9 28 17 4 11 6 6 1 6
7 9 32 32 32 18 32 30 25 22 26
8 9 20 8 5 11 20 11 7 14 10
9 9 12 15 13 25 9 19 16 14 13
10 2 11 24 8 19 2 20 24 14 8
11 9 13 7 3 28 4 26 31 32 27
13 8 18 21 27 11 31 31 30 22 28
15 2 29 15 18 8 16 16 20 9 22
17 9 4 13 6 11 23 9 14 14 9
18 9 8 8 15 21 11 24 17 22 29
19 9 26 8 27 25 11 25 29 22 30
20 5 10 31 21 32 20 22 27 22 16
21 9 14 3 31 21 27 29 11 6 31
22 9 29 8 18 31 4 17 23 22 23
23 9 24 15 24 30 4 8 22 22 20
24 2 17 25 27 1 27 32 32 22 32
25 9 7 28 24 8 1 5 5 9 1
26 9 2 8 11 7 16 3 1 1 2
27 9 1 30 16 3 16 1 4 3 3
28 1 23 25 14 11 23 13 17 9 7
29 9 5 18 6 8 3 2 2 3 4
30 9 22 1 12 25 16 10 21 14 12
31 9 3 5 8 6 8 4 3 3 5
32 9 19 18 21 28 11 18 13 14 14
33 9 26 6 10 19 9 21 12 14 15
34 9 16 18 3 11 20 15 8 9 17
35 9 21 2 2 11 11 12 9 14 11
36 9 31 21 1 24 23 23 10 22 21
The results o f the analysis are shown in Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5. Efficient Trajectory Pairs and corresponding MCAs
MCA MCA MCA
Trajectory Pair As model Pair 31 eliminated 31&29 eliminated
26 2.000 2.000 2.000
27 1.200 1.200 1.200
29 1.143 1.250 -
31 1.125 - -
A ll other pairs 1.000 - -
Interestingly, pairs 31, 29, and 26 were ranked in the top three by all the collective 
choice rules explored by Dyer and Miles, w ith pair 27 appearing in 4th place for 
tw o rules. Pair 31 emerged top using their rank sum rule, though I would have been 
tempted to eliminate this pair as not providing sufficient advantage versus other 
options, even under BPL conditions, to justify retention. In fact the pair w ith the 
highest MCA above, pair 26, was selected for implementation.
W ith the meritocratic constitution (arbitrarily ranking science teams by their table 
order) there was greater freedom o f weights and only 6 pairs were immediately 
eliminated; 3 pairs had MCAs o f 1.001-1.2; 13 had MCAs o f 1.201-1.5; 7 o f 1.501- 
2.0; 2 o f 2.01-3; and 1 was unbounded. W hilst the MCAs could be used to 
determine a ranking it would be desirable to further circumscribe the latitude o f the 
weights.
The variant here was also applied to Cook and Kress's data (1990,pl309). The 
MCAs were a=0.813, b= 1.273, c= 1.046, d= 1.1364, e=0.688, f=0.688. b, cand d 
are the same potential optima identified by Cook and Kress. The lim ited 
circumstances o f optim ality for c are indicated by its low MCA.
Readers should note that scores under rank valuation methods may be affected by 
irrelevant alternatives and m ight profitably be reworked w ith "no-hopers" eliminated.
This approach could in principle be used as a first screening mechanic in elections 
conducted under the Alternative Vote System. However, the method would lack 
the methodological transparency to ordinary voters, necessary for public elections.
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It m ight be possible to incorporate features such as the blank "slots" approach 
adopted in a different context by Cook and Kress (1985) to reflect intensity o f 
preference; (I am not aware whether they have sought to  combine their tw o 
techniques). The possible impact o f such a feature is unclear.
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Chapter 8 Using Dora-D in developing a personal financial portfolio
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter I seek to illustrate the use o f the approach in a practical application- 
the Core Problem. This is investment decision making- specifically my share decision 
making. I start by explaining my attitude to the problem and my approach to 
explaining this as, simultaneously, decision maker, analyst and researcher.
I describe my data sources and my Vague Objectives as decision maker. I then 
describe in detail the application o f the Basic method to  a share purchase analysis 
conducted in 1998. This involves an explanation o f the Attributes I used and how I 
derived them, indicating problems I perceived and how I attempted to  address 
them. I then describe a series o f runs from Initial Option Reduction and subsequent 
reductions in which I employ a number o f elicitation and representation mechanics, 
eventually homing in on a single CAF. I discuss the methodological conclusions I 
drew at the time.
I remind the reader o f the lim itations o f the basic method in a portfolio situation and 
go on to discuss a more recent analysis based on May 2002 data using the 
Extended Model. I discuss the nature o f the risk I am seeking to  ameliorate and my 
tastes and attitudes concerning the valuation and representation o f risk. I outline the 
risk measure incorporated.
I also describe how I use Beta, and a simplification that the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model allows me to make. I describe modifications to  Attribute definitions relative 
to the 1998 analysis. I also discuss the issues o f using a static model for sequential 
decision making and describe the approach that I chose to take in my role as 
analyst. I also discuss formulation short-cuts that can help to  speed the NLP if  it is 
taking too long.
Before going on to the actual analysis, I describe my initial share portfolio and some 
practical aspects which need to be acknowledged and taken account of.
I outline the issues involved in the selection o f a Reference Portfolio and the choice 
made.
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In this analysis I make particular use o f the Larichev Decomposition and Attribute 
W eight Capping mechanics. M y preferences between decomposed choices and 
their representation w ithin the MP are discussed. The many analysis cycles involving 
capping adjustments are then outlined. This led to a single CAF which could be said 
to be my value function as decision maker. It also defined a theoretical portfolio. 
However practical problems had to  be addressed and a series o f other analyses 
were performed before an implementable plan was created. I describe these.
8.2 The background to  my problem
As mentioned in Chapter 4 ,1 have an interest in stocks and shares. This is married 
w ith a belief or hope that, over the long run, I should be able to do as well as the 
manager o f a fund whose assets I (and my fellow stakeholder, my wife) m ight 
alternatively purchase, at least after management charges are added in. This 
supposition was partially attributable to occasional comments in the money advice 
press concerning the ability, or lack o f it, o f Managed Funds to outperform Trackers. 
Additionally I considered that the market is mainly constituted by Funds or 
professional advisers to people and organisations operating in a similar way, and, 
de facto, their average performance approximates to  that o f the market. This is not 
to suggest that there are not fund managers who are superior. But the information 
necessary reliably to identify them is not available to  me. Moreover, it is d ifficult to 
distinguish luck from performance in this area.
I digress at this point. Whether I am right or wrong in this view  is o f a personal 
interest to  me and my wife but is irrelevant to this thesis. This is not an exercise in 
the quality o f my decision making judgement, nor do I claim a system designed to 
forecast the movement o f share values in a way which beats the market. What is at 
issue is an aid to  articulating objectives, judgements o f the importance o f issues, 
and the translations o f these into decisions. This theme occurs throughout many o f 
the succeeding sections. I w ill be explaining the use o f technique as Researcher, as 
Decision Maker and as Decision Analyst supporting the Decision Maker. In the role 
o f Decision Maker I claim for myself the same sovereignty over values that all 
decision makers can assert, that wise decision theorists recognise in the approaches 
they commend, and to  which good analysts respond in problem identification, their 
models, and in the information they seek concerning fact and the mind o f the 
decision maker.
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The distinction I ask the reader to make between the w riter as researcher and the 
w riter as analyst is rather more difficult. A ll good analysts have to  innovate or 
develop technique to effect solutions to a decision maker's problem, moreover both 
speak the language o f models and technique. The borderline here is therefore 
inevitably unclear and where it is ambiguous it is appropriate that the researcher 
w ithin the trichotomous personality should explain himself and not duck behind the 
skirts o f the unseen analyst. Nevertheless matters which are purely analytic o f this 
problem for this decision maker, and which another analyst and decision maker on a 
similar problem would review from first principles, w ill I hope be judged by the 
reader as incidental, even if they consider that they would take a different view  in 
the circumstances. The selection o f and some aspects o f the processing o f attribute 
information m ight be o f this type. When I wish to make my assumed role 
unambiguous I may use the first person acronyms AD EM I (As decision maker, I) or 
IMRANI (In my role o f analyst, I).
I also had a clear view o f the investment philosophy that I wished to  adopt. This 
w<is not one o f trend spotting but is essentially a Value investing approach o f the 
type first popularly promoted by Benjamin Graham, notably in The Intelligent 
Investor (1973, 4th Edition), first published in 1949. Graham's position Is that it is 
difficult to  pick market turning points; "..if [the investor] places his emphasis on 
tim ing, in the sense o f forecasting, he w ill end up as a speculator and w ith the 
speculator's financial results." (p95). One should instead look to  the fundamental 
characteristics o f the companies underlying the shares and should seek to obtain 
good value for money for the part o f the company one purchases.
M y extension o f this is that a company can be thought o f as a package o f properties 
to which can be attached value. These can be financial or non-financial, tangible or 
intangible, subjective or objective, relate to the present, the past or expectations o f 
the future. The issue then is to  buy the maximum quantity o f constituents o f that 
value for the minimum outlay.
If one had a clear prior view  o f how those combine to  form a money equivalent, the 
problem becomes relatively simple and can be tackled w ithin the models o f MPT. 
What would have been effectively measured is the Alpha o f a share, this can then 
be combined w ith assessed systematic risk Beta (or vectors o f Betas) to  generate 
investment conclusions. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, this appears to be the
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approach o f "Quant" investment houses. But, as mentioned, assessment o f Alpha is 
the difficult part and the decision efficacy, given Alpha, is o f far less consequence. 
Moreover there may be some qualities that relate to value that are not causes o f 
cash performance. However, the key issue is that whether others can make these 
translations or not, IMRANI could not.
In any case this is not the only approach, nor probably the dominant approach, 
adopted. Professional houses also depend on the flair o f managers to qualitatively 
translate company data into views o f whether company is a good "buy" or not. They 
translate the disparate information they have on a company, its attributes, into a 
view  o f value, seemingly w ithout using an explicit intermediate Alpha. This is also 
the approach o f the press. The Investors Chronicle, for example, draws on 
quantitative data and qualitative information to argue value conclusions concerning 
individual shares eventually summarised on a semantic scale "sell", "high enough", 
"fairly priced", "good value", and "buy". Attention is sometimes paid to  specific 
indicators, Price/Earnings is often a starting point for discussion. Another 
popularised by investor Jim Slater is "PEG" which is attentive to expected earnings 
growth. Graham would commend a wide range o f financial indicators o f the type 
outlined in Cottle, Murray, and Block (1988), (a recent edition o f a book Graham 
published in the thirties), whilst ensuring that accounts examined reflected what 
they purported to and were adjusted where necessary. I felt that I had not the 
interest, time, nor confidence, to adopt a predominantly qualitative approach; nor 
the desire to depend on the recommendation o f others. A  quantitavist by training 
and disposition, I sought a number based approach that did not require me to make 
a prior judgement o f how factors translate to value, particularly in a situation in 
where I recognised my objectives as vague. However, as w ill be seen, I was and am 
prepared to use the opinions o f others who have made such judgements.
I perceived the problem as one o f buying a package o f Attributes, in a similar way 
that a blender o f animal feed may seek to buy formulation components, each having 
some but different amounts o f nutrients which contribute to their value. But the 
blender s problem is simplified by constraints on each nutrient w ithin the compound 
he is required to develop. Hailerbach and Spronk (1997) expressed the same idea 
as balancing attributes at the portfolio level in a way that best suits an investor's 
preferences. This is a departure from retum-variance planar thinking. But the 
question becomes how to do this?
259
It was DEA that stimulated the approach I adopted. Treat shares in the same way as 
DMUs. Determine, what each share does best and judge it in those terms. It was 
immediately apparent that whilst one could generate efficient shares and what I 
now call CAFs, it was what I wanted that counted; efficiency needed to be judged in 
my terms not from the standpoint o f some anthropomorphic share. (In this I had a 
different outlook from Smith (1990) who suggests DEA as a method o f measuring 
the financial performance o f companies, to  resolve the difficulty o f selection from 
alternative financial performance ratios). Nevertheless, each potential optimum 
would be revealed w ith a circumstance under which it would be optimum. It was 
also apparent that the potential optima identified were those w ithout constraints on 
value, allowing complete latitude on the CAF. Even if  I was too vague about my 
objectives immediately to articulate a CAF that reflected them, it should be possible 
to progressively reduce the latitude, guided by the results achieved, progressively 
elim inating potential optima until one remained and an order for all other shares 
obtained.
In the set o f analyses I describe first, I first sought a single share. This analysis 
process employed what I have described as the Basic Technique. This parallels the 
whole process for some types o f decision analysis. However, it is lim ited w ithin the 
investment selection subject area o f the core problem, as it excludes consideration 
o f interdependent risk effects which, as has been discussed, are important to 
portfolio formation. Nevertheless the analysis can be used as a valid first step 
towards a full portfolio formation process, by generating valuation listings which can 
be used as one input to a subjective portfolio selection, or as a means o f articulating 
valuations for non-interactive attributes, which can later be used to  condense the 
number o f attributes used in a full portfolio analysis. I w ill later describe how this 
was extended to generate portfolios, whilst allowing for interdependent risk.
The analysis which I describe first represents a complete and self-contained 
sequence leading to a single choice. As in all analysis and model-building, it 
depends on previous experience. In structuring the model I had learnt from 
problems revealed in previous experiments. In this series new issues became 
apparent and the means employed to resolve them as they arose are reported. This 
researcher has never experienced tidy decision development or modelling either as 
a manager or, in his early career, as an analyst. This is a consequence o f seeking to 
approximate situations as bounded problems when they never are. Events here
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were not wart free and necessitated backtracking, but the description has been 
sanitised only to the extent that blind alleys having no bearing on subsequent runs, 
or repetitions due to errors, or after "losing the thread", have not been reported. In 
seeking to convey the flavour o f real rather than stylised problems, the description is 
long. The issues discussed are mainly those o f decision maker and analyst. W hilst 
the reader may find some particular practicalities o f detailed interest, the narrative 
need not always be read in its full detail
I should add that, in my early work, 1 sought the Decision Maker's hidden value 
function and secured option reduction mainly by incorporating the Decision Maker's 
declared preferences between the Attribute combinations o f specific pairs o f 
companies. It is since (and because of) this early work that I have become less 
comfortable w ith my own ability to  make, and the general soundness of, such 
judgements. In the 1998 work I relate first, I continued to use o f this mechanic but 
also explored other methods to help home in on a single value function and a best 
share selection and share rank ordering.
8.3 Data for the Basic Approach
I purchased Company REFS which publishes detailed company financial statistics in a 
comparable format, news developments and company comments (latterly on CD). 
This was and is the main effective source o f data for all my share analyses.
However, I originally "cut and pasted" data from the CD into Excel for processing. 
Hemmington-Scott, originally the publishers o f REFS, later kindly assisted by 
supplying much o f the same data in a more easily processed form but nothing was 
used that was not calculable from the REFS Company Pages. I subscribed to 
Infotrade, which although also publishing some company data, made daily share 
price data available for downloading. I also regularly received Investors Chronicle for 
background and sometimes referred to newspaper internet archives when finalising 
trades.
I confined my interest to shares in the FTSE350 index which provided a large 
enough pool to work w ith. Although there would be interesting opportunities 
outside this, good selection w ithin it should secure most o f the benefits o f a w ider 
universe. Moreover, the data management problems o f a larger pool would become 
difficult. I also consider myself risk averse and concentration on major shares
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appeared "safer". (I later excluded financial shares from the set o f shares considered, 
for reasons mentioned below. Investment Trusts are constituents o f the index but, as 
these are themselves share portfolios and not trading companies, these were also 
excluded). In the particular analyses I describe here, I also initia lly excluded one 
other company w ith an excessively low  PE ratio which would have resulted in the 
spurious exclusion o f more normal shares from efficient sets. Two further examples 
o f companies having highly distorted data were identified during the course o f the 
analysis. Their treatment w ill be described. Overall, some 317 shares were initia lly 
available for selection in the analysis.
8.4 My objectives as Decision Maker
ADEMI felt that the follow ing Vague objectives were relevant to my share selection 
decision. I made prior assessment o f the relative importance o f these factors:
- High level o f company earnings relative to  a share price.
- Solidity and lack o f uncertainty o f those earnings
- Growth in historic earnings relative to  share price
- Growth in future earnings relative to  share price
- Financial security/conservatism o f the company
- Good Dividend yield
- Minimal impact o f adverse factors already known to  the market, as 
evidenced by a company's share price performance over the preceding 
year relative to the market
- Good cash generation relative to earnings o f the company
ADEMI perceived that as the past was a partial guide to  the future, value can be 
attributed to  historic statistics. But I also made vicarious use o f other peoples' 
judgements by using brokers' Consensus Forecasts o f the future level and growth o f 
earnings.
8.5 The original 1998 analysis using the Basic Method
8.5.1 The Attribute variables used 
The variables used were:
- Earnings per Share /  Present Price per Share (EPS/PPS) for latest actual 
year (Yr 0) (E0)
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- Cumulative EPS/ Present PPS for Yr-5 to Yr 0 (QE-5,..rQ E-l) ( QE-5 was 
directly used, QE-4 to QE-1 were used to calculate WE)
- A  linearly weighted average "wedge" o f the EPS from Yr-4 To Yr 0 w ith 
weights o f 1,2,3,4 for each successive year (WE) see below
- Forecast EPS/ Present PPS for Yr +2 (E2)
- Growth in EPS/ Present PPS from Yr-5 to Yr 0, split into four variables, ie 
that amount constituting
... growth from positive EPS positions w ithin the period (T++)
... declines from positive EPS positions w ithin the period (T+')
... growth from negative EPS positions w ithin the period (T"+)
... declines from negative EPS positions w ithin the period (T~)
- Growth in EPS/ Present PPS to Yr +2 (T2)
- Dividend per Share/ PPS for Yr 0 (DO)
- (Cash Flow-EPS)/PPS for Y r) (CO)
- A  single measure representing Net-Gearing-Cash Richness (for ungeared 
Companies) and Negative Equity (where it existed) (GCR), defined:
... Zero, if a company's assets are less them its borrowing (i.e. it has 
negative equity)
... 100-10Ox (Borrowings net o f Liquid Assets)/ (Borrowings net o f Liquid 
Assets +Shareholders' Equity), for positive net borrowing 
... 100-10Ox (Liquid Assets net o f Borrowings)/ (Liquid Assets net o f 
Borrowings +SharehoIders' Equity), for negative net borrowing.
- A  binary "Is Financial?" variable signifying whether the Company is a Bank 
or Insurance Company for which some statistics are not available (IF)
- One year Relative Strength o f the share, if it is negative, and 0 if  it is 
positive (RSNO)
ADEMI felt that these attributes were generally reflective o f my Vague Objectives. 
They were calculated for each share in the analysis set.
It w ill be noted that most variables above are normalised expressions o f relative 
value found by dividing a "money flow" per share by price per share. They are not 
strictly dimensionless but are effectively so as money flows can be equated to  
momentary money value by discounting. The other variables are dimensionless 
measures to which similar value can be attached.
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Amplification o f the purpose or structure o f some variable sets adopted in my 
analyst role is appropriate.
8.5.2 "Block" and "Wedge" weighting of historical Earnings per Share 
ADEMI sought to include a weighted average o f historic EPS to which could be 
attached value. As analyst this presented m inor difficulties. I wanted to reflect a 
dim inishing importance o f less recent elements o f the historic EPS vector. I wanted 
the dim inution to be smooth, to  be parsimonious in parameters, to be determined 
in the analysis not predetermined, and to be manageable w ithin LP structure. I 
would have liked exponential weighting but it could not be readily approximated 
w ithin a linear model.
In earlier analyses 6 historic EPS measures were used. These were the latest EPS, the 
cumulative EPS for the last tw o years, the cumulative for the last three years, for the 
last four, for the last five and for the last six. A  weighted sum o f such composites 
creates a weighted sum o f the variables from which they are composed, but if  the 
weighting coefficients o f these variables is constrained to be greater than zero (a 
feature o f the normal LP formulation), dim inishing influence weighting o f the 
primary variables is achieved.
The problem w ith the formulation is that it allows "unsmooth" weighting patterns for 
which justification in terms o f a rational decision maker's value set would be difficult 
to  justify. As it also implied a capability o f fitting  a six parameter model o f just a 
single factor to  a share, and failed the test o f reasonable parsimony.
However, IMRANI felt an adequate reflection could be achieved w ith a tw o variable 
model. One o f the variables, the "Block" was the cumulative EPS over six years. The 
other was a linear declining weighting, or triangular "Wedge" o f relative influence in 
which the latest year had a relative weight o f 5, and each o f the 4 preceding years 
had a weight o f 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. In practice this was achieved w ithin the 
LPs by equally weighting four o f the five cumulative variables already defined, and 
constraining them to the weight that the analysis assigns to the latest EPS (EO). A  
long-term influence could be reflected by the Block having a greater weight relative 
to the Wedge and vice versa.
In more recent analyses a different approach has been adopted.
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8.5.3 Historic Earnings trend
In earlier explorations, high scoring shares included a significant number o f shares 
where high increases in earnings had been achieved but from poor or negative 
earnings bases. ADEMI felt that this did not reflect the value I put on growth in 
different situations. I considered that:
- Growth from a loss-making position is less valuable than corresponding 
growth from positive earnings.
- The loss o f perceived share value resulting from a positive earnings figure 
A  declining to a lesser one B, is greater than the gain in share value that is 
attributable to an improvement in profit o f the same amount, that is if 
earnings were to move from B to A.
- A  decline in earnings from a loss-making position has more effect on 
perceived value than the corresponding decline from positive earnings.
To give effect to this, the Earnings per share movements over 5 years were split into 
four variables, separating those parts which represented decline w ithin the period 
relative to  the previous year, from those parts constituting growth, in combination 
w ith whether the growth or decline was from positive or negative earnings. The 
aggregate o f the four trend variables always equalled the total trend over the whole 
period. This facilitated incorporation o f both non-linear and irreversible or 
"hysteresis" effects, and also penalised unsteady earnings patterns relative to, 
otherwise equal, steady ones.
8.5.4 Present value versus past value ambiguity and the "Relative Strength" work-around
The purpose o f the analysis is to calculate the current value o f a share in terms o f its 
attributes. These attributes may reflect recent events or past events, as in the 
inclusion o f Historic EPS data. But these data also contribute to  the past value o f a 
share. It was noticed that in early experiments a number o f shares were appearing 
to be efficient but had fallen significantly in price over the latest data year. Recent 
statistics o f such shares were poor. In consequence, in seeking to show the shares in 
their Best Possible Light, the program over-emphasised historical attributes. It, in 
effect, synthesised a past valuation and, when this was compared w ith a present 
share price it scored such shares well. Such an ambiguity is clearly a dangerous one.
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To avoid the issue, one approach m ight be to exclude all historic data but ADEMI 
fe lt that historical attributes did influence present valuation. Another m ight be to 
exclude from the consideration all shares which have fallen relative to the market. 
However, this would exclude some shares which were genuinely efficient against 
current considerations.
A  different approach was adopted. One-Year Relative Strength (the percentage by 
which the share moved relative to the market average over the preceding year), 
was incorporated, but only for shares having negative Relative Strength (ie 
declining) shares only. The variable was set to  zero for all shares w ith positive 
Relative Strength. This enabled the follow ing approaches:
- Prevention o f Negative Relative Strength shares from pushing out 
otherwise efficient shares o f better Relative Strength from the efficient set.
- Inclusion o f valuation penalties if and when ADEMI fe lt that it reflected 
valuation o f the attribute's negative impact.
- The discounting o f the historic components o f the various EPS measures, 
for falling shares, to offset potential valuation bias.
8.5.5 Net Gearing-Cash Richness
The rationale for the net cash element o f this expression is that it treats cash as 
having an opposite but similar magnitude o f impact to borrowings, where net 
borrowings are smaller than equity. It also discounts the effect o f large net cash 
assets. Later, the treatment o f these factors was reviewed and changed.
8.5.6 The "Is Financial?" variable
The raw materials for the Gearing-Cash Richness measure is not available for Banks 
or Insurance Companies. In the analysis these companies were given gearing 
statistics as if they had negative equity. To compensate for this conservative 
treatment, financial houses were assigned a dummy variable to which the procedure 
could assign value. However, throughout the analysis, constraints were placed on 
the value that could be assigned to it. Later, financial companies were excluded 
from analysis on grounds o f administrative sim plicity, as Hemmington-Scott were 
not able to supply simply accessible data to  me.
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8.5.7 The Option Reduction runs
Run 1. Finding the initial Efficient Set. Initial Option Reduction
The LP was structured as described in Chapter 5. The additional constraints
mentioned above were incorporated. One other set o f pre-emptive constraints was
imposed on the analysis. This was on the weightings, ws(T++), ws(T+'),w s(T '+),
w s(T"), permitted for the historic trend attributes T++, T'+, T+", T "  for any share S. 
These were:
ws(T ') < wsCT+) < ws(T+) < wsCT')
Constraints were included to ensure that the valuation for any share was no greater 
than 1. (In these runs the Andersen-Petersen adaptation was not adopted, though I 
now usually prefer to exclude the investment being assessed from the Comparison 
Set). 13 independent variables corresponding to attributes were incorporated. An LP 
was individually run for each o f the 317 shares in the analysis set, maximising the 
Maximal Comparative Advantage (MCA) for each, and finding the Comparative 
Advantage Function (CAF) and the Best Possible Light set o f attribute weightings, 
subject to  not violating the constraints discussed.
MCAs were found for every share. The contribution o f each attribute to  the 
aggregate MCA, and the efficient Peers and other shares scoring well under its CAF 
valuation, were recorded for each share. The individual attribute weights were also 
available from each LP, but were not routinely recorded by the summarising 
program.
The MCAs found are tabulated in Table 8.1. The number o f efficient shares, that is 
having MCAs o f 1, was 99.
Run 2. Starting the Second Stage Reduction to restrict Criterion Space. Further pre-emptive 
assumptions.
The imposition o f further constraints restricting the latitude o f the decision maker's 
value function, demotes some o f the originally efficient set. But none outw ith the 
set can become efficient. It is therefore permissible to  restrict subsequent 
consideration to a reduced Comparison Set o f efficient shares. As the macro 
controlled computerised analysis sequence for 317 shares w ith 317 share 
constraints, at the time, took over 8 hours to  run on a 486DX4, it was worth
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reducing the considered set in this way. This was done for subsequent runs (in fact 
103 shares were included in the modified Comparison Set). [Much faster software 
and hardware subsequently reduced this problem].
In Run 2, ADEMI took a less open view  on some aspects o f the value o f forecast 
growth amount in EPS relative to the future level and on the relative potency o f 
historic growth or declines classified in the attributes T++, T4", T + and T”, and this 
view  was reflected in the tighter constraints:
2.wsCT') < ws(Tf+) < 0.5.ws(T+) < 0.25.ws(T )
- The relationship between the value o f future EPS trend and future EPS level 
depends on Discounted Cash Flow considerations. In principle the relative 
value o f an increasing level o f real earnings can be equated w ith a 
corresponding steady level o f real earnings through Net Present Value 
calculations. But it poses the question, "How long m ight we expect a forecast 
trend to  persist?". To get a simple handle on this, IMRANI undertook some 
simple statistical analyses directed to  finding the extent to  which growth in 
one year is related to  growth in the follow ing year. From this I assumed a 
rate o f erosion o f the forecast earnings trend in subsequent years and, using 
DCF, approximated the value equivalence o f a forecast trend, relative to 
steady state earnings. ADEMI considered this represented the lower bound 
o f the value o f trend, for reasons related to  the possible conservatism o f the 
estimate, and because ASDEMI considered a strong projected trend as a 
measure o f safety, not just an indicator o f future earnings alone.
ADEMI considered that tw ice the lower bound constituted a reasonable upper lim it.
0.155.ws(E2) < ws(T2) < 0.325.ws(E2)
(sic. The inconsequential discrepancy from intention was spotted later)
When these constraints were added to the model and the LPs re-run, 64 shares 
were still found to have an MCA o f 1, a reasonable reduction o f the efficient set. 
These are shown in Table 8.2.
Table 8.1 Maximal Comparative Advantage (Ol)* after Run 1
MCA(OI) MCA(OI) MCA(OI) MCA(OI)
Abbey National 1.000 Christies International 1.000 Legal & General 0.883 Schraders 0.801
Admiral 0.837 Close Brothers 0.813 Lex Service 1.000 Scottish & Newcastle 0.709
AEA Technology 0.620 CMG 0.871 Liberty International Holdings 0.665 Scottish Hydro-Electric 1.000
Aegis 0.436 Coats Viyella 1.000 LIMIT 1.000 Scottish Media 0.564
Aggregate Industries 1.000 Cobham 0.577 Lloyds TSB 0.881 Scottish Power 0.989
Aggreko 0.641 COLT Telecom 0.752 Logica 0.742 Sears 0.982
Airtours 0.975 Compass 0.392 London & Manchester 1.000 Securicor 0.435
Albright & Wilson 1.000 Cookson 0.927 London Clubs International 0.925 Sedgwick 1.000
Alliance & Leicester 1.000 Cordiant Communications 0.332 London Forfaiting Co 0.924 Select Appointments 0.935
Alliance Unichem 0.681 Courtaulds 0.742 London International 0.463 Serna 1.000
Ailied Domecq 0.840 Croda International 0.731 Lonrho 1.000 Senior Engineering 0.733
AMVESCAP 0.437 CRT 0.881 LucasVarity 0.988 Serco 0.366
Anglian Water 1.000 Daily Mail & General Trust 0.468 M&G 0.773 Severn Trent 1.000
Arcadia 1.000 Danka Business Systems 1.000 Man (ED&F) 0.922 Shell Transport & Trading 0.710
Argos 1.000 Davis Service 1.000 Manchester United 1.000 Shire Pharmaceuticals 0.767
Arjo Wiggins Appleton 1.000 De La Rue 1.000 Marks & Spencer 0.679 Siebe 0.632
Arriva 1.000 Debenhams 1.000 Mariey 1.000 SIG 1.000
Asda 0.734 Delta 1.000 Mayflower Corporation 0.822 Signet 1.000
Ashstead Group 0.906 Devro 0.853 McKechnie 1.000 Slough Estates 0.466
Associated British Foods 0.582 DFS Furniture 1.000 Medeva 1.000 Smith & Nephew 0.862
Associated British Ports Hold 1.000 Dixons 0.650 Meggitt 0.679 Smith (David S) Holdings 0.988
Atkins (WS) 1.000 Electrocomponents 0.792 MEPC 0.527 Smith (WH) 0.824
Avis Europe 0.508 Elementis 0.943 Mersey Docks & Harbour Co 0.835 SmithKline Beecham 0.525
BAA 0.614 EMAP 0.642 Meyer International 0.856 Smiths Industries 0.719
Bank of Scotland 0.900 EMI 0.877 MFI Furniture 1.000 Somerfield 0.802
Barclays 1.000 English China Clays 0.923 Micro Focus 0.998 South West Water 1.000
Barratt Developments 1.000 Enterprise Oil 0.926 Millennium & Copthome Hote 0.822 Southern Electric 1.000
Bass 0.669 Express Dairies 1.000 Mirror Group 0.797 Spirax-Sarco Engineering 0.814
BAT Industries 0.963 Fairey 1.000 Misys 0.304 St Ives 0 924
BBA 0.684 FI Group 0.929 Monument Oil & Gas 1.000 St James's Place Capital 0.626
Beazer 1.000 First Leisure 0.701 More Group 0.644 Stagecoach Holdings 0.577
Bellway 1.000 FirstGroup 0.612 Morgan Crucible 0.971 Stakis 0.965
Berkeley Group 0.932 FKI 1.000 Morrison (WM) Supermarkets 0.854 Standard Chartered 1.000
BG 1.000 Flextech 0.596 National Express 0.954 Storehouse 1.000
BICC 1.000 Galen Holdings 0.780 National Grid 0.739 Sun Life & Provincial Holding 0.458
Billiton 1.000 Gallaher 1.000 National Power 0.875 Tarmac 0.803
Biocompatibles International 1.000 General Accident 1.000 National Westminster Bank 0.970 Tate & Lyle 0.789
Blue Circle Industries 1.000 General Cable 0.459 Newsquest 0.727 Taylor Woodrow 1.000
BOC 0.601 General Electric Co 1.000 Next 0.855 TBI 1.000
Body Shop International 0.791 GKN 1.000 NFC 0.864 Telewest Communications 1.000
Bodycote International 0.929 Glaxo Wellcome 0.429 Northern Foods 0.841 Tesco 0.701
Booker 1.000 Glynwed International 1.000 Northern Rock 1.000 Thames Water 1.000
Boots 0.822 Granada 0.660 Norwich Union 0.786 Thistle Hotels 0.927
Bowthorpe 0.864 Great Portland Estates 0.545 Nycomed Amersham 0.743 Thom 1.000
BPB 0.863 Great Universal Stores 0.867 Ocean Group 0.868 Tl 0.762
Bradford Property Trust 0.680 Greenalls 0.906 Orange 0.410 Tomkins 1.000
Britannic Assurance 1.000 Greene King 0.807 P&O 0.872 Travis Perkins 1.000
Britax International 1.000 Guardian Royal Exchange 1.000 Parity 0.965 Trinity International Holdings 0.737
British Aerospace 1.000 Halifax 0.760 Pearson 0.554 TT 0.976
British Airways 0.694 Halma 0.856 Peel Holdings 0.586 Unigate 1.000
British Biotech 0.998 Hammerson 0.506 Pentland Group 0.843 Unilever 0.871
British Energy 1.000 Hanson 1.000 Perpetual 0.954 United Assurance 1.000
British Land 0.355 Hardy Oil & Gas 0.414 Persimmon 0.968 United Biscuits (Holdings) 0.831
British Petroleum 0.657 Hays 0.676 Pilkington 0.967 United News & Media 0.908
British Sky Broadcasting 0.480 Hazlewood Foods 0.818 Pillar Property 0.484 United Utilities 1.000
British Steel 1.000 Hepworth 0.824 Pizza Express 0.800 Vaux 0.903
British Telecommunications 0.899 Hewden Stuart 1.000 Powell Duffryn 1.000 Viridian 1.000
British Vita 0.949 Highland Distilleries 0.709 PowerGen 0.893 Vodaphone 0.417
British-Bomeo Petroleum 1.000 Hillsdown Holdings 1.000 Premier Famell 0.727 Wassail 1.000
Brixton Estate 0.584 House of Fraser 0.864 Premier Oil 0.822 Weir 0.979
Brown (N) Group 0.627 HSBC Holdings 0.906 Provident Financial 0.684 Wessex Water 1.000
Bryant Group 1.000 Hyder 1.000 Prudential Corporation 0.686 Wetherspoon (JD) 0.688
BTG 0.734 IMI 0.973 Racal Electronics 0.585 Whitbread 0.673
BTP 0.856 Imperial Chemical Industries 0.676 Railtrack 0.774 Willis Corroon 1.000
BTR 0.856 Imperial Tobacco 1.000 Rank 0.864 Wilson Bowden 0.961
Bunzl 0.865 Inchcape 1.000 Reckitt & Colman 0.590 Wilson Connolly Holdings 1.000
Burford Holdings 0.479 Independent Insurance 1.000 Redraw 0.958 Wimpey (George) 1.000
Burmah Castrol 0.845 Inspec 1.000 Reed International 0.502 Wolseley 0.786
Cable & Wireless 0.789 lonica 1.000 Rentokil Initial 0.455 Wolverhampton & Dudley Bre 0.900
Cadbury Schweppes 0.662 Jarvis 0.914 Reuters 0.651 Woolwich 0.815
Cairn Energy 0.708 JJB Sports 1.000 Rexam 1.000 WPP 0.630
Caledonia Investments 0.607 Johnson Matthey 0.996 Rio Tinto 0.655 Yorkshire Water 1.000
Capita Group 1.000 Johnstone Press 0.729 RMC 0.763 Yule Catto & Co 0.852
Capital Radio 0.743 Kalon Group 0.914 Rolls-Royce 0.750 Zeneca 0.606
Caradon 0.839 Kingfisher 0.717 Royal & Sun Alliance Insuran 0.791
Carlton Communications 0.885 Kwik-Fit Holdings 0.929 Royal Bank of Scotland 1.000 * Basis of this set of runs was that
Carpetright 1.000 Ladbroke 0.613 Rugby Group 0.883 each option under consideration
Cattles 0.591 Laird Group 1.000 Safeway 0.646 was in Reference Set
Centrica 0.916 Land Securities 0.538 Sage 0.233
Charter 0.840 Laporte 0.833 Sainsbury (J) 0.648
Chelsfield 0.537 LASMO 0.511 Scapa Group 0.888
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Run 3. Allowing for some Larichev-tvpe preferences
A t the tim e o f undertaking this analysis, I had not fully developed the Larichev 
Decomposition procedure described in Chapter 7. Nevertheless, in this part o f the 
analysis, I used some o f these ideas. I established a reference case constituted by 
the average o f the attribute levels o f the 317 shares under consideration. Then for a 
selection o f attribute measures, I sought to find the m ix o f efficient shares that gave 
each attribute in turn its most favourable value, subject to  no other attribute being 
perm itted to take up a value inferior to  a reference case. These best values for each 
attribute were efficient solutions and were also found using LP (requiring one run 
per attribute). ADEMI then ranked preferences amongst each variation from the 
reference case.
Table 8.3-Larichev Choice variations from reference case
Case Attribute Reference Level Best Possible 
Value o f 
Designated 
Attribute*
Difference o f 
Best Value from 
Reference
1 QE-5 0.256 0.545 0.289
2 WE 0.729 1.479 0.750
3 E2 0.060 0.117 0.057
4 yf+ 0.0343 0.0996 0.065
5 T2 0.0066 0.0463 0.039740
6 CO -0.026 0.148 0.174
7 DO 0.021 0.063 0.042
8 GCR 70.0 157.3 87.300
9 RSNO -3.10 0 3.100
A ll other attributes at their reference level or better
Thus if, as decision maker, I prefer Case3 to Case2, it implies a preference for a level 
o f 0.117 for attribute E2 and 0.729 for WE, to a level o f 0.060 and 1.479 for the 
same variables, all other variables remaining at reference. Thus, I prefer an 
increment o f 0.057 in attribute E2 to one o f 0.750 in attribute WE. Accordingly:
0.057.ws(E2) > 0.750. ws(WE)
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Unfortunately ADEMI remained vague regarding many o f these comparisons and 
fe lt unable to express preferences between many o f the above cases. I was 
nevertheless prepared to assert that I preferred:
Case 3 to Case 2 to Case 1 
Case 2 to  Case 4 
and Case 6 to Case 7
The constraints corresponding to these were incorporated and the LPs were re-run.
The number o f efficient shares reduced from 66 to  58 as a result. These are shown in 
Table 8.2.
In this instance, these preferences only helped to refine the search a small amount. 
However, this does not im ply that the approach w ill always lack potency. Thus, if 
Case 5 was asserted as preferable to Case 3, a further reduction o f 14 shares would 
have resulted.
Run 4. Incorporating Preference Bracketing. An over and under compensation methodology.
An alternative [1,1] methodology is Preference Bracketing (see Chapter 5). This asks 
the subject to propose relationship bounds which he or she is confident w ith, rather 
than presenting pre-determined choices that he or she may be unable to 
distinguish.
ADEMI sought to compare the sum o f all the EPS components (relative to current 
share price) (E) to Gearing/Cash Richness (GCR), Cash Flow -Latest EPS (relative to 
share price) (CO), Relative Strength (non-positive only)(RSNO). In DM role I 
considered the follow ing statements to  be reasonable:
(7% E, 80% GCR)^(5% E, 30% GCR^(7% E, 40% GCR)
(4% E, -1.6% CO) ^(5%  E, -2.6% C0)^(4% E, +2.4% CO)
(7% E, -30% RSNO)^(5% EPS, -5% RSNO)^_(7% EPS, -10% RSNO) 
These im plied :
10% AGCR^2% AE^50% AGCR
1% AC0^1% AE^5% AC0
5% ARSNCH2% AE^25% ARSNO 
These were translated into LP constraints eg wco < wE < 5wco and the shares
reassessed. The efficient set reduced to  26.
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Run 5. Seeking weight balance
In this run I sought to avoid excessive dependence on certain variables which 
appeared to be getting undue prominence. ADEMI looked at the most favourable 
(usually largest) value o f an attribute occurring amongst all 317 shares in the full 
analysis set. I specified that this level o f an attribute could not make a bigger 
contribution to the MCA than a selected, though arbitrary lim it, specific to  the 
attribute. Upper lim its for the corresponding weighting parameters were set 





The efficient set was reduced to 7.
Run 6. Preference between companies
A t this stage it became possible to scrutinise the shares w ithin the efficient set 
individually. It was observed that one, Britannic Assurance, was an unreasonable 
outlier. I excluded this company from the constraint structure so that it would not 
influence the valuation o f any other share. This m ight allow shares to  re-enter the 
efficient set including those not in the short-list o f 103, pushed-out after Run 1. 
However, as no other shares had been constrained by Britannic, recalculation was 
redundant.
ADEMI felt that o f the six remaining shares, tw o (Arriva and Thom) had attributes 
which to  me made them less preferable to tw o others (Davis Service and W illis- 
Corroon) in the analysis set. Constraints were added to  achieve the implied 
reduction in valuation latitude.
The efficient set reduced to two, Lex Service and Willis-Corroon.
Run 7 Back-trackina to re-model
Both Lex and Willis-Corroon were, in the light o f the data, acceptable shares w ith 
appealing sets o f attributes. However they both had, what seemed to me as 
decision maker, a high weighting o f the Gearing/Cash Richness parameters. In the 
case o f Willis-Corroon in particular, over half the MCA was accounted for by this
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attribute. Willis-Corroon was very cash rich and was reasonably cheap. It had a 
generally solid earnings history but had declined in the past year and was not 
expected to fully recover quickly. It had come to  the top o f the pack by virtue o f its 
cash.
ADEMI fe lt that this had been over-emphasised in the results o f the analysis. 
However, I was keen to penalise shares w ith poor gearing. It seemed that in using a 
single variable to reflect Cash richness and Gearing I had denied myself an 
opportunity for a more distinctive treatment. In reality, I did not attribute equal 
value to movements in Gearing to those o f Cash Richness. I decided to split the 
variable into two, as well as constraining the coefficient o f the Gearing attribute to 
be larger than that for Cash Richness.
It was necessary to go back in the sequence o f runs. As the change was a radical 
one the full set o f 317 shares was used again. The share constraints subsequent to 
Run 5 were removed. The constraint Z.WsOF") < ws(Tf+) < 0.5.ws(T+) < 0.25.ws(T') 
was also inadvertently reinstated to its Run 1 form,
WsCT') <  Ws(T++) < ws(T+) < ws(T").
The efficient set increased again this tim e to Argos, Arriva, Davis-Service, Signet 
and Thom.
Run 8. Constraints reinstated
A t this stage the company constraints developed for Run 6 were reinstated; the 
Cash Richness constraint was set so that at a Cash Richness o f 72% the maximum 
contribution it could make to the MCA was 20%. However, the continued use o f the 
over-relaxed form o f the historic trend constraints, was not spotted.
The run resulted in a single efficient share Davis Service. Again whilst quite satisfied 
w ith Davis Service as a selection, I was not satisfied w ith what seemed an 
overweight given to one attribute, this tim e the Cash Flow-EPS difference.
Run 9. Contradictions
Some piece-meal experimentation was now undertaken w ith individual constraints 
being tried and individual shares being tested rather using a full formal run. It was 
apparent that the imposition o f constraints designed to achieve a balance effect w ith 
which ADEMI was comfortable resulted in infeasible LPs. This im plied internal
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contradictions between some o f the constraints imposed. As a result o f this I 
removed or relaxed some existing constraints that I was no longer confident in, 
w hilst introducing or reinstating old ones. In the formal run 9 ,1:
- reinstated 2.ws0 r') < wsCT+) < 0.5.ws(T+) < 0.25.ws(T )
- set 72 CR > 0.1
- set .26 T*+>= . 1
- removed the Run 3 constraint where Case2 (WE at its extreme) was preferred 
to  Case 4  (Tf+ at its extreme).
Run 10. Continuation
Attribute weight balance in the observed efficient set, still d id not meet my 
perceptions o f my valuation objectives. The difficulties were caused by the upper 
and lower bounds o f attribute contributions and these constraints were thrown out (I 
now use this mechanic w ith circumspection). I introduced a relative upper bound on 
the T" attribute which was taking up excessive values relative to Tf+.
This was preparatory to more systematically imposing absolute "top-down1' 
weighting restrictions after scrutiny o f the BPL weightings, rather than by m ixing 
floor and ceiling constraints. These used simultaneously had inhibited a clear view  o f 
what was going-on and caused infeasibility. ( I now favour this approach).
16 efficient shares emerged.
Runs 11 to 14 Capping large weightings
Solutions now appeared that placed excessive weight on the Relative Strength 
parameter. This penalised falling price shares by more than ADEMI fe lt reasonable. 
The parameter for RLNO was capped w ith an upper-bound o f 0.04.
Then Dividend DO parameter also appeared too high in many BPL value functions. 
This was also capped.
An efficient set o f 7 shares meeting all the constraints was found which were again 
individually checked. Another distorting share, TBI, was excluded. This resulted in 
another small temporary extension o f the short-list
The Cash Richness parameter CR was allowing some shares to  have an excessive 
MCA contribution from this factor. This was accordingly capped at a level which
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reduced it to  what ADEMI considered reasonable.
The shortlist reduced to Lex Service and Willis-Corroon. The latter still depended on 
CR for a very high proportion o f its RV. The CR cap was therefore further reduced to  
the minimum consistent w ith feasibility, that is to  .005
Only one share emerged from the next run w ith a score o f 1; Lex Service.
Run set 15. Fixing a single Comparative Advantage Function
There was still available latitude in the valuation w ithin the preference constraints 
developed whilst imposing an MCA o f 1 on Lex. To find a unique function Lex was 
constrained to equal 1. The DO parameter still seemed high so the LP was run to 
minimise this. Once this had been fixed at its minimum value, no more weight 
flexib ility could be found. This fully determined a unique valuation function w ithin 
the preferences expressed. Table 8.4 records the parameters found and Table 8.5 
the scores o f the top 100 shares using these weights.
Table 8.4- Unique Valuation Function Found after Run Set 15 with Attribute Contributions for Lex
IF G CR E-5 E-4 E-3 E-2 E-1 EO E2 T** 1 * T* T  T2 DO CO
Attribute Values 0 0 0.473934 0.336595 0.301566 0.247554 0.192172 0.138356 0.077104 0.091585 0.04364 0 -0.00157 0 0.014481 0.034247 -0.009
Attribute Weights 0.4 0.008152 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0.000296 4.071739 7.999508 0 60.35954 120.7191 1.893359 11.078 4.076185





T a b le  t .S  M CA * a f te r  R u n  S a t  15
Top 100
C o m p a n y  MCA
Lex S e rv ice  1.000
A rrive 0.900
T hom  0 .900
D avts S e rv ice  0 .900
Willis C orroon  0.900
T om klna 0.882
C hris ties  International 0 .812
Vlridlan 0.811
A g g re g a te  Industries  0 .793
Brttax In ternational 0 .750
S e m a  0 .727
A tkins (W S) 0 .722
GKN 0.701
U niga te  0 .642
Kwlk-FIt H oldings 0 .623
U nited A ssu ra n c e  0 .603
Billiton 0.582
S to re h o u se  0 .569
LIMIT 0 .568
P e rp e tu a l 0.551
B arclays 0 .522
M cK echnl* 0 .519
C a p ita  G roup  0.515
G e n e ra l E lectric  C o  0 .507
A rgos 0.504
N ational E x p ress  0 .466
A sso c ia ted  British P o r ts  H oldings 0.461 
B odycot*  In ternational 0.475
A bbey  N ational 0 .475
O c e a n  G ro u p  0.471
R alltrack  0 .467
L ucasV arfty  0.447
P arity  0 .448
T histle H o te ls  0 .445
S om erfleld  0.411
S e le c t A p po in tm en ts  0 .410
T h a m e s  W a te r  0 .407
A rcadia  0 .395
S t Iv es  0 .384
BPB 0 .382
C a b le  & W ire le ss  0.381
Brw rthorpe 0 .380
H ew den  S tu a r t 0 .379
FI G ro u p  0 .378
IMI 0.374
M orrison (WM) S u p e rm ark e ts  0 .368
A lliance & L eice ster  0 .363
B oo ts  0 .360
CM G  0 .348
B T P 0 .345
A dm iral 0 .340
PA O  0 .334
M ersey  D ocks & H arbou r C o  0 .334
V aux 0 .330
G en e ra l A cciden t 0 .329
M illennium & C o p th o m e  H otels 0 .328
B ank  o f S c o tla n d  0 .327
S tak is  0 .327
C arlton  C om m un ications 0 .326
In d ep e n d en t In su rance  0 .326
M ayflow er C orporation  0 .324
A sd a  0 .322
M&G 0.321
S e v e rn  T re n t 0 .319
S co ttish  H ydro-Electric 0 .317
Bunzl 0 .318
S o u th e rn  E lectric  0 .318
R oyal B ank  a t  S co tland  0 .305
U nilever 0 .297
British T elecom m un ications 0 .296
T ravis P e rk in s  0 .295
A sh s te a d  G roup  0 .295
B arre tt D ev e lopm en ts  0 .284
P ow ell Duffryn 0 2 7 9
British A e ro sp a c e  0 .275
T e s c o  0 2 7 5
B urm ah C a stro l 0 .274
G re a t U niversa l S to re s  0.261
P lz z a E x p re ss  0 2 6 0
L ogics 0 2 4 8
G alen  H oldings 0 2 4 6
S edgw ick  0 2 3 8
FKI 0 .237
C R T  0.235
N orthern  R ock  0  2 19
L egal & G en e ra l 0 .197
TBI 0 .197
L loyds T SB  0 .195
H ay s  0 .185
H alm a 0 .182
S co ttish  P o w e r  0 .175
A nglian W ate r  0 .156
S o u th  W e s t W ate r  0 .147
EM A P 0 .144
S m ith s Industries  0 .135
L aporte  0 .132
R a c a l E lectron ics 0 .124
C lo se  B ro the rs  0.121
S c h ra d e rs  0 .119
T rinity International H oldings 0 .118
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8.5.8 Conclusion following this example
Some aspects o f this analysis were successful. The ability o f the Dora-D analysis 
method to turn statements o f preference into a valuation function and to  reduce 
decision options in a transparent way, was well established. There was reasonably 
effective convergence on a valuation function that defined a unique solution, whilst 
being consistent w ith declared preferences.
The unique function actually derived was adequate, though w ith lim itations. Lex and 
many o f the other shares high in the final list are good shares. This analysis is based 
on a price o f 511 p in July 1998.1 purchased them in September at 421 p. This 
continued to  fall during 1998 but rose during 1999 and on 11 May they were 
667p).
However some aspects did not seem fully satisfactory. The emerging scale was too 
spread-out and did not appear to reflect relative value. This may be because o f a 
high weighting given to measures which are not inherently proportionate to  value, 
such as Cash Richness. However, there m ight have also been issues o f configurality 
involved which were not reflected. I can see in my values a desire for some degree 
o f conjunctive configurality feeling (as decision maker) that a share should score 
well across the range o f attributes, rather than being exceptionally good in a few. 
There are some areas where 1 could be quite explicit. W hilst a high EPS/Price (the 
inverse o f PE ratio more popularly used in investment analysis) is desirable, a very 
high ratio could be indicating risk. I consider this statistic to  be coincave w ith value- 
a factor I did not accommodate in this analysis although I made this explicit later.
Arriva and Thom stubbornly stayed high in the valuations despite my suspicion o f 
them. I did not like Arriva because o f its excessive Gearing but it is arguable that 
other favourable attributes adequately compensate. A t the tim e o f originally w riting 
this up, I still did not rate Thom which had a good history but a poor EPS trend 
forecast. An adequate weight is given in the unique function to the forecast level o f 
EPS but not o f the forecast trend. ADEMI relaxed the upper bound o f the 
relationship between the forecast level and the forecast trend before Run 10 but the 
relaxation may not have been sufficient. Despite reducing the CR coefficient to  the 
minimum consistent w ith earlier constraints, I still view  it as high and I must 
therefore have been inconsistent or, there remained some structural mis-
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specification. Consideration was also given to the inclusion o f other non-linearities.
In particular I noted that ADEMI give high priority to the avoidance o f negative 
forecast earnings trends but this was not reflected in this analysis structure. This 
im plied a need to split the forecast trend variable into separate growth and decline 
variables, in similar manner to the approach I adopted for historic trend. I have 
subsequently adopted this approach.
However, I fe lt that the imperfection in the value function that emerged was 
prim arily due to  cognitive issues in the expression o f my underlying preferences 
rather than their processing. I was happy w ith most o f the techniques explored 
here. The historic trend pre-emptive assumptions worked w ell in that I still feel that 
they approximate my value system fairly. However, my "objective" calculation o f the 
equivalence o f the value o f forecast trend versus forecast level may not have 
reflected the qualitative importance which ADEMI attaches to  the earnings trend 
forecast, as a broader indicator o f share value.
The lim ited use I made here o f direct preferences between packages o f company 
attribute preference, proved to have little  reduction effect on this occasion. I had 
already established that it can be a mechanically potent elim ination method w ithin 
the option reduction process. The issue is not its mathematical efficacy but its 
psychological reliability. It is not a mechanic that I now commend. I do not find this 
form o f [n,m] comparison easy, preferring fundamentally decomposed alternatives. 
Nevertheless, other decision makers m ight reliably use the mechanic in some 
situations, say, w ith less attributes.
After these analyses, I did not feel that my use o f Larichev type comparisons before 
Run 3 was helpful as a means o f expressing my value system. I had found it d ifficult 
to  declare a clear preference between some choices. I fe lt that I could better express 
preference through the Preference Bracketing methodology used in Run 4. This is 
also a form o f fundamentally decomposed comparison. W ith the passage o f tim e 
and a greater understanding o f my poor ability to  articulate firm  value (which I share 
w ith other humans), I now attribute problems to value vagueness not to  technique 
impairment. One cannot have a clearer elicitation structure than Fundamentally 
Decomposed Preference. In these circumstances, we can then more reasonably say 
that "can't say" choices are broadly equal. Nevertheless, the analyst must not 
immediately rush to  attribute equality o f value to such cases.
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The use o f lower-bound absolute lim its on parameter values was ineffective, serving 
to generate LP infeasibility. I now prefer to "squeeze" from the top by capping. It 
may have a place, when sources o f infeasibility can be easily traced. Parameter 
Capping, after considering the attribute weightings and their contributions o f 
particular efficient solutions, appeared a useful technique that could be introduced 
earlier in the analysis sequence. The advantage o f the method is that it corrects 
observed undesirable weightings emerging from real cases. In our metaphor it 
invites the decision maker to object to a feature "proposed" by an option w ithin its 
best possible light CAF. To force the value revealing statement, "I don't like this!", I 
now make much greater use o f this mechanic and o f Fundamentally Decomposed 
Preference.
The method used in Run 5 to generate upper bounds o f the maximum value 
contribution o f particular attributes, is methodologically flawed. It can cause 
attribute weights to be forbidden for some options whilst allowing them for others. 
In the early stages o f analysis, it can be used to  avoid LP bounding problems as well 
as numerical problems, arising from large cancelling contributions from attributes o f 
opposite polarity.
8.6 Extending the Analysis for Portfolios
8.6.1 Dealing with risk
The method above essentially selects a single share. It also measures the value o f 
other shares against the same criterion. One can argue that high ranking shares from 
the list should form part o f a portfolio, and, indeed, this w ill tend be so. However, 
the methodology provides no guidance on the depth o f the list from which shares 
should be drawn nor a means o f specifying their proportions. From the beginning it 
was clear that its use on the portfolio problem would be a lim ited, approximate, 
though useful, aid to portfolio decision making.
The need for several shares, for diversity, arises from the need to  ameliorate risk, 
and this is the element which must be incorporated in the analysis. This is a non­
linear function o f the proportions o f the shares in a portfolio, however its detail is 
defined. The "Frontier Probing" technique described earlier was designed to address 
this issue and I applied it here.
As decision maker and analyst I had access to some relevant risk data. These 
included measured systematic risk Betas for all shares, provided quarterly by 
Hemmington-Scott. I also had daily share prices for shares quoted on the London 
Stock Exchange, for several years. However, I did not have access to a convenient 
cheap source o f Beta vectors, for use in m ultiple index models, or the data to 
generate them easily. I rejected as impracticable, a "team o f one" developing the 
parameters for such a model on a routine basis; I needed off-the-shelf statistics as 
far as possible. (As the data pre-processing required each Quarter is large, this still 
seems an appropriate position. However, the feasibility o f developing the 
parameters of, say, a 3 or 4 Beta model from a Principal Components Analysis o f 
the variance-covariance matrix o f the prices o f shares considered, could be 
investigated).
I also did not have calculated parameters concerning residual variance.
ADEMI was initia lly unclear about the exact nature o f the risk to be m itigated. This 
was in, principle, o f tw o types. First was the expected vo latility o f value movements 
o f the portfolio being developed, essentially the statistical risk considered in MPT. 
Second was the risk o f non-statistical catastrophic performance not reflected in the 
stochastic characteristic o f share prices (seemingly not addressed by MPT). I wished 
to  dilute, if  I could not avoid, the problems o f purchasing a Marconi, or Enron. The 
first could be incorporated by some form o f Standard Deviation statistic. I also 
contemplated using Entropy to reflect portfolio variety and to represent a measure 
o f insurance against the second type o f risk. However, IMRANI concluded that this 
objective could also be adequately accommodated w ith a variance measure, 
particularly w ith the approximation I eventually used.
But the issue necessitated some re-scrutiny o f objectives. Was I trying to minimise 
the vo la tility o f my share portfolio or something else? I recognised I sought to 
invest in the stock exchange as a whole. I was seeking to outperform it in terms o f 
the value characteristics I defined, but I was also seeking a portfolio which was 
otherwise similar to the market. If the short-term fluctuations were to echo the 
FTSE350, I would be satisfied. There was thus a dimension o f index emulation in 
what I wanted. Initially I therefore tried a model in which I included both a 
representation o f portfolio standard deviation and deviation from the market. I was 
intending to establish parameters for both o f these attributes w ithin the Dora-D
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methodology. The statistical calculation o f the first o f these was more complicated 
but, more importantly, the statistic was closely related to that o f the second, and I 
came to see it as misconceived. Minimisation o f random deviations from the market 
was a closer reflection o f what I wanted- simply to incorporate and to apply a 
penalty to what was left over after Beta correlation had been taken out. I 
subsequently felt that this was more in keeping w ith those aspects o f the Capital 
Assets Pricing Model (CAPM), which I later adopted. I w ill discuss the simple 
measure o f variance used shortly.
IMRANI originally included Beta as a parameter o f the model, as a linear attribute o f 
a share to which value should be attached. This aspect was to be treated like all 
other attributes considered above. 1 considered that my valuation o f the disbenefit 
o f Beta would not be in line w ith the market's. Indeed, ADEMI fe lt that as I was risk 
averse I would put a high value on a low Beta.
This missed an important implication o f the CAPM: It does not depend on my 
valuation o f Beta. If an investor can define an optimum portfolio for high Beta 
(within the range where many shares have a higher Beta) and an optimum portfolio 
for a low  Beta, the optimum portfolio for any intervening Beta w ill be a linear 
combination o f these two. M y w ife and I were investing in a variety o f other 
investments such as Building Societies, Government Stocks, ISAs, etc. These had 
low Betas and, indeed, were likely to be broadly efficient. We did not seek an 
overall portfolio w ith a Beta o f greater than 1. It follows that if  I could find an 
Optimal Equity Portfolio, w ith higher Beta than we needed, that portfolio combined 
w ith any proportion o f cash-like assets, would also be pareto-optimal. A  reasonable 
Beta to choose is Unity, the Beta o f the market, reinforcing the idea o f emulating the 
index. The problem then becomes to  find an optimum portfolio subject to  it having 
a Beta o f less than one.
This approach has an additional justification. Measured Betas tend to regress to one 
(Elton and Gruber 1981 ppl41-142). Assigning value to  historic Beta on the basis 
that it was an approximation to future Beta would cause bias. However, a constraint 
approach, w ith a constraint on Beta equal to  1 (the value to which the Betas 
regressed) would be unbiased. In the absence o f specific information on future 
Betas, a constraint o f 1 on historic Beta implies a constraint o f 1 on expected future 
values.
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Moreover, in addition to principles there were practicalities. Ideally I would have 
measured the residual share price standard error, that is the standard error o f its 
price after taking out the market effect, what in MPT is called non-systematic or 
diversifiable risk, eg:
£» = P „ ~  P „ - I -  A (.Pm, -  Pmf-\)  
or
e„ = P v - P , , 0 - P , ( P m , - P m .  o)
Where est = random variable representing residual variation 
of share, s, in period, t. 
p s t = price o f share relative to its average price 
p mjt = normalised "price" o f the market
ie index value x (average share price/average index value)
(8.1)
I fe lt that it would constitute an unreasonable analysis burden to calculate these 
statistics on a regular census basis. I therefore sought a model o f them. It seemed 
possible that the residual errors could themselves be related to Beta. If a share was 
sensitive to  market fluctuations, m ight it not vary a lo t about it? I analysed a sample 
o f 21 shares and plotted residual error against Beta. There were some indications 
that this could be so but were insufficient to establish either a statistically significant 
or practically useful relationship. I therefore adopted a constant residual error 
assumption for all shares under consideration.
W hilst recognising the value o f later returning to  this issue, I decided as decision 
maker and analyst that the practical benefits would not repay the analytical outlay at 
this stage. In early portfolio runs I made use o f the more complex (spurious) model 
and established that the Dora-D structure is able to accommodate more complex 
assumptions. The simplification can be defended on sensitivity grounds: amongst 
otherwise equal shares, optimum portfolio proportions would be in inverse 
proportion to  the variance o f residuals. However, the penalty for variations from the 
optim um  proportions seems relatively low, as the partial differentials are zero.
8.6.2 Getting a "handle" on the valuation of risk
ADEMI had no intuitive notion o f the value I attach to  the avoidance o f uncertainty, 
and even now I cannot readily attach a valuation function weight to it. I m ight be 
able to  give an analyst a vague indication o f an acceptable and, w ith greater
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confidence, provide a rough indication o f the spread o f shares I would like to see in 
a portfolio. IMRANI attempted to gain some insight o f my negative u tility  o f 
variability as a decision maker.
I recognised that I would be prepared to take some risk for an attractive gamble. I 
attempted to articulate this (in an investment situation) as being indifferent to 
paying £ 10,000 for a "gamble" w ith a 0.333 probability o f £0 return and a 0.667 
probability o f £20,000. The expected value o f such a gamble is £3333. However, 
the Standard Deviation o f the return is £9428. The net value o f the gamble is zero; 
therefore the negative u tility  is 35% o f Standard Deviation. Originally I failed to 
clarify the reference frame o f such a gamble but later perceived it as a gamble 
relative to  the market. What expected gain would I wish to make relative to the 
market in order to justify a variation about it?
IMRANI regressed logarithms o f fortnightly differences in share prices against 
corresponding statistics for the FTSE100 index and, found the residual sum o f 
squares for each o f 22 shares. Assuming residual independence, and averaging over 
the shares sampled, I converted this to  an annual (and natural logarithmic) basis, 
finding a measure o f standard deviation o f the residuals o f approximately 0.41 
(loosely interpretable as a 41% o f the mean share price). Another analysis found that 
the standard deviation o f the natural logarithm o f 12 month relative prices (relative 
strength +100), gave a comparable figure o f .45. In principle this is exploitable but 
there remains the issue o f how one converts an annual SD to value. What is the 
appropriate scaling to provide a capital value equivalent? One approach m ight be 
to  assume uncertainty premiums are effectively loss o f income and to  discount 
annual increments in SD in a discounted cash flow  analogue. On this basis, a scaling 
factor o f the order o f 3 m ight be appropriate. However, one could argue that one 
should assume that the share is held until such tim e as fundamentals realistically 
convert to  price changes and take the variance as a capital movement. This is 
vaguer. The first if I did not find it convincing is more manageable. This would lead 
to  an uncertainty loss o f value o f 3x.35x.41x Portfolio Value for a portfolio o f one 
share. If the share value in MCA terms (excluding uncertainty issues) in a practical 
portfolio is 0.75 (this now seems too conservative), we could justify a model factor, 
c , o f 0.32. The "value" for other portfolios would be given by:
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v » = - c -aITj?
Where vu = contribution to portfolio value o f uncertainty
c = factor incorporating u tility  o f uncertainty and residual 
variability(after market factors o f a single share) 
f t = proportion o f share i in the portfolio
(8.2)
(This equation would require little  adjustment to incorporate a non constant 
assumption for standard deviations o f residual uncertainty for individual shares).
Notwithstanding the above, I found it d ifficult to  relate intuitively to the logic 
discussed for generating the c factor. I fe lt at greater ease judging c in terms o f its 
implications on the characteristics o f the portfolio. I found myself liking shareholding 
which were typically 7% or 8% o f portfolio value, w ith individual shares having no 
more than double this representation, and rejecting as "too small to  bother with" 
those o f less than about 3%. A c around 0.5 seemed to generate portfolios w ith 
subjectively attractive characteristics and seems reasonable in the light o f the 
considerations above. This was used as a starting value for the analysis discussed 
below, though in this instance the value used was increased as the portfolio 
generated seemed too concentrated.
8.6.3 New and modified variables and prior constraints
Over the few years since seeking to aid my decision making through the approach 
described, the model I have used and the methodology I have employed has often 
changed. This is unsurprising as decision analysis, though directed to finding 
preference, is, given its lability, bound to challenge and modify it. In some cases 
Decision Analysis serves to solidify preference. For example, in a difficult area, once 
having stated a preference to the precision a decision maker feels able, he or she 
may not feel it fruitful to  revisit the area.
Moreover, the elicitation mechanics I have used have also altered, as I have 
explored ideas as analyst and researcher seeking to satisfy me better as decision 
maker, and as my theoretical ideas have developed in response to  introspection, or 
w ith greater "understanding" o f impairment o f cognition. In general I have become 
steadier in the mechanics that suit me, I have "fixed", or defined close lim its, for 
some elements o f my preference function. Nevertheless, many elements o f my
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preference function are determined anew each quarter, although the definition o f 
most attribute variables is little  changed from those specified earlier.
The follow ing are the attribute variables used in recent runs:
- EO, QE-5,..rQ E -l, E2, Tf+, T4", T +, T", DO, CO, RSNO as described above 
but w ith some differences o f calculation, (see below).
- New variables NG and CR replacing GCR; PT2, NT2, replacing T2.
- New variables SRSS, SG, Beta, IR
The follow ing attribute variable used before have been excluded w ithout explicit 
replacement.
- WE
Variables EO and E2 and the intermediate Earnings per Share data used to calculate
QE-5,. .rQE-1 were subject to  modified calculation to reflect that ADEMI no longer 
sought to impute value to  a Earnings per Share linearly w ith the raw statistics. I 
used the follow ing transformation to  generate a modified measure which ADEMI 
considered reflected linearity:
em = %-f— _  i f  e > 0, = e i f  e < 0
n *yje +eu
Where e = true earnings yield (=eps/pps) 
em = modified earnings yield 
eu = upper lim it o f modified earnings yield
(8.3)
The effect o f this modification is an imposed asymptotic lim it o f eu on the modified 
value but as e tends to zero em tends to e . I used a value . 15 for em.
ADEMI eventually adopted fixed weight ratios for the trend variables, to reflect my 
more solid views. This were reflected as follows:
w+~= 2.w++
3.w_+ = w++
w~~ II to ■*+ 1
Where w" = weight o f T'”
(8.4)
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IMRANI abandoned the Wedge approach, in favour o f constraints on the weights on 
the cumulative earnings yield variables (the reader w ill recall, to  ensure a declining 
contribution o f historic data). I simulated a "faster than linear" decline, by requiring 
the weight attached to the average o f the components o f a cumulative composite, 
to be less than the weight attached to the average o f the cumulative composite o f 
one year shorter duration (ie that the expected contribution from a cumulative 
variable, should not be greater than that for any o f the defined cumulative variables 
over shorter periods). The weight constraints were:
6.WQE -  5 < 5 .WQE -  4 < 4.WQE -  3 < 3 .WQE -  2 < 2 .WQE - 1  <  WEO ( 8 - 5 )
However, the cumulative variables continued to be modified by the Relative 
Strength workaround explained before.
ADEMI judged the avoidance o f Gearing to  be more important than the 
corresponding quantum o f surplus cash. The original single integrated measure was 
therefore replaced by two. Negative Gearing (NG) and Cash Richness (CR), ie:
- NG= - Net Borrowing/ (Shareholders Equity + Gross Borrowing)
= -1, for negative equity
- CR= Net Cash/ (Shareholders Equity + Gross Borrowing)
Net Borrowings is Gross Borrowings less Cash, and Net Cash is Cash- Gross 
Borrowings. This constitutes a change o f definition and o f origin. The source data 
used was also slightly different. NG is specified as a negative number so that 
improvements correspond to additions to value.
ADEMI was also incompletely satisfied w ith the future earnings trend variable T2. If 
current earnings have taken a temporary dip even a relatively modest recovery may 
create the beguiling illusion o f an attractive trend. I sought a more conservative 
treatment and therefore redefined the variable, taking as reference, not the latest 
situation, but the best o f recent years, as follows:
T i  -  E 2 - m a x { E o , E  - \ , E  - 2, E - 3 , E - 4 , E - s ]  (8.6)
I also tried to  reflect asymmetry o f values o f decline from those o f increase; as had
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been done, ab initio, for historic trend. Thus, the variable T2 was redefined into tw o 
variables PT2 and NT2, such that:
Ti = PTi + NTi 
PT2 = 0, i f r 2<0 
NT2 = 0, i f r 2>0
(8.7)
The weight o f NT2 was constrained to  be greater than that for PT2.
The additional variables were as follows:
- SRSS = A  measure o f standard deviation o f residuals for a portfolio after 
allowing for market related movements, based on an assumption o f 
independence, normalised so that SRSS=1 for a portfolio consisting only 
o f 1 share. It is defined by
SRSS = , fi = proportion o f share i in the portfolio. (8.8)
This is the only non-linear attribute incorporated requiring a Bpl type 
parameter (as in Chapter 60.
- SG = (£ Turnover per share Yr 0 -£ Turnover per share Yr -1 )/ Present 
Price per Share (PPS).
- BetaD, is a simple modification o f the normal expression o f Beta. It is 
Beta as defined and calculated by Hemmington Scott, minus 1. It is a 
constant that relates the expected change in the share price to a change 
in the market price, assuming a model o f the form:
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Pi = <*/ + (A  + tyPm 
Where
pt = price of share i relative to its previous 
price at reference moment 
pm -  market index relative to index 
at reference moment 
Pt -  BetaD
Pt < -1 for shares prices negatively correlated with the market 
P, =  -1 for shares prices uncorrelated with the market 
-1  < Pt < 0 for shares with positive correlation but less sensitive than the market 
Pt = 0  for shares with positive correlation and the same sensitivity as the market 
Pt > 0  for shares with positive correlation and greater sensitivity than the market
(8.9)
- IR is an Inverse Rank indicator. Shares under consideration are ranked in 
inverse order o f their market capitalisation, allowing the possibility o f a 
company size value premium.
8.6.4 Portfolio dynamics and stability
No difficulty o f principle arises if a decision maker seeks a long term portfolio 
w ithout existing investments. However, in practice I seek to use a static model to 
solve a dynamic problem in which an existing portfolio is subject to periodic review. 
If the model is used to review my portfolio from first principles at each review 
(normally at quarterly intervals) I may end up w ith a completely different portfolio. 
Issues o f cost may make this ill advised but other factors are also relevant. I chose 
the shares for my perception o f their long-term value w ith the intention o f having a 
stable portfolio. The quantified expression o f my selection values are likely to be 
labile, yet I can qualitatively assert that I do not wish to have a volatile portfolio. 
Moreover, even w ithin the context o f relatively stable values, the selection o f 
constituents may be sensitive to  relatively small variation in attribute weights and 
magnitudes, and that some period to period variation in their measurement may 
not be significant in the longer term. As analyst, I sought a pragmatic work-around, 
that would satisfy me as decision maker.
More than one approach seemed possible, but the approach adopted was to restrict 
the permitted portfolio turnover rate. W ithin my quarterly review system, I 
nominated a retention rate o f 70-80%. This would, notionally, allow me to replace a 
"good" portfolio turned "bad" over a year. It is, o f course, still open to me to
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generate first principles portfolios and to review the model's suggestions and to  cut 
deeper or more shallowly if  I see fit. The follow ing describes the structure o f 
additionally imposed constraints which operationalises this:
= proportion o f share i in new portfolio 
r( = proportion o f share i in old portfolio 
qt = amount by proportion o f share i in old portfolio 
retained in new portfolio 
K  = proportion o f old portfolio to be retained in the new portfolio
8.6.5 Analysis short-cuts
When I started this work, the speed o f my computer and the software caused runs 
to take several hours. Now times are much reduced and are generally manageable 
w ithout assisting the non-linear optim isation routine built into the software. 
However, at some stages o f analysis, the non-linear model may take one or tw o 
minutes to reach an optimum. As 50 to 100 passes may be necessary to generate 
frontier constraints and to introduce preference constraints, the exercise can still be 
time-consuming. I employed a number o f short-cuts to speed up the process.
I remind the reader that finding the CAF o f the test portfolio is a linear problem and 
this part is very quick. Finding the efficient peer using that CAF is non-linear and 
potentially tim e consuming. This section o f the computation cycle can be 
substantially accelerated by using the efficient peer portfolio used to generate a 
frontier constraint, as an initial solution in the identification o f the next one. This 
works well, although IMRANI feels it prudent to check the results obtained after 
convergence by starting w ith a radical and non-feasible portfolio.
Another approach is a simple linearisation o f the non-linear function w ithin the
q( < f i  V ie { l , ...,«}
qi < r i Vze
Where
(8.10)
model. The approach successfully used was to replace the attribute
291
Where f t are as previously defined
f t are the f t for the most recently found efficient 
peer portfolio used to generate a frontier constraint
(8.11)
If the ( J l - f t) are small, then this constitutes a good approximation. This can be 
guaranteed by imposing constraints o f the form:
8 > 0
Where 8 =  a small number
If 8 is set at 0.01 the approximation is satisfactory, though there is often 
unimportant cycling between solutions close to the optimum. This precision is 
perfectly adequate for defining portfolios' proportions. Moreover, one can usually 
move from any portfolio to  any other realistic one, in about 15 steps restricted in 
this way. This is typically much less than the number o f cycles necessary to generate 
frontier constraints. It is open to another analyst to vary 8 during the analysis or, as 
I successfully did, to  establish frontier constraints using this quick approach but to 
define a precise solution using the non-linear optimiser.
One other approach m ight be used. There is in this approach to portfolio analysis a 
simple exploitable analogue to  the more general Kuhn Tucker conditions o f 
Quadratic Programming. Amongst those investments constituted w ithin a portfolio, 
the marginal value w ith respect to /  w ill be the same for all the investments w ithin 
the portfolio. (If this were not so, an arbitrage gain can be secured by increasing the 
proportion o f an investment w ith higher marginal value, at the expense o f one w ith 
a lower one). The marginal gain for any investment is the partial differential o f the 
objective function w ith respect to the proportion o f that investment. If we generalise 
the formula for the cost o f residual variance (from the unit standard deviation 
assumption used above) we can say:
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V = f
= ' L wi £ f i a/ t - c-s
(8.13)
Where a t-  standard deviation o f price residuals for investment i 
after allowing for market related movements based 
on an assumption o f independence.
S= ,2
V{ = linear elements o f value exclusively associated with 
per unit o f price
Other variables as previously defined
Accordingly, if one can establish the weights o f the linear attributes and then rank 
all projects in the order o f the calculated Vt , then there w ill be a cut-off point, say,
Vc such that all investments w ith V( greater than Vc w ill be in the portfolio and all 
others w ill be excluded. Vc represents the marginal value o f all investments in the 
portfolio. We can say for all investments in the portfolio that:
In summary the cut-off marginal value Vc determines the f t and fully defines the 
portfolio. In the simplified assumptions ADEMI have used, the optimal fractions are 
proportional to the (V{ -V c). In principle this could be applied directly if weights
were to be established outw ith the Dora-D procedure. In the formulated problem, 
the pre-emptive constraint requiring BetaD to be no greater than zero, introduces a
Vc = V - d . f t f
(8.14)
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minor complication. Cut-off rates are also used in MPT (Elton and Gruber, p i84) 
though the above derivations are not immediately related.
8.7 Using Frontier Probing to  generate portfolios- A  practical example.
To illustrate the use o f the methodology to generate buy and sell decisions, I 
describe its use in the review conducted in early May 2002, based on price data for 
29 April and financial data published by Hemmington-Scott and Company REFS (ie 
some four years later than the "single share" analysis described). As before, I have 
tried to  relate it w ithout over-tidying the analysis. However, some minor arithmetic 
errors were made in the live run in the specification o f Fundamentally Decomposed 
Preferences. These were tested against the value function developed, and confirmed 
as having no significance. However, the analysis was re-synthesised w ithout this 
imprecision. (I use the term re-synthesised rather than replicated. There can be 
sensitivity in the parameters o f a particular frontier constraint selected at a particular 
moment to initial conditions and sensitivity o f the detail o f portfolio weights to 
small changes in value weights. Issues were therefore revealed in a different order). 
Also, as one moves towards a practical portfolio there is also an inevitable and 
desirable stage o f "tinkering" and exploring variations conducted at a speed and 
style, such that detailed recording is impracticable w ithout distorting the 
consideration process, and is unilluminating.
The analysis may be seen as unrealistic in one respect. I have tended to redevelop 
weights from first principles in each quarterly review (except as mentioned above). 
Had I not been developing methodology, it is likely that I would have settled on a 
set o f weights, which I would have changed slowly from period to period. I would 
not expect other decision makers to re-synthesise their value functions once they 
had established a representation to their general satisfaction.
The share portfolio o f my wife and myself consisted principally o f shares w ithin that 
part o f the FI5E 350 for which data was conveniently available, selected on the 
basis o f past model analyses. There was nevertheless some untidiness. Three 
financial sector shares were held, arising from purchases prior to their exclusion 
from explicit analysis or for other reasons. Two telecommunications shares were 
held arising from a series o f acquisitions and divestments from a purchase made 
several years ago. Both o f these have been marked for disposal, one, Vodaphone, is
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within the review group and, though a "sell" on the basis o f the model, has been 
temporarily retained by my w ife and myself on tim ing grounds. Two further 
technology shares (one purchased prior to  the development o f the model and one 
purchased more recently on speculative grounds) are retained. One o f these, Sage, 
is in the review group and not favoured by the model. Our "stake" in this has been 
reduced but I still consider it a desirable holding. (I remark, en passant, that the 
attributes peculiar to  companies whose development prospects outweigh their 
prospective shorter term contributions, have not at this stage been incorporated in 
the model. Ad hoc treatment appears appropriate in circumstances where, 
generally, we favour a conservative perspective).
A t the tim e o f this analysis we held three shares, purchased on the basis o f the 
model, in companies that had dropped-out o f the index for which data was 
routinely provided (in one case the share had been promoted again but data had 
not yet been re-included in the material provided by Hemmington-Scott). The 
practice I adopt in such cases, is to synthesise the value function w ithout them and 
to assess them for sale or retention outside the main analysis, using a Ready- 
Reckoner Spreadsheet based on the model and using data o f the same form. 
Purchases from outside the FT5E350 are not considered. Also available for disposal 
on an individual share or shares on the basis o f the model, is a holding in an 
investment trust, Foreign and Colonial. Its disposal is a matter o f judgement but I 
am usually disinclined to purchase in parcels o f much less than 5% o f portfolio 
value, preferring to  keep this already diversified holding, rather than purchasing 
smaller parcels which m ight be suggested by the model.
The shares held w ithin the review group prior to this analysis were as shown in 
Table 8.6.
O f these only Sage and Vodaphone were not originally selected w ithin a Dora-D 
based procedure. The three shares originally selected by aid o f the model, but now 
outside the routine review group are Ashstead Group, New Look and Mayflower 
Corporation.
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8.7.1 General approach of May 2002 analysis
ASDEMI, based on experience to date over the project as a whole, decided to base 
the value self-elicitation on 4 principles:
- Retention of particular weight relativities, established by experience of 
previous analyses (eg those connecting historic EPS trend variables to 
each other, keeping open their collective connection to other variables). 
These have been discussed above.
- Selection of an appropriate Reference Portfolio.
- Ranking of Fundamentally Decomposed Choices derived in a "portfolio" 
variation of Larichev Decomposition.
- Attribute Weight Capping.
Within the reference group there were three shares which, ab initio, 1 excluded from 
consideration within frontier defining portfolios, because of extreme magnitudes of 
one or more statistics. These were Energis, Eurotunnel and Marconi.
8.7.2 The Reference Portfolio
The Reference Portfolio can be an important influence on the value function used to 
determine an optimum portfolio. As discussed, the methodology seeks to find the 
Efficient Peer of the Reference Portfolio, subject to whatever additional constraints, 
reflecting a decision maker's preferences, that might also be added-in. As also 
discussed it might be reasonable in some circumstances to accept such an efficient 
peer without additional elicitation. On the other hand if expressed preferences fully
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circumscribe available latitude, the Reference Portfolio has no ultimate influence. 
Bases for possible Reference Portfolios might include:
- A good qualitative guess or "pet" portfolio.
- A portfolio derived by other methods (eg lexicographically)
- An existing or previous portfolio with satisfactory characteristics.
- An "index" or average market portfolio.
In this case, ASDEMI was in some sense tiying to emulate the market whilst 
wanting the characteristics of financially well-managed, reliable companies, and a 
simple criterion. The Reference Portfolio therefore chosen was the top 15 shares in 
the Reference group by Market Capitalisation in equal proportions. The shares were 
Anglo American, Astra Zeneca, BAE Systems, BG Group, BP, BAT, British Sky 
Broadcasting, BT, Diageo, GlaxoSmithKline, Rio Tinto, Shell Transport and Trading, 
Tesco, Unilever, Vodaphone. The attributes associated with this portfolio for May 
were as in Table 8.7.
Table 8.7 Reference Portfolio Attribute Values
SRSS NG CR QE-5 QE-4 QE-3 QE-2 QE-1 EPS0 EPS+2
0.258 -0.317 0.001 23.96 20.24 16.38 12.73 8.774 4.531 5.526
r + V r* r FT2 NT2 DO CO RSNO BetaD SG 1R
2.335 0 -1.627 -0.112 0.578 -0.436 2.306 2.71 -4.939 -0.494 0.045 284.0
8.7.3 Generating Fundamentally Decomposed Choices for ranking, based on the Larichev 
Method
In the methodology described in Chapter 7, a Best Dominated Choice (BDC) is 
derived from the set of all extreme-point efficient options. Maximal Efficient Choices 
(MECs) are then generated by finding the highest incidence of each attribute, from 
amongst the permitted efficient options, and combining each of those attribute 
magnitudes into a package with other attributes drawn from the BDC. Every choice 
so generated thus differs from every other choice only in two attributes. They are 
thus weakly efficient [1,1] choices.
The methodology of generating BDCs was originally conceived for situations where 
all options were explicit. Only recently have I appreciated that, at least, an 
approximate, "Best Dominated Choice" for the Portfolio extension of Dora-D could 
also be simply generated. Instead I used, and use here, the Reference Portfolio in 
the same way as the BDC. It should be noted that this Portfolio though generally
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inefficient w ill not be dominated by all, or even most, efficient options, though the 
efficient [1,1] choices generated from it w ill, indeed, dominate it. However, if our 
Reference Portfolio is sensibly chosen, and is not itself close to efficiency, we can 
reasonably expect our optimal solution to lie in the positive orthant (oriented by 
value) o f the attribute space w ith the Reference Portfolio at its origin. 
Notwithstanding, this expectation is not essential. The selection o f Reference 
Portfolio does not prevent the value function eventually developed, pointing to  a 
solution which does not dominate the Reference Portfolio.
To generate the MECs I used the NLP facilities o f What's Best to find the portfolios 
which, in turn, maximised each attribute (or minimised them in the case o f 
unfavourable attributes) subject to no attribute having an inferior value to those in 
the Reference Portfolio. The MEC corresponding to a particular attribute was a vector 
w ith  the attribute at its most favourable value and w ith all other elements set to be 
no less than Reference Portfolio levels. The most favourable values o f each attribute 
were as in Table 8.8.
Table 8.8 Most Favourable Attribute Values
SRSS NG CR QE-5 QE-4 QE-3 QE-2 QE-1 EPSO EPS+2
0.064 0 0.881 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9.098 9.849
r + r* T* r PT2 NT2 DO CO RSNO BetaD SG IR
N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.032 0 4.954 14.54 0 N/A 1.054 N/A
Instead o f attribute values for individual QE-n, a composite attribute referred to as 
adjH EPS was used instead. This was the aggregate over all the accumulation 
periods, including EPSO, o f the average EPS over the period. This was to enable a 
preference constraint to  be imposed reflecting aggregate EPS weight, whatever 
period it related to. The maximum value o f this composite was 47.47 compared 
w ith  25.30 for the Reference Portfolio. Similarly as the relative weights between 
T ++,T+',T"+,T ~ were pre-determined, an adjusted T attribute, expressed in 
equivalent terms to T ++ was used. This composite attribute, ad jT , was equal to 
T +++0.5T +'+3T ++6T' =5.532.
As BetaD was to  be constrained to be less than or equal to  0 and no valuation view  
was to  be taken on its weight, no minimum value o f this attribute was sought. In 
this series o f analyses this constraint was never critical. Although a minimum SRSS 
value was found this statistic was not used. As IR for the reference portfolio was
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already the maximum that could be obtained for an equal weight portfolio o f 15 
shares, this was not used to generate a [1,1] choice corresponding to the attribute. 
The alternative treatment used is mentioned below.
In the next stage I specified [1,1] choices for which preferences would be declared. 
These are the differences between the attribute magnitude in the Reference Portfolio 
and the value o f that attribute in its MEC; that is the differences in the values o f 
Table 8.7 from those o f Table 8.8. Relevant differences are shown in Table 8.9. The 
value for PT2 is as used, including a small transcription error. The magnitude above 
for IR is based on different and arbitrary principles. I found the minimum IR subject 
to other attributes remaining above their reference portfolio levels. A t this stage I 
om itted consideration o f adjH EPS.
Table 8.9 Differences between Most Favourable Value o f Attributes 
and their Values in the Reference Portfolio
NG CR AdjH
EPS
EPSO EPS+2 AdjT PT2 NT2 DO CO RSNO SG




I then ranked my initial preferences for the other differences. These were:
(AC0=11.83) >- (AAdj T=8.75) >- (AEPS+2-11.83) >- (ANG=0.317) 
(ACR=0.88) >- (ASG=1.009) >- (APT2=2.545) >- (AEPS0=4.568) >- 
(AD0=2.648) >- (ANT2=0.436) >- (ARSNO=4.933) >- (AIR-260) 
Where (AS=n) >- means that a change in Attribute S 
o f n is strictly preferred to ...
This translates to  LP constraints as follows:
11.83 JF(C0) > 8.75 W(T) >11.83 IF(AEPS+2) >0.317 JF(NG) >
0.88JF(CR) > 1.009 FF(SG) > 2.545fF(PT2) > 4.568fF(EPS0) >
2.648 FF(D0) > 0.436JF(NT2) > 4.933fF(RSNO) > 260IF(IR)
Where IF(S)= Weight o f Attribute S in value function.
In addition to  these, I imposed that the weight o f NT2 must be at least tw ice that o f 
PT2. Also, whilst I had notionally made comparisons between EPSO and EPS2,1 
recognised that I was using EPSO as a proxy for all historic EPS measures and I
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therefore represented the relativity found ostensibly for EPSO, as a constraint on the 
weight o f AdjH EPS.
8.7.4 Initiating Frontier Probing
In setting up the LP/NLP cycles, I imposed some technical constraints. First to  
prevent unbounded solutions and to  speed the early iteration process, I imposed a 
lim it o f 10 on the valuation o f any portfolio. I also lim ited the valuation contribution 
o f any individual attribute to  1 .0 .1 set-up the first cycles o f the LP/NLP routine to 
make use o f the linear approximation already discussed. This requires that a 
portfolio found at the end o f any cycle, is a close relative o f the initial solution for 
each cycle. I imposed that the proportion o f any share in a portfolio at the end o f a 
cycle, would not differ by more than ± 1 percentage point. I also required the first 
such initial solution to be the Reference Portfolio. The reader is reminded that the 
Frontier Probing Cycles follow  the sequence:
1. Specify constraints, including:
Constraints on the latitude o f the value function. Initially here, 
those derived from the ranking o f FDCs.
Constraints arising from the requirement that no explicit portfolio 
may have a value o f more than 1.
Technical constraints and any other constraints imposed on 
solutions.
2. Find the CAF o f the Reference Portfolio by maximising the value o f that 
portfolio, subject to  those constraints.
3. Find the portfolio having the highest value, using the CAF found, subject 
to  technical constraints- and its value.
4. If the portfolio found has a valuation materially above 1, the CAF violates 
the requirement that no CAF is allowed that causes any portfolio to  be 
valued at more than 1. Accordingly, generate a constraint to  ensure, in 
subsequent cycles, that portfolio shall always be valued at no greater than
1. Add this to the constraints used in the prior cycle.
5. Start the next cycle.
W ithin the Excel-What's Best-VBA Macro approach adopted, the cycles are 
controlled semi-automatically. Initial constraints and evolving preference constraints
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are manually specified but the generated constraints are added-in automatically. 1 
ran the routine through 10 cycles.
A t this point the "value" o f the portfolio found was 1.0 (though still marginally above 
zero). The actual portfolio was o f no consequence but the CAF found was examined. 
ADEMI felt this indicated an excessive contribution to  value o f attribute CO, which 
was at its artificial upper bound o f 1.0. The technical objections to constraining 
contribution other than as a crude bounding constraint has been discussed, I moved 
to capping the weight o f CO and lim ited this to  0.2.
I ran the routine through to cycle 12. The value o f the portfolio then found was 
1.47; I therefore ran it through to cycle 15 w ithout modification. The value o f the 
portfolio then produced was 1.03. This would have been too high at the terminal 
stages o f analysis but was low  enough to review weights.
The contribution o f EPS2 seemed excessive and I capped the attribute weight at 
0.05. A t this stage I switched to  precise optim isation and ran the analysis through 
to cycle 19. The contribution o f CO was still high at 50.5% o f value and the weight 
was capped at 0.02.
After cycle 20 objective function was 1.03. The shape, but not the content, o f the 
portfolio was examined. I felt that it was insufficiently diversified. I accordingly 
sought to penalise concentration somewhat more severely by increasing the weight 
o f SRSS from 0.5 to 1.0. Cycle 21 was then run.
The measured portfolio value was 1.03. DO now seemed somewhat high, its weight 
was capped at 0.05.
In cycle 22 the objective dropped to 0.814. This normally implies mutual 
incompatibility between value indicating constraints- in this case either over-zealous 
capping or interaction between the caps and the Larichev ranking constraints. Now 
CO seemed too light and the attribute weight lim it was raised to 0 .025 .1 ran cycle 
23.
The objective function still indicated problems and I decided to demote NG and CR 
in the ranking to below SG and PT1. This was shown to be to little  effect in cycle 24.
I decided to break the link between EPS2 and SG in the FDC rankings. SG seemed 
low  and the constraint was critical. I then ran to  cycle 26.
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This resulted in a portfolio value o f 1.00 but unfortunately, w ithout the Larichev 
ranking constraint, SG became excessive and its attribute weight was capped at 0.3. 
This pushed the objective function down to  below 1 again, to  0.914 in run 27
I then allowed historic EPS (which in the set o f runs was only influencing EPSO) to 
come up by relaxing its coefficient in the Larichev constraints to 4.0. In run 28 this 
had the effect o f restoring optimal portfolio value to 1.00.
The weight o f NG now seemed too high notwithstanding its earlier demotion. I 
lim ited its weight to 0.3 in cycle 29 which again over-suppressed valuation o f the 
optimal portfolio to  0.861.
The constraint on CR in the FDC rankings suppresses the coefficient o f CR relative to 
NG. A relative weighting o f NG being at least tw ice that o f CR is quite sufficient and 
this effect is achieved by dropping the weight o f CR in the Rankings to 0.632. But 
this did not allow significant movement in the value o f the objective, 0.870.
I then relaxed the NG cap from 0.3 to 0.5 and in cycle 31 the objective went into 
the residual latitude area w ith a value o f 1.004.
The general characteristics o f the weights and contributions in the optimal portfolio 
at this point, seemed generally satisfactoiy. T^+ seemed somewhat light and I 
therefore experimented w ith fixing its weight at 0.03. Cycle 32 demonstrated that 
this did not use up residual latitude (Objective = 1.003)
I therefore did the same w ith NT1 forcing its weight to 0.15 in run 33. The optimum 
portfolio value was then 1.008, sufficiently close to unity not to  require the 
interposition o f further frontier constraints. I was then generally content w ith the 
attribute weights and the relative contribution o f the attributes to the value o f the 
optimal portfolio found at that point. These then constituted the weights o f the 
attributes in the CAF o f the Reference Portfolio under the preferences declared, and 
consequently my value function; they are shown in Table 8.4. The optimal portfolio 
corresponding to this and the attribute values for this portfolio are:
Table 8.4. Coefficient o f Attributes In ADEMl's 
Value Function after Frontier Probing
SRSS NG CR QE-5 QE-4 QE-3 QE-2 QE-1 EPSO EPS+2
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1.0 0.454 0.227 0 0 0 0 0 .0358 .05
r + T ' T* T PT2 NT2 DO CO RSNO BetaD SG IR
0.03 0.015 0.09 0.18 0.075 0.15 0.05 0.025 0.013 0 0.3 .00025
Table 8.5. Optimal Portfolio corresponding to  Value Function
AMEC PLC 0.65%
Anglo American PLC 3.47%
ARRIVA PLC 10.26%
Barratt Developments PLC 8.03%
Carpetright PLC 5.33%
Collins Stewart Holdings PLC 10.79%
Dairy Crest Group PLC 4.92%
Davis Service Group (The) PLC 1.49% 
DFS Furniture Company PLC 15.46%
G K N PLC 5.10%
ICAP PLC 0.94%
Inchcape PLC 1.95%




Taylor Woodrow PLC 6.15%
W  H Smith PLC 3.46%
Wimpey (George) PLC 3.35%
Table 8.6 Attribute values for Optimal 
Portfolio after Frontier Probing
SRSS NG CR QE-5 QE-4 QE-3 QE-2 QE-1 EPSO EPS+2
0.306 -0.180 0.454 35.35 30.79 25.55 20.15 14.32 7.69 8.49
r + T~ T + r PT2 NT2 DO CO RSNO BetaD SG IR
3.70 0 -0.57 0 0.87 -0.11 3.32 7.58 -0.028 -0.366 0.320 129.7
8.7.5 Generating dealing decisions
It w ill be noted that o f the 19 shares generated in the analysis thus far, 5 already 
form part o f the existing portfolio. The initial suggested proportions o f these shares 
was 21.5%.
The issue o f portfolio stability has been discussed. Generally my w ife and I are 
prepared to turnover 20-30% o f an existing portfolio, selling the worst and buying 
the best. However, this can be increased, if  shares suggested seem attractive, or 
reduced, if not. An additional factor here is the size o f parcels suggested, we 
generally prefer not to  purchase in parcels much below 4%. We are also averse, 
since a price fall in a large holding, to large parcels, say, over 12% o f aggregate 
portfolio. (I recognise a dichotomous attitude in myself, and believe I am perhaps
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relaxed w ith "flatter" portfolios than the statistical approach leads to). It is also open 
to  us to convert Foreign and Colonial, if  an attractive proposition is suggested.
These aspects are questions o f judgement which have been incompletely modelled. 
However, optim isation w ithin turnover constraints can be readily handled.
The next stage therefore was to generate an optimal portfolio, in this instance such 
that 70% o f existing holdings are retained. When this was done the shares in Table
8.7 were suggested.
However, w ithin the Comparison Set, as mentioned, there are tw o shares, Sage and 
Vodaphone, to be retained at least temporarily. When these are forced in the 
suggested portfolio became, as per Table 8.8.
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Table 8.8. Suggested Portfolio with 
Vodaphone and Sage forced In.
ARRIVA PLC 4.80%
Barratt Developments PLC 12.40%
Bellway PLC 2.78%
Brake Bros PLC 0.25%
Carpetright PLC 0.08%
Collins Stewart Holdings PLC 5.31%
Dairy Crest Group PLC 11.79%
Davis Service Group (The) PLC 8.06%




Sage Group (The) PLC 3.60%
Taylor Woodrow PLC 10.84%
Travis Perkins PLC 3.18%
Vodafone Group PLC 4.72%
There were no Increase suggestions; Retain (or Substantially Retain) suggestions 
were Barratt, Dairy Crest, Davis, Rexam, Rolls Royce, and Taylor Woodrow; Reduce 
suggestions were Bellway, and Travis Perkins; Sell suggestions (including shares 
where very small retentions were indicated) were Brake Bros, Enterprise Inns, FK1 
and Innovation Group; Suggested significant Buys were Arriva, Collins Stewart, DFS 
and Persimmon.
All these were reviewed, particularly using the REFS detailed company fact sheets, 
which include Brokers' recommendations. My wife and I rejected Arriva (which had 
previously been in and out of our portfolio on the basis of the model) on the 
grounds of uncertainty related to public transport policy. Persimmon seemed 
attractive but there was a diversity issue; Barratt, Bellway, Taylor Woodrow, and 
Travis Perkins were in related markets. However, as some of these would probably 
be sold or reduced this was not critical. Before finalising others, the model 
suggestions were re-analysed constraining Arriva out, new purchases were subject 
to an additional arbitrary limit of 10% of portfolio value. The revised 
recommendations are in Table 8.9.
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In the original analysis Collins Stewart was suggested as 7.4% and GKN was higher 
than Carpetright, at 2.0% at this point. It was decided to sell Brake Bros., Enterprise 
Inns, and FKI and to  sell approximately half the holdings in Bellway and in Travis 
Perkins. It was further decided to reinvest all proceeds w ith miscellaneous cash 
balances in the relevant accounts principally in Collins Stewart, DFS, and Persimmon 
in approximately equal proportions. A  smaller purchase o f approx 1/3 the quantum 
o f the other 3 was also considered, for which Carpetright and GKN were candidates. 
GKN was decided upon. O f the unconstrained portfolio value, measured as 1.008, a 
0.102 drop arises from the requirement o f 70% retention o f the existing portfolio. 
There is a further 0.064 from constraining Arriva out and Sage and Vodaphone 
constraints. The purchase quantum roundings (embracing differences in the 
recommendations from the reconstructed model) account for a value deviation o f 
0.0034.
Generally there is considerable insensitivity o f value, to  imprecision in proportions o f 
shares in a portfolio provided, the issue is the quantum not the fact o f inclusion.
Thus a 3 percentage point increase from optimum in the holding o f Collins Stewart, 
causes an attrition o f measured value o f only 0.002.
8.8 Conclusions relating to  the portfolio procedure 
I am broadly happy w ith the application o f the portfolio procedure to my 
investment problem based on the tw o mechanics used. This is despite, in this 
review, generating mutually incompatible sets o f preferences at a point in the
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analysis. Further thought is necessary to  ensure, as analyst and decision maker, that 
the FDCs that are developed are the most useful ones, in the sense o f allowing the 
easiest judgements. As analyst and decision maker I recognised an unhelpful 
introspective pressure to  force a preference rather than settling for "don't know" and 
then, if necessary, seeking to exploit "close to indifference". Generally where there 
was a mental conflict I felt "happier" w ith Capping, using this to avoid extremely 
unbalanced contribution effects. However, I recognise that this could be a self 
deception and believe that comparison o f FDCs is a more direct principle.
I am increasingly conscious o f wanting more conjunctive valuation (two symptoms 
o f this may be my apparent dislike o f parametrically polarised models, feeling 
happier when all factors have a moderate representation in the valuation; and my 
desire for "flatter" portfolios). More recently I have started to explore its 
incorporation in the portfolio model. I would also like to find ways to avoid onerous 
pre-processing o f data and I have started to  explore whether rank data, used 
cardinally, in association w ith the general configural model, may allow simplification 
w ithout loss o f power. It would appear to diminish the problems o f spurious data in 
the tails o f distributions and could avoid some o f the complicated transformations I 
have hitherto fe lt constrained to adopt.
I am also exploring partitioning into groups o f attributes (not necessarily disjoint), as 
an aid to achieving easier weight evaluation; notably dividing attributes into safety 
factors and performance factors.
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Chapter 9 Testing the approach using simulation
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I review the performance o f the methodology. I consider only issues 
o f the mechanical efficacy o f Dora-D to convert statements o f preference, which 
simulate a variety o f elicitation devices, into consistent and, for the expressed 
values, optimum decisions. Accordingly, I ignore issues o f the psychological 
reliability o f the elicitation device. Indeed, I assume that the simulated decision 
maker is totally reliable and consistent in the weights he or she attaches to 
attributes and, in binaiy preference situations, he or she can declare an accurate 
strong preference however slight the value advantage. The main purpose o f the 
simulations was to:
(a) Pragmatically demonstrate that Dora-D w ill progressively reduce the 
potential optima and find an optimum.
(b) Indicate the relative speed o f convergence for the mechanics used.
Most o f the simulations test variations in elicitation mechanics for the discrete 
decision linear model (ie the basic model), though a configural discrete model and a 
portfolio model are also demonstrated.
I start by outlining the data used. In order to facilitate comparison between 
mechanics, ten standard sets o f data are predominantly used. These serve to 
represent problems o f moderate size and complexity.
An encapsulation o f the m ultiple attribute decision analysis is to find the weights 
that attach to  attributes. In the simulations I use a concept o f revealing "Hidden 
Weights". Both the concept and values used are explained to the reader. The 
simulated decision maker is assumed to express preferences exactly and 
consistently, in accordance w ith these values, but the simulated decision maker is 
deemed unaware o f the weights, which are only revealed to a simulated analyst 
through the expression o f preference, w ithin the analysis process being considered.
Two criteria o f analysis performance are then discussed. One, the Information View, 
focuses on the number o f options that remain potentially optimal. The other, termed 
the Performance View, concentrates on the average value, assessed using the
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"hidden weights'" o f the options, that at a particular stage remain potentially optimal, 
given the preferences declared.
The methodology used is briefly discussed which is centred on the Basic 
Methodology using the Andersen-Petersen variant. An issue arises here and the use 
o f a different option elim ination criterion in these simulations, from that 
commended for practical situations, is explained.
I then relate the various experiments undertaken. The first is by way o f context 
setting. A  decision by analyst and decision maker o f how many attributes to 
embrace in an analysis, is itself an expression o f value that influences both the 
number and identity o f potential optima, just as expressions o f preference do. A t 
extremes, it either completely determines the optimum, or fails to  eliminate any 
options, w ithout the need for further analysis. Taking the Information view  only, I 
examine how the number o f potential optima is influenced by the number o f 
attributes considered for inclusion in an analysis, and seek to  establish relationships.
Simulations 2 to 6 consider the impact o f reductions o f value function latitude, 
secured by expressions o f preference between options and different mechanics for 
identifying options for comparison. I address the extent to which reduction is 
achieved by Dora-D, if  such expressions are reliable. Different methods o f 
identifying options for comparison or prioritisation are examined.
Simulation 7 assesses the reduction achieved by the ranking o f attribute weights.
I go on to consider the mechanical efficacy o f Weight Capping, before examining 
tw o approaches to [1,1] decomposition.
Simulations 11 to 13 examine the effects o f mis-specifying a non-linear value 
mechanism as a linear one. Two true underlying value structures are investigated. In 
one o f these no major problems emerge. However, LP infeasibilities were caused in 
the other. Alternative methods o f proceeding are investigated, one appearing to be 
more effective.
I then move to  a situation in which non-linearity is considered possible, by 
assuming, within the simulated analysis, that the decision maker's values can be 
represented by the Modified Minkowski Metric. However, we still test this concept
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on a mis-specified model, by making the simulated decision maker's "actual'1 value 
function correspond to a m ultiplicative model. A  model in which we simultaneously 
seek both the arithmetic weight and power parameters is considered first. This is 
unsuccessful. In Simulation 15 we consider the Conservative Fixed Parameter 
methodology discussed in Chapter 7, finding more encouraging results. Finally, 
w ithin this group, the relationship between the configural parameter and the 
number o f efficient options at Initial Option Reduction is assessed, demonstrating 
relatively low variation.
9.2 The data
AH data are artificial. Ten sets o f data were used for most o f the analyses. Each o f 
these was a 5x50 matrix simulating 50 potential decisions in a selection situation 
characterised by 5 attributes, elements o f the matrix are the magnitudes o f those 
attributes for each option. The values for all attributes and for all sets o f data were 
generated in an identical manner. They were found using the random number 
generator o f M icrosoft Excel 97, from a seed o f 2813 in a single pass. This 
generated a 50 x 50 matrix consisting o f normally distributed random variables o f 
unit mean and unit SD. This was divided into the ten sets. These parameters provide 
for data sets w ith predominantly positive numbers but w ith a number o f negative 
numbers. This set o f data is designated as 5x50data_2810.
The reader should note, nevertheless, that any positive multiplicative scaling o f any 
variable constitutes a strategically identical problem. Any translation o f origin also 
generates a problem that is comparable, in the sense that it generates identical 
efficient options in the initial option reduction, and corresponding expressions of 
preference w ill generate the same optimum answer and the same ranking.
However, the attribute weights w ill be different, and final MCAs, although still 
represented on an interval scale, w ill also be different. The selection o f attributes 
w ith identical parameters therefore implies no loss o f generality w ith respect to the 
parameters. The selection o f a normal distribution is arbitrary though, w ith an 
additive value function, is consistent w ith a normal distribution in consequential 
values.
Value is assumed to increase w ith increases in the magnitudes o f all attributes.
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9.3 The "Hidden Weights"
It is assumed that the decision maker acts consistently w ith respect to hidden 
weights, known to the researcher and declared to the reader, but only revealed to 
the simulated analyst through the expression and incorporation o f preference, in the 
analysis process. In most analyses, exactly equal weights are used as the hidden 
valuation function (but see below). It is considered that this assumption is neither 
simpler nor more demanding than any other assumption. As the value function is an 
additive composite o f components that, for this exercise, are normally distributed, 
the distribution o f the option values w ill also be normally distributed, whatever the 
weights that underlie it, and can always be reduced to a distribution w ith standard 
mean and standard deviation. The identification o f the extreme point o f that 
distribution, the optimum option, would accordingly seem a priori to  be no easier 
nor more difficult, whatever the weights that constitute it. However, this 
assumption was checked by comparing the effectiveness o f initial stage reduction 
for an "extreme alternative", where the hidden valuation function has zero weight for 
all but one o f the attributes.
One partial elicitation methodology, the ordering o f weights, requires different 
treatment. To deal w ith this case, I effectively assume that there are infinitesimal 
differences from the evenly weighted case, such that first attribute is deemed to 
have infinitesimally higher weight than the second, the second than the third, the 
third than the fourth etc.
9.4 Criteria
9.4.1 Information View
I here take tw o complementary views o f the efficacy o f selection. One can be 
termed the Information View, the other the Performance View.
In the Information View the decision maker has a number o f options. In the absence 
o f values, criteria and methodology, we can say that each choice is equally likely. 
The task o f the decision analysis is, by means o f the expression o f preference allied 
w ith a method o f exploiting it, progressively to  polarise the probabilities so that at 
the conclusion one option can be assigned a probability o f unity o f it being 
optimum, w ith all others having a probability o f zero. If we had 64 choices at the
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commencement we would have a situation w ith an entropy o f 6 bits; that is 6 bits 
o f relevant information are necessary to convert options into a decision, a 
determined “system” w ith zero entropy. A statement by a decision maker that the 
value o f the decision is determinable from a single attribute, married w ith 
knowledge o f the magnitude o f that attribute for each option, is sufficient to  provide 
the information necessary to identify the optimum. Indeed, such a declaration 
provides the very much greater amount o f information (in fact log2 i bits)
/=2  to 64
necessary to generate a complete ranking. Precisely 6 bits o f information, sufficient 
to solve the optimum identification problem, would be provided by the statement 
"Option 8 is the option having the highest value for the relevant attribute” . 
Alternatively, 2 bits o f information would be provided, if  an unordered listing o f all 
the options in the top quartile were to be given.
If a decision maker were to assert that there were, say, 200 relevant attributes and 
that the value o f any option were to be fixed by an undetermined linear 
combination o f them, he or she would have provided virtually no useful 
information. But if  he or she were to make the same assertion in respect o f 2, 3, 5, 
or 10, some degree o f exploitable information would already have been provided, if 
a suitable analytic tool were also available to evaluate it. (O f course, if the 
information enabled the decision maker to improve the probability o f selecting the 
optimum without an analytic tool, some gain would be made; but he or she needs 
to double the probability to make a one bit gain. This is an issue o f calculation not o f 
judgement o f value, and a person should not expect to outperform a machine on 
this task. Indeed he or she m ight seriously under-perform it, and could reach a 
totally erroneous conclusion (eg by excluding the optimum)).
It m ight in principle be possible to make an analytic calculation o f the likely 
information gain, from the provision o f such statements given a method o f 
processing it. However, such a calculation appears an extremely complex one 
dependent on an assumption o f a prior distribution, and involves the mathematics 
o f statistical extremes. It is not attempted here.
Nevertheless, Dora-D can itself be used to estimate the exploitable information gain, 
by simulation. If remaining potential optimum options are equally likely, the
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information gain from the provision o f attribute data, if  associated with the means o f 
converting that data into information, w ill be given by:
\og2n -\og2ne
Where n = number o f options
ne = number o f efficient options 
(ie potential optima)
(9.1)
Similarly, in subsequent stages, the information gain associated w ith a particular 
mechanic can be measured in terms o f the reduction o f the number potentially 
optimal options that remain.
9.4.2 Performance View
The Information View only provides a measure o f the extent to which an optimum 
has been identified; that is the degree to which uncertainty in the specification o f 
the best option has been reduced. It provides no indication o f the amount by which 
an identified optimum is superior to  an alternative candidate. If a non-optimal 
option is infinitesimally different in value from that o f the optimum, the missing 
information is o f no consequence, but this may not be discernible. An alternative 
view  point that highlights this issue, is to  examine the expected true value o f 
remaining potentially optimal options and how this is improved by the provision o f 
preference indicating information.
We can define the Performance Gain associated w ith the provision o f any particular 
package o f information, as:
v —vopt av
Where G = performance gain
v, = average true value o f all options remaining 
potentially optimal after imposition o f prior 
and preference constraints at any stage i 
in the analysis 
vopt = true value o f the optimum option 
vm = average true value o f original options
(9.2)
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I use both Information Gain and Performance Gain, when testing elicitation 
mechanics, to  gauge the impact o f preference expressions w ithin the analysis 
structures.
9.5 Methodology and methodological issues
In the simulations the Basic Methodology was used in the manner described in 
Chapter 5, except where indicated. The test simulations were started before I had a 
clear understanding o f the relative merits o f including the option under assessment 
w ithin the Comparison Set, or using the Andersen-Petersen (AP) variation o f 
excluding it. I now favour excluding it for reasons mentioned in Chapter 5 and have 
usually excluded it here.
Much o f this is immaterial to  these analyses. However, it should be noted that the 
instances o f a measured MCA o f exactly one, w ill be treated differently. I have 
argued elsewhere that such an option should be retained until it can be excluded on 
other grounds, as it represents a potential tie. However, I exclude them as potential 
optima in these analyses, where in most examined situations all attributes have 
finite weights. The reason for this is that a strict preference between pairs o f real 
options are usually represented in these analyses by an x > y value constraint rather 
than, more properly but inconveniently, a strong one using the form x > y  + e . 
Instances where MCAs o f exactly 1 occur, w ithin these simulations under AP 
conditions, w ill usually be where such a strict preference constraint has come into 
effect, im plying a genuinely dominated, and hence non-optimal, option. This in no 
way invalidates the earlier suggestion for practical cases. Little is lost by retaining an 
option a little  longer, particularly when it is overtly flagged, and its proper status 
can be readily checked.
9.6 The simulations
9.6.1 Simulation 1. Contextual examination of inherent extractable information in declared 
attribute data.
In this set o f analyses I examine the information, relevant to the selection o f an 
optimal decision, inherent in the specification by a decision maker o f the number o f 
attributes that he or she considers relevant. As has already been discussed, the
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selection o f a single determined attribute w ill fully define the optimum solution. On 
the other hand, a failure to commit to any, or to allow a large number to be o f 
potential relevance, provides no, or negligible, information. Accordingly, simply to 
allow that some attributes may be relevant, is itself an intermediate expression o f 
value by the decision maker that can be exploited. The fewer attributes that are 
allowed, the more the latitude o f the optimum is circumscribed. This analysis 
attempts a quantification o f the impact o f such specification and provides a context 
in which the efficacy o f other expressions o f preference can be judged.
In the analysis here I take only an Information View, judging the information gain by 
the difference between the system variety or entropy when all options are equally 
likely, and the entropy when only potentially optimal options are included. The 
number o f potentially optimal (ie efficient) options are assessed by determ ining the 
MCA for each option in the option set, reviewed under AP conditions. The follow ing 
18 situations were examined:
(a) Situations w ith 10, 20, 30, and 40 options, each w ith 3, 5 and 7 sets o f 
attributes designated as relevant.
(b) Situations w ith 50 options, w ith 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 sets o f attributes 
designated as relevant.
The 5x50data_2810 was supplemented by a further set 5x50data_0422 generated 
in like manner to the first. This was used to provide additional attribute data for 
those situations involving 7 and 10 attributes. 10 cases were evaluated in each 
situation, that is a total o f 180 cases. Consistent subsets o f the 50 options cases 
were used to generate the cases for 10, 20, 30, and 40 options; in fact the first 10, 
20, 30 or 40 options o f each set. Similarly consistent subsets o f the 5 attribute cases 
were used to generate the data for lesser numbers o f attributes. The attribute data 
for the 10 attribute cases consisted o f the data for the 5 attribute cases, plus the 
supplementary data. The data for the additional 2 attributes in the 7 attribute cases, 
was that for the 5 attribute cases, in addition to a consistent subset o f 2 attributes 
from the supplementary data.
In addition to the above there were a set of single attribute situations for which an 
invariable single potential optimum could be assumed w ithout calculation.
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Each option, in each case, for every situation was evaluated using the Dora-D basic 
model, involving the execution o f approximately 6000 LP runs. For each case, the 
number o f efficient options was recorded. The potential optimum Entropy was 
calculated as:
£ ,= lo g 2n„,
Where Et = Entropy in respect o f uncertainty of 
optimum option, for case i 
ne i = number of efficient options for case i
(9.3)
The mean Entropy was calculated from the ten cases representative o f each o f the 
situations. These results are shown in Table 9.1.
Table 9.1-Entropy in respect o f uncertainty o f optimum option 
related to  total options and number o f declared attributes
No. attributes 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 Starting
No. Options Entropy
10 0.00 1.87 2.74 3.28 3.32
20 0.00 2.20 3.22 4.10 4.32
30 0.00 2.20 3.56 4.57 4.91
40 0.00 2.38 3.74 4.86 5.32
50 0.00 1.43 2.38 3.01 3.70 4.40 5.06 5.64
These data may be represented in alternative form, either as Information Gain 
achieved (Table 9.2), or as Proportion o f Information required to determine the 
solution (Table 9.3).
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Table 9.2- Information gain achieved by declaration o f attributes 
related to  total options
No. attributes 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 Starting
No. Options Entropy
10 3.32 1.45 0.58 0.05 3.32
20 4.32 2.12 1.10 0.22 4.32
30 4.91 2.71 1.35 0.34 4.91
40 5.32 2.95 1.59 0.46 5.32
50 5.64 4.21 3.26 2.64 1.94 1.25 0.59 5.64
Table 9.3- Proportion o f information required to  fully determine optimum 
provided by declaration o f attributes, related to  total options
No. attributes 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 Starting
No. Options Entropy
10 1.000 0.436 0.176 0.014 3.32
20 1.000 0.490 0.255 0.052 4.32
30 1.000 0.552 0.274 0.069 4.91
40 1.000 0.554 0.298 0.086 5.32
50 1.000 0.746 0.578 0.467 0.344 0.221 0.104 5.64
The follow ing generalised observations can be made:
(a) A  substantial reduction in the original difficulty o f identification o f optima 
is achieved by the specification o f a lim ited number o f relevant attributes; 
typically the entropy is o f the order o f 2-3 bits (corresponding optima 
shortlist 4-8) for a 3 attribute concentration, and 3-4 bits (corresponding 
optima shortlist 8-16) for 5 attributes. More than half the information 
necessary to identify a single optimum is provided, if 3 attributes are 
designated as being relevant, relative to  a situation in which no opinion is 
expressed, for problems w ith a medium to high number o f original 
options.
(b) Diminishing returns are achieved as the number o f attributes declared to  
be relevant increases. Thus, for example, the option reduction achieved
w ith  10 relevant attributes, is not materially better than the original 
problem when no opinion as to  relevant factors is given.
(c) Entropies for any specified number o f attributes are naturally lower w ith  
lower numbers o f starting available options, though the fall o ff is not as 
marked as I expected. The inform ation gain is higher in both absolute and 
proportional terms, w ith  higher numbers o f initial options.
In order to  a ttem pt to  formulate an empirical model o f the relationship between 
information provision and number o f attributes and total options, the logarithm (to 
base 2, which w ill be im p lic it throughout this Chapter) o f the number o f efficient 
options, was p lotted against the logarithm o f the number o f declared attributes for 
all cases for the 50 option situations. This p lo t is shown in Figure 9.1. This p lo t has 
10 points per attribute value, many coincident; coincident points are p lotted as one.
The graph strongly suggests a linear relationship through the origin. This is 
supported by a p lo t o f Average Entropy versus the Logarithm o f the number o f 
attributes for the alternative number o f options cases examined; as shown in Figure 
9.2.
Figure 9.1- Entropy versus A ttribu tes fo r 
50 Option Cases
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Similarly the Average Entropy of situations varying by the original number of 
options but fixed with respect to the number of attributes declared, was also plotted 
for alternative attribute numbers. These plots are graphed in Figure 9.3.
Figure 9.3- Average Entropy v Options
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The plots suggest an adequate linear approximation over the data range, though 
the standing of this empirical relationship is of lower order than that I suggest for 
the relationship of Entropy to Attributes.
In order to develop a generalised relationship it is perhaps convenient to depend on 
the proportionality of Entropy to the log of the number of declared attributes. If one 
divides the log of the number of efficient options, by the log of the number of 
declared attributes and averages over all cases with a specific number of starting 
options, one achieves a measure of Marginal Entropy (with respect to log number of 
attributes) which can be related to the number of options. Figure 9.4 plots these 
points with a fitted polynomial.
Figure 9.4- Marginal Entropy v No. of Options
1.4




2  0.4 
0.2
Log no. of Options
321
Thus an integrated rule o f thumb for calculating Entropy is:
Ein = A(«).(0.43P(0-0.028P(02)
Where Ein = Estimated Entropy in respect o f uncertainty o f
optimum option, for situation with i original options 
and n declared relevant attributes 
A (n) = log2«
P(/) = log2/
(9.4)
The use o f this rule o f thumb to  estimate the statistics o f Table 9.3 (which was based 
on the simulated data) is shown in Table 9.4. A  comparison o f the tw o tables shows 
that relative errors are highest for the higher numbers o f attributes and distortions 
are exaggerated for the lower numbers o f original attributes.
Table 9.4-Estimated proportion o f Information required, to  fully determine optimum 
secured by declaration o f attributes, related to  total options
No. attributes 1 2 3 4 5 7 10 Starting
EntropyNo. Options
10 1.000 0.466 0.218 -0.119 3.32
20 1.000 0.510 0.283 -0.026 4.32
30 1.000 0.536 0.321 0.028 4.91
40 1.000 0.555 0.348 0.067 5.32
50 1.000 0.728 0.569 0.456 0.369 0.236 0.097 5.64
9.6.2 Simulation 2. Focused comparison of preference between most overvalued option 
with another.
One method o f using Dora-D for single option decision identification, is for a 
decision maker to highlight anomalies in valuations suggested by MCAs and then 
specify preferences which circumscribe valuation latitude by “forbidding” the “out o f 
order” relationships highlighted. I make no comment in this section on the 
cognitive reliability o f this mechanic, considering only its analytic power. The 
approach may be given practical effect by identifying an option which appears 
overvalued and ranked above another decision which the decision maker considers 
is o f greater value; developing a constraint which ensures that the first option 
cannot have an assigned MCA greater than the second; rerunning the evaluation;
32 2
identifying a further anomaly to be resolved in a similar manner; and continuing 
until the decision maker is satisfied w ith the ranking obtained.
This set o f simulations, which was performed using the ten decision situations o f 50 
options w ith 5 declared attributes represented in 5x50data_2810, attempts to 
assess the optimum seeking efficacy o f this process. In practice such anomalies 
would be judged subjectively. However, for the purpose o f simulation, it is 
necessary to define a non-arbitrary criterion for selection o f each "anomalous" pair. I 
assume here that the simulated decision maker selects:
(a) as most overvalued option (A); the option having the highest ratio o f 
MCA to  true value.
(b) as comparison option (B); the option, from w ithin the group o f options 
having higher true values than the most overvalued option, that option 
having the lowest calculated MCA.
Having done so, a constraint on value, v(A) < v(B) , is imposed, and the MCAs 
recalculated by rerunning the set o f LPs for all options. The procedure is repeated 
until the decision maker is satisfied that there is no anomalous ranking.
For Data Set 1 the follow ing results were obtained.
Table 9.5- Results simulation 2: most overvalued option
Data set 1















None 0 10 3.322 0.731 2.322 0.411 0.527
37<49 1 9 3.170 0.752 2.474 0.438 0.564
26<15 2 6 2.585 0.807 3.059 0.542 0.661
19<14 3 4 2.000 0.870 3.644 0.646 0.772
46<26 4 3 1.585 0.891 4.059 0.719 0.808
21 <38 5 3 1.585 0.891 4.059 0.719 0.808
39<32 6 1 0.000 1.000 5.644 1.000 1.000
In Table 9.5, Preference A<B signifies that Option A is deemed by the simulated 
decision maker to have a value that is no higher than that of Option B. NTV is 
“Normalised True Value”, that is the average “true” value of the options described, 
calculated using the decision maker’s hidden valuation function, relative to the 
value of the true optimum. The remaining single efficient option after the 
declaration of these 6 preferences is the true optimum, for this data set, option Z. 
These results can also be represented graphically as in Figure 9.5:
Figure 9.5- Gain v No. of Preferences
a. on
1 nnI .uu 
n an ■ ■u.ou












) 5 10 1 
No. of Preferences
In undertaking these simulations for the other 9 data sets the following 
circumstances arose. In Set 2 there was a reduction from 12 efficient options to 3, 
after the specification of 5 preference pairs. However it took a further 5 preferences 
to determine the optimum. Similarly for Set 8, there was a reduction to 3 efficient 
options after the specification of 5 preferences, but it took a further 3 preferences to 
reduce the optimum candidates to 3, and a further 4  to distinguish the optimum. In 
both these cases the true values of the two additional options which were persistent 
in the efficient sets, were close in value to the optimum. The average of the NTV for 
the three persistent options was 0.970 for set 2 and 0.989 for set 8  suggesting that 
they had not been discriminated easily because they were close in value.
In a number of cases weakly efficient options (MCA=1) were found (eliminated as 
potential optima in this analysis). These appeared to arise when 1 efficient option 
was compared in a binary preference to another efficient option.
In three instances (Sets 6, 8,10) the optimum option was at some stage evaluated 
as the most overvalued option. In those instances the next most overvalued option 
was used as one of the members of the anomalous pair. In one instance (Set 8) an 
option was determined as most over-valued but already had the lowest MCA; the 
next most overvalued option was again used in the situation.
In all cases the hidden true optimum was correctly identified.
In all instances, expression of preference causes MCAs to migrate to lesser values 
(necessarily, MCAs can only reduce as value latitude diminishes). They move closer 
to a clear linear relation with the true value, with reducing dispersion. Figure 9.6  
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It should be noted that the information provided by six preferences is, in this 
instance, sufficient to resolve the optimum. However, it is not sufficient to provide 
an accurate full ordering of all options. Nor should one be surprised as the 
combinatorial information inherent in a complete order is of a far greater order than 
mere specification of one out of a few. The specification of further options would 
continue to improve the line.
The summary of results for all ten sets of data areas is shown in Table 9.6 and Figure
9.7 as follows:
Table 9.6- Results simulation 2: Most overvalued option 
Average over 10 Sets















None 0 13.200 3.703 0.746 1.941 0.344 0.476
1 10.600 3.383 0.767 2.261 0.401 0.518
2 8.600 3.048 0.800 2.596 0.460 0.583
3 6.700 2.651 0.828 2.993 0.530 0.641
4 4.300 2.011 0.877 3.633 0.644 0.744
5 2.600 1.208 0.950 4.436 0.786 0.897
6 1.600 0.475 0.991 5.168 0.916 0.981
7 1.600 0.475 0.991 5.168 0.916 0.981
8 1.500 0.417 0.990 5.227 0.926 0.980
9 1.300 0.258 0.996 5.385 0.954 0.992
10 1.100 0.100 0.999 5.544 0.982 0.998
11 1.100 0.100 0.999 5.544 0.982 0.998
12 1 0 1 5.644 1 1
Figure 9.7- Gain v No. of Preferences
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9.6.3 Simulation 3. Focused comparison of preference between most overvalued efficient 
option with another option.
In the previous simulations it was assumed that a decision maker can subjectively 
spot the most “out o f order” option and can partially correct valuations, by putting 
the test option below the worst evaluated superior case. In this simulation the 
perspective is altered so that the decision maker specifically considers only the most 
over-valued option amongst efficient options, that is those w ith an MCA greater 
than 1, but otherwise assesses them in like manner to simulation 2.
The average results obtained are summarised in Table 9.7 and Figure 9.8.
Table 9.7- Results simulation 3: Most over valued efficient option 
Average over 10 Sets















None 0 13.200 3.703 0.746 1.941 0.344 0.476
1 10.900 3.415 0.764 2.229 0.395 0.513
2 8.700 3.077 0.895 2.567 0.455 0.575
3 6.500 2.644 0.822 2.999 0.531 0.634
4 3.900 1.898 0.893 3.745 0.664 0.773
5 2.100 0.917 0.969 4.727 0.838 0.932
6 1.400 0.358 0.985 5.285 0.936 0.964
7 1.000 0.000 1.000 5.644 1.000 1.000
The reader w ill note that there is little  difference in the achievement relative to 
simulation 2, for lower numbers o f preferences, but a small, not necessarily material, 
gain around four/five preferences.
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9.6.4 Simulation 4. Comparison of preference between randomly generated pairs of options
In Simulations 2 and 3 the decision maker is assumed to make judged selections, 
the selection of the pair for scrutiny, as well as the expression of preference 
between the options within the pair, within the simulated process. In this set of 
analyses, it is assumed that the decision maker expresses preferences within pairs, 
but these pairs are randomly generated (once again using the facilities of Microsoft 
Excel), unguided by the Dora-D process.
For manageability of analysis the constraints are introduced in blocks of five but the 
analyses are in other respects of identical form to Simulations 3 and 4; that is the 
analyses were performed on each of the same ten sets of 50 option 5 attribute data 
with 50 LPs being executed on each pass to determine the MCA under AP 
conditions of each option. Those strongly efficient options with MCA(AP) greater 
than 1 remain potential optima. A summary of the results obtained are shown in 
Table 9 .8  and Figure 9.9.
Table 9.8- Results simulation 4; randomly generated pairs 
Average over 10 Sets















None 0 13.200 3.703 0.746 1.941 0.344 0.476
5 8.700 3.085 0.801 2.559 0.453 0.587
10 7.000 2.753 0.833 2.890 0.512 0.654
15 5.700 2.407 0.864 3.237 0.573 0.718
20 5.300 2.296 0.871 3.348 0.593 0.732
Figure 9.9- Gain v No. of Preferences
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Whilst information is brought to the process in a way which reduces the number of 
potential optima, the unfocused nature of the mechanic provides far less exploitable 
information than the focused procedures of Simulations 3 and 4. The gain achieved 
by the expression of 15 random preferences is little better than that achieved using 
3 focused ones. The information gain from 15 unfocused preferences is also roughly 
equivalent in information effect to the decision maker deciding to reduce the 
attributes considered relevant from 5 to 3.
329
9.6.5 Simulation 5. Progressive partial order development amongst efficient options.
In this set o f analyses we return to  the theme o f making focused comparisons but 
we allow prior Dora-D passes to “select” the options over which the decision maker 
is asked to make preference judgements.
The procedure is that after Initial Option Reduction, the simulated decision maker is 
asked to express a preference between the options having the tw o highest 
MCA(AP), which it reliably does on the basis o f its hidden valuation function. I again 
suspend judgement regarding the ability o f a decision maker to reliably assert such 
a preference, but note that in some sense we can look on these as the most 
contrasted amongst the potential optima, as each has a substantial advantage 
against the other when evaluated using its own CAF.
A value constraint based on the preference is imposed for the second pass and 
another option is identified w ith the highest MCA(AP) amongst the remaining 
efficient options. The decision maker is “asked” to place this option in correct value 
rank w ith respect to  the other two, forming a partial order o f three options. The 
procedure continues in like manner, creating rankings o f 3, 4, 5 etc until only a 
single efficient option remains.
The reader w ill note that the placing o f a new option w ithin an existing partial 
order, w ill usually be equivalent to  the expression o f more than one binary 
preference. Thus, if we say, when seeking to add a fifth option, that the fifth may 
w ith even chance slot anywhere w ithin the ordinal scale defined by the other 4, 
there is 100% chance o f 1+ comparison being necessary, an 80% chance o f 2+, a 
60% chance o f 3+, a 40% o f 4; or an average o f 2.8. More generally we can say that
the average number o f preferences that need to  be expressed is n (^ j/ + ^ j/  + ,
where n is the number o f options in the existing partial order. When assessing the 
effective number o f preferences expressed in the creation o f a partial order, 
allowance must also be made for the number o f binary preferences used to  generate 
the order, prior to the insertion o f the last option. For ease o f comparison w ith the 
binary preference mechanics explored, I w ill use this conversion to binary 
preference equivalence in the tables and graphs that follow. The rule worked well in 
comparison w ith the number o f true preferences expressed, when averaged over 
the data sets o f data used.
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Using Set t data the results obtained were as follows:

















None 0 10 3.322 0.731 2.322 0.411 0.527
19>37 1.00 9 3.170 0.752 2.474 0.438 0.564
16>19>37 2.67 8 3.000 0.764 2.644 0.468 0.585
16>42>19>37 4.92 6 2.585 0.791 3.059 0.542 0.633
16>32>42>19> 
37
7.72 5 2.322 0.788 3.322 0.589 0.627
16>32>29>42>
19>37
11.05 3 1.585 0.807 4.059 0.719 0.661
16>47>32>29>
42>19>37
14.91 1 0.000 1.000 5.644 1.000 1.000
Table 9.10- Results simulation 5; progressive partial order development
















None 0 13.200 3.703 0.746 1.941 0.344 0.476
1.00 11.700 3.522 0.751 2.122 0.376 0.486
2.67 9.500 3.204 0.771 2.440 0.432 0.522
4.92 6.700 2.657 0.791 2.987 0.529 0.564
7.72 4.600 2.121 0.794 3.523 0.624 0.573
11.05 2.600 1.309 0.875 4.334 0.768 0.738
14.91 1.200 0.200 0.983 5.444 0.965 0.959
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The mechanic appears more powerful than random pair generation but still 
considerably less so than the focused paired comparison, for example. However, it 
should be recognised that the procedure of Simulation 3 itself involves a complex 
judgement process which, if decomposed, can be construed as a partial order 
formation. It might be expected to be more discriminatory, here we merely seek to 
rank efficient options behind other efficient options (ie highly scoring options), there 
we rank them behind poorly scoring options, a more discriminatory principle.
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Nevertheless, the procedure serves progressively to isolate the optimum and does 
so more economically than universal comparisons, ab initio. The situation is less 
clear-cut if  one takes as a starting point the efficient options that remain after stage 
one reduction. One m ight note here that an efficient content-independent search, 
where a decision maker is cognitively competent to make consistent choices, 
requires one less comparison than the number o f original options existing, in order 
to determine an optimum. In this simulation, the subsequent average pace of 
reduction in the number o f potential optima, seems little  different from 
straightforward elim ination o f the reduced set remaining. The factors here are 
unclear, but it could be useful to explore whether additional efficacy is related the 
number o f potential optima remaining, compared to the number o f attributes 
considered relevant.
9.6.6 Simulation 6. Focused comparison of preference between the efficient pair of options 
having the highest MCA(AP) statistics.
The mechanic o f Simulation 5 had the m erit o f securing good information gain 
relative to  the number o f Dora-D reduction passes made. However, there was doubt 
as to the reduction effectiveness o f the approach if the construction o f partial orders 
Is considered in terms o f the number o f paired comparisons to which it is 
equivalent. Reference was made to the fact that it did not appear to be superior to 
an unstructured succession o f paired comparisons o f efficient options, which 
(because each such comparison makes a previously efficient option, inefficient) w ill 
generate an optimum, after as many comparisons as there are efficient options 
follow ing Initial Option Reduction, less one. In part this may be caused by the 
characteristic that to  place an efficient option w ithin an existing partial order, 
involves a comparison w ith one efficient option, but the other options w ithin the 
order are no longer potentially optimal.
In this series o f simulations we return to strict comparisons o f individual pairs, 
recalculating the efficient set and MCAs (under AP conditions) w ith a Dora-D pass, 
after specification by the simulated decision maker o f the preferred option w ithin 
each considered pair. The pair tested on each occasion are the tw o options having 
the highest MCAs amongst efficient options remaining; retaining the principle 
adopted in Simulation 6. I have already indicated that these options can be 
considered to be the “most different” insofar as the penalty for choosing incorrectly
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when the other is the optimum is, on the information available, the largest for these 
tw o options. There are other grounds. They are also, prima facie, the tw o most likely 
options; each such comparison secures the maximum reduction in a measure o f 
“possibility” even if this cannot be equated to  a probabilistic measure. Finally, it 
secures the maximum guaranteed aggregate reduction in MCA amongst the 
potential optima, this w ill be at least equal to  the second highest MCA as the MCA 
o f the least preferred o f the pair w ill reduce to no greater than 1 on the next Dora-D 
pass. MCAs o f other hitherto efficient options may also be reduced (possibly to 
below unity); though not the MCA o f the preferred option o f the pair. There is a 
guarantee the mechanic w ill be at least as effective as an efficient content- 
independent search, as we know that in making any comparison between efficient 
options we must secure a reduction in the number o f potential optima by at least 
one.
The results are summarised in Table 9.11 and Figure 9.12.
Table 9.11- Results simulation 6; Comparison between pairs o f efficient options 
having highest MCA(AP)s. Average over 10 sets















None 0 13.200 3.703 0.746 1.941 0.344 0.476
1 11.300 3.469 0.751 2.175 0.385 0.484
2 10.100 3.297 0.755 2.347 0.416 0.492
3 8.700 3.052 0.755 2.592 0.459 0.493
4 7.300 2.778 0.754 2.865 0.508 0.494
5 6.100 2.481 0.766 3.163 0.560 0.523
6 5.000 2.101 0.767 3.543 0.628 0.526
7 3.900 1.562 0.822 4.082 0.723 0.641
8 3.200 1.292 0.834 4.351 0.771 0.668
9 2.500 0.891 0.896 4.753 0.842 0.786
10 2.000 0.581 0.940 5.063 0.897 0.872
11 1.700 0.417 0.953 5.227 0.926 0.906
12 1.500 0.332 0.956 5.312 0.941 0.912
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In Figure 9.12 the magenta points designate the information gain for an efficient 
content-independent elimination.
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It w ill be noted that performance gain is lim ited over the first few preference 
introductions, im plying that early eliminations are not much more likely to be o f 
options o f lower than average true value. The information gain relative to  the 
minimum information line is useful, but it is not a radical gain. Indeed in tw o cases 
out o f the ten, the mechanic did no better than content-independent elimination 
and in tw o further cases just one comparison was saved. Some methodological 
issues are at stake. The measure o f both performance gain and information gain is 
dependent on an assumption o f equal likelihood amongst the efficient options that 
remain. It is apparent that MCA(AP) is related to  likelihood in the sense that options 
w ith a higher MCA have bigger domains o f variation in the value function under 
which the option are optimal. The optimum entered the pair for comparison, on 
average, by the third comparison. There is over the ten data sets, an average o f
13.2 initia lly efficient options. Therefore, on equal likelihood assumptions, we m ight 
expect the optimum to  enter the comparison pair on average by the sixth 
comparison.
There is one further ground for considering the approach is a useful one. I argue in 
this thesis that values are labile; that a decision maker, quite independently o f 
measurement or elicitation methodology issues, cannot stably and w ith precision 
retain weights w ithin his or her value system. Amongst efficient multiple attribute 
options, a decision maker may not be able to discriminate value beyond a lim ited, 
say a 3 bit, capability. This implies there is a level at which the potential for value 
improvement o f a particular option w ill be spurious. The level o f the MCA in excess 
o f 1 is a measure o f the maximum value advantage that a particular option can 
achieve relative to the best o f the rest. It follows that we can set a value o f MCA at 
which do not consider the matter worth pursuing, not because the value difference 
wouldn’t  be important if  a particular value function was the “true” function, but 
because it can never be said w ith sufficient precision that it was. One m ight set an 
MCA(AP) as a threshold not o f indifference but o f discrimination, say, o f 1.1. If one 
stops the search at this level, an average o f 6.1 comparisons would have been 
made over the test set. In reality, the true optimum o f the simulated decision maker 
(which differs from real decision makers in being able to retain its value’s perfectly) 
would have been found by this tim e in every case. If the threshold were to be 1.15, 
the number o f comparisons drops to an average o f 4.3. The optimum would have 
been correctly identified in 9 out o f 10 o f the test cases and in the tenth case the
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value o f the selected option would have been w ithin Vi% o f the value for the 
optimum.
An area for possible future research is to obtain a greater understanding o f how 
MCAs can be related to likelihood o f optim ality and, accordingly, get a fuller insight 
into the information and performance gain o f the approach.
9.6.7 Simulation 7. Ranking of Attributes.
In this series, the simulated decision maker places attributes in order o f potency.
The effect on the reduction in the number o f potential optima and the performance 
gain is evaluated. It w ill be recalled that the hidden weights are equal in value, that 
is equal in potency, and this remains the basis for identifying the true optimum and 
the value o f all options. However, notwithstanding, it is assumed that the "decision 
maker" w ill declare weak preferences. The "decision maker" when “asked” ranks the 
attributes in the order 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
For each set o f the ten, the reduction o f potential optima and their average 
Normalised True Value is found for five conditions. These are (1) No preference 
expressed; (2) weight o f attribute 1 is greater than or equal to 2; (3) weight o f 
attribute 1 is greater than or equal to  attribute 2, which is greater than or equal to  3; 
(4) weight o f attribute 1 is greater than or equal to 2, which is greater than or equal 
to 3, which is greater than or equal to 4; (5) weight o f attribute 1 is greater than or 
equal to 2, which is greater than or equal to  3, which is greater than or equal to 4, 
which is greater than or equal to  5.
The gains obtained over the ten sets are summarised in Table 9.12 and Figure 9.13.
Table 9.12- Results simulation 7; Ranking o f attribute weights by potency
Average over 10 sets
















None 0 13.200 3.703 0.746 1.941 0.344 0.476
w1>w2 1 11.900 3.556 0.748 2.088 0.370 0.481
w1>w2>w3 2 9.300 3.193 0.771 2.451 0.434 0.528
w1>w2>w3
>w4
3 6.300 2.609 0.800 3.034 0.538 0.591
w1>w2>w3
>w4>w5












Figure 9.13- Gain v Attibute Orderings
2 3
No. of Orderings
♦  Inform ation  
P erform ance
The effect o f these orderings can be compared w ith  the information gain im p lic it in 
reducing the number o f relevant attributes. W ith the test data, stating tw o  ordinal 
preferences is rather less effective than reducing the number o f attributes by 1; and 
specifying 4 orderings seems more effective than reducing variables by 2.
Placing all variables in order provides a similar additional gain in information to  that 
obtained in the initial option reduction. It appears an analytically potent mechanic, 
particularly as ordering o f attribute weights seems a psychologically more reliable 
expression than the comparison o f options varying simultaneously in m ultip le  
dimensions.
338
9.6.8 Simulation 8- Capping of Attribute Weights
As discussed previously, whatever the ability o f this or any other technique to 
eliminate options on the basis o f preference between real options, these w ill tend to 
require expression by a decision maker o f [m,n] preferences. This, I have argued and 
assume, is generally not a cognitively easy task, though it may be w ithin the 
competence o f some decision makers in some situations.
A decision maker may, however, “know what he/she doesn’t like” , in the light o f 
the implications o f a Dora-D pass. Dora-D “suggests” CAFs and indicates for any 
options CAF the contribution to value o f particular attributes. Decision makers may, 
from such evidence, be able to assert that particular attributes for some feasible 
CAFs are “over-weighted” . This is a concept that I feel comfortable w ith as a 
decision maker, and, whatever the psychological justification, is well established as 
a pragmatic procedure w ithin the OR paradigm, where a decision maker’s 
satisfaction w ith the implications o f a model, contributes either to  its validation or 
indicates flaws that should be addressed. I suggest that a decision maker may 
reasonably express upper bounds o f weights o f some attributes, and can 
progressively reduce value function latitude through re-examining the implications 
o f possibilities that persist, after successive Dora-D reductions.
This set o f simulations explores the extent to which potential optima are reduced, 
and measures the information and performance gains by a decision maker 
“capping” attribute weights. It is assumed that the simulated decision maker caps 
weights for all attributes at, respectively, factors o f 2.00, 1.50, 1.20, 1.10, 1.05,
1.02 o f the hidden true value o f the weights w ithin "his" value system. It should be 
noted that in practice a decision maker or analyst cannot make an actual 
determination o f his/her capping level. He or she merely states a level that they are 
"confident" represents an upper lim it. However, he or she is able to see the impact 
o f such judgements on the options that can remain efficient in the light o f such 
judgements and their corresponding CAFs.
I also examine for the test cases, the effect o f the decision maker capping only 
attribute 1; attributes 1 and 2; attributes 1 to 3; and attributes 1 to 4  at the 1.2 level. 
Tables 9.13-9.15 show how the declaration o f weight upper lim its reduces potential 
optima, and the extent o f the Information and Performance Gains over the test sets:
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All 1.20 1.60 2.00 2.90 6.80 10.40 13.20
Table 9.14- Proportion of information required to folly determine optimum 









All 0.965 0.901 0.848 0.764 0.528 0.406 0.344










All 0.999 0.972 0.954 0.903 0.682 0.561 0.476
Fig 9.14- Proportion of Information Gain v Capping Level 
All attributes capped
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In broad terms, capping all attributes at the 1.5 level provides half the information 
necessary to  determ ine the optim um , and a similar impact is achieved by capping 4 
attributes at the 1.2 level. If a decision maker can assess capping lim its for all 
attributes which are 1.2 actual attribute weights, then the decision maker is 
reducing the scale o f the problem to a sim ilar degree as if  he or she had asserted 
that 2, rather than 5, attributes were relevant.
9.6.9 Simulation 9- Supplemented Larichev Fundamentally Decomposed Preference
I have suggested that comparison o f [1,1] choices should be more psychologically 
reliable than choices o f Higher Order. In the next tw o  simulation sets I consider 
preferences between such fundamentally decomposed choices generated from the 
options. In the first o f these I use Larichev Decomposition. Using the method I have 
described in Chapter 7, r [1,1] choices (where r is the number o f attributes) are 
constructed from the efficient options generated on each Dora-D pass. These r 
choices, five in this set o f simulations, are ranked by preference to  the decision 
maker. The constraints so generated are used to develop another set o f efficient 
options and another set o f [1,1] choices until no further reduction is possible.
As w ill be commented, Larichev decomposition does not always reduce efficient 
options by as much as can be eventually achieved (it is surmised that the method 
w ill always reduce efficient options to  no more than the number o f attributes). 
Franklin decomposition can sometimes achieve further reductions, and so, in these
simulations, switches are made to Franklin if this situation is encountered. Larichev 
is equivalent to  Franklin for 2 remaining options. Accordingly, a Larichev reduction 
to 2 options cannot be improved by this extension.
As in Simulation 5, the ranking effectively involves several binary choices, an 
average o f 7.72 per pass for the attributes o f the test data. To facilitate comparison, 
equivalent binary preferences are tabulated in the analyses. The results averaged 
over the ten test data sets are shown in Table 9.16 and Figure 9.14.
Table 9.16- Results simulation 9: Larichev Fundamentally 



















None 0 13.200 3.703 0.746 1.941 0.344 0.476
1 7.72 4.500 2.089 0.861 3.555 0.630 0.712
2 15.44 2.500 1.123 0.940 4.521 0.801 0.874
3 23.16 2.100 0.832 0.970 4.812 0.853 0.937












Figure 9.14- Gain v Equivalent Preferences
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Only in 4  cases did potential optim a reduce to 1 by successive unm odified 
application o f the method. In tw o  further cases they reduced to  2. In the remaining 
four cases further reductions were possible by supplem enting the technique by
Franklin Decomposition; these were to  tw o  options in three cases, and to  3 options 
for case 8, where the true values o f the final candidates were close.
Information Gain per pass was good and, per equivalent binary preference, was 
comparable to the m ethodologies explored in Simulations 4 to  7, many o f which 
depend on cognitively more d ifficu lt elicitation. It is inferior in discrim ination to  the 
methods o f Simulations 2 and 3 but it  w ill be recalled that these involve s lo tting an 
overvalued option below another option selected for efficacy. This judgem ent brings 
extra information to  the problem. Performance gain relative to information gain is 
marginally superior in a number o f instances.
The method bears a sim ilarity to  comparison o f attribute weights and the results 
obtained are similar to the comparable test o f Simulation 7.
The m igration o f CRVs to  true values using this method is illustrated in Figures 9.16 
and 9.17.
Fig 9.15 M igration of CRVs to TRV by Larichev Decom position
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Fig 9.16 Migration of CRVs to TRV by Larichev Decomposition
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9.6.10 Simulation 10- [1,1 ] Franklin Fundamentally Decomposed Preference
In this series, the performance o f [1,1] Franklin Decomposition is explored, ab initio. 
Pairs o f efficient options are decomposed and attribute differences ranked, and 
converted into value constraints for subsequent Dora-D passes. The procedure is 
repeated until potential optim a reduce to one, or decompositions o f all pairs o f 
remaining potential optim a have been explic itly  examined. The results averaged 
over the ten sets are summarised in Table 9.17 and Figure 9.17.
Table 9.17- Results simulation 10: Franklin Fundamentally 



















None 0 13.200 3.703 0.746 1.941 0.344 0.476
1 7.72 7.600 2.878 0.823 2.766 0.490 0.632
2 15.44 4.300 1.952 0.898 3.692 0.654 0.787
3 23.16 2.400 1.117 0.966 4.527 0.802 0.927
4 30.88 1.900 0.800 0.982 4.844 0.858 0.962
Figure 9.17- Gain v Equivalent Preferences
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Generally, pure [1,1] Franklin Decomposition is inferior to supplemented Larichev 
Decomposition (that is, with switches to Franklin when the pure procedure "sticks"). 
The difference seems marked in the early passes, though after four passes both 
methods have secured good reduction. Franklin secured reduction to the optimum 
in 4 cases and to two options in 4 further cases. For case 8 it did not reduce below 
4. This was the same case that supplemented Larichev could not reduce below 3.
The difference between the Larichev and the Franklin methods is, although they are 
both based on decompositions of efficient options, the virtual choices derived in the 
Franklin approach are not necessarily themselves efficient. The Larichev choices, 
though dominated, are weakly efficient. We can be sure that if the choices were 
strongly efficient, each binary comparison would secure at least a one option 
reduction. I surmise that the slightly weaker Larichev condition is still highly 
discriminatory and provides powerful elimination, at least to the point where 
remaining options can simultaneously sustain an MCA of 1 (ie are on an efficient 
facet).
345
9.6.11 Simulation 11. The effect of model mis-specification from making false linear 
assumptions. Non-linear additive values.
I have suggested, w ith specific qualifications, that the existence o f a mental, 
m ultiple variable, valuation system, involving non-linearities o f which a decision 
maker is unconscious, is a philosophically suspect basis for well-founded decision 
making.
However, it is possible that this is not so, or that a decision maker or analyst, who 
in other respects believe the techniques described here may be useful to  them, 
does not believe it to  be so. Therefore, to  test the implication o f making this form of 
false assumption, I consider here situations in which the hidden value function is 
non-linear in the attribute measures and the decision maker expresses preferences 
between choices on the basis o f this function. However, the analyst models the 
situation as linear in the attributes.
The emphasis here is not on the speed o f convergence and reduction efficiency but 
on the degree to  which one can be misled. Before starting this analysis, I sought to 
predetermine an analysis mechanism from the several that were available. I sought 
to  test correct elim ination by Dora-D, distinguishing this from the effectiveness o f 
any tie-breaking mechanism. I therefore decided to examine the effectiveness on 
tw o bases:
(a) The generation o f a short-list o f efficient options by successively feeding- 
back Larichev choices (and then [1,1] Franklin choices if and when 
Larichev "sticks") into Dora-D passes until no further reduction is possible. 
Then allowing the fictional decision maker to pick the best from the short­
list that remains.
(b) Proceeding as in (a) until Dora-D secures no further reduction and then 
applying a tie-break procedure.
The tie-break procedure chosen, in prospect, was to find the "linear" value function 
which maximised the minimum value o f the remaining options and to use this to 
determine the optimum. This overlooked that, w hilst this particular tie-breaker can 
be a useful elim inator where several options remain, it cannot distinguish between 
options on an efficient facet (ie options for which there exists a CAF such that the
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CRV o f the options is simultaneously 1). On the first appearance o f this situation, a 
supplementary criterion was adopted. This was to take the average o f the 
normalised "linear" CAFs for the remaining potential "optima" and to select the 
option which was maximised w ith that function. In practice all remaining options 
after the Larichev/ Franklin reductions were o f this "on facet" type.
In Simulation 11 hidden true value was defined to  be additive and:
- linear w ith the square o f Variable 1 o f the data set for positive values- 
zero otherwise.
- linear w ith the Variable 2 to the power 1.5 for positive values- zero 
otherwise.
- linear w ith Variable 3.
- linear w ith Variable 4 to the power o f 2/3 for positive values- zero 
otherwise.
- linear w ith the square root o f Variable 1 o f the data set for positive 
values- zero otherwise.
Thus the fictitious "analyst" continued to assume the linear Dora-D model w ith the 
standard test data, but the "decision maker's" preference declarations were 
determined by applying the above hidden non-linear value function to the same 
data. The follow ing results were obtained:
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Table 9.18- Simulation 11: Effect of linear mls-specification
of non-linear additive model


























1 1 19 1 1 19 1 19 1
2 2 12 1 12 1 12 1
50 0.727 2
3 1 25 1 1 25 1 25 1
4 2 17 1 1 17 1 17 1
43 0.690 4
5 2 16 1 1 16 1 16 1
31 0.834 2
6 1 33 1 1 33 1 33 1
7 1 39 0.971 3 39 0.971 39 .971
8 2 1 0.946 2 45 1 45 1
45 1 1
9 1 27 1 1 27 1 27 1




1.5 0.947 1.5 0.997 0.971
In nine o f the ten test cases the normal Dora-D reductions included the true 
optimum w ithin the final set. In the other case the third ranked option had a true 
value close to that o f the optimum. In one case the tie-break failed to  find the best 
option available selecting the third ranked option (out o f 50) although this had a 
materially lower NTV. In no case was a preference expressed w ithin the linear 
model which led to infeasibility.
In further tests it was established that in the ten data sets there were only 8 options 
out o f the 134 options that were initia lly efficient w ithin the non-linear model, that 
were not also efficient w ithin the linear one. Thus the optimum is rarely excluded 
from the set for reduction, and, where this does occur, the likelihood is that there is 
a good solution w ithin the set that is considered. Also, because decision makers
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need not necessarily resort to  an automatic tie-breaker but can continue w ith other 
forms o f elicitation, the risk o f practically misleading conclusions seems small.
9.6.12 Simulation 12. The effect of model mis-specification from making false linear 
assumptions. Underlying multiplicative model. Retained constraints.
In this simulation it is assumed that the decision maker now determines his 
preferences according to  an underlying m ultiplicative model, but that in other 
respects the simulation is similar to  Simulation 11. Specifically, the fictitious 
"decision maker" values options in proportion to the geometric means o f the 
attribute, subject to  the minimum value o f any attribute being taken as being 0.5, if 
its actual value is less than this.
In this set there were several instances o f the simulated decision maker's rankings 
generating sets o f inconsistent constraints. Where this occurred, all existing 
constraints used in previous passes were retained. W ithin the set o f new constraints 
relating to the last stated rankings o f preferences, the procedure adopted was to 
accept the binaiy preferences between adjacent higher ranking choices before the 
lower ranking ones. The last constraint which then resulted in infeasibility was 
permanently excluded and the remaining constraints allowed unless these too 
"caused" infeasibility. No attempt was made to  find the most plausible violating 
constraint or to  replace the constraint w ith others (eg to reflect preferences between 
"non-adjacent" choices). It is not suggested that this is the best procedure and 
another is used in Simulation 13.
It is only necessary to run one LP w ithin the pass to establish LP infeasibility and 
adjustment is a quick process w ith the criteria mentioned.
The results obtained are shown in Table 9.19.
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Table 9.19- Simulation 12: Effect of linear
mis-specification of multiplicative model


























1 1 47 .802 2 47 .802 2 .802
2 2 5 .636 13 12 .885 12 .885
12 .885 2
3 1 24 .949 2 24 .949 24 .949
4 2 11 .661 12 43 1 43 1
43 1 1
5 1 16 .882 6 16 .882 16 .882
6 1 30 1 1 30 1 30 1
7 2 19 1 1 19 1 29 .921
29 .921 2
8 2 13 1 1 13 1 13 1
45 .995 2
9 1 27 .826 6 27 .826 27 .826




1.5 0.891 3.6 0.934 0.907
The results obtained were visibly inferior to those obtained for the additive non­
linear true model. In tw o cases the selected option was outside the "actual" top 5 in 
both the selection from short-list and automatic tie-break methods. The tie-break 
selected the inferior o f the available options in 2 out o f the 5 cases when more than 
one option remained.
9.6.13 Simulation 13. The effect of model mis-specification from making false linear
assumptions. Underlying multiplicative model. Successive constraint elimination.
In this set we consider identical preference valuation assumptions to  those 
considered above but the evaluation procedure is different. A  short justification o f 
this approach is appropriate.
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Where there is a true linear relationship, the inclusion o f value lim iting constraints 
for dominated options could be redundant, but does no harm. However, if  the true 
value relationship is non-linear, retention o f such constraints, used to identify now 
excluded options, may serve to restrict the ability o f Dora-D to find the best linear 
approximation w ith respect to the remaining candidates.
By the same token, whilst retention o f previous linear constraints has use in a linear 
model, perhaps improving the precision o f the value function, they can be a 
handicap in a non-linear situation where non-linear preferences can give rise to 
apparent inconsistencies if  the models "expectation" is o f linear valuation. Moreover, 
much o f the information contained in prior constraints is already reflected in the 
options retained or rejected; if constraints have resulted in reduction they have 
largely "done their w ork".
Accordingly in the simulation procedure investigated here the Larichev system is 
applied as before. But each time a reduction is secured the previously declared 
preference constraints are discarded. Moreover, the Comparison Set is reduced to 
the potential optima. That is, no constraint is imposed requiring the valuation o f 
already eliminated options to have a value o f less than 1.
Prior constraints are retained only:
(a) When no reduction is secured on a pass, and
(b) When there is no infeasibility
Thus, where Larichev fails to reduce, Franklin is followed, retaining prior preference 
constraints. If a further reduction is achieved Larichev is reinstated. Tie-breaks are 
determined by the magnitude o f the CRVs for the uneliminated options, subject to 
already eliminated options not being permitted to  inhibit respective valuations.
In one case the introduction o f a single set o f constraints reflecting a Franklin ranking 
was incompatible w ith a linear model resulting in infeasibility. In this case the 
Simulation 12 approach was used to  eliminate one o f the constraints.
The results obtained are shown in Table 9.20.
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Table 9.20- Simulation 13: Effect o f linear mis-speciflcatlon 
o f m ultiplicative model. Successive constraint elim ination.























1 1 47 .802 2 47 .802 2 .802
2 1 12 .885 2 12 .885 12 .885
3 2 14 1 1 14 1 14 1
24 .949 2
4 1 43 1 1 43 1 43 1
5 2 26 .944 3 31 .995 26 .944
31 .995 2
6 1 30 1 1 30 1 30 1
7 2 19 1 1 19 1 29 .921
29 .921 2
8 2 13 1 1 13 1 13 1
45 .995 2
9 1 49 1 1 49 1 49 1




1.5 0.949 1.6 0.968 0.935
These results are superior to  those obtained in Simulation 12. No option inferior to 
rank 3 was shortlisted and, whilst the optimum was excluded in 3 cases, in no case 
was the rank o f the best option in the shortlist below 2. Where the shortlist was 
extended relative to Simulation 12, it was to include a superior option and, where it 
was reduced, it was to exclude an inferior one. The best shortlisted option for each 
case was the same as, or superior to, that available in Simulation 12 and the 
automatic tie-break produced the same, or a superior, decision in each case.
The automatic tie-break selected the inferior available choice in 3 out o f the 5 cases 
when its use was invoked.
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9.6.14 Simulation 14. Configural Dora-D: simultaneous optimisation.
In this set o f simulations the perspective is changed. It is assumed that a configural 
possibility is accepted and that the Configural Dora-D model, discussed in Chapter 
7, is assumed. However the hidden value function o f the "decision maker" is the 
multiplicative model used in simulation 13, not the modified Minkowski metric that 
is assumed in the analysis routine. What's Best was used in non-linear mode to  find 
the modified Minkowski power parameter modifying the linear variables, 
simultaneously w ith finding the BPL weights. This set o f simulations tests the extent 
to which the true optimum can be identified.
The 5x50data_2810 data was used. However, positive values are necessary to  use 
the model and it is assumed that the 0.5 minimum attribute valuation which 
underlay the decision maker's hidden model previously, is recognised by the 
analyst, and the analysis routine, in this simulation set.
The preference indicating mechanic used is the Larichev/Franklin decomposition 
methodology. Criterion (a) which was the main test criterion, is used again here. An 
automatic tie-break method is used and this is, arbitrarily, as per Criterion (b) o f the 
previous simulations. However it should be noted that, in this model, the "CRV" 
statistic does not have a comparable, or clearly interpretable, meaning. In practice it 
would be preferable to  continue reduction using other approaches. Prior constraints 
were retained only:
(a) When no reduction had been secured on their introduction, and
(b) When there was no infeasibility
(c) In the terminal stages o f analysis, prior to  tie-break, when prior 
constraints were reintroduced (back to the last Larichev)
As previously, where a single set o f Larichev or Franklin preferences produced 
infeasibility, individual constraints were eliminated preferring the elim ination o f 
preferences for lower ranking choices to higher ranking ones. Once an option 
returned a CRV o f less than one, it was eliminated and permanently excluded from 
the Comparison Set.
As the Minkowski parameter tends to zero, all CRVs tend to  one. To prevent this 
unhelpful condition the parameter was restricted to a lower bound o f 0.2. During
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the analysis o f Data Set 2 it became apparent that the model in conjunction w ith  the 
What's Best software was not well-behaved in a variety o f ways.
Behaviour was improved by the following:
- Setting the starting modified Minkowski parameter at 1.5.
- Placing an upper bound on this parameter o f 3.
- Lim iting maximum CRV to 2.
- Placing a lower bound on every weight o f 0.001.
- Placing a lower bound on the magnitude o f the most preferred attribute
after its Minkowski transformation, o f 0.001.
Whilst this assisted, there were further instances o f failure to find a CRV greater than 
1 when it was known one existed. Accordingly there may have been false 
eliminations.
The results obtained are shown in Table 9.21.
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Table 9.21- Simulation 14: Effect of simultaneous configural
optimisation with multiplicative valuation.























1 2 16 1 1 16 1 16 1
39 .704 4
2 3 12 .885 2 22 1 12 .885
22 1 1
23 .718 8
3 1 33 .908 4 33 .908 33 .908
4 2 11 .661 12 43 1 43 1
43 1 1
5 1 31 .995 2 31 .995 31 .995
6 3 30 1 1 30 1 30 1
36 .809 4
37 .826 3
7 1 29 .921 2 29 .921 29 .921
8 3 1 .991 3 45 .995 45 .995
30 .577 22
45 .995 2
9 1 49 1 1 49 1 49 1
10 1 7 1 1 7 1 7 1
Av. Ten 
Sets
1.8 0.911 3.4 0.982 0.970
The performance o f this implementation o f the configural model, albeit applied to a 
structurally different configural situation, is inferior to  that obtained on the 
assumption that valuation is linear using the constraint elim ination approach.
The method is complicated, computationally slow, unreliable and unnecessary. It 
has no advantages relative to the Conservative Fixed Parameter formulation 
considered in Simulation 15.
9.6.15 Simulation 15. Configural Dora-D: Conservative Fixed Parameter formulation.
The methodology for Simulation 14 was predicated on the im plicit assumption that 
there was an upper and lower bound o f the modified Minkowski parameter, for
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which a potentially optimal option remained potentially optimal. The assumption is 
a false one. As has been discussed in Chapter 7, follow ing that simulation, it was 
established that, whilst for most options (but not all) there may be an upper bound 
on the parameter for an option to remain efficient, an option which is efficient for a 
particular M odified Minkowski parameter is efficient for all smaller parameters. In 
other words, if  an option is efficient under certain configural conditions, it w ill 
remain optimal under less disjunctive (or more conjunctive) configurations. The 
implication is that those options which are not efficient for the realistic minimum o f 
the parameter w ill not be efficient at higher levels. A  conservative shortlist o f 
potentially optimal options can thus be established using the lowest reasonable 
M odified Minkowski parameter. No genuine additional potential optima are to  be 
found by allowing the parameter to float.
Reduction can be achieved using preference indicating mechanics just as w ith the 
linear model, though mechanics involving FDC are likely to  be more reliable as the 
meaning o f the transformed attribute variables may otherwise distort elicitation.
Accordingly in this simulation the same Franklin/Larichev approach was again 
adopted. The same methodology was used for introducing constraints. However, in 
this instance the Modified Minkowski parameter was fixed at 0.2.
The results obtained are as shown in Table 9.22.
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Table 9.22- Simulation 15: Effect of Conservative Fixed Parameter configural 
optimisation with multiplicative valuation.























1 1 16 1 1 16 1 16 1
2 1 22 1 1 22 1 22 1
3 2 10 .757 8 24 .949 24 .949
24 .949 2
4 1 43 1 1 43 1 43 1
5 2 1 .898 5 31 .995 31 .995
31 .995 2
6 2 30 1 1 30 1 30 1
36 .809 4
7 3 19 1 1 19 1 29 .921
22 .862 3
29 .921 2
8 2 1 .991 3 13 1 1 .991
13 1 1
9 2 29 .912 4 49 1 49 1
49 1 1





1.9 0.943 2.5 0.994 0.966
Although, in principle, though sometimes not in practice, the Larichev cycles o f the 
analysis should have produced identical results to previously, the Franklin cycles 
need not. This is because the CRVs found would be calculated on different 
principles, w ith no promise that they would give identical rankings.
Generally, the results obtained by this approach were superior to those o f the 
previous method, particularly in its ability to  retain the first or second rank solutions 
in the potentially optimal set prior to tie-break. It is doubtful that the differences 
would be statistically significant or material in decision making terms. The superior 
validity o f this method rests on a more methodological foundation. More interesting
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is the relative performance o f this model to  that o f ignoring configurality altogether 
and assuming a linear model. There is a superficial advantage in the Configural 
model but it is by no means marked and one would have to perform many more 
simulations to form a view o f its statistical significance.
In tw o out o f ten o f these, the true optimum was not w ithin the reduced set before 
tie-break. In neither case did the best o f the options left, lie outside the range o f 
realistic value discrimination, but the optima's exclusion is nevertheless curious. This 
modest failure seems at variance w ith the apparent success, already discussed, o f 
the Modified Minkowski metric in approximating (in strategic equivalence terms, 
w ith some precision) a bi-variable cross product term. A  fuller investigation into the 
performance o f the approximation would be instructive.
Philosophic, rather than the measured performance considerations illustrated in 
these simulations, govern appropriate treatment for real problems. If there is no 
reason to  suppose configural valuation, the adoption o f a pure linear model is 
reasonable until it is counter-indicated (perhaps by the expression o f preferences 
which are inconsistent w ith linear behaviour but would be possible w ithin a 
conjunctive model). Equally, if configurality is suspected, the general configural 
model m ight be assumed reverting to the linear model on grounds o f parsimony, if 
this is equally consistent w ith all declared preferences at the conclusion. If 
configurality is explicit it should be modelled in structure and parameterisation to  
reflect the decision maker's declared intent as closely as possible.
If a specific configural structure is suspected, the use o f the generalised configural 
model would not be the best approach. If, for example, specific interaction terms 
can be identified, it may be more appropriate to  use the Supplementary Variables or 
M ultiple Parallel Models methodologies. Both these call for specific prior 
suggestions regarding the form o f configurality. These methods have not yet been 
tested for relative superiority. But one can assert that if  the value model does not 
mis-specify the structure o f the decision maker's valuations, then the optimum 
cannot be excluded before a tie-break stage. This, o f course, also applies if the ’Teal" 
model is Minkowski.
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9.6.16 Simulation 16. Configural Dora-D: Relationship of number of efficient options to 
configurality.
In this set o f analyses, the number o f efficient options occurring for different levels o f 
the M odified Minkowski parameter in the General Configural Model, is tested. The 
data used was as employed in Simulations 12-15. Parameters o f 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 
and 2 were tested. The test embraced Initial Option Reduction only, ie it excluded 
preference constraints.
The results obtained are summarised in Table 9.23 and Figure 9.18.
The simulations confirmed my prior observation that all efficient options for higher 
parameters are w ithin the set o f options for lower parameters; for example the 8 
efficient options for data set 2, parameter 2.0 are included w ithin the 14 efficient 
options for parameter 0.2.




0.2 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Data Set 1 11 10 10 10 10
2 14 12 10 8 8
3 15 14 13 13 8
4 14 12 11 10 7
5 16 14 13 11 10
6 15 14 10 8 7
7 14 14 13 10 9
8 13 11 10 9 7
9 17 15 14 9 8
10 19 18 13 12 11
Average 14.8 13.4 11.7 10.0 8.5
Figure 9.18- Relationship of no. of efficient options 
to configurality
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The results illustrate remarkable insensitivity. There is a power of ten diference in 
impact between a parameter of 0.2 and 2.0; they are quite extreme paameters. 
Thus, a relative contribution to value of 0.8 with a configurality of 0.2, becomes a 
relative contribution of 0.1 at configurality of 2.0. Yet this reduces efficient options 
by an average of 6.3- rather less than 50%
Taking an information view, Initial Option Reduction provides approxinately 1.8 bits 
of the 5.6 necessary to resolve the optimum but configurality contributes a 
maximum of 0.8, even for this extreme range.
9.6.17 Simulation 17. Testing Frontier Probing
In this set of analyses, I consider the portfolio extension. I examine theability of 
Portfolio Dora-D to find an Efficient Peer of a Reference Portfolio, by fincing and 
inserting explicit frontier constraints when implicit constraints are violated. This 
procedure was outlined in Chapter 6.
The analyses are again based on the data set 5x50data_2810. In this imtance each 
of the 50 rows is considered to be a sub-option or potential portfolio component. 
Attributes 2 to 5 are considered to be additive and independent attribites and 
correspond directly to variables 2-5 in the data sets. Variable 1 of the portfolio 
component variables is used to generate a single interdependent portfolio level and 
portfolio descriptive attribute. This attribute is defined as follows:
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Where f ph = proportion o f potential portfolio 
component h in portfolio p 
bh = parameter governing dependence o f 
Portfolio attribute Bh on component h.
(9.5)
In the simulations bh was assumed to be the square o f each element o f variable 1 o f
each data set. Thus Bp may be thought o f as representing the standard deviation o f
an unknown random variable associated w ith the portfolio, where the absolute 
value o f bh is the standard deviation o f mutually independent random variables for
the components. This variable was assumed to be negatively related to value, whilst 
all other variables were assumed to be positively related.
Only Initial Stage Reduction was considered (ie no value constraining preferences 
were introduced). Up to  40 Virtual Frontier Constraints were made specific in each 
simulation, introducing 1 constraint per cycle in the manner described in Chapter 6, 
based on finding the most violating portfolio. The MCA o f each such portfolio was 
found but recorded only for every fourth cycle. The analyses here were based on 
Reference Portfolios, which for each data set were defined as being the first 25 
potential components in equal proportions. The nominal MCA for the Reference 
Portfolio was also calculated. The reader should note that this statistic is always 
overestimated (and the nominal MCA divided by the MCA o f the most violating 
portfolio always underestimates the statistic), until the MCA for the most violating 
portfolio is close to 1.
For numerical reasons, I imposed that the MCA o f any portfolio and the contribution 
to MCA o f Attributes 2 to  4 should be less than or equal to 10 at every stage.
Experiments were also conducted using Data Set 1 in which, respectively, 5 and 50 
equal components test portfolios were used, instead o f the 25 standard. The results 
obtained are not tabulated here.
The results obtained for the 25 component reference portfolios are illustrated in 
Table 9.24. In all ten cases, there was suitable convergence on a Peer Portfolio, w ith
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adequate solutions (violation o f less than 5%) generally being obtained in under 16 
cycles. Very nearly optimum solutions (violations o f less than 0.05%) were typically 
obtained in under 24 cycles, by when the MCA o f the Reference Portfolio was 
invariably accurately defined. Although not observable in this data, cycle by cycle 
results, when these were individually recorded, confirm that the measured violation 
o f the most violating portfolio, did not invariably diminish on each cycle, although 
converging towards 1. For this number o f attributes and potential components, an 
adequate Peer o f the Reference Portfolio was typically developed after the 
identification and insertion o f 16 violating constraints, and a good estimate o f the 
MCA o f the Reference after the insertion of 20
It w ill be seen that the number o f components in each Efficient Peer Portfolio varied. 
W hilst sometimes single component portfolios were generated, ail efficient Peers 
had less elements than the Reference Portfolio, w ith this data and portfolio attribute 
definition.
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Table 9.24- Illustrating convergence of MCA for last violating option and valuation o f reference portfolio.
























Cycle 4 3.47 1.058 4.51 1.280 7.95 2.80 5.60 1.54 3.19 1.12 2.93 0.978 1.88 0.989 9.22 4.55 2.09 0.791 3.17 0.919 4.40 1.6025
8 1.64 0.531 1.48 0.722 1.15 0.561 1.39 0.808 1.76 0.772 1.17 0.553 1.65 0.778 1.31 0.677 1.17 0.566 1.054 0.567 1.3774 0.6535
12 1.071 0.440 1.089 0.568 1.028 0.537 1.044 0.616 1.17 0.656 1.005 0.512 1.017 0.722 1.013 0.581 1.065 0.520 1 0.557 1.0502 0.5709
16 1.019 0.428 1.026 0.546 1.007 0.531 1.015 0.605 1.037 0.636 1 0.511 1.003 0.720 1.003 0.577 1.019 0.504 1.0129 0.5615
20 1.009 0.425 1.005 0.538 1.004 0.529 1.006 0.604 1.006 0.631 1.001 0.719 1.001 0.576 1.010 0.503 1.0042 0.5593
24 1.002 0.424 1.002 0.538 1.001 0.529 1.002 0.603 1.002 0.628 1.000 0.718 1.001 0.576 1.003 0.502 1.0013 0.5586
28 1.002 0.424 1 0.538 1.000 0.529 1.001 0.602 1.002 0.628 1.000 0.718 1.000 0.576 1.001 0.502 1.00061 0.5585
32 1.000 0.424 1.000 0.529 1.000 0.602 1.001 0.627 1.000 0.576 1.001 0.502 1.0002 0.5584
36 1.000 0.424 0.602 1.000 0.627 1.000 0.501 1 0.5583
40 1.000 0.501 1 0.5583
Components in Efficient 
Peer Portfolio 8 1 i 7 ti I t3 ( 7 1
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9.7 Summary and Conclusions
A ll the preference elicitation mechanics investigated for the linear Basic Model 
performed satisfactorily, in terms o f achieving reliable convergence towards a single 
true optimum, or an adequate short-list containing it, at reasonable speed. 
Calculated MCAs progressively migrated to  a straight line when plotted against true 
value, im plying a progressive development o f correct linear orders. Except w ith 
tautological elicitation (eg "How do you rank the remaining tw o options"), one could 
not necessarily reduce beyond "on a facet" options, but it appears that one can 
usually reduce to at least this extent.
Generally the expected cognitive reliability o f a method would appear a more 
critical issue for choosing between mechanics than its technical efficiency w ithin the 
Dora-D framework. Unsurprisingly, focused comparisons appeared markedly 
superior to  random ones. The procedure for slotting an option into an existing 
ranking seemed somewhat less efficient, per equivalent preference, than generating 
a pair o f focused and then re-computing, but the concept is far more efficient per 
computational pass. There seemed to be a very small gain from looking for the most 
over-valued efficient option, compared w ith seeking the most over-valued option. 
However, again the argument should not be resolved by technical efficiency 
considerations. It seems sensible to  concentrate one's scrutiny on options that could 
be optimal, rather than to  determine optim ality on the basis o f definitely non- 
optimal choices. It also means examining a smaller set.
It is clear that the simple ranking o f attribute weights constitutes a potent mechanic. 
This is recommended for early use, whenever practicable.
The simulations here demonstrate the performance and information gain that can be 
achieved by capping, but the efficacy o f the method is dependent entirely on the 
competence o f decision maker (or possibly his or her confidence in the particular 
situation) to make the necessary judgements. The expressed terms o f the Capping 
simulations do not fully stylise real situations. In the simulation a "true weight" and 
optimum exist and it is a question o f the degree to which a corresponding optimum 
is revealed by an upper lim it. In real elicitation a "true lim it" is revealed by a capping 
statement, devoid o f a "Capping Level" label (it is not an estimate o f the lim it o f 
error o f a mean estimate expressed w ith a particular degree o f confidence) and the
364
issue is how good this is at revealing optima, compared w ith eliciting "true weights" 
by other means. The simulations confirms that reduction-useful information is 
provided by such statements. I suspect the rest is personal.
It is clear that, o f the decomposition mechanics explored, Supplemented Larichev 
(simulation set 9) is superior to [1,1] Franklin ab initio, and this is recommended o f 
these tw o approaches. It is also clear that Supplemented Larichev is superior to  the 
two, roughly comparable, "whole efficient option" mechanics explored in the 
simulation sets 5 and 6 on a per pass basis. On an equivalent binary preference 
basis over the lim ited intermediate range where they overlap, 9 and 6 appear o f 
roughly comparable power. However, these are not being compared on a strict like 
for like basis. Were Larichev vectors to be compared as binary preferences (rather 
than ordered w ithin a group), w ith a reselection o f vectors made after each 
comparison (as in simulation 6), an improvement in per equivalent binary 
preference o f Larichev should be expected. (It is proposed to  examine this in 
follow-up work). In any event, the psychological reliability o f [1,1] comparisons over 
[m,n] puts the issue o f overall superiority o f Larichev to "whole efficient option" 
comparisons, beyond doubt.
Established non-optimal options retained in the Comparison Set are redundant in a 
strictly linear model. However, the simulations suggest that if  non-linearities exist, 
or if  a model is misspecified, their inclusion can contribute to distorting results. 
Accordingly if  there is any question that this may be the situation, options should be 
removed from the Comparison Set once they are established as non-optimal. This is 
anyway justifiable on the grounds o f "independence from irrelevant alternatives" 
alone. It also seems that it is helpful to remove preference constraints once they 
have served their purpose in elim inating one or more options, in the same type o f 
situations. W ith these precautions, and assuming there is no cavalier disregard o f 
suspected major non-linearities, a linear mis-specification o f a non-linear model may 
not necessarily be damaging and a "good" non-optimal option may be suggested 
even if  the optimum is missed.
In cases o f configurality o f non-specific or unknown form, the Modified Minkowski 
Model is useful. The Conservative Fixed Parameter approach to finding the optimum 
w ithin Dora-D is recommended. This guarantees (if genuinely o f Minkowski form) 
the inclusion o f the optimum in the efficient set follow ing Initial Option Reduction.
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The expression o f Larichev preferences, which can, and should, still be presented to 
the decision maker in un-transformed form, w ill then secure reduction to a set, 
which again, is guaranteed to include the optimum. If the parameter is too 
conservative, more potential optima than necessary may remain. Accordingly, if  no 
other reduction is possible, further elimination may be achieved by increasing the 
Minkowski parameter.
The insensitivity o f the Modified Minkowski Model to  parameter variations suggests 
that if the extent o f configurality is unknown, but thought to  be modest, it may do 
no great harm to ignore it all together. This would particularly commend itse lf if 
disjunctive circumstances apply.
The Frontier Probing technique works effectively and computationally manageably in 
finding efficient peers, MCAs, and CAFs for test portfolios.
It is believed that the Information measure, based on equal likelihood o f efficient 
options used in these analyses, is conservative. If a reliable relationship between the 
MCA(AP) and probability o f being optimum can be found, as seems possible, early 




Others m ight have been tempted to entitle the ultimate Chapter, "Conclusions". 1 
can make no such definite claims. Rather, I feel like a painter who has sketched out 
an outline w ith some parts o f his work being supported by drawings, parts o f the 
canvas having crude outlines and some parts still empty. In all areas, refinement is 
necessary.
I am also conscious that I have worked vulnerably at the interfaces o f many areas 
where I have lacked specific training and long experience. I have not pretended to 
emulate the depth o f knowledge and understanding o f those working in the 
mainstreams o f those areas. I have borrowed bits o f Empirical Psychology, 
Evolutionary Psychology, Decision Theory, Data Envelopment Analysis,
Mathematics, Mathematical Programming, Statistics, Modem Portfolio Theory etc. In 
using them I have abstracted their simplest and most accessible ideas. Yet in doing 
so, I think I have generated potentially important insights, and have remained true 
to the Operational Research tradition: or at least to  the traditions o f its founding 
fathers.
To me, the tw o most potentially potent ideas that come from Data Envelopment 
Analysis are the concepts o f inductive analysis using "Best Possible Light", and the 
closely related notion o f normalising weights or parameters o f descriptive function, 
not by their sums, but by their aggregate contributions. Both these lie at the core o f 
Dora-D and I hope that I have illustrated their use in a wide-ranging collection o f 
problem structures. It may be that other areas o f OR analysis could exploit them, as 
they seem, notwithstanding their simplicity, to  be powerful concepts. It seems a 
pity that DEA seems to have de-emphasised the BPL aspect by relegating the 
multiplier form to secondary status, preferring to give prominence to the 
envelopment form, which now, though not originally, is usually designated the 
Primal. I am not aware o f anyone else reflecting that the "upper bounding" used in 
DEA, and here w ith Dora-D, is a form o f weight normalisation but this seems to be 
what it does; and far more revealingly than delim iting weights by ensuring that they 
add to one, to which no interpretative meaning can be attached. This parallel is 
illustrated w ithin the thesis by formulating and solving MOLPs, w ithout using
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traditional weight normalisation, w ithin the Dora-D framework. This is successful at 
least to  the extent o f providing an interactive search framework to find the preferred 
efficient solution.
Originally, it had seemed to me that man (more specifically, I) was not adept at 
handling objectives, except w ithin a concept o f Vagueness, which 1 have attempted 
to describe. It was not, as March suggests, only preferences that we would seem to 
construct, but Objectives as well. The Dora-D structure accommodates this concept 
well. It allows the use o f a flexible range o f latitude reducing and preference 
indicating mechanics, including delim iting methods such as Capping Weights 
(which I still consider a cognitively reliable concept), using various forms o f 
decomposed preference, and even directly comparing real options o f one form or 
another (which I would not now commend as a reliable elicitation method).
The quest for a less arbitraiy basis for cognitive assumptions led, not only to 
consideration o f empirical psychological findings and views, but the use o f EP as a 
standardising criterion, or touchstone. My position was that, however powerful the 
human mind's facility for tackling difficult unbounded problems and identifying 
issues o f importance, it is not capable (or, we should not assume that most are 
capable) o f doing many o f those things that we m ight think it should, in order to 
prime the models that the modem analyst builds to  assist modem economic man. 
This went beyond my suspicion o f Objectives. Man seems an efficient identifier o f 
factors, but in analysis was a Comparator not a Calculator. Notwithstanding apparent 
holistic skills, he is not adept at precise detailed multidimensional comparison. His 
values are labile and, just as w ith sensory phenomena, he can only discriminate 
value cues w ith low  "resolution", I suggested. I developed m inimalist assumptions 
and have attempted to illustrate that powerful conclusions can be reached 
notwithstanding, and that that this can be done w ithin the Dora-D framework. I 
believe some o f these assumptions could be useful to other modellers. Cognitive 
lim itations, perhaps, have been underplayed by other methodology designers, 
though I except from this Larichev and his collaborators. Even if  I have not made 
my case, the minimalist perspective is safer, and conclusions that can nevertheless 
be drawn w ithin its context are, by any standard, more powerful.
The notion o f decomposition o f decision problems is well understood by decision 
analysts, psychologists and thinking managers, even if  it is sometimes left im plicit;
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though a more specific recognition o f this process, aided, perhaps, by the 
classification I have suggested, m ight aid analysts in simplifying the resolution o f 
some problems. The heuristic I have suggested for partitioning preferences o f higher 
order to choices o f lower order could be viewed as trivial, it is no more than the 
application o f the principle o f preferential independence, but its systematic 
application in what I have called Franklin Decomposition may be a practically useful 
modem development o f Franklin's 250 year old suggestion. Franklin was not phased 
by [3,2] comparisons but Larichev pointed out the better psychological reliability o f 
[1,1] comparisons. I have perceived such choices, what I have called Fundamentally 
Decomposed Preference, as the most basic preference building blocks and believe 
more general use can be made o f the idea. I have illustrated how such choices can 
be generated in a manner which ensures that they are potent indicators, and then 
used w ithin Dora-D to shrink valuation latitude; in some modes, w ithout risking 
formulation infeasibility. However, I see no reason why the same concept cannot be 
employed w ithin other solution methods.
I have speculated that designers o f decision analysis techniques, sometimes, 
im plicitly, may have approached value discovery as if  the decision maker is a 
complicated inanimate black box, like many other systems that the OR discipline 
examines. We may ask him about certain things but, somehow, we do not expect 
him to  know about the structure o f his own values. Accordingly, the implication is 
that we must discover these in the same types o f way as we m ight analyse an 
inanimate production system. 1 suggest that other analysts may find the notions o f 
Conscious Process and Qualified Self Awareness, which I discuss, useful: specifically 
that, whilst some things may be elicited, it is not constructive, and may be 
misleading, to seek beyond a decision maker's informed and conscious statements. I 
have suggested that the fine structure and form o f valuation falls into this class. 
Unless a decision maker asserts at least the possibility of, say, a particular non-linear 
or interactive structure, it is not merely unwise or unnecessary to delve for 
unconscious structure, but, perhaps, impertinent too. It smacks o f accessing the 
opinions o f a homunculus super-sovereign, w ithin the mind o f the decision maker, 
o f whom he or she is unaware but to whom he or she is subordinate, and who talks 
only to the analyst.
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The implication o f this view is that we can be far simpler; matters o f value should 
generally be transformable readily into linear relationships on the basis o f 
straightforward expressions o f intent by the decision maker. (However, the reader 
w ill recall that I cautioned that this is distinct from knowledge o f the fine structure o f 
pertinent physical relationships outw ith the mind, about which even a well-informed 
decision maker may be ignorant). In any case, the evidence is that judges however 
introspectively sophisticated they seek to be, tend to  be inferior to simple linear 
models o f their behaviour. If it is true o f a well trod judgement situation it should be 
even more true o f a typical decision one. Thus whilst cognitive lim itations may 
sometimes make life more difficult, this aspect o f cognitive imprecision, which 
recognises a fruitless journey for what it is, makes it easier.
Similarly, "low resolution" o f multidimensional value balance, can simplify the 
analysts task practically. I suggest that it is important to discriminate between the 
undiscemed and the indistinguishable. This is not, I believe, an issue o f getting a 
better microscope. A t a certain point on a delineated scale, which is coarse relative 
to the precision o f the scales measuring the attributes contributing to it, our 
conscious sovereign decision maker is not able to  te ll in a sense which is 
independent o f expression. A  distinction does not exist. Though we cannot describe 
this as indifference in its classical sense, pragmatically it may be appropriate to treat 
it as such. The analyst may exploit this, but pursues the illusion o f refinement at his 
or her peril. The attempt to use this property to generate archetypical options in the 
infinite option portfolio model, proved too demanding for a realistic condensation 
to a manageable number o f "don't bother to look outside this list" options.
However, the use o f a coarser resolution, proved the principle o f the method 
adopted and it would certainly be useful if  one wished to provide a "material short­
list" from a large but finite number o f discrete efficient solutions, in a problem w ith 
the Basic Dora-D structure.
I gave the issue o f Configurality some attention, as an interesting case in which a 
decision maker may make a conscious assertion concerning interaction between 
attributes. I commended the use o f what I called the General Configural Model. This 
had tw o interesting properties. It could first be used to enabled transformation into 
a linear function which, whilst not being "proportional" to  value, was strategically 
equivalent to such a scale. (It is actually quite difficult to  explain what one means by
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a "scale o f linear value" when non-specific configurality is involved). Additionally, it 
has the interesting property that all options which are efficient for a particular 
configurality, are efficient for all less disjunctive (or more conjunctive) configurality. 
This is a powerful conclusion, allowing a conservative view  to  be taken, whilst still 
working simply w ithin the confines o f the approach developed, and is perhaps 
exploitable elsewhere.
In my Portfolio Analysis case, I took a far more complex view  o f Return than is 
typical w ithin established Portfolio Theoiy, whilst taking a simpler view  o f the 
stochastic aspects o f risk. This was done w ith my Decision Maker's eyes open, 
because o f data availability and manageability. It seems that residual variance tends 
to  affects the proportions o f an investment w ithin a portfolio, but not generally 
whether the investment is above or below an inclusion threshold. The precise 
proportions are not very value sensitive, so I was not distressed by my crudity on 
this issue, given that I had incorporated Beta, by generating portfolios o f imposed 
standard Beta. The ability to  treat the potential components o f return m ulti- 
dimensionally, seemed much more critical, feeling as I have suggested, that this 
fundamental issue is begged w ithin MPT. (Once I have a reliable vector measure o f 
Expected Returns, I w ill not need to worry too much about the issues o f turning that 
information into portfolios, even w ith over-simplification o f uncertainty). But we are 
in any event talking about an analytic framework, not my view  o f analytic treatment 
o f a particular problem at one moment. The full panoply o f MPT risk could, if  an 
investment analyst wished it, be incorporated in a Dora-D portfolio model and 
analysed w ith the Frontier Probing algorithm.
10.2 Potentially publishable material 
The basic method has already been published. The follow ing lists concepts, ideas 
and issues covered in this thesis, which I suggest could be suitable for publication, 
or developed for publication.
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1 Extension o f Basic Dora-D to infinite option problems and Frontier Probing
2 Application o f Dora-D to Financial Portfolio construction
3 Application o f Dora-D to Research Portfolio construction: including use o f 
the Reference Complements.
4 The General Configural Model, and the relationship o f the membership o f 
efficient option sets to conjunctive and disjunctive intensity. Working w ith 
linear decision models.
5 Formulating and evaluating MOLP structured problems using BPL 
principles
6 Shortlisting options by archetyping.
7 Choice as a Value Statement. Generating an optimum from a Holistic 
selection.
8 Revisiting Franklin. Classifying choice complexity and decomposing options 
into lower order choices. Specification o f a modem algorithm based on 
Comparative Preference.
9 Generating potent Fundamentally Decomposed Choices for Dora-D and 
MOLP problem solving.
10 Normative Rationality for a Comparator. An operational criterion based on 
assumptions o f m inimalist and non-cardinal cognition assumptions.
11 Decision Making and Value concepts from an EP perspective. Generating 
m inimalist mental facility assumptions.
10.3 Issues for further research
I have already indicated that I believe BPL-weight normalisation by contribution has 
more to offer and I have discussed some possibilities. Other areas that I have not 
touched upon is the feasibility o f using the idea in the solution o f Interval (Single) 
Objective Function problems and I believe a method akin to  Frontier Probing could 
achieve this. I speculate whether it m ight also be used in a manner akin to some 
forms o f Statistical procedure, such as Principle Components Analysis.
I believe that it m ight be possible to integrate the Dora-D methodology, w ith 
methods which express degree o f preference in semantic expressions.
I feel confident that it would be relatively straightforward to modify Dora-D 
formulations to exploit "proximity" as a way to generating an option ranking, in 
similar style to, for example, Rivett (1977); albeit using a technique o f very different 
character. It would be useful to pursue this. This could involve ordering o f 
confidence o f statements o f closeness and would probably require an interval 
minimisation optimisation. O f additional interest, is the exploitable reliability o f 
statements o f the form "A is close in value to B" compared w ith "I prefer A  to B". A
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combination approach should not be ruied-out. Indeed the tie-breaker suggestions 
made for the Basic Method m ight be construed as constituting this type o f process.
There appears to be some relationship between the magnitude o f the MCA(AP) o f 
an efficient option and the likelihood o f its optim ality. It would be useful to  research 
this further. This would enable a more sophisticated Information model than the 
present assumption based on prior equal likelihood.
Further empirical simulations to test the discriminatory efficacy o f binary preference 
between [1,1] Larichev vectors, compared w ith the power o f binary preference 
between [m,n] "efficient whole options", could be undertaken.
The statistical inter-relationships between assumptions o f lack o f discrimination o f 
value expressed in information terms and the uncertainty o f weights, and measures 
o f composite value derived from multidimensional attributes, could also usefully be 
addressed. This m ight enable a firmer suggestion regarding appropriate thresholds 
o f effective indifference, particularly if  associated w ith the work suggested in the 
follow ing paragraph. In the related area, further work could be done on methods for 
developing option archetypes.
I had felt constrained to make assumptions about some issues that, at least in 
principle, could be subjected to empirical testing. Could one design a method to 
properly measure the lability o f value, and the ability or otherwise o f a decision 
maker to  discriminate multi-dimensional value, in a way that would enable numbers 
to be put on it, as M iller originally suggested for sensory inputs? A special feature 
that distinguishes recognition o f composite value from the type phenomena 
considered by M iller, is the very fine discriminatory power that exists for single 
attributes because o f their "no brain" character, which disappears as soon as one 
expands the process to tw o variables.
Even more untested is the "meaningfulness" o f m ultiple objectives as useable 
intuitive cardinal concepts guiding action. With Objectives a central thread o f much 
practical strategy formation (or is it promulgation?), this would seem an empirical 
research area o f much potential importance.
Whilst I have not majored in this thesis on consideration o f the impact o f probability 
on decisions, I have suggested that Comparator-man should not be adept at
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cardinal probability. Work has been done on "encoding o f frequency1' but, though 
recognising that my knowledge o f the specialist literature is lim ited, I am not aware 
o f work which comments on the distinction between comparative likelihood and 
cardinal assessment and, given that the former can be confused w ith the latter, 
seeks to distinguish whether it is comparative frequency rather than a cardinal 
estimate that is actually encoded. This too would be topic on which empirical 
psychologists could assist decision analysts.
Finally, I would like experienced Evolutionary Psychologists to pursue some o f the 
ideas relating to  functional decision-related mental skills, which I have attempted to 
outline in this thesis, but that they seem not yet to  have addressed.
3 7 4
Appendix A
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Dr Joseph Priestly on Moral or Prudential Algebra
TO DR. PRIESTLEY.
LONDON, 19 September, 1772.
DEAR SIR :— In the affair of so much importance to you, wherein you ask my advice, I cannot, 
for want of sufficient premises, advise you what to determine; but, if you please, I will tell you 
how. When these difficult cases occur, they are difficult, chiefly because, while we have them 
under consideration, all the reasons pro  and con are not present to the mind at the same time; but 
sometimes one set present themselves, and at other times another, the first being out of sight.
Hence the various purposes or inclinations that alternately prevail, and the uncertainty that 
perplexes us.
To get over this, my way is, to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two columns; writing over 
the one pro, and over the other con; then during three or four days’ consideration, I put down under 
the different heads short hints of the different motives, that at different times occur to me, fo r  or 
against the measure. When I have thus got them all together in one view, I endeavour to estimate 
their respective weights; and, where I find two (one on each side) that seem equal, I strike them 
both out. If I find a reason pro  equal to some two reasons con, I strike out the three. If I judge some 
two reasons con, equal to some three reasons pro, I strike out the five; and thus proceeding I find at 
length where the balance lies; and if, after a day or two of farther consideration, nothing new that is 
of importance occurs on either side, I come to a determination accordingly. And though the weight 
of reasons cannot be taken with the precision of algebraic quantities, yet, when each is thus 
considered separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, 
and am less likely to make a rash step; and in fact I have found great advantage from this kind of 
equation, in what may be called m oral or prudential algebra.
Wishing sincerely that you may determine for the best, I am ever, my dear friend, yours most 
affectionately, B. FRANKLIN.
From The complete works o f  Benjamin Franklin (Bigelow, J) 1887 Putnam: New York 4 522-524.
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